Rebase changes from the v4.8.6 branch #28

dm0- · 2016-11-29T20:07:11Z

No description provided.

Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount. This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then revert back to old creds and release new creds. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

A file is being copied up for overlay file system. Prepare a new set of creds and set create_sid appropriately so that new file is created with appropriate label. Overlay inode has right label for both context and non-context mount cases. In case of non-context mount, overlay inode will have the label of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have the label from context= mount option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

…verlay file Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return 0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno upon an error. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/ with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context mount, we don't want to copy up label as newly created file got its label from context= option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide where to fetch security pointer from. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get label as if task had created file in upper/. We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to be. This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new creds for file creation. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid in the passed creds. Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from set of creds passed in. (old->security). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load only modules signed with a trusted key. Bugzilla: N/A Upstream-status: Fedora mustard. Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if any such restrictions have been enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if any of these features are enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

…cted This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on loading modules. Disable it in that case. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>

…ictions kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec in this situation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

…Boot mode UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option that enforces this automatically when enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in a secure modules environment. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots, provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for builds done within a sandbox where the eventual root is prefixed by some undesirable path component.

commit b888fb6 upstream. Move the workaround from stmpe_gpio_irq_unmask() which is executed in atomic context to stmpe_gpio_irq_sync_unlock() which is not. It fixes the following issue: [ 1.500000] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/1/0x00000002 [ 1.500000] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2-00020-gbd4301f-dirty #28 [ 1.520000] Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [ 1.520000] [<0000bfc9>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<0000b347>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc) [ 1.530000] [<0000b347>] (show_stack) from [<0001fc49>] (__schedule_bug+0x39/0x58) [ 1.530000] [<0001fc49>] (__schedule_bug) from [<00168211>] (__schedule+0x23/0x2b2) [ 1.550000] [<00168211>] (__schedule) from [<001684f7>] (schedule+0x57/0x64) [ 1.550000] [<001684f7>] (schedule) from [<0016a513>] (schedule_timeout+0x137/0x164) [ 1.550000] [<0016a513>] (schedule_timeout) from [<00168b91>] (wait_for_common+0x8d/0xfc) [ 1.570000] [<00168b91>] (wait_for_common) from [<00139753>] (stm32f4_i2c_xfer+0xe9/0xfe) [ 1.580000] [<00139753>] (stm32f4_i2c_xfer) from [<00138545>] (__i2c_transfer+0x111/0x148) [ 1.590000] [<00138545>] (__i2c_transfer) from [<001385cf>] (i2c_transfer+0x53/0x70) [ 1.590000] [<001385cf>] (i2c_transfer) from [<001388a5>] (i2c_smbus_xfer+0x12f/0x36e) [ 1.600000] [<001388a5>] (i2c_smbus_xfer) from [<00138b49>] (i2c_smbus_read_byte_data+0x1f/0x2a) [ 1.610000] [<00138b49>] (i2c_smbus_read_byte_data) from [<00124fdd>] (__stmpe_reg_read+0xd/0x24) [ 1.620000] [<00124fdd>] (__stmpe_reg_read) from [<001252b3>] (stmpe_reg_read+0x19/0x24) [ 1.630000] [<001252b3>] (stmpe_reg_read) from [<0002c4d1>] (unmask_irq+0x17/0x22) [ 1.640000] [<0002c4d1>] (unmask_irq) from [<0002c57f>] (irq_startup+0x6f/0x78) [ 1.650000] [<0002c57f>] (irq_startup) from [<0002b7a1>] (__setup_irq+0x319/0x47c) [ 1.650000] [<0002b7a1>] (__setup_irq) from [<0002bad3>] (request_threaded_irq+0x6b/0xe8) [ 1.660000] [<0002bad3>] (request_threaded_irq) from [<0002d0b9>] (devm_request_threaded_irq+0x3b/0x6a) [ 1.670000] [<0002d0b9>] (devm_request_threaded_irq) from [<001446e7>] (mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x49/0x8a) [ 1.680000] [<001446e7>] (mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq) from [<0013d45d>] (mmc_start_host+0x49/0x60) [ 1.690000] [<0013d45d>] (mmc_start_host) from [<0013e40b>] (mmc_add_host+0x3b/0x54) [ 1.700000] [<0013e40b>] (mmc_add_host) from [<00148119>] (mmci_probe+0x4d1/0x60c) [ 1.710000] [<00148119>] (mmci_probe) from [<000f903b>] (amba_probe+0x7b/0xbe) [ 1.720000] [<000f903b>] (amba_probe) from [<001170e5>] (driver_probe_device+0x169/0x1f8) [ 1.730000] [<001170e5>] (driver_probe_device) from [<001171b7>] (__driver_attach+0x43/0x5c) [ 1.740000] [<001171b7>] (__driver_attach) from [<0011618d>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x3d/0x46) [ 1.740000] [<0011618d>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<001165cd>] (bus_add_driver+0xcd/0x124) [ 1.740000] [<001165cd>] (bus_add_driver) from [<00117713>] (driver_register+0x4d/0x7a) [ 1.760000] [<00117713>] (driver_register) from [<001fc765>] (do_one_initcall+0xbd/0xe8) [ 1.770000] [<001fc765>] (do_one_initcall) from [<001fc88b>] (kernel_init_freeable+0xfb/0x134) [ 1.780000] [<001fc88b>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<00167ee3>] (kernel_init+0x7/0x9c) [ 1.790000] [<00167ee3>] (kernel_init) from [<00009b65>] (ret_from_fork+0x11/0x2c) Signed-off-by: Alexandre TORGUE <alexandre.torgue@st.com> Signed-off-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@st.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 28b0f8a upstream. A tty is hung up by __tty_hangup() setting file->f_op to hung_up_tty_fops, which is skipped on ttys whose write operation isn't tty_write(). This means that, for example, /dev/console whose write op is redirected_tty_write() is never actually marked hung up. Because n_tty_read() uses the hung up status to decide whether to abort the waiting readers, the lack of hung-up marking can lead to the following scenario. 1. A session contains two processes. The leader and its child. The child ignores SIGHUP. 2. The leader exits and starts disassociating from the controlling terminal (/dev/console). 3. __tty_hangup() skips setting f_op to hung_up_tty_fops. 4. SIGHUP is delivered and ignored. 5. tty_ldisc_hangup() is invoked. It wakes up the waits which should clear the read lockers of tty->ldisc_sem. 6. The reader wakes up but because tty_hung_up_p() is false, it doesn't abort and goes back to sleep while read-holding tty->ldisc_sem. 7. The leader progresses to tty_ldisc_lock() in tty_ldisc_hangup() and is now stuck in D sleep indefinitely waiting for tty->ldisc_sem. The following is Alan's explanation on why some ttys aren't hung up. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101170908.6ad08580@alans-desktop 1. It broke the serial consoles because they would hang up and close down the hardware. With tty_port that *should* be fixable properly for any cases remaining. 2. The console layer was (and still is) completely broken and doens't refcount properly. So if you turn on console hangups it breaks (as indeed does freeing consoles and half a dozen other things). As neither can be fixed quickly, this patch works around the problem by introducing a new flag, TTY_HUPPING, which is used solely to tell n_tty_read() that hang-up is in progress for the console and the readers should be aborted regardless of the hung-up status of the device. The following is a sample hung task warning caused by this issue. INFO: task agetty:2662 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.11.3-dbg-tty-lockup-02478-gfd6c7ee-dirty #28 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. 0 2662 1 0x00000086 Call Trace: __schedule+0x267/0x890 schedule+0x36/0x80 schedule_timeout+0x23c/0x2e0 ldsem_down_write+0xce/0x1f6 tty_ldisc_lock+0x16/0x30 tty_ldisc_hangup+0xb3/0x1b0 __tty_hangup+0x300/0x410 disassociate_ctty+0x6c/0x290 do_exit+0x7ef/0xb00 do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0 get_signal+0x1b3/0x5d0 do_signal+0x28/0x660 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x46/0x86 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 The following is the repro. Run "$PROG /dev/console". The parent process hangs in D state. #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <errno.h> #include <signal.h> #include <time.h> #include <termios.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct sigaction sact = { .sa_handler = SIG_IGN }; struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 }; pid_t pid; int fd; if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "test-hung-tty /dev/$TTY\n"); return 1; } /* fork a child to ensure that it isn't already the session leader */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { perror("fork"); return 1; } if (pid > 0) { /* top parent, wait for everyone */ while (waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) >= 0) ; if (errno != ECHILD) perror("waitpid"); return 0; } /* new session, start a new session and set the controlling tty */ if (setsid() < 0) { perror("setsid"); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) { perror("open"); return 1; } if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSCTTY, 1) < 0) { perror("ioctl"); return 1; } /* fork a child, sleep a bit and exit */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { perror("fork"); return 1; } if (pid > 0) { nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL); printf("Session leader exiting\n"); exit(0); } /* * The child ignores SIGHUP and keeps reading from the controlling * tty. Because SIGHUP is ignored, the child doesn't get killed on * parent exit and the bug in n_tty makes the read(2) block the * parent's control terminal hangup attempt. The parent ends up in * D sleep until the child is explicitly killed. */ sigaction(SIGHUP, &sact, NULL); printf("Child reading tty\n"); while (1) { char buf[1024]; if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { perror("read"); return 1; } } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@llwyncelyn.cymru> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 12e750b ] If alloc_workqueue fails in alua_init, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise it will trigger null-ptr-deref while unloading module which calls destroy_workqueue dereference wq->lock like this: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000080 by task syz-executor.0/7045 CPU: 0 PID: 7045 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0+ #28 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e __kasan_report+0x171/0x18d ? __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0 lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1b0 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xb90 drain_workqueue+0x25/0x290 destroy_workqueue+0x1f/0x3f0 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x244/0x330 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Fixes: 03197b6 ("scsi_dh_alua: Use workqueue for RTPG") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5caaf29 ] If spi_register_master fails in spi_bitbang_start because device_add failure, We should return the error code other than 0, otherwise calling spi_bitbang_stop may trigger NULL pointer dereference like this: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __list_del_entry_valid+0x45/0xd0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/3661 CPU: 0 PID: 3661 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0+ #28 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x45/0xd0 ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x45/0xd0 __kasan_report+0x171/0x18d ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x45/0xd0 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 __list_del_entry_valid+0x45/0xd0 spi_unregister_controller+0x99/0x1b0 spi_lm70llp_attach+0x3ae/0x4b0 [spi_lm70llp] ? 0xffffffffc1128000 ? klist_next+0x131/0x1e0 ? driver_detach+0x40/0x40 [parport] port_check+0x3b/0x50 [parport] bus_for_each_dev+0x115/0x180 ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x20/0x20 __parport_register_driver+0x1f0/0x210 [parport] ? 0xffffffffc1150000 do_one_initcall+0xb9/0x3b5 ? perf_trace_initcall_level+0x270/0x270 ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40 do_init_module+0xe0/0x330 load_module+0x38eb/0x4270 ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20 ? kernel_read_file+0x188/0x3f0 ? find_held_lock+0x6d/0xd0 ? fput_many+0x1a/0xe0 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 ? __ia32_sys_init_module+0x40/0x40 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xb4/0x3f0 ? wait_for_completion+0x240/0x240 ? vfs_write+0x160/0x2a0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xb5/0x100 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x14/0x2a0 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Fixes: 702a487 ("spi: bitbang: Let spi_bitbang_start() take a reference to master") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Reviewed-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 3dd550a upstream. The syzbot fuzzer provoked a slab-out-of-bounds error in the USB core: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xa6/0xb0 lib/string.c:904 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881d175bed6 by task kworker/0:3/2746 CPU: 0 PID: 2746 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5+ #28 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 memcmp+0xa6/0xb0 lib/string.c:904 memcmp include/linux/string.h:400 [inline] descriptors_changed drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5579 [inline] usb_reset_and_verify_device+0x564/0x1300 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5729 usb_reset_device+0x4c1/0x920 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5898 rt2x00usb_probe+0x53/0x7af drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c:806 The error occurs when the descriptors_changed() routine (called during a device reset) attempts to compare the old and new BOS and capability descriptors. The length it uses for the comparison is the wTotalLength value stored in BOS descriptor, but this value is not necessarily the same as the length actually allocated for the descriptors. If it is larger the routine will call memcmp() with a length that is too big, thus reading beyond the end of the allocated region and leading to this fault. The kernel reads the BOS descriptor twice: first to get the total length of all the capability descriptors, and second to read it along with all those other descriptors. A malicious (or very faulty) device may send different values for the BOS descriptor fields each time. The memory area will be allocated using the wTotalLength value read the first time, but stored within it will be the value read the second time. To prevent this possibility from causing any errors, this patch modifies the BOS descriptor after it has been read the second time: It sets the wTotalLength field to the actual length of the descriptors that were read in and validated. Then the memcpy() call, or any other code using these descriptors, will be able to rely on wTotalLength being valid. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35f4d916c623118d576e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.1909041154260.1722-100000@iolanthe.rowland.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 98375b8 upstream. The syzbot fuzzer provoked a general protection fault in the hid-prodikeys driver: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5+ #28 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event RIP: 0010:pcmidi_submit_output_report drivers/hid/hid-prodikeys.c:300 [inline] RIP: 0010:pcmidi_set_operational drivers/hid/hid-prodikeys.c:558 [inline] RIP: 0010:pcmidi_snd_initialise drivers/hid/hid-prodikeys.c:686 [inline] RIP: 0010:pk_probe+0xb51/0xfd0 drivers/hid/hid-prodikeys.c:836 Code: 0f 85 50 04 00 00 48 8b 04 24 4c 89 7d 10 48 8b 58 08 e8 b2 53 e4 fc 48 8b 54 24 20 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 13 04 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8b The problem is caused by the fact that pcmidi_get_output_report() will return an error if the HID device doesn't provide the right sort of output report, but pcmidi_set_operational() doesn't bother to check the return code and assumes the function call always succeeds. This patch adds the missing check and aborts the probe operation if necessary. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1088533649dafa1c9004@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 0ce772f ] The p9_tag_alloc() does not initialize the transport error t_err field. The struct p9_req_t *req is allocated and stored in a struct p9_client variable. The field t_err is never initialized before p9_conn_cancel() checks its value. KUMSAN(KernelUninitializedMemorySantizer, a new error detection tool) reports this bug. ================================================================== BUG: KUMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in p9_conn_cancel+0x2d9/0x3b0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88805f9b600c by task kworker/1:2/1216 CPU: 1 PID: 1216 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc4+ #28 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events p9_write_work Call Trace: dump_stack+0x75/0xae __kumsan_report+0x17c/0x3e6 kumsan_report+0xe/0x20 p9_conn_cancel+0x2d9/0x3b0 p9_write_work+0x183/0x4a0 process_one_work+0x4d1/0x8c0 worker_thread+0x6e/0x780 kthread+0x1ca/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Allocated by task 1979: save_stack+0x19/0x80 __kumsan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xbc/0x120 kmem_cache_alloc+0xa7/0x170 p9_client_prepare_req.part.9+0x3b/0x380 p9_client_rpc+0x15e/0x880 p9_client_create+0x3d0/0xac0 v9fs_session_init+0x192/0xc80 v9fs_mount+0x67/0x470 legacy_get_tree+0x70/0xd0 vfs_get_tree+0x4a/0x1c0 do_mount+0xba9/0xf90 ksys_mount+0xa8/0x120 __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 0: (stack is not available) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88805f9b6008 which belongs to the cache p9_req_t of size 144 The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of 144-byte region [ffff88805f9b6008, ffff88805f9b6098) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00017e6d80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888068b63740 index:0xffff88805f9b7d90 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0100000000010200 ffff888068b66450 ffff888068b66450 ffff888068b63740 raw: ffff88805f9b7d90 0000000000100001 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kumsan: bad access detected ================================================================== Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190613070854.10434-1-shuaibinglu@126.com Signed-off-by: Lu Shuaibing <shuaibinglu@126.com> [dominique.martinet@cea.fr: grouped the added init with the others] Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

rhvgoyal and others added 21 commits November 29, 2016 12:01

efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI

fe523b6

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit

e75618e

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

crawford approved these changes Nov 29, 2016

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dm0- merged commit 0906541 into coreos:v4.8.11-coreos Nov 29, 2016

dm0- deleted the v4.8.11-coreos branch November 29, 2016 20:24

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Rebase changes from the v4.8.6 branch #28

Rebase changes from the v4.8.6 branch #28

dm0- commented Nov 29, 2016

Rebase changes from the v4.8.6 branch #28

Rebase changes from the v4.8.6 branch #28

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dm0- commented Nov 29, 2016