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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been...

Moderate severity Unreviewed Published Oct 21, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Oct 25, 2024

Package

No package listedSuggest a package

Affected versions

Unknown

Patched versions

Unknown

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/vt-d: Fix potential lockup if qi_submit_sync called with 0 count

If qi_submit_sync() is invoked with 0 invalidation descriptors (for
instance, for DMA draining purposes), we can run into a bug where a
submitting thread fails to detect the completion of invalidation_wait.
Subsequently, this led to a soft lockup. Currently, there is no impact
by this bug on the existing users because no callers are submitting
invalidations with 0 descriptors. This fix will enable future users
(such as DMA drain) calling qi_submit_sync() with 0 count.

Suppose thread T1 invokes qi_submit_sync() with non-zero descriptors, while
concurrently, thread T2 calls qi_submit_sync() with zero descriptors. Both
threads then enter a while loop, waiting for their respective descriptors
to complete. T1 detects its completion (i.e., T1's invalidation_wait status
changes to QI_DONE by HW) and proceeds to call reclaim_free_desc() to
reclaim all descriptors, potentially including adjacent ones of other
threads that are also marked as QI_DONE.

During this time, while T2 is waiting to acquire the qi->q_lock, the IOMMU
hardware may complete the invalidation for T2, setting its status to
QI_DONE. However, if T1's execution of reclaim_free_desc() frees T2's
invalidation_wait descriptor and changes its status to QI_FREE, T2 will
not observe the QI_DONE status for its invalidation_wait and will
indefinitely remain stuck.

This soft lockup does not occur when only non-zero descriptors are
submitted.In such cases, invalidation descriptors are interspersed among
wait descriptors with the status QI_IN_USE, acting as barriers. These
barriers prevent the reclaim code from mistakenly freeing descriptors
belonging to other submitters.

Considered the following example timeline:
T1 T2

ID1
WD1
while(WD1!=QI_DONE)
unlock
			lock
WD1=QI_DONE*		WD2
			while(WD2!=QI_DONE)
			unlock
lock
WD1==QI_DONE?
ID1=QI_DONE		WD2=DONE*
reclaim()
ID1=FREE
WD1=FREE
WD2=FREE
unlock
			soft lockup! T2 never sees QI_DONE in WD2

Where:
ID = invalidation descriptor
WD = wait descriptor

  • Written by hardware

The root of the problem is that the descriptor status QI_DONE flag is used
for two conflicting purposes:

  1. signal a descriptor is ready for reclaim (to be freed)
  2. signal by the hardware that a wait descriptor is complete

The solution (in this patch) is state separation by using QI_FREE flag
for #1.

Once a thread's invalidation descriptors are complete, their status would
be set to QI_FREE. The reclaim_free_desc() function would then only
free descriptors marked as QI_FREE instead of those marked as
QI_DONE. This change ensures that T2 (from the previous example) will
correctly observe the completion of its invalidation_wait (marked as
QI_DONE).

References

Published by the National Vulnerability Database Oct 21, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Oct 21, 2024
Last updated Oct 25, 2024

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

0.043%
(11th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2024-49993

GHSA ID

GHSA-cjwf-5vh9-w48g

Source code

No known source code

Dependabot alerts are not supported on this advisory because it does not have a package from a supported ecosystem with an affected and fixed version.

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