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Support OAEP decryption with modulus above 4096 #418
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Which type of keys are you asking about?
PKCS#8 and SPKI are capped to 4096-bits, following recommendations from the X.509 ecosystem. Since these keys are potentially attacker-controlled they're a potential DoS vector if too large. See #166. |
Sorry, I'm in fact referring to PKCS#8 keys in this particular case. Again, as I said I'm well aware of the implication, that's why I was asking specifically for an opt-in solution, something you'd have to explicitly enable. Can this be done? |
You can parse the PKCS#8 key yourself using the Adding a dedicated feature for this would be rather tricky and seems generally questionable. Can I ask what use case you have for extremely large PKCS#8 keys? |
In this case it's for keys provided by third parties and we cannot change it. Regardless the problem does not occur when initializing the let key = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_encrypted_pem(my_pem, my_password)?;
let decrypted = key.decrypt(my_oaep_padding_instance, my_encrypted_payload)?; // this errors out with ModulusTooLarge In particular the error seems to come from This last one then calls if public_key.n().bits() > max_size {
return Err(Error::ModulusTooLarge);
} Additionally, the max_size value comes from The idea would be to have some sort of override for this functionality, so that we can use whatever we want as a max size, or even an exact expected size. |
Okay, I agree that's an edge case in OAEP decryption which should be allowed since it's a private key and not a potentially untrusted public key |
Any updates on this? Are you able to give me an ETA, or point me in a direction to propose a PR? |
You can open a PR which removes this restriction, yes |
Riffing off of #210 I wanted to ask if it's possible to add some feature flag or some other opt-in solution to support keys with modulus size bigger than 4096.
I understand the concerns for algorithmic denial of service, but I think having an escape hatch for when you actually want to use this key size for various reasons would be useful, and in fact it's necessary for a particular need I have 😅
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