btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio

Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is
happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU
runner device:

   ==================================================================
   BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780
   Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219

   CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ torvalds#15
   Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020
   Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs]
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0
    ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
    print_report+0x174/0x505
    ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
    ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410
    ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
    kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0
    ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
    ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60
    lock_release+0x708/0x780
    ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
    ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
    ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
    _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60
    __wake_up+0x44/0x60
    btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs]
    btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs]
    ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780
    ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0
    ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
    ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460
    ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0
    ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460
    process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460
    ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
    ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240
    worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0
    ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
    kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0
    ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
    ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
    ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
    </TASK>

   Allocated by task 3661:
    kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
    kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
    __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
    btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs]
    send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs]
    process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs]
    changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs]
    btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs]
    _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs]
    btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs]
    __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0
    do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

   Freed by task 3661:
    kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
    kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
    kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
    __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70
    kfree+0x143/0x490
    btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs]
    send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs]
    process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs]
    changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs]
    btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs]
    _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs]
    btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs]
    __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0
    do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

   The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00
    which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96
   The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
    freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60)

   The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
   page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83
   flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
   page_type: f5(slab)
   raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004
   raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
   page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

   Memory state around the buggy address:
    ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
   >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
                               ^
    ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ==================================================================

Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that
the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on
the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler.

Commit 4ff47df ("btrfs: move priv off stack in
btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct
btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack.

Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when
analyzing the vmcore after a crash:

*(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = {
	.wait = (wait_queue_head_t){
		.lock = (spinlock_t){
			.rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){
				.raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){
					.val = (atomic_t){
						.counter = (int)-2005885696,
					},
					.locked = (u8)0,
					.pending = (u8)157,
					.locked_pending = (u16)40192,
					.tail = (u16)34928,
				},
				.magic = (unsigned int)536325682,
				.owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29,
				.owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0,
				.dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){
					.key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c,
					.class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 },
					.name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "",
					.wait_type_outer = (u8)37,
					.wait_type_inner = (u8)178,
					.lock_type = (u8)154,
				},
			},
			.__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 },
			.dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){
				.key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c,
				.class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 },
				.name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "",
				.wait_type_outer = (u8)37,
				.wait_type_inner = (u8)178,
				.lock_type = (u8)154,
			},
		},
		.head = (struct list_head){
			.next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca,
			.prev = (struct list_head *)0x47,
		},
	},
	.pending = (atomic_t){
		.counter = (int)-1491499288,
	},
	.status = (blk_status_t)130,
}

Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the
large negative atomic values of ->pending or
->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic
0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus
pointer values for ->wait->head.

To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the
corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on
x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic
operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already
decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not
completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread
continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the
atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and
continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the
test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a
use-after-free.

Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com>
Fixes: 1881fba ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>

fs/btrfs/inode.c

@@ -9089,7 +9089,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(struct btrfs_bio *bbio)
 		 */
 		WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status);
 	}
-	if (atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending) == 0) {
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) {
 		int err = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status));
 
 		if (priv->uring_ctx) {