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[DWC3] New USB Controller isn't supported by the Linux kernel #2

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Sonicadvance1 opened this issue Nov 12, 2019 · 1 comment
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help wanted Extra attention is needed High Priority

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@Sonicadvance1
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The 8cx and SQ1 use a new USB controller that is still based off the dwc3 but is unsupported by the upstream kernel.
Until someone manages to get this working then the device is dead in the water since all external connections come from USB on the Surface Pro X.

It is still a Synopsys Designware USB 3.0 dual-role USB controller.
Shwos up as QCOM0497 on ACPI on the Surface Pro X.

@Sonicadvance1 Sonicadvance1 added help wanted Extra attention is needed High Priority labels Nov 12, 2019
@Sonicadvance1
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With PR #6, the left two USB ports work but the USB ports from the Surface Connect port still do not.
Will open a new issue for the surface connect port

Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 6, 2021
Like other tunneling interfaces, the bareudp doesn't need TXLOCK.
So, It is good to set the NETIF_F_LLTX flag to improve performance and
to avoid lockdep's false-positive warning.

Test commands:
    ip netns add A
    ip netns add B
    ip link add veth0 netns A type veth peer name veth1 netns B
    ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
    ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth0
    ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
    ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1

    for i in {2..1}
    do
            let A=$i-1
            ip netns exec A ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec A ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.$i.1/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec A ip r a 10.0.$i.2 encap ip src 10.0.$A.1 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.2 via 10.0.$i.2 dev bareudp$i

            ip netns exec B ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec B ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.$i.2/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec B ip r a 10.0.$i.1 encap ip src 10.0.$A.2 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.1 via 10.0.$i.1 dev bareudp$i
    done
    ip netns exec A ping 10.0.2.2

Splat looks like:
[   96.992803][  T822] ============================================
[   96.993954][  T822] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   96.995102][  T822] 5.10.0+ torvalds#819 Not tainted
[   96.995927][  T822] --------------------------------------------
[   96.997091][  T822] ping/822 is trying to acquire lock:
[   96.998083][  T822] ffff88810f753898 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   96.999813][  T822]
[   96.999813][  T822] but task is already holding lock:
[   97.001192][  T822] ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.002908][  T822]
[   97.002908][  T822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   97.004401][  T822]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   97.004401][  T822]
[   97.005784][  T822]        CPU0
[   97.006407][  T822]        ----
[   97.007010][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.007779][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.008550][  T822]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.010057][  T822]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   97.010057][  T822]
[   97.011594][  T822] 7 locks held by ping/822:
[   97.012426][  T822]  #0: ffff888109a144f0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x12f7/0x2b00
[   97.014191][  T822]  #1: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.016045][  T822]  #2: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.017897][  T822]  #3: ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.019684][  T822]  #4: ffffffffbce2f600 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: bareudp_xmit+0x31b/0x3690 [bareudp]
[   97.021573][  T822]  #5: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.023424][  T822]  #6: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.025259][  T822]
[   97.025259][  T822] stack backtrace:
[   97.026349][  T822] CPU: 3 PID: 822 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0+ torvalds#819
[   97.027609][  T822] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   97.029407][  T822] Call Trace:
[   97.030015][  T822]  dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
[   97.030783][  T822]  __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x149/0x3a9
[   97.031773][  T822]  ? stack_trace_save+0x81/0xa0
[   97.032661][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.033673][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.034679][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
[   97.035697][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[   97.036690][  T822]  lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x730
[   97.037515][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.038466][  T822]  ? check_flags+0x50/0x50
[   97.039277][  T822]  ? netif_skb_features+0x296/0x9c0
[   97.040226][  T822]  ? validate_xmit_skb+0x29/0xb10
[   97.041151][  T822]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[   97.041977][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.042927][  T822]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.043852][  T822]  ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x290/0x290
[   97.044824][  T822]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120
[   97.045712][  T822]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12c/0x3e0
[   97.046824][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.047771][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.048710][  T822]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x41/0x120
[   97.049626][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.050556][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.051509][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.052443][  T822]  ? check_chain_key+0x244/0x5f0
[   97.053352][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x56/0xa0
[   97.054317][  T822]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[   97.055263][  T822]  ? pneigh_lookup+0x410/0x410
[   97.056135][  T822]  ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[ ... ]

Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Fixes: 571912c ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201228152136.24215-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
ASD and TA share the same firmware in SIENNA_CICHLID and only TA
firmware is requested during boot, so only need release TA firmware when
remove device.

[   83.877150] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x1269f97e6ed04095: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   83.888076] CPU: 0 PID: 1312 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W  OE     5.9.0-rc5-deli-amd-vangogh-0.0.6.6-114-gdd99d5669a96-dirty #2
[   83.901160] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/TUF Z370-PLUS GAMING II, BIOS 0411 09/21/2018
[   83.912353] RIP: 0010:free_fw_priv+0xc/0x120
[   83.917531] Code: e8 99 cd b0 ff b8 a1 ff ff ff eb 9f 4c 89 f7 e8 8a cd b0 ff b8 f4 ff ff ff eb 90 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 <4c> 8b 67 18 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 45 94 41 00 b8 ff ff ff ff f0 0f
[   83.937576] RSP: 0018:ffffbc34c13a3ce0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[   83.943699] RAX: ffffffffbb681850 RBX: ffffa047f117eb60 RCX: 0000000080800055
[   83.951879] RDX: ffffbc34c1d5f000 RSI: 0000000080800055 RDI: 1269f97e6ed04095
[   83.959955] RBP: ffffbc34c13a3cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[   83.968107] R10: ffffbc34c13a3cc8 R11: 00000000ffffff00 R12: ffffa047d6b23378
[   83.976166] R13: ffffa047d6b23338 R14: ffffa047d6b240c8 R15: 0000000000000000
[   83.984295] FS:  00007f74f6712540(0000) GS:ffffa047fbe00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   83.993323] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   84.000056] CR2: 0000556a1cca4e18 CR3: 000000021faa8004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[   84.008128] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   84.016155] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   84.024174] Call Trace:
[   84.027514]  release_firmware.part.11+0x4b/0x70
[   84.033017]  release_firmware+0x13/0x20
[   84.037803]  psp_sw_fini+0x77/0xb0 [amdgpu]
[   84.042857]  amdgpu_device_fini+0x38c/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[   84.048815]  amdgpu_driver_unload_kms+0x43/0x70 [amdgpu]
[   84.055055]  drm_dev_unregister+0x73/0xb0 [drm]
[   84.060499]  drm_dev_unplug+0x28/0x30 [drm]
[   84.065598]  amdgpu_dev_uninit+0x1b/0x40 [amdgpu]
[   84.071223]  amdgpu_pci_remove+0x4e/0x70 [amdgpu]
[   84.076835]  pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xc0
[   84.081609]  device_release_driver_internal+0xfb/0x1c0
[   84.087558]  driver_detach+0x4d/0xa0
[   84.092041]  bus_remove_driver+0x5f/0xe0
[   84.096854]  driver_unregister+0x2f/0x50
[   84.101594]  pci_unregister_driver+0x22/0xa0
[   84.106806]  amdgpu_exit+0x15/0x2b [amdgpu]

Signed-off-by: Dennis Li <Dennis.Li@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
nexthop: Various fixes

This series contains various fixes for the nexthop code. The bugs were
uncovered during the development of resilient nexthop groups.

Patches #1-#2 fix the error path of nexthop_create_group(). I was not
able to trigger these bugs with current code, but it is possible with
the upcoming resilient nexthop groups code which adds a user
controllable memory allocation further in the function.

Patch #3 fixes wrong validation of netlink attributes.

Patch #4 fixes wrong invocation of mausezahn in a selftest.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107144824.1135691-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
We had kernel panic, it is caused by unload module and last
close confirmation.

call trace:
[1196029.743127]  free_sess+0x15/0x50 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743128]  rtrs_clt_close+0x4c/0x70 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743129]  ? rnbd_clt_unmap_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743130]  close_rtrs+0x25/0x50 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743131]  rnbd_client_exit+0x93/0xb99 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743132]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x190/0x260

And in the crashdump confirmation kworker is also running.
PID: 6943   TASK: ffff9e2ac8098000  CPU: 4   COMMAND: "kworker/4:2"
 #0 [ffffb206cf337c30] __schedule at ffffffff9f93f891
 #1 [ffffb206cf337cc8] schedule at ffffffff9f93fe98
 #2 [ffffb206cf337cd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9f943938
 #3 [ffffb206cf337d50] wait_for_completion at ffffffff9f9410a7
 #4 [ffffb206cf337da0] __flush_work at ffffffff9f08ce0e
 #5 [ffffb206cf337e20] rtrs_clt_close_conns at ffffffffc0d5f668 [rtrs_client]
 #6 [ffffb206cf337e48] rtrs_clt_close at ffffffffc0d5f801 [rtrs_client]
 #7 [ffffb206cf337e68] close_rtrs at ffffffffc0d26255 [rnbd_client]
 #8 [ffffb206cf337e78] free_sess at ffffffffc0d262ad [rnbd_client]
 #9 [ffffb206cf337e88] rnbd_clt_put_dev at ffffffffc0d266a7 [rnbd_client]

The problem is both code path try to close same session, which lead to
panic.

To fix it, just skip the sess if the refcount already drop to 0.

Fixes: f7a7a5c ("block/rnbd: client: main functionality")
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()->tipc_node_xmit()->tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028 ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108071337.3598-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: core: Thermal control fixes

This series includes two fixes for thermal control in mlxsw.

Patch #1 validates that the alarm temperature threshold read from a
transceiver is above the warning temperature threshold. If not, the
current thresholds are maintained. It was observed that some transceiver
might be unreliable and sometimes report a too low alarm temperature
threshold which would result in thermal shutdown of the system.

Patch #2 increases the temperature threshold above which thermal
shutdown is triggered for the ASIC thermal zone. It is currently too low
and might result in thermal shutdown under perfectly fine operational
conditions.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108145210.1229820-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep
splat:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.10.0-rc6+ torvalds#217 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  mount/779 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
	 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130
	 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100
	 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40
	 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0
	 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0
	 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750
	 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120
	 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0
	 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170
	 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726
	 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
	 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x433/0xc10
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
	 start_transaction+0x444/0x700
	 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320
	 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40
	 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10
	 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370
	 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0
	 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
	 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726
	 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
	 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x433/0xc10
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-root-00);
				 lock(sb_internal#2);
				 lock(btrfs-root-00);
    lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  2 locks held by mount/779:
   #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380
   #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ torvalds#217
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0
   check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0
   ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260
   __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10
   lock_acquire+0x116/0x370
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
   ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0
   ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100
   btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726
   btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
   legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
   vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
   btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
   ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320
   legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
   ? capable+0x3a/0x60
   path_mount+0x433/0xc10
   __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup
the balance_ctl.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
In Linux, if a driver does disable_irq() and later does enable_irq()
on its interrupt, I believe it's expecting these properties:
* If an interrupt was pending when the driver disabled then it will
  still be pending after the driver re-enables.
* If an edge-triggered interrupt comes in while an interrupt is
  disabled it should assert when the interrupt is re-enabled.

If you think that the above sounds a lot like the disable_irq() and
enable_irq() are supposed to be masking/unmasking the interrupt
instead of disabling/enabling it then you've made an astute
observation.  Specifically when talking about interrupts, "mask"
usually means to stop posting interrupts but keep tracking them and
"disable" means to fully shut off interrupt detection.  It's
unfortunate that this is so confusing, but presumably this is all the
way it is for historical reasons.

Perhaps more confusing than the above is that, even though clients of
IRQs themselves don't have a way to request mask/unmask
vs. disable/enable calls, IRQ chips themselves can implement both.
...and yet more confusing is that if an IRQ chip implements
disable/enable then they will be called when a client driver calls
disable_irq() / enable_irq().

It does feel like some of the above could be cleared up.  However,
without any other core interrupt changes it should be clear that when
an IRQ chip gets a request to "disable" an IRQ that it has to treat it
like a mask of that IRQ.

In any case, after that long interlude you can see that the "unmask
and clear" can break things.  Maulik tried to fix it so that we no
longer did "unmask and clear" in commit 71266d9 ("pinctrl: qcom:
Move clearing pending IRQ to .irq_request_resources callback"), but it
only handled the PDC case and it had problems (it caused
sc7180-trogdor devices to fail to suspend).  Let's fix.

>From my understanding the source of the phantom interrupt in the
were these two things:
1. One that could have been introduced in msm_gpio_irq_set_type()
   (only for the non-PDC case).
2. Edges could have been detected when a GPIO was muxed away.

Fixing case #1 is easy.  We can just add a clear in
msm_gpio_irq_set_type().

Fixing case #2 is harder.  Let's use a concrete example.  In
sc7180-trogdor.dtsi we configure the uart3 to have two pinctrl states,
sleep and default, and mux between the two during runtime PM and
system suspend (see geni_se_resources_{on,off}() for more
details). The difference between the sleep and default state is that
the RX pin is muxed to a GPIO during sleep and muxed to the UART
otherwise.

As per Qualcomm, when we mux the pin over to the UART function the PDC
(or the non-PDC interrupt detection logic) is still watching it /
latching edges.  These edges don't cause interrupts because the
current code masks the interrupt unless we're entering suspend.
However, as soon as we enter suspend we unmask the interrupt and it's
counted as a wakeup.

Let's deal with the problem like this:
* When we mux away, we'll mask our interrupt.  This isn't necessary in
  the above case since the client already masked us, but it's a good
  idea in general.
* When we mux back will clear any interrupts and unmask.

Fixes: 4b7618f ("pinctrl: qcom: Add irq_enable callback for msm gpio")
Fixes: 71266d9 ("pinctrl: qcom: Move clearing pending IRQ to .irq_request_resources callback")
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maulik Shah <mkshah@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Maulik Shah <mkshah@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114191601.v7.4.I7cf3019783720feb57b958c95c2b684940264cd1@changeid
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.11, take #2

- Don't allow tagged pointers to point to memslots
- Filter out ARMv8.1+ PMU events on v8.0 hardware
- Hide PMU registers from userspace when no PMU is configured
- More PMU cleanups
- Don't try to handle broken PSCI firmware
- More sys_reg() to reg_to_encoding() conversions
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 31, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Various fixes

Patch #1 fixes wrong invocation of mausezahn in a couple of selftests.
The tests started failing after Fedora updated their libnet package from
version 1.1.6 to 1.2.1. With the fix the tests pass regardless of libnet
version.

Patch #2 fixes an issue in the mirroring to CPU code that results in
policer configuration being overwritten.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210128144820.3280295-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 29, 2021
Commit f5ce815 ("scsi: target: tcmu: Support DATA_BLOCK_SIZE = N *
PAGE_SIZE") introduced xas_next() calls to iterate xarray elements.  These
calls triggered the WARNING "suspicious RCU usage" at tcmu device set up
[1]. In the call stack of xas_next(), xas_load() was called.  According to
its comment, this function requires "the xa_lock or the RCU lock".

To avoid the warning:

 - Guard the small loop calling xas_next() in tcmu_get_empty_block with RCU
   lock.

 - In the large loop in tcmu_copy_data using RCU lock would possibly
   disable preemtion for a long time (copy multi MBs). Therefore replace
   XA_STATE, xas_set and xas_next with a single xa_load.

[1]

[ 1899.867091] =============================
[ 1899.871199] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 1899.875310] 5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#41 Not tainted
[ 1899.879222] -----------------------------
[ 1899.883299] include/linux/xarray.h:1182 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[ 1899.890940] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1899.899082] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[ 1899.905719] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/1368:
[ 1899.910161]  #0: ffffa1f8c8b98738 ((wq_completion)target_submission){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ee/0x580
[ 1899.920732]  #1: ffffbd7040cd7e78 ((work_completion)(&q->sq.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ee/0x580
[ 1899.931146]  #2: ffffa1f8d1c99768 (&udev->cmdr_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: tcmu_queue_cmd+0xea/0x160 [target_core_user]
[ 1899.941678] stack backtrace:
[ 1899.946093] CPU: 0 PID: 1368 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#41
[ 1899.953070] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME Z270-A, BIOS 1302 03/15/2018
[ 1899.962459] Workqueue: target_submission target_queued_submit_work [target_core_mod]
[ 1899.970337] Call Trace:
[ 1899.972839]  dump_stack+0x6d/0x89
[ 1899.976222]  xas_descend+0x10e/0x120
[ 1899.979875]  xas_load+0x39/0x50
[ 1899.983077]  tcmu_get_empty_blocks+0x115/0x1c0 [target_core_user]
[ 1899.989318]  queue_cmd_ring+0x1da/0x630 [target_core_user]
[ 1899.994897]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1899.999695]  ? trace_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 1900.003501]  ? __kmalloc+0x205/0x380
[ 1900.007167]  tcmu_queue_cmd+0x12f/0x160 [target_core_user]
[ 1900.012746]  __target_execute_cmd+0x23/0xa0 [target_core_mod]
[ 1900.018589]  transport_generic_new_cmd+0x1f3/0x370 [target_core_mod]
[ 1900.025046]  transport_handle_cdb_direct+0x34/0x50 [target_core_mod]
[ 1900.031517]  target_queued_submit_work+0x43/0xe0 [target_core_mod]
[ 1900.037837]  process_one_work+0x268/0x580
[ 1900.041952]  ? process_one_work+0x580/0x580
[ 1900.046195]  worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0
[ 1900.049921]  ? process_one_work+0x580/0x580
[ 1900.054192]  kthread+0x143/0x160
[ 1900.057499]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
[ 1900.062661]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210519135440.26773-1-bostroesser@gmail.com
Fixes: f5ce815 ("scsi: target: tcmu: Support DATA_BLOCK_SIZE = N * PAGE_SIZE")
Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Bodo Stroesser <bostroesser@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Sonicadvance1 pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 29, 2021
Function skb_ext_add() doesn't initialize created skb extension with any
value and leaves it up to the user. However, since extension of type
TC_SKB_EXT originally contained only single value tc_skb_ext->chain its
users used to just assign the chain value without setting whole extension
memory to zero first. This assumption changed when TC_SKB_EXT extension was
extended with additional fields but not all users were updated to
initialize the new fields which leads to use of uninitialized memory
afterwards. UBSAN log:

[  778.299821] UBSAN: invalid-load in net/openvswitch/flow.c:899:28
[  778.301495] load of value 107 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[  778.303215] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[  778.304933] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  778.307901] Call Trace:
[  778.308680]  <IRQ>
[  778.309358]  dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[  778.310307]  ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
[  778.311167]  __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x43/0x48
[  778.312454]  ? memset+0x20/0x40
[  778.313230]  ovs_flow_key_extract.cold+0xf/0x14 [openvswitch]
[  778.314532]  ovs_vport_receive+0x19e/0x2e0 [openvswitch]
[  778.315749]  ? ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid+0x330/0x330 [openvswitch]
[  778.317188]  ? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x20/0x20
[  778.318220]  ? arch_stack_walk+0x82/0xf0
[  778.319153]  ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
[  778.320399]  ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0
[  778.321362]  ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160
[  778.322517]  ? lock_release+0x52e/0x760
[  778.323444]  netdev_frame_hook+0x323/0x610 [openvswitch]
[  778.324668]  ? ovs_netdev_get_vport+0xe0/0xe0 [openvswitch]
[  778.325950]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x771/0x2db0
[  778.327067]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6f0
[  778.328021]  ? lock_acquire+0x565/0x720
[  778.328940]  ? generic_xdp_tx+0x4f0/0x4f0
[  778.329902]  ? inet_gro_receive+0x2a7/0x10a0
[  778.330914]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[  778.331867]  ? udp4_gro_receive+0x4c4/0x13e0
[  778.332876]  ? lock_release+0x52e/0x760
[  778.333808]  ? dev_gro_receive+0xcc8/0x2380
[  778.334810]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[  778.335769]  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x295/0x820
[  778.336955]  ? process_backlog+0x780/0x780
[  778.337941]  ? mlx5e_rep_tc_netdevice_event_unregister+0x20/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[  778.339613]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0xa7/0xc0
[  778.341033]  ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[  778.342072]  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f5/0xcb0
[  778.343288]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[  778.344234]  ? mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq+0x9e0/0x9e0 [mlx5_core]
[  778.345676]  ? mlx5e_xmit_xdp_frame_mpwqe+0x14d0/0x14d0 [mlx5_core]
[  778.347140]  ? __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x820/0x820
[  778.348351]  ? mlx5e_post_rx_mpwqes+0xa6/0x25d0 [mlx5_core]
[  778.349688]  ? napi_gro_flush+0x26c/0x3c0
[  778.350641]  napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6b0
[  778.351627]  mlx5e_napi_poll+0x373/0x1b80 [mlx5_core]
[  778.352853]  __napi_poll+0x9f/0x510
[  778.353704]  ? mlx5_flow_namespace_set_mode+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]
[  778.355158]  net_rx_action+0x34c/0xa40
[  778.356060]  ? napi_threaded_poll+0x3d0/0x3d0
[  778.357083]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x190
[  778.358041]  ? __common_interrupt+0x8e/0x1a0
[  778.359045]  __do_softirq+0x1ce/0x984
[  778.359938]  __irq_exit_rcu+0x137/0x1d0
[  778.360865]  irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x20
[  778.361708]  common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0
[  778.362640]  </IRQ>
[  778.363212]  asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[  778.364204] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
[  778.365273] Code: 4f ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 50 3f 40 fe e9 dc fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 43 3f 40 fe eb 90 cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 74 05 62 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 64 05 62 00 f4 c3 cc cc 0f 1f 44 00
[  778.369355] RSP: 0018:ffffffff84407e48 EFLAGS: 00000246
[  778.370570] RAX: ffff88842de46a80 RBX: ffffffff84425840 RCX: ffffffff83418468
[  778.372143] RDX: 000000000026f1da RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8343af5e
[  778.373722] RBP: fffffbfff0884b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88842de46bcb
[  778.375292] R10: ffffed1085bc8d79 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[  778.376860] R13: ffffffff851124a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
[  778.378491]  ? rcu_eqs_enter.constprop.0+0xb8/0xe0
[  778.379606]  ? default_idle_call+0x5e/0xe0
[  778.380578]  default_idle+0xa/0x10
[  778.381406]  default_idle_call+0x96/0xe0
[  778.382350]  do_idle+0x3d4/0x550
[  778.383153]  ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40
[  778.384143]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[  778.385078]  start_kernel+0x3c7/0x3e5
[  778.385978]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb

Fix the issue by providing new function tc_skb_ext_alloc() that allocates
tc skb extension and initializes its memory to 0 before returning it to the
caller. Change all existing users to use new API instead of calling
skb_ext_add() directly.

Fixes: 038ebb1 ("net/sched: act_ct: fix miss set mru for ovs after defrag in act_ct")
Fixes: d29334c ("net/sched: act_api: fix miss set post_ct for ovs after do conntrack in act_ct")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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