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Support for reconfiguring the root storage #94
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We discussed this briefly in the meeting today - There are two things I'd like (personal opinion) to do as part of this:
Andrew also mentioned that he'd like the solution to be generic enough that if we decide to support new use cases in the future our current solution doesn't prohibit us from doing so. If we build something new, this is reasonable. |
Lots of discussion around partitioning in #18 Let's repurpose this issue as a tracker for support for reconfiguring the root filesystem in any form; RAID is a subset of that. Bigger picture, this gets a lot more complex with the combination of FCOS:(ostree, ignition) as opposed to ContainerLinux:(dual partition /usr, ignition), because with CL replacing the rootfs is nearly trivial, but for ostree it is entangled with the OS (which adds flexibility, but does make this problem more complex). There are two sub-paths to this problem: One where we're not destroying the existing rootfs (e.g. we're just adding a new partition that we want to make into the rootfs), and one where we're intending to replace it. I think if we're trying to replace the rootfs...we get into an interesting problem domain because we need to pull the ostree repo into RAM temporarily. In most cases...hmm, that should be fine really. But, if we want to optimize things, I could imagine that And we need support for running ostree in the initramfs - shouldn't be too hard. The flow would be something like:
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Hadn't considered pulling it into RAM; I like that idea. I was thinking about just pulling over network, but RAM has some obvious speed/bandwidth cost advantages. There's some tricky bits:
This doesn't help on clouds. I'd rather have a unified way. In some ways it would be easier to just do all of disks then, but that's got it's own challenges and deserves it's own ticket. Proposal:
Sequence would look like:
This still leaves open the question of "how do we find/mount root on subsequent boots". An unrelated question is: do we support blowing away /boot? My gut says no. On x86_64 you can blow away |
Yeah I had the same hesitation but then I realized two things. First, the current FCOS is 1.5G. I think if you're doing something like RAID we can presume you have a "serious" system and have at least say 8G of RAM. Second, we could enable zram temporarily. |
I realized I initially missed the bit about "what if we're just moving the rootfs and the old one will still be accessible". Do you think it's worth the complexity to implement that? If so I think we ought to do this in two phases, handling the generic case first then treating that as an optimization. |
Neat! I think we ought to handle that second and only enable it when we don't have enough ram to do it without. |
I'm confused...doesn't this stuff imply Ignition running twice? We know the initial rootfs we're booting from isn't on RAID because our default disk image doesn't do that. |
I'm not sure why it would imply running Ignition twice? Unless you're referring to getting the config, in which case that's why I'm suggesting we split that into its own stage. I'm saying it's nontrivial to know with 100% certainty that the root is being destroyed since the block device has aliases that we would need to wait for. I suppose we could, but that makes the live pxe case harder since there isn't a device and some aliases aren't known before boot. Consider if FCOS is installed with /dev/sda4 being root. That can be referenced by
Because of that we should be detecting that we're creating a new rootfs instead of deleting the old one. We can either do that with partitions looking for a partlabel (which can have false positives when just resizing) or with the filesystem label (which can have false positives if they create an entry that matches the on-disk FS (see https://github.com/coreos/ignition/blob/master/doc/operator-notes.md#filesystem-reuse-semantics), though I'm not sure why you'd do that). |
We discussed this at the FCOS IRC meeting today, mostly about how to handle the second boot. There's essentially five options:
In cases 2-5 there's also the question of "how do we specify what is needed to start the root disk?" Case 1 it's implied that you specify it with type guids. We could:
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Bit of data: looks like the kcmdline size is 2048 on all the arches we care about except s390x where it is 896. |
Carrying over from #18 since it's closed. Re: Re: mkfs.xfs uses a 4096 byte sector size on 512e and 4Kn, but uses 512 bytes on 512n. Those two above combined suggests three raw images, unless something gives. Also, when dd'd to a different sized drive, the GPT becomes invalid, so that should probably get fixed as a first step. Each RAID layout should get its own mkfs.xfs for setting stripe width/unit On 4Kn drives, minimum EFI system partition size is 256MiB if it's FAT32, which the UEFI spec does suggest it should be, sorta. But mkdosfs only starts using FAT32 above something near 550MiB, unless Re: ZRAM dynamically allocates RAM, setting up swap on ZRAM at 1:1 to RAM has inconsequential overhead on a system that doesn't need it, but you could do a test similar to Anaconda's implementation and only start it for low memory devices. I'd like to see this upstream version working and rebase the myriad implementations on it. |
I'm working on the fundamentals of this in coreos/ignition-dracut#107 First MVP is to support this fcct:
Tracker for issues:
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To reiterate on some discussion in that PR, this is to help enable openshift/enhancements#15 without requiring the root filesystem to come in a LUKS container by default (and relatedly, ensure that when a user chooses LUKS it can be encrypted from the start with a TPM2-sealed key, etc.) |
Sorry, I didn't mean to close. I have NO idea why "close and comment" is next to the comment button. |
All this does is put the immutable bit on the target directory. The intention is to replace this bit to start: https://github.com/coreos/coreos-assembler/blob/8b205bfbb971707382ace76bbb39e46ed3fc560d/src/create_disk.sh#L229 However, the real goal here is to add code in this file to handle redeploying the rootfs for Fedora CoreOS which combines OSTree+Ignition: coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Basically doing this in proper Rust is going to be a lot nicer than shell script in dracut modules. Among other details, coreutils `mv` doesn't seem to do the right thing for SELinux labels when policy isn't loaded.
All this does is put the immutable bit on the target directory. The intention is to replace this bit to start: https://github.com/coreos/coreos-assembler/blob/8b205bfbb971707382ace76bbb39e46ed3fc560d/src/create_disk.sh#L229 However, the real goal here is to add code in this file to handle redeploying the rootfs for Fedora CoreOS which combines OSTree+Ignition: coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Basically doing this in proper Rust is going to be a lot nicer than shell script in dracut modules. Among other details, coreutils `mv` doesn't seem to do the right thing for SELinux labels when policy isn't loaded.
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com>
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Reinazhard <reinazhard@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: meydiwahendra <meydiwahendra@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded. One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID, on first boot, at initrd time.[1] Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the second part of this process; this commit enables the first part. [1] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ] Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker#94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
FCOS will have a static, server-side generated initramfs. This means the initramfs needs to know how to find the root filesystem to mount it, including if that means starting RAID devices. However, we do NOT want to start other raid devices (unless Ignition is starting them as part of the creation process) since users might be writing out configuration to things like
/etc/mdadm.conf
that they want to use.On CL we require that RAIDed devices be partitions with the a special GPT partition type guid and have a udev rule to start only those.
For FCOS I can see two options:
/boot
which is a "rootmap". This would describe the "path to root" including what services like mdadm need to be started. Ignition could generate this if we include a way of flagging partitions/RAIDs as "containing root" or it could be user written. If it is user written we should unmount root after Ignition files/umount and then let whatever tooling reads it mount the root itself to ensure the first boot is not "special" in any way.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: