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As far as I can tell, the
proxy
only protects against one edge case attack (a malicous plan could write directly to theplans
mapping, allowing it to create plans that can executed with no delay). All other storage locations are exposed on interfaces that require only that they are being called from aplan
.The only case that I can see where this would give an attacker a real advantage is if there was an attack that could only be composed of multiple simulatneous transactions executed with the identity of the pause.
Given that
plot
is authed and a malcious plan could anyway take ownership of the entire pause, I think that the risk introduced by the additional implementation complexity that this countermeasure requires is greater than the risk of allowing this particular attack.This does mean losing one nice invariant: 'There is no way to bypass the delay'.
Am I missing something?
cc @kmbarry1 @iamchrissmith @gbalabasquer