feat(WIP): secp256k1-support, rename PublicKey to VerifyingKey #134
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Actionable comments posted: 7
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (7)
Cargo.toml (1)
Clarification Needed on
lazy_staticandsecp256k1Feature Usage
lazy_staticis used incrates/common/src/operation.rsbut was not mentioned in the PR objectives. Please provide context for its addition.- The
secp256k1feature is utilized incrates/common/src/test_utils.rs. Confirm if this is the intended usage and explain its role within the codebase.🔗 Analysis chain
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78-101: Summary of Cargo.toml changesThe changes to Cargo.toml generally align with the PR objectives of adding secp256k1 support:
- The secp256k1 dependency has been updated to include the "rand-std" feature, which is appropriate for cryptographic operations.
- A new secp256k1 feature has been added to the workspace features, although it's currently empty.
- A new lazy_static dependency has been added, which wasn't mentioned in the PR objectives.
To ensure a complete understanding of these changes, please address the following:
- Clarify the intended use of the lazy_static dependency in the context of this PR.
- Explain the current empty state of the secp256k1 feature and how it will be used in the codebase.
These clarifications will help in fully evaluating the impact and completeness of the changes.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check for usage of lazy_static and secp256k1 feature in the codebase # Test: Search for lazy_static usage echo "Searching for lazy_static usage:" rg --type rust 'use lazy_static' || echo "No usage of lazy_static found" # Test: Search for secp256k1 feature usage echo -e "\nSearching for secp256k1 feature usage:" rg --type rust '#\[cfg\(feature = "secp256k1"\)\]' || echo "No usage of secp256k1 feature found"Length of output: 440
crates/prism/tests/integration_tests.rs (2)
7-12: LGTM! Consider grouping related imports.The changes align well with the PR objectives. The addition of
VerifyingKeyandcreate_mock_signing_keyreflects the intended modifications to key management.Consider grouping related imports for better readability:
use prism_common::{ operation::{ CreateAccountArgs, KeyOperationArgs, Operation, ServiceChallengeInput, SignatureBundle, SigningKey, VerifyingKey, }, test_utils::create_mock_signing_key, };
118-118: LGTM! Using mock signing keys in tests.The change to use
create_mock_signing_key()instead ofcreate_signing_key()is a good practice for testing, as it provides better isolation and reproducibility.Consider adding a brief comment explaining why mock signing keys are used here:
// Use mock signing keys for deterministic test behavior let new_key = create_mock_signing_key();crates/prism/src/node_types/sequencer.rs (1)
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1-624: Summary: Consistent implementation of VerifyingKey and mock signing keysThe changes in this file successfully implement the transition from
PublicKeytoVerifyingKeyand introduce mock signing keys for tests. These modifications align well with the PR objectives of implementing Secp256k1 support and renamingPublicKeytoVerifyingKey. The consistent use of theverifying_key()method and mock signing keys across tests suggests improved type safety and potentially better support for different key types.To ensure the changes are comprehensive:
- Verify that similar changes have been applied to other relevant files in the codebase.
- Check if there are any remaining uses of
PublicKeythat need to be updated.- Ensure that the Secp256k1 support is properly implemented and tested in the relevant cryptographic modules.
Consider adding a test that explicitly verifies the support for Secp256k1 keys, if not already present in other test files.
crates/common/src/operation.rs (3)
5-9: Consolidate Imports and Improve ReadabilityThe imports for
ed25519_dalekandsecp256k1can be grouped together to enhance readability. Also, consider ordering imports alphabetically or logically (standard libraries first, then external crates, and finally local modules).
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205-229: Handle Errors Instead of UsingexpectUsing
expectcan cause the program to panic if an error occurs. For better error handling and robustness, propagate the error using?instead of panicking.Apply this change:
-op.insert_signature(signing_key) - .expect("Inserting signature into operation should succeed"); +op.insert_signature(signing_key)?;And ensure the function signature reflects the potential error:
pub fn new_create_account(...) -> Result<Self> {
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373-385: Consider Passing Public Keys by ReferencePassing
pubkeyby value moves the key, which might not be necessary. Passing by reference can improve performance and prevent potential issues with ownership.Modify the function signature:
-pub fn verify_user_signature(&self, pubkey: VerifyingKey) -> Result<()> { +pub fn verify_user_signature(&self, pubkey: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<()> {And update calls accordingly.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
Cargo.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (9)
- Cargo.toml (3 hunks)
- crates/common/Cargo.toml (1 hunks)
- crates/common/src/hashchain.rs (5 hunks)
- crates/common/src/operation.rs (10 hunks)
- crates/common/src/test_utils.rs (4 hunks)
- crates/prism/src/main.rs (2 hunks)
- crates/prism/src/node_types/sequencer.rs (7 hunks)
- crates/prism/tests/integration_tests.rs (5 hunks)
- justfile (1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (37)
crates/common/Cargo.toml (4)
21-21: LGTM: Addition of secp256k1 dependencyThe addition of the
secp256k1dependency aligns with the PR objective of implementing secp256k1 support. Using workspace-level version management is a good practice for maintaining consistency across the project.
21-29: Summary: Changes align with PR objectives, minor clarifications requestedThe changes to
Cargo.tomlalign well with the PR objective of implementing secp256k1 support. The addition of thesecp256k1dependency and feature, along with thelazy_staticdependency, contribute to this goal.A few points for consideration:
- Please clarify the specific use case for
lazy_staticin the context of this PR.- Confirm that the
rand-stdsub-feature ofsecp256k1meets the security requirements for your cryptographic operations.Once these points are addressed, the changes to this file look good to merge.
24-24: Approved: Addition of lazy_static, but clarification neededThe addition of the
lazy_staticdependency is approved. It's a useful crate for lazy initialization of static variables, which can be beneficial in various scenarios, including cryptographic operations.However, could you please clarify the specific use case for
lazy_staticin the context of this PR? This will help ensure that the addition is necessary and aligns with the project's needs.To help understand the usage, let's search for
lazy_staticin the codebase:
29-29: Approved: secp256k1 feature added, consider reviewing RNG requirementsThe addition of the
secp256k1feature with therand-stdsub-feature is approved and aligns with the PR objective of implementing secp256k1 support.However, it's worth noting that while the standard random number generator is suitable for many use cases, cryptographic operations often require a cryptographically secure random number generator. Could you please confirm that
rand-stdmeets the security requirements for your specific use case? If not, consider using a cryptographically secure alternative.To help understand the usage of random number generation in the context of secp256k1, let's search for relevant code:
crates/prism/src/main.rs (3)
44-45:⚠️ Potential issueImprove error handling and clarify Secp256k1 support.
The changes reflect the new type structure for handling verification keys. However, there are a few points to consider:
- The error handling could be improved. Instead of using
unwrap(), consider usingmap_err()to provide more specific error messages.- The code is still using
Ed25519VerifyingKey, which doesn't align with the PR objective of implementing Secp256k1 support.Consider refactoring the code as follows:
.and_then(|vk: VerifyingKey| { Ed25519VerifyingKey::from_bytes(vk.as_bytes().try_into().map_err(|_| "Invalid key length")?) .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create Ed25519VerifyingKey: {}", e)) })Also, could you clarify how Secp256k1 support is implemented? Is it intended to coexist with Ed25519, or replace it entirely?
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check for Secp256k1 related code in the codebase # Test: Search for Secp256k1 related code rg --type rust -i 'secp256k1|k256' # Test: Check if there are any new types or traits related to VerifyingKey ast-grep --lang rust --pattern 'trait VerifyingKey { $$$ }' ast-grep --lang rust --pattern 'struct VerifyingKey { $$$ }' ast-grep --lang rust --pattern 'enum VerifyingKey { $$$ }'
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1-85: Consider a broader review for consistency with new VerifyingKey type.The changes in this file are minimal and maintain the overall structure of the main function. However, given the PR objectives of renaming PublicKey to VerifyingKey and implementing Secp256k1 support, it's important to ensure consistency across the entire codebase.
Consider reviewing other parts of the codebase to:
- Update any remaining uses of
PublicKeytoVerifyingKey.- Implement or integrate Secp256k1 support as mentioned in the PR objectives.
- Update any documentation or comments that might reference the old
PublicKeytype.#!/bin/bash # Description: Check for remaining PublicKey uses and potential inconsistencies # Test: Search for remaining PublicKey uses rg --type rust 'PublicKey' # Test: Check for potential inconsistencies with VerifyingKey usage rg --type rust 'VerifyingKey' # Test: Look for TODO or FIXME comments related to key types rg --type rust -i 'todo|fixme' -C 3 | rg -i 'key|public|verify'
8-8: LGTM! Clarification needed on Secp256k1 support.The changes to imports align with the PR objective of renaming PublicKey to VerifyingKey. The alias
Ed25519VerifyingKeyhelps distinguish between different VerifyingKey types.However, I don't see any imports related to Secp256k1, which was mentioned in the PR objectives. Could you clarify where the Secp256k1 support is implemented?
Also applies to: 10-10
Cargo.toml (3)
78-78: LGTM: secp256k1 dependency updateThe addition of the "rand-std" feature to the secp256k1 dependency is appropriate for implementing secp256k1 support. This change aligns well with the PR objectives.
89-89: Please clarify the intended use of lazy_staticThe addition of the lazy_static dependency wasn't mentioned in the PR objectives. While it's a useful library for lazy initialization of static variables, it would be helpful to understand its specific intended use in the context of this PR. Could you please provide some context on why this dependency was added and how it relates to the secp256k1 support or other changes?
101-101: LGTM: secp256k1 feature addition, but please clarify its usageThe addition of the secp256k1 feature aligns well with the PR objectives. However, the feature is currently empty. Could you please clarify:
- Is the implementation complete, or is this a placeholder for future work?
- Are there plans to use this feature flag in the codebase to conditionally compile secp256k1-related code?
crates/prism/tests/integration_tests.rs (3)
30-30: LGTM! Explicit conversion to VerifyingKey.The change from
signing_key.into()tosigning_key.verifying_key()aligns with the PR objectives and provides a more explicit conversion from SigningKey to VerifyingKey.
41-41: LGTM! Function signature updated to use VerifyingKey.The change from
PublicKeytoVerifyingKeyin theadd_keyfunction signature directly implements the PR objective and ensures consistency with the new naming convention.
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143-147: LGTM! VerifyingKey usage is consistent. Clarification needed on secp256k1 support.The change from
PublicKeytoVerifyingKeyis consistent with the PR objectives and the rest of the changes in the file.However, the PR objectives mention adding secp256k1 support, but this part of the code still uses Ed25519. Could you clarify if secp256k1 support is intended to be added here or in a different part of the codebase?
To verify the current key types supported, we can run the following script:
✅ Verification successful
Secp256k1 support is confirmed elsewhere in the codebase. The use of
VerifyingKey::Ed25519incrates/prism/tests/integration_tests.rsaligns with existingSecp256k1implementations found incrates/common/src/operation.rs. No further actions are required regarding key type support in this section.🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check for supported key types in the codebase echo "Supported key types:" rg --type rust -g '!target/' '(PublicKey|VerifyingKey)::(Ed25519|Secp256k1)' -A 2Length of output: 1877
crates/prism/src/node_types/sequencer.rs (5)
462-462: LGTM: Consistent use ofverifying_key()method.The changes from
signing_key.clone().into()tosigning_key.verifying_key()align with the PR objective of renamingPublicKeytoVerifyingKey. This improves type safety and makes the relationship between signing and verifying keys more explicit.To ensure this change is consistently applied throughout the codebase, let's verify its usage:
#!/bin/bash # Verify the usage of verifying_key() method rg --type rust "\.verifying_key\(\)" cratesAlso applies to: 488-488
526-526: LGTM: Consistent use ofverifying_key()in invalid transaction test.The changes to use
signing_key_2.verifying_key()are consistent with the PR objective and previous changes. This test is crucial for ensuring the system's robustness when handling invalid transactions.To ensure comprehensive test coverage for invalid transactions, let's verify the existence of similar tests:
#!/bin/bash # Search for tests related to invalid transactions rg --type rust "test.*invalid.*tx|test.*invalid.*transaction" crates/prism/srcAlso applies to: 534-534
593-593: LGTM: Consistent use of mock signing keys andverifying_key()method in epoch finalization test.The change to use
create_mock_signing_key().verifying_key()is consistent with the PR objective and previous changes. This test is crucial for ensuring correct epoch finalization behavior.To ensure comprehensive test coverage for epoch finalization with different key types, let's verify the existence of related tests:
#!/bin/bash # Search for tests related to epoch finalization rg --type rust "test.*finalize.*epoch" crates/prism/src
560-560: LGTM: Consistent use of mock signing keys andverifying_key()method.The change to use
create_mock_signing_key().verifying_key()is consistent with the PR objective and previous changes. The shift to using mock signing keys in tests might be related to the Secp256k1 support implementation.Let's verify the implementation of
create_mock_signing_key():#!/bin/bash # Search for the implementation of create_mock_signing_key rg --type rust "fn create_mock_signing_key" crates
418-418: LGTM: New import for mock signing key creation.The addition of
create_mock_signing_keyimport aligns with the PR objective of implementing Secp256k1 support. This change suggests a new approach to creating mock signing keys in tests.To ensure this change is consistently applied, let's verify its usage:
✅ Verification successful
Verified:
create_mock_signing_keyis correctly imported and utilized insequencer.rs.The import addition aligns with the PR objectives and is consistently applied throughout the file.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Verify the usage of create_mock_signing_key in test files rg --type rust "create_mock_signing_key" crates/prism/srcLength of output: 308
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#!/bin/bash # Corrected: Verify the usage of create_mock_signing_key in test files rg --type rust 'create_mock_signing_key' crates/prism/srcLength of output: 1695
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Expanded search: Verify the usage of create_mock_signing_key across the entire repository rg --type rust 'create_mock_signing_key' .Length of output: 2674
crates/common/src/test_utils.rs (8)
3-3: Approving the inclusion ofSigningKeyandVerifyingKeyin importsThe added imports of
SigningKeyandVerifyingKeyare appropriate and necessary for the subsequent code changes.
7-8: Approving conditional import ofEd25519SigningKeyThe conditional import of
Ed25519SigningKeywhen thesecp256k1feature is not enabled is correct.
10-13: Approving imports from therandcrateThe imports of
OsRng,StdRng, andRngfrom therandcrate are correct and necessary for random number generation.
14-15: Approving conditional import ofSecp256k1SigningKeyThe conditional import of
Secp256k1SigningKeywhen thesecp256k1feature is enabled is correct.
175-176: Confirming use ofverifying_key()increate_random_updateThe retrieval of the
VerifyingKeyusingsigning_key.verifying_key()is correct and aligns with the updated key handling.
184-185: Verifying parameters inOperation::new_add_keyThe
Operation::new_add_keyfunction is correctly called with the updatedverifying_key, ensuring proper key addition.
195-198: Approvingcreate_mock_signing_keyfunction for Ed25519The
create_mock_signing_keyfunction correctly generates an Ed25519 signing key when thesecp256k1feature is not enabled.
200-203: Approvingcreate_mock_signing_keyfunction for Secp256k1The
create_mock_signing_keyfunction correctly generates a Secp256k1 signing key when thesecp256k1feature is enabled.crates/common/src/hashchain.rs (6)
11-12: ImportVerifyingKeyfor key managementThe addition of
VerifyingKeyto the import statements ensures that the type is available for use throughout the module. This change is necessary for the updates made to key handling functions.
73-73: Update parameter type increate_accountfunctionThe
valueparameter in thecreate_accountfunction is updated toVerifyingKey. This change aligns with the new key type being used and ensures consistency across key-related operations.
112-112: Initializevalid_keyswithVerifyingKeyinstancesThe
valid_keysHashSet is now correctly defined to holdVerifyingKeyinstances. This update maintains consistency with the new key type and ensures proper key validation in theverify_last_entrymethod.
184-184: Return&VerifyingKeyinget_key_at_indexThe return type of the
get_key_at_indexfunction has been updated toResult<&VerifyingKey>. This change reflects the switch toVerifyingKeyand ensures that callers receive the correct key type.
191-192: Updateget_valid_keysto returnHashSet<VerifyingKey>The
get_valid_keysfunction now returns aHashSet<VerifyingKey>, which is consistent with the updated key type used throughout the module. This ensures that all valid keys are correctly managed asVerifyingKeyinstances.
211-211: Update parameter type inis_key_revokedfunctionThe
keyparameter in theis_key_revokedfunction has been changed toVerifyingKey. This update maintains consistency with the key type changes and ensures accurate key revocation checks.crates/common/src/operation.rs (5)
12-15: Handle Potential Security Risks withSecp256k1SigningKeyEnsure that the
Secp256k1SigningKeyis securely managed, especially since it deals with cryptographic keys. Consider implementing zeroization or secure memory management to prevent key leakage.[security]
80-88: ImplementFromTrait Consistently forVerifyingKeyThe
Fromtrait implementations forSecp256k1SigningKeyandSecp256k1VerifyingKeycorrectly convert toVerifyingKey. Ensure that similar implementations exist forEd25519SigningKeyandEd25519VerifyingKeyto maintain consistency.
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373-385: Verify Correct Use of Public Keys in Signature VerificationIn
verify_user_signature, theCreateAccountvariant usesargs.value.verify_signature, whileAddKeyandRevokeKeyusepubkey.verify_signature. Ensure that the correct public key is used for verification in each case to prevent unauthorized operations.Check that
args.valueandpubkeycorrespond to the intended verifying keys.
42-63:⚠️ Potential issueEnsure Consistent Hashing Algorithm in Signature Verification
The
verify_signaturemethod forSecp256k1uses a customHasher. It's crucial to ensure that the hashing algorithm matches the expectations of thesecp256k1library (typically SHA-256). IfHasheris not using SHA-256, this could lead to incorrect signature verification.Verify the hashing algorithm used by
Hasherand ensure it aligns with the standards.Run the following script to check the implementation of
Hasher:✅ Verification successful
Hasher Uses SHA-256 Algorithm as Required
The
Hasherimplementation incrates/common/src/tree.rsutilizessha2::Sha256, ensuring consistency with thesecp256k1library's expectations.🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Find the definition of `Hasher` and check its algorithm. # Find the `Hasher` implementation fd --type f --name '*.rs' | xargs grep -E 'struct Hasher|impl Hasher' # Check if `Hasher` uses SHA-256 rg --type rust 'Sha256|sha2::Sha256'Length of output: 928
21-23: Uselazy_staticAppropriately for Thread SafetyWhile
lazy_static!is used to create a static instance ofSecp256k1, it's important to ensure thread safety. Verify thatSecp256k1<secp256k1::All>is thread-safe when stored as a static reference.You can run the following script to check if
Secp256k1implementsSyncandSendtraits:
sebasti810
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (2)
crates/common/src/operation.rs (1)
31-60: LGTM with suggestion: VerifyingKey implementation updated for Secp256k1 supportThe changes to the
VerifyingKeyimplementation correctly add support for Secp256k1 keys. Theas_bytesmethod has been appropriately updated, and theverify_signaturemethod now handles both Ed25519 and Secp256k1 signatures correctly.However, there's a minor inconsistency in error handling:
In the Secp256k1 branch of the
verify_signaturemethod, consider wrapping the error withanyhow!for consistency with the Ed25519 branch:vk.verify(&SECP, &message, &signature) - .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Failed to verify signature: {}", e)) + .map_err(|e| anyhow!(e))This change will make the error handling consistent across both branches.
crates/common/src/tree.rs (1)
171-173: LGTM, but consider security implications.The
to_bytesmethod provides a straightforward way to access the raw byte data of theDigest. This can be useful for serialization or other low-level operations. However, consider adding a comment or documentation explaining the potential security implications of exposing the raw bytes, and guidelines for safe usage.Consider adding a doc comment like this:
/// Returns the raw byte representation of the Digest. /// /// # Security Considerations /// /// This method exposes the internal representation of the Digest. /// Use with caution and avoid exposing these bytes directly in /// security-sensitive contexts. pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.0 }
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📒 Files selected for processing (3)
- crates/common/src/operation.rs (10 hunks)
- crates/common/src/test_utils.rs (4 hunks)
- crates/common/src/tree.rs (1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- crates/common/src/test_utils.rs
🔇 Additional comments (9)
crates/common/src/operation.rs (9)
5-14: LGTM: New imports for Secp256k1 supportThe added imports for Secp256k1 related types are correctly placed and grouped with other cryptographic imports. This change aligns with the PR objective of implementing Secp256k1 support.
20-22: LGTM: Lazy initialization of SECP constantThe use of
lazy_staticfor initializing theSECPconstant is a good practice. It ensures that the Secp256k1 context is only created when needed, which can improve performance.
26-28: LGTM: VerifyingKey enum updated for Secp256k1 supportThe renaming of
PublicKeytoVerifyingKeyand the addition of theSecp256k1variant are consistent with the PR objectives. These changes provide a more accurate description of the key's purpose and enable support for Secp256k1 keys.
65-86: LGTM: New From implementations for VerifyingKeyThe added
Fromimplementations for various key types toVerifyingKeyare correct and provide convenient conversions. These implementations enhance the API ergonomics and are consistent with the new support for Secp256k1 keys.
141-142: LGTM: Updated CreateAccountArgs structThe change of the
valuefield type fromPublicKeytoVerifyingKeyin theCreateAccountArgsstruct is consistent with the renaming of thePublicKeyenum. This update maintains consistency throughout the codebase.
157-157: LGTM: Updated ServiceChallenge enumThe change of the
Signedvariant to useVerifyingKeyinstead ofPublicKeyin theServiceChallengeenum is consistent with the renaming of thePublicKeyenum. This update maintains consistency throughout the codebase.
170-170: LGTM: Updated KeyOperationArgs structThe change of the
valuefield type fromPublicKeytoVerifyingKeyin theKeyOperationArgsstruct is consistent with the renaming of thePublicKeyenum. This update maintains consistency throughout the codebase.
368-368: LGTM: Updated verify_user_signature methodThe change in the
verify_user_signaturemethod signature to useVerifyingKeyinstead ofPublicKeyis consistent with the renaming of thePublicKeyenum. This update maintains consistency throughout the codebase.
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1-438: Summary of changes and suggestionsThe changes in this file successfully implement Secp256k1 support and rename
PublicKeytoVerifyingKey, aligning with the PR objectives. The code quality is generally good, with consistent updates throughout the file.Key points:
- Secp256k1 support has been added to relevant enums and methods.
- The renaming from
PublicKeytoVerifyingKeyhas been consistently applied.- A new
SigningKeyenum has been introduced to provide a unified interface for signing operations.Suggestions for improvement:
- Update the
TryFrom<String>implementation forVerifyingKeyto support Secp256k1 keys.- Improve error handling in the
verify_signaturemethod ofVerifyingKeyand thesignmethod ofSigningKey.Overall, these changes enhance the cryptographic capabilities of the codebase and improve naming consistency. After addressing the minor suggestions, this PR will be ready for approval.
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
crates/common/src/operation.rs (1)
473-536: Remove debug print statement in testThe new test cases for creating
VerifyingKeyfrom strings look comprehensive and well-structured. However, there's a debug print statement in thetest_verifying_key_from_string_secp256k1_compressedtest that should be removed.Please remove the following line:
if let Ok(VerifyingKey::Secp256k1(key_bytes)) = result { - dbg!(key_bytes.len()); assert_eq!(key_bytes, secp256k1_bytes); } else { panic!("Expected Secp256k1 key"); }This will keep the test output clean and focused on the actual test results.
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📒 Files selected for processing (3)
- Cargo.toml (3 hunks)
- crates/common/Cargo.toml (1 hunks)
- crates/common/src/operation.rs (10 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (2)
- Cargo.toml
- crates/common/Cargo.toml
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🔇 Additional comments (2)
crates/common/src/operation.rs (2)
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1-25: LGTM: Import statements and VerifyingKey enumThe addition of secp256k1 imports and the renaming of
PublicKeytoVerifyingKeywith the newSecp256k1variant align well with the PR objectives. These changes provide a solid foundation for supporting both Ed25519 and Secp256k1 keys.
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1-536: Overall assessment: Good implementation with minor improvements neededThe changes in this file successfully implement Secp256k1 support and rename PublicKey to VerifyingKey, aligning well with the PR objectives. The implementation is generally solid, with good test coverage for the new functionality.
Key points:
- The
VerifyingKeyandSigningKeyenums provide a clean abstraction for different key types.- The
TryFrom<String>implementation forVerifyingKeyis well-structured and handles different key types correctly.- Error handling could be improved in a few places, particularly in the
SigningKey::signmethod.- Some minor simplifications and optimizations have been suggested.
Please address the issues and suggestions mentioned in the previous comments to further improve the code quality and robustness.
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
crates/common/src/operation.rs (1)
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321-327: Consider renaming get_public_key method for clarityThe
get_public_keymethod has been correctly updated to return aVerifyingKeyinstead of aPublicKey. However, to maintain clarity and consistency with the new terminology, consider renaming this method toget_verifying_key. This would make it immediately clear that the method returns aVerifyingKeyand not aPublicKey.pub fn get_verifying_key(&self) -> Option<&VerifyingKey> { // ... existing implementation ... }This change would improve the overall consistency of the API with the new key type names.
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📒 Files selected for processing (3)
- Cargo.toml (2 hunks)
- crates/common/Cargo.toml (1 hunks)
- crates/common/src/operation.rs (10 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (2)
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- crates/common/Cargo.toml
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🔇 Additional comments (5)
crates/common/src/operation.rs (5)
5-13: LGTM: Import statements and VerifyingKey enumThe addition of Secp256k1 related imports and the modification of the VerifyingKey enum to include Secp256k1 support are appropriate and align with the PR objectives. The changes provide a good foundation for supporting both Ed25519 and Secp256k1 key types in the system.
Also applies to: 21-25
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229-255: LGTM: Operation::new_create_account methodThe changes to the
Operation::new_create_accountmethod correctly adapt the implementation to use the newSigningKeytype instead ofPublicKey. The overall logic of the method remains unchanged, and the modifications are consistent with the PR objectives.
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262-309: LGTM: Operation::new_add_key and Operation::new_revoke_key methodsThe modifications to
Operation::new_add_keyandOperation::new_revoke_keymethods correctly implement the transition fromPublicKeytoVerifyingKey. The overall logic of both methods remains intact, and the changes are consistent with the PR objectives of supporting both Ed25519 and Secp256k1 key types.
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396-410: LGTM: Operation::verify_user_signature methodThe
verify_user_signaturemethod has been correctly updated to useVerifyingKeyinstead ofPublicKey. The overall logic of the method remains unchanged, and the modifications are consistent with the PR objectives of transitioning fromPublicKeytoVerifyingKey.
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1-536: Overall assessment: Good implementation with minor improvements neededThe changes in this file successfully implement the PR objectives of adding Secp256k1 support and renaming PublicKey to VerifyingKey. The implementation is generally solid and consistent throughout the file. However, there are a few areas that could benefit from improvement:
- Error handling: Some methods, particularly those dealing with Secp256k1 operations, could benefit from more robust error handling.
- Naming consistency: Consider renaming the
get_public_keymethod toget_verifying_keyfor better clarity and consistency with the new terminology.- Code simplification: The
From<Secp256k1SigningKey>implementation forVerifyingKeycould be simplified.These minor improvements would enhance the overall quality and robustness of the implementation. Great work on successfully integrating Secp256k1 support and maintaining consistency throughout the file!
The PR includes:
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
secp256k1feature in the workspace.lazy_static, to enhance functionality.Improvements
PublicKeywithVerifyingKeyfor consistency.Digestinstances to byte arrays.Bug Fixes
Sequencerand integration tests.Documentation
Chores
secp256k1feature.