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AAD Usage Clarifications #51
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--- | ||||
title: Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) | ||||
abbrev: COSE HPKE | ||||
docname: draft-ietf-cose-hpke-07 | ||||
docname: draft-ietf-cose-hpke-08 | ||||
category: std | ||||
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ipr: pre5378Trust200902 | ||||
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@@ -77,20 +77,9 @@ This document defines the use of the HPKE with COSE. | |||
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Hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE) {{RFC9180}} is a scheme that | ||||
provides public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts given a | ||||
recipient's public key. HPKE utilizes a non-interactive ephemeral-static | ||||
Diffie-Hellman exchange to establish a shared secret. The motivation for | ||||
standardizing a public key encryption scheme is explained in the introduction | ||||
of {{RFC9180}}. | ||||
recipient's public key. | ||||
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The HPKE specification provides a variant of public key encryption of | ||||
arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also | ||||
includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates | ||||
possession of a pre-shared key, one that authenticates possession of | ||||
a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key, and one that | ||||
authenticates possession of both a pre-shared key and a KEM private key. | ||||
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This specification utilizes HPKE as a foundational building block and | ||||
carries the output to COSE ({{RFC9052}}, {{RFC9053}}). | ||||
This document defines the use of the HPKE with COSE ({{RFC9052}}, {{RFC9053}}). | ||||
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# Conventions and Terminology | ||||
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The sender MUST place the 'encapsulated_key' parameter into the unprotected | ||||
header. Although the use of the 'kid' parameter in COSE_Encrypt0 is | ||||
discouraged by RFC 9052, this profile allows the use of the 'kid' parameter | ||||
(or other parameters) to identify the static recipient public key used by | ||||
the sender. If the COSE_Encrypt0 contains the 'kid' then the recipient may | ||||
discouraged by RFC 9052, this documents RECOMMENDS the use of the 'kid' parameter | ||||
(or other parameters) to explicitly identify the static recipient public key | ||||
used by the sender. If the COSE_Encrypt0 contains the 'kid' then the recipient may | ||||
use it to select the appropriate private key. | ||||
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HPKE defines an API and this API uses an "aad" parameter as input. When | ||||
COSE_Encrypt0 is used then there is no AEAD function executed by COSE | ||||
natively and HPKE offers this functionality. | ||||
The HPKE specification describes an API and this API uses an "aad" parameter | ||||
as input. When COSE_Encrypt0 is used then there is no AEAD function executed | ||||
by COSE natively and HPKE offers this functionality. | ||||
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The "aad" parameter provided to the HPKE API is constructed | ||||
as follows (and the design has been re-used from {{RFC9052}}): | ||||
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In this approach the following layers are involved: | ||||
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- Layer 0 (corresponding to the COSE_Encrypt structure) contains the content (plaintext) | ||||
encrypted with the CEK. This ciphertext MAY be detached. If not detached, then | ||||
encrypted with the CEK. This ciphertext may be detached, and if not detached, then | ||||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I don't think detached / non-detached needs to be mention in this document. (not a big deal, but I thought I'd mention it). There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I downgraded the sentence to avoid the use of the MAY to may |
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it is included in the COSE_Encrypt structure. | ||||
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- Layer 1 (corresponding to a recipient structure) contains parameters needed for | ||||
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The COSE_Encrypt MAY be tagged or untagged. | ||||
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When encrypting the content at layer 0 then the instructions in | ||||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. This seems correct to me. |
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Section 5.3 of {{RFC9052}} need to be followed, which includes the | ||||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. "need" -> "MUST"
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calculation of the authenticated data strcture. | ||||
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At layer 1 where HPKE is used to encrypted the CEK, the "aad" parameter | ||||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. "encrypt", not "encrypted" There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. This is progress on #42. It is saying what the "aad" parameter input to the Seal() API is.
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provided to the HPKE API is constructed as follows (and the design has | ||||
been re-used from {{RFC9052}}): | ||||
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~~~ | ||||
Enc_structure = [ | ||||
context : "Enc_Recipient", | ||||
protected : empty_or_serialized_map, | ||||
external_aad : bstr | ||||
] | ||||
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empty_or_serialized_map = bstr .cbor header_map / bstr .size 0 | ||||
~~~ | ||||
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The protected field in the Enc_structure contains the protected attributes | ||||
from the COSE_recipient structure at layer 1, encoded in a bstr type. | ||||
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The external_aad field in the Enc_structure contains the Externally Supplied | ||||
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Suggested change
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Data described in Section 4.3 and Section 5.3 in RFC 9052. If this field is | ||||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. This is restating some of 9052. I kind of thought it's better not to do restatements and if you do, say the original is normative. (not a big deal, but I thought I'd mention it). There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I agree with Laurence that there is no need to restate what is written in another spec. However, I also think that this PR should be merged once and editorial corrections can be done later as a PR that resolves the issue (#41) Laurence filed. There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
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not supplied, it defaults to a zero-length byte string. | ||||
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The HPKE APIs also use an "info" parameter as input and the details are | ||||
provided in {{info}}. | ||||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Wish we could improve this a lot. Kind of seems like the user of COSE-HPKE has to do a deep threat analysis of their use case to know what to do here. Probably they have to do a lot less than in regular COSE, because COSE-HPKE internally takes care of a lot of this. There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I agree, and I think it would be better to solve this with another PR. |
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An example is shown in {{two-layer-example}}. | ||||
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## Key Representation {#key-representation} | ||||
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# Ciphersuite Registration | ||||
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This specification registers a number of ciphersuites for use with HPKE. | ||||
A ciphersuite is thereby a combination of several algorithm configurations: | ||||
A ciphersuite is a group of algorithms, often sharing component algorithms | ||||
such as hash functions, targeting a security level. | ||||
An HPKE ciphersuite, is composed of the following choices: | ||||
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- HPKE Mode | ||||
- KEM algorithm | ||||
- KDF algorithm | ||||
- AEAD algorithm | ||||
- KEM Algorithm | ||||
- KDF Algorithm | ||||
- AEAD Algorithm | ||||
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The "KEM", "KDF", and "AEAD" values are conceptually taken from the HPKE IANA | ||||
registry {{HPKE-IANA}}. Hence, COSE-HPKE cannot use a algorithm combination | ||||
that is not already available with HPKE. | ||||
The "KEM", "KDF", and "AEAD" values are chosen from the HPKE IANA | ||||
registry {{HPKE-IANA}}. | ||||
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For better readability of the algorithm combination ciphersuites labels are | ||||
build according to the following scheme: | ||||
For readability the algorithm ciphersuites labels are built according | ||||
to the following scheme: | ||||
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~~~ | ||||
HPKE-<Version>-<Mode>-<KEM>-<KDF>-<AEAD> | ||||
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For a list of ciphersuite registrations, please see {{IANA}}. The following | ||||
table summarizes the relationship between the ciphersuites registered in this | ||||
document and the values registered in the HPKE IANA registry {{HPKE-IANA}}. | ||||
document, which all use the "Base" mode and the values registered in the | ||||
HPKE IANA registry {{HPKE-IANA}}. | ||||
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~~~ | ||||
+--------------------------------------------------+------------------+ | ||||
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I think the use or non-use of kid depends on the use case. If you have a use case where the key is known already then it is not needed (not a big deal, but I thought I'd mention it).
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That's correct. You don't have to use it but we recommend it in the generic case.