chore(deps): update dependency @openzeppelin/contracts to v4.4.2 [security] #25
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This PR contains the following updates:
4.3.2
->4.4.2
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
GHSA-wmpv-c2jp-j2xg
When ERC1155 tokens are minted, a callback is invoked on the receiver of those tokens, as required by the spec. When including the
ERC1155Supply
extension, total supply is not updated until after the callback, thus during the callback the reported total supply is lower than the real number of tokens in circulation.Impact
If a system relies on accurately reported supply, an attacker may be able to mint tokens and invoke that system after receiving the token balance but before the supply is updated.
Patches
A fix is included in version 4.3.3 of
@openzeppelin/contracts
and@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
.Workarounds
If accurate supply is relevant, do not mint tokens to untrusted receivers.
Credits
The issue was identified and reported by @ChainSecurityAudits.
For more information
Read TotalSupply Inconsistency in ERC1155 NFT Tokens by @ChainSecurityAudits for a more detailed breakdown.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
GHSA-9c22-pwxw-p6hx
Impact
Initializer functions that are invoked separate from contract creation (the most prominent example being minimal proxies) may be reentered if they make an untrusted non-view external call.
Once an initializer has finished running it can never be re-executed. However, an exception put in place to support multiple inheritance made reentrancy possible in the scenario described above, breaking the expectation that there is a single execution.
Note that upgradeable proxies are commonly initialized together with contract creation, where reentrancy is not feasible, so the impact of this issue is believed to be minor.
Patches
A fix is included in the version v4.4.1 of
@openzeppelin/contracts
and@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
.Workarounds
Avoid untrusted external calls during initialization.
References
OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts#3006
Credits
This issue was identified and reported by @chaitinblockchain through our bug bounty on Immunefi.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
GHSA-m6w8-fq7v-ph4m
Impact
The
GovernorCompatibilityBravo
module may lead to the creation of governance proposals that execute function calls with incorrect arguments due to bad ABI encoding. This happens if the proposal is created using explicit function signatures, e.g. a proposal to invoke the functionfoo(uint256)
is created aspropose([target], [0], ["foo(uint256)"], ["0x00..01"])
. If the function selector is provided as part of the encoded proposal data the issue is not present, e.g. the same proposal is created aspropose([target], [0], ["0x2fbebd3800..01"])
, where2fbebd38
is the function selector.We've assessed the instances of this contract found on chain, and did not find any occurrence of this bug in the past. Proposal creation through Tally or OpenZeppelin Defender is not affected. The core
Governor
contract on its own is not affected.Patches
A fix is included in version v4.4.2 of
@openzeppelin/contracts
and@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
.Workarounds
Do not create proposals using explicit function signatures. Instead, use the
propose
function without thesignatures
argument, and create the proposal using the fully ABI-encoded function call including the function selector in thecalldatas
argument as explained above.References
OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts#3099
Credits
This issue was identified and reported by @GeraldHost.
For more information
If you have any questions, comments, or need assistance regarding this advisory, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
To submit security reports please use our bug bounty on Immunefi.
Release Notes
OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
v4.4.2
Compare Source
Bugfixes
GovernorCompatibilityBravo
: Fix error in the encoding of calldata for proposals submitted through the compatibility interface with explicit signatures. (#3100)v4.4.1
Compare Source
Initializable
: change the existinginitializer
modifier and add a newonlyInitializing
modifier to prevent reentrancy risk. (#3006)Breaking change
It is no longer possible to call an
initializer
-protected function from within anotherinitializer
function outside the context of a constructor. Projects using OpenZeppelin upgradeable proxies should continue to work as is, since in the common case the initializer is invoked in the constructor directly. If this is not the case for you, the suggested change is to use the newonlyInitializing
modifier in the following way:v4.4.0
Compare Source
Ownable
: add an internal_transferOwnership(address)
. (#2568)AccessControl
: add internal_grantRole(bytes32,address)
and_revokeRole(bytes32,address)
. (#2568)AccessControl
: mark_setupRole(bytes32,address)
as deprecated in favor of_grantRole(bytes32,address)
. (#2568)AccessControlEnumerable
: hook into_grantRole(bytes32,address)
and_revokeRole(bytes32,address)
. (#2946)EIP712
: cacheaddress(this)
to immutable storage to avoid potential issues if a vanilla contract is used in a delegatecall context. (#2852)_setApprovalForAll
toERC721
andERC1155
. (#2834)Governor
: shift vote start and end by one block to better match Compound's GovernorBravo and prevent voting at the Governor level if the voting snapshot is not ready. (#2892)GovernorCompatibilityBravo
: consider quorum an inclusive rather than exclusive minimum to match Compound's GovernorBravo. (#2974)GovernorSettings
: a new governor module that manages voting settings updatable through governance actions. (#2904)PaymentSplitter
: now supports ERC20 assets in addition to Ether. (#2858)ECDSA
: add a variant oftoEthSignedMessageHash
for arbitrary length message hashing. (#2865)MerkleProof
: add aprocessProof
function that returns the rebuilt root hash given a leaf and a proof. (#2841)VestingWallet
: new contract that handles the vesting of Ether and ERC20 tokens following a customizable vesting schedule. (#2748)Governor
: enable receiving Ether when a Timelock contract is not used. (#2748)GovernorTimelockCompound
: fix ability to use Ether stored in the Timelock contract. (#2748)v4.3.3
Compare Source
ERC1155Supply
: HandletotalSupply
changes by hooking into_beforeTokenTransfer
to ensure consistency of balances and supply duringIERC1155Receiver.onERC1155Received
calls.Configuration
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