Merge branch 'uaccess-work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/…

…linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull iov_iter hardening from Al Viro:
 "This is the iov_iter/uaccess/hardening pile.

  For one thing, it trims the inline part of copy_to_user/copy_from_user
  to the minimum that *does* need to be inlined - object size checks,
  basically. For another, it sanitizes the checks for iov_iter
  primitives. There are 4 groups of checks: access_ok(), might_fault(),
  object size and KASAN.

   - access_ok() had been verified by whoever had set the iov_iter up.
     However, that has happened in a function far away, so proving that
     there's no path to actual copying bypassing those checks is hard
     and proving that iov_iter has not been buggered in the meanwhile is
     also not pleasant. So we want those redone in actual
     copyin/copyout.

   - might_fault() is better off consolidated - we know whether it needs
     to be checked as soon as we enter iov_iter primitive and observe
     the iov_iter flavour. No need to wait until the copyin/copyout. The
     call chains are short enough to make sure we won't miss anything -
     in fact, it's more robust that way, since there are cases where we
     do e.g. forced fault-in before getting to copyin/copyout. It's not
     quite what we need to check (in particular, combination of
     iovec-backed and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) is almost certainly a bug, not a
     cause to skip checks), but that's for later series. For now let's
     keep might_fault().

   - KASAN checks belong in copyin/copyout - at the same level where
     other iov_iter flavours would've hit them in memcpy().

   - object size checks should apply to *all* iov_iter flavours, not
     just iovec-backed ones.

  There are two groups of primitives - one gets the kernel object
  described as pointer + size (copy_to_iter(), etc.) while another gets
  it as page + offset + size (copy_page_to_iter(), etc.)

  For the first group the checks are best done where we actually have a
  chance to find the object size. In other words, those belong in inline
  wrappers in uio.h, before calling into iov_iter.c. Same kind as we
  have for inlined part of copy_to_user().

  For the second group there is no object to look at - offset in page is
  just a number, it bears no type information. So we do them in the
  common helper called by iov_iter.c primitives of that kind. All it
  currently does is checking that we are not trying to access outside of
  the compound page; eventually we might want to add some sanity checks
  on the page involved.

  So the things we need in copyin/copyout part of iov_iter.c do not
  quite match anything in uaccess.h (we want no zeroing, we *do* want
  access_ok() and KASAN and we want no might_fault() or object size
  checks done on that level). OTOH, these needs are simple enough to
  provide a couple of helpers (static in iov_iter.c) doing just what we
  need..."

* 'uaccess-work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  iov_iter: saner checks on copyin/copyout
  iov_iter: sanity checks for copy to/from page primitives
  iov_iter/hardening: move object size checks to inlined part
  copy_{to,from}_user(): consolidate object size checks
  copy_{from,to}_user(): move kasan checks and might_fault() out-of-line

include/linux/thread_info.h

@@ -113,6 +113,33 @@ static inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */
 
+extern void __compiletime_error("copy source size is too small")
+__bad_copy_from(void);
+extern void __compiletime_error("copy destination size is too small")
+__bad_copy_to(void);
+
+static inline void copy_overflow(int size, unsigned long count)
+{
+	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool
+check_copy_size(const void *addr, size_t bytes, bool is_source)
+{
+	int sz = __compiletime_object_size(addr);
+	if (unlikely(sz >= 0 && sz < bytes)) {
+		if (!__builtin_constant_p(bytes))
+			copy_overflow(sz, bytes);
+		else if (is_source)
+			__bad_copy_from();
+		else
+			__bad_copy_to();
+		return false;
+	}
+	check_object_size(addr, bytes, is_source);
+	return true;
+}
+
 #ifndef arch_setup_new_exec
 static inline void arch_setup_new_exec(void) { }
 #endif

include/linux/uaccess.h

@@ -109,8 +109,11 @@ static inline unsigned long
 _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	unsigned long res = n;
-	if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)))
+	might_fault();
+	if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))) {
+		kasan_check_write(to, n);
 		res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+	}
 	if (unlikely(res))
 		memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
 	return res;
@@ -124,58 +127,31 @@ _copy_from_user(void *, const void __user *, unsigned long);
 static inline unsigned long
 _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+	might_fault();
+	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) {
+		kasan_check_read(from, n);
 		n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+	}
 	return n;
 }
 #else
 extern unsigned long
 _copy_to_user(void __user *, const void *, unsigned long);
 #endif
 
-extern void __compiletime_error("usercopy buffer size is too small")
-__bad_copy_user(void);
-
-static inline void copy_user_overflow(int size, unsigned long count)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count);
-}
-
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	int sz = __compiletime_object_size(to);
-
-	might_fault();
-	kasan_check_write(to, n);
-
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
-		check_object_size(to, n, false);
+	if (likely(check_copy_size(to, n, false)))
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	} else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
-		copy_user_overflow(sz, n);
-	else
-		__bad_copy_user();
-
 	return n;
 }
 
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	int sz = __compiletime_object_size(from);
-
-	kasan_check_read(from, n);
-	might_fault();
-
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
-		check_object_size(from, n, true);
+	if (likely(check_copy_size(from, n, true)))
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	} else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
-		copy_user_overflow(sz, n);
-	else
-		__bad_copy_user();
-
 	return n;
 }
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT

include/linux/uio.h

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define __LINUX_UIO_H
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/uio.h>
 
 struct page;
@@ -91,26 +92,79 @@ size_t copy_page_to_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
 			 struct iov_iter *i);
 size_t copy_page_from_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
 			 struct iov_iter *i);
-size_t copy_to_iter(const void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
-size_t copy_from_iter(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
-bool copy_from_iter_full(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
-size_t copy_from_iter_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+
+size_t _copy_to_iter(const void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+size_t _copy_from_iter(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+bool _copy_from_iter_full(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+size_t _copy_from_iter_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+bool _copy_from_iter_full_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+
+static __always_inline __must_check
+size_t copy_to_iter(const void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, true)))
+		return bytes;
+	else
+		return _copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
+}
+
+static __always_inline __must_check
+size_t copy_from_iter(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+		return bytes;
+	else
+		return _copy_from_iter(addr, bytes, i);
+}
+
+static __always_inline __must_check
+bool copy_from_iter_full(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+		return false;
+	else
+		return _copy_from_iter_full(addr, bytes, i);
+}
+
+static __always_inline __must_check
+size_t copy_from_iter_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+		return bytes;
+	else
+		return _copy_from_iter_nocache(addr, bytes, i);
+}
+
+static __always_inline __must_check
+bool copy_from_iter_full_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+		return false;
+	else
+		return _copy_from_iter_full_nocache(addr, bytes, i);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE
 /*
  * Note, users like pmem that depend on the stricter semantics of
  * copy_from_iter_flushcache() than copy_from_iter_nocache() must check for
  * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE) before assuming that the
  * destination is flushed from the cache on return.
  */
-size_t copy_from_iter_flushcache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+size_t _copy_from_iter_flushcache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
 #else
-static inline size_t copy_from_iter_flushcache(void *addr, size_t bytes,
-				       struct iov_iter *i)
+#define _copy_from_iter_flushcache _copy_from_iter_nocache
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline __must_check
+size_t copy_from_iter_flushcache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
 {
-	return copy_from_iter_nocache(addr, bytes, i);
+	if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+		return bytes;
+	else
+		return _copy_from_iter_flushcache(addr, bytes, i);
 }
-#endif
-bool copy_from_iter_full_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
+
 size_t iov_iter_zero(size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *);
 unsigned long iov_iter_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i);
 unsigned long iov_iter_gap_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i);