Isse iandennismiller#65: Add a few special cross-links.

src/appendix/appendix-d.tex

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ \subsection{Transfers}
 \footnote{\blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}}
 On February~23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi-object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were dismissed.% 3
 \footnote{Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia.
-\textit{See} Vol.~I, Section~IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the transfer decision described here.}
+\textit{See} \hyperlink{subsubsection.1.4.1.8}{Vol.~I, Section~IV.A.8}. The trial and plea happened after the transfer decision described here.}
 Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel's Office closed the \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} and referred them \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} investigation as it deemed appropriate.
 The Office based its decision to close those matters on its mandate, the indictments of Manafort, Gates's plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate its resources, among other reasons; \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation}.
 At \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Investigation} continued the investigation of those closed matters.

src/volume-1/decisions.tex

@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ \subsubsection{Potential Section 1030 Violation By [$\blacksquare\blacksquare\bl
 Justice Manual \S~9-27.230. \blackout{Personal Privacy}
 
 \subsection{Russian Government Outreach and Contacts}
-As explained in Section~IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous links (\textit{i.e.}, contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government.
+As explained in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous links (\textit{i.e.}, contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government.
 The Office evaluated the contacts under several sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate in the United States.
-After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section~IV above---with the exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine.
+After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} above---with the exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine.
 One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals---the June~9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising derogatory information on Hillary Clinton---implicates an additional body of law: campaign finance statutes.
 Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions.
 As explained below, the Office evaluated those questions in connection with the June~9 meeting \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter}.
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ \subsubsection{Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion}
 \textit{See Dennis~v.\ United States}, 384~U.S. 855, 861~(1966); \textit{Hammerschmidt~v.\ United States}, 2605~U.S. 182, 188~(1924); \textit{see also United States~v.\ Concord Mgmt.\ \& Consulting LLC}, 347~F. Supp.~3d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2018).
 The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officials---or between such officials and Russia-linked individuals---to interfere with or obstruct a lawful function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period.
 And, as discussed in \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.1}{Volume~I, Section V.A}, \textit{supra}, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the Office charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in \hyperlink{section.1.2}{Volume~I, Section~II}, \textit{supra}.
-Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section~IV above.
+Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in \hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} above.
 
 \subsubsection{Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18~U.S.C. \S~951)}
 The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government.

src/volume-1/executive-summary.tex

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ \subsection*{Russian Social Media Campaign}
 The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States.
 To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States.
 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA\null.
-Section~II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media campaign.
+\hyperlink{section.1.2}{Section~II} of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media campaign.
 
 \subsection*{Russian Hacking Operations}
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ \subsection*{Russian Hacking Operations}
 WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016.
 Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server used by Clinton when she was Secretary of State (he later said that he was speaking sarcastically).
 \blackout{Harm to Ongoing Matter: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor} WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta's stolen emails on October~7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump.
-Section~III of this Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.
+\hyperlink{section.1.3}{Section~III} of this Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.
 
 \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign}
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ \subsection*{Russian Contacts with the Campaign}
 Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.
 
 The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved U.S.--Russian relations.
-Section~IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.
+\hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.
 
 \textbf{2015}.
 Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow.
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ \subsection*{The Special Counsel's Charging Decisions}
 The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if so, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives.
 \textit{See} Justice Manual \S~9-27.220.
 
-Section~V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions, which contain three main components.
+\hyperlink{section.1.5}{Section~V} of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions, which contain three main components.
 
 First, the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election---the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations---violated U.S. criminal law.
 Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. \textit{See United States~v.\ Internet Research Agency, et~al.}, No.~18-cr-32 (D.D.C.).

src/volume-1/hacking-dumping.tex

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ \section{Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations}
 Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC).
 The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers.
 In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks.% 109
-\footnote{As discussed in Section~V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of
+\footnote{As discussed in \hyperlink{section.1.5}{Section~V} below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of
 18~U.S.C. \S\S~1030 and~371.
 \textit{See} \hyperlink{subsection.1.5.2}{Volume~I, Section V.B}, \textit{infra};
 Indictment, \textit{United States~v.\ Netyksho}, No.~1:18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July~13, 2018), Doc.~1 (``\textit{Netyksho} Indictment'').}

src/volume-1/introduction.tex

@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume I}
 The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:
 
 \hyperlink{chapter.1}{\textit{Volume~I}} describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.
-Section~I describes the scope of the investigation.
-Sections~II and~III describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election.
-Section~IV describes links between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
-Section~V sets forth the Special Counsel's charging decisions.
+\hyperlink{section.1.1}{Section~I} describes the scope of the investigation.
+\hyperlink{section.1.2}{Sections~II} and~\hyperlink{section.1.3}{III} describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election.
+\hyperlink{section.1.4}{Section~IV} describes links between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
+\hyperlink{section.1.5}{Section~V} sets forth the Special Counsel's charging decisions.
 
 \hyperlink{chapter.2}{\textit{Volume~II}} addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel's investigation.
 \hyperlink{chapter.2}{Volume~II} separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation.

src/volume-2/introduction.tex

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ \section*{Introduction to Volume II}
 \hr
 
 This report on our investigation consists of four parts.
-Section~I provides an overview of obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations.
-Section~II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence.
-Section~III addresses statutory and constitutional defenses.
-Section~IV states our conclusion.
+\hyperlink{section.2.1}{Section~I} provides an overview of obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations.
+\hyperlink{section.2.2}{Section~II} sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence.
+\hyperlink{section.2.3}{Section~III} addresses statutory and constitutional defenses.
+\hyperlink{section.2.4}{Section~IV} states our conclusion.