build(deps): update dependency @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable to 4.4.2 [security] #302
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This PR contains the following updates:
4.3.3
->4.4.2
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
GHSA-9c22-pwxw-p6hx
Impact
Initializer functions that are invoked separate from contract creation (the most prominent example being minimal proxies) may be reentered if they make an untrusted non-view external call.
Once an initializer has finished running it can never be re-executed. However, an exception put in place to support multiple inheritance made reentrancy possible in the scenario described above, breaking the expectation that there is a single execution.
Note that upgradeable proxies are commonly initialized together with contract creation, where reentrancy is not feasible, so the impact of this issue is believed to be minor.
Patches
A fix is included in the version v4.4.1 of
@openzeppelin/contracts
and@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
.Workarounds
Avoid untrusted external calls during initialization.
References
OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts#3006
Credits
This issue was identified and reported by @chaitinblockchain through our bug bounty on Immunefi.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
GHSA-m6w8-fq7v-ph4m
Impact
The
GovernorCompatibilityBravo
module may lead to the creation of governance proposals that execute function calls with incorrect arguments due to bad ABI encoding. This happens if the proposal is created using explicit function signatures, e.g. a proposal to invoke the functionfoo(uint256)
is created aspropose([target], [0], ["foo(uint256)"], ["0x00..01"])
. If the function selector is provided as part of the encoded proposal data the issue is not present, e.g. the same proposal is created aspropose([target], [0], ["0x2fbebd3800..01"])
, where2fbebd38
is the function selector.We've assessed the instances of this contract found on chain, and did not find any occurrence of this bug in the past. Proposal creation through Tally or OpenZeppelin Defender is not affected. The core
Governor
contract on its own is not affected.Patches
A fix is included in version v4.4.2 of
@openzeppelin/contracts
and@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
.Workarounds
Do not create proposals using explicit function signatures. Instead, use the
propose
function without thesignatures
argument, and create the proposal using the fully ABI-encoded function call including the function selector in thecalldatas
argument as explained above.References
OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts#3099
Credits
This issue was identified and reported by @GeraldHost.
For more information
If you have any questions, comments, or need assistance regarding this advisory, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
To submit security reports please use our bug bounty on Immunefi.
Configuration
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