fix(tools): sandbox glob and grep to project directory

[androolloyd]

Summary

Adds path containment checks to glob and grep tools to prevent searches outside the project directory.

Problem

When an AI agent provides a path parameter that resolves outside the project directory (e.g., ~, /Users/username, or ../), the glob and grep tools would happily traverse the entire filesystem. On macOS, this triggers permission dialogs for protected directories like:

• ~/Library
• ~/Music
• ~/Photos
• ~/Pictures

This is both a security concern and a poor UX (permission dialog spam).

Solution

Mirror the existing sandboxing pattern from bash.ts (line 88) which uses Filesystem.contains() to validate paths:

if (!Filesystem.contains(Instance.directory, searchPath)) {
  throw new Error(`Search path "..." is outside the project directory...`)
}

Changes

• glob.ts: Add Filesystem import and containment check after path resolution
• grep.ts: Add path import, Filesystem import, resolve relative paths, and add containment check

Testing

Verified the logic correctly:

• ✅ Allows searches within project directory
• ✅ Allows searches in subdirectories
• ✅ Blocks $HOME directory
• ✅ Blocks ../ escape attempts
• ✅ Blocks absolute paths outside project
• ✅ Blocks protected macOS directories

Related

This fixes the same class of issue that bash tool already handles, bringing glob/grep tools to parity.

[github-actions]

Thanks for your contribution!

This PR doesn't have a linked issue. All PRs must reference an existing issue.

Please:

1. Open an issue describing the bug/feature (if one doesn't exist)
2. Add Fixes #<number> or Closes #<number> to this PR description

See CONTRIBUTING.md for details.

[github-actions]

The following comment was made by an LLM, it may be inaccurate:

I found several related PRs that address similar path containment and security concerns:

Related PRs:

1. PR fix(security): prevent path traversal via symlinks in File.read and File.list #8727 - fix(security): prevent path traversal via symlinks in File.read and File.list

   • Directly related: addresses path traversal security using similar containment patterns

2. PR fix: prevent path traversal via symlinks and cross-drive paths #8316 - fix: prevent path traversal via symlinks and cross-drive paths

   • Related: part of the broader effort to prevent path traversal vulnerabilities

3. PR fix: address external_directory gaps and improve symlink checks #7515 - fix: address external_directory gaps and improve symlink checks

   • Related: addresses gaps in directory security checks

4. PR fix: prevent symlink escape in Filesystem.contains #6403 - fix: prevent symlink escape in Filesystem.contains

   • Related: improves the underlying Filesystem.contains() method that this PR uses

These are not duplicates of PR #8754, but rather part of a coordinated effort to secure path handling across multiple tools and improve the Filesystem.contains() function it relies on.