4.19 wifi #43
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4.19 wifi #43
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frank-w
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Oct 10, 2018
[ Upstream commit d49b48f ] gpiochip_add_data_with_key() adds the gpiochip to the gpio_devices list before of_gpiochip_add() is called, but it's only the latter which sets the ->of_xlate function pointer. gpiochip_find() can be called by someone else between these two actions, and it can find the chip and call of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate() which leads to the following crash due to a NULL ->of_xlate(). Unhandled prefetch abort: page domain fault (0x01b) at 0x00000000 Modules linked in: leds_gpio(+) gpio_generic(+) CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.18.0+ #43 Hardware name: ARM-Versatile Express PC is at (null) LR is at of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate+0x2c/0x38 Process insmod (pid: 830, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) (of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate) from (gpiochip_find+0x48/0x84) (gpiochip_find) from (of_get_named_gpiod_flags+0xa8/0x238) (of_get_named_gpiod_flags) from (gpiod_get_from_of_node+0x2c/0xc8) (gpiod_get_from_of_node) from (devm_fwnode_get_index_gpiod_from_child+0xb8/0x144) (devm_fwnode_get_index_gpiod_from_child) from (gpio_led_probe+0x208/0x3c4 [leds_gpio]) (gpio_led_probe [leds_gpio]) from (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x9c) (platform_drv_probe) from (really_probe+0x1d0/0x3d4) (really_probe) from (driver_probe_device+0x78/0x1c0) (driver_probe_device) from (__driver_attach+0x120/0x13c) (__driver_attach) from (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4) (bus_for_each_dev) from (bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x268) (bus_add_driver) from (driver_register+0x78/0x10c) (driver_register) from (do_one_initcall+0x54/0x1fc) (do_one_initcall) from (do_init_module+0x64/0x1f4) (do_init_module) from (load_module+0x2198/0x26ac) (load_module) from (sys_finit_module+0xe0/0x110) (sys_finit_module) from (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) One way to fix this would be to rework the hairy registration sequence in gpiochip_add_data_with_key(), but since I'd probably introduce a couple of new bugs if I attempted that, simply add a check for a non-NULL of_xlate function pointer in of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate(). This works since the driver looking for the gpio will simply fail to find the gpio and defer its probe and be reprobed when the driver which is registering the gpiochip has fully completed its probe. Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
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Oct 10, 2018
[ Upstream commit d49b48f ] gpiochip_add_data_with_key() adds the gpiochip to the gpio_devices list before of_gpiochip_add() is called, but it's only the latter which sets the ->of_xlate function pointer. gpiochip_find() can be called by someone else between these two actions, and it can find the chip and call of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate() which leads to the following crash due to a NULL ->of_xlate(). Unhandled prefetch abort: page domain fault (0x01b) at 0x00000000 Modules linked in: leds_gpio(+) gpio_generic(+) CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.18.0+ #43 Hardware name: ARM-Versatile Express PC is at (null) LR is at of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate+0x2c/0x38 Process insmod (pid: 830, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) (of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate) from (gpiochip_find+0x48/0x84) (gpiochip_find) from (of_get_named_gpiod_flags+0xa8/0x238) (of_get_named_gpiod_flags) from (gpiod_get_from_of_node+0x2c/0xc8) (gpiod_get_from_of_node) from (devm_fwnode_get_index_gpiod_from_child+0xb8/0x144) (devm_fwnode_get_index_gpiod_from_child) from (gpio_led_probe+0x208/0x3c4 [leds_gpio]) (gpio_led_probe [leds_gpio]) from (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x9c) (platform_drv_probe) from (really_probe+0x1d0/0x3d4) (really_probe) from (driver_probe_device+0x78/0x1c0) (driver_probe_device) from (__driver_attach+0x120/0x13c) (__driver_attach) from (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4) (bus_for_each_dev) from (bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x268) (bus_add_driver) from (driver_register+0x78/0x10c) (driver_register) from (do_one_initcall+0x54/0x1fc) (do_one_initcall) from (do_init_module+0x64/0x1f4) (do_init_module) from (load_module+0x2198/0x26ac) (load_module) from (sys_finit_module+0xe0/0x110) (sys_finit_module) from (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) One way to fix this would be to rework the hairy registration sequence in gpiochip_add_data_with_key(), but since I'd probably introduce a couple of new bugs if I attempted that, simply add a check for a non-NULL of_xlate function pointer in of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate(). This works since the driver looking for the gpio will simply fail to find the gpio and defer its probe and be reprobed when the driver which is registering the gpiochip has fully completed its probe. Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
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Oct 12, 2018
gpiochip_add_data_with_key() adds the gpiochip to the gpio_devices list before of_gpiochip_add() is called, but it's only the latter which sets the ->of_xlate function pointer. gpiochip_find() can be called by someone else between these two actions, and it can find the chip and call of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate() which leads to the following crash due to a NULL ->of_xlate(). Unhandled prefetch abort: page domain fault (0x01b) at 0x00000000 Modules linked in: leds_gpio(+) gpio_generic(+) CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.18.0+ #43 Hardware name: ARM-Versatile Express PC is at (null) LR is at of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate+0x2c/0x38 Process insmod (pid: 830, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) (of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate) from (gpiochip_find+0x48/0x84) (gpiochip_find) from (of_get_named_gpiod_flags+0xa8/0x238) (of_get_named_gpiod_flags) from (gpiod_get_from_of_node+0x2c/0xc8) (gpiod_get_from_of_node) from (devm_fwnode_get_index_gpiod_from_child+0xb8/0x144) (devm_fwnode_get_index_gpiod_from_child) from (gpio_led_probe+0x208/0x3c4 [leds_gpio]) (gpio_led_probe [leds_gpio]) from (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x9c) (platform_drv_probe) from (really_probe+0x1d0/0x3d4) (really_probe) from (driver_probe_device+0x78/0x1c0) (driver_probe_device) from (__driver_attach+0x120/0x13c) (__driver_attach) from (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4) (bus_for_each_dev) from (bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x268) (bus_add_driver) from (driver_register+0x78/0x10c) (driver_register) from (do_one_initcall+0x54/0x1fc) (do_one_initcall) from (do_init_module+0x64/0x1f4) (do_init_module) from (load_module+0x2198/0x26ac) (load_module) from (sys_finit_module+0xe0/0x110) (sys_finit_module) from (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) One way to fix this would be to rework the hairy registration sequence in gpiochip_add_data_with_key(), but since I'd probably introduce a couple of new bugs if I attempted that, simply add a check for a non-NULL of_xlate function pointer in of_gpiochip_match_node_and_xlate(). This works since the driver looking for the gpio will simply fail to find the gpio and defer its probe and be reprobed when the driver which is registering the gpiochip has fully completed its probe. Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
frank-w
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Dec 17, 2018
Increase kasan instrumented kernel stack size from 32k to 64k. Other architectures seems to get away with just doubling kernel stack size under kasan, but on s390 this appears to be not enough due to bigger frame size. The particular pain point is kasan inlined checks (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE vs CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE). With inlined checks one particular case hitting stack overflow is fs sync on xfs filesystem: #0 [9a0681e8] 704 bytes check_usage at 34b1fc #1 [9a0684a8] 432 bytes check_usage at 34c710 #2 [9a068658] 1048 bytes validate_chain at 35044a #3 [9a068a70] 312 bytes __lock_acquire at 3559fe #4 [9a068ba8] 440 bytes lock_acquire at 3576ee #5 [9a068d60] 104 bytes _raw_spin_lock at 21b44e0 #6 [9a068dc8] 1992 bytes enqueue_entity at 2dbf72 #7 [9a069590] 1496 bytes enqueue_task_fair at 2df5f0 #8 [9a069b68] 64 bytes ttwu_do_activate at 28f438 #9 [9a069ba8] 552 bytes try_to_wake_up at 298c4c #10 [9a069dd0] 168 bytes wake_up_worker at 23f97c #11 [9a069e78] 200 bytes insert_work at 23fc2e #12 [9a069f40] 648 bytes __queue_work at 2487c0 #13 [9a06a1c8] 200 bytes __queue_delayed_work at 24db28 #14 [9a06a290] 248 bytes mod_delayed_work_on at 24de84 #15 [9a06a388] 24 bytes kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on at 153e2a0 #16 [9a06a3a0] 288 bytes __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue at 158168c #17 [9a06a4c0] 192 bytes blk_mq_run_hw_queue at 1581a3c #18 [9a06a580] 184 bytes blk_mq_sched_insert_requests at 15a2192 #19 [9a06a638] 1024 bytes blk_mq_flush_plug_list at 1590f3a #20 [9a06aa38] 704 bytes blk_flush_plug_list at 1555028 #21 [9a06acf8] 320 bytes schedule at 219e476 #22 [9a06ae38] 760 bytes schedule_timeout at 21b0aac #23 [9a06b130] 408 bytes wait_for_common at 21a1706 #24 [9a06b2c8] 360 bytes xfs_buf_iowait at fa1540 #25 [9a06b430] 256 bytes __xfs_buf_submit at fadae6 #26 [9a06b530] 264 bytes xfs_buf_read_map at fae3f6 #27 [9a06b638] 656 bytes xfs_trans_read_buf_map at 10ac9a8 #28 [9a06b8c8] 304 bytes xfs_btree_kill_root at e72426 #29 [9a06b9f8] 288 bytes xfs_btree_lookup_get_block at e7bc5e #30 [9a06bb18] 624 bytes xfs_btree_lookup at e7e1a6 #31 [9a06bd88] 2664 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_near at dfa070 #32 [9a06c7f0] 144 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent at dff3ca #33 [9a06c880] 1128 bytes xfs_alloc_vextent at e05fce #34 [9a06cce8] 584 bytes xfs_bmap_btalloc at e58342 #35 [9a06cf30] 1336 bytes xfs_bmapi_write at e618de #36 [9a06d468] 776 bytes xfs_iomap_write_allocate at ff678e #37 [9a06d770] 720 bytes xfs_map_blocks at f82af8 #38 [9a06da40] 928 bytes xfs_writepage_map at f83cd6 #39 [9a06dde0] 320 bytes xfs_do_writepage at f85872 #40 [9a06df20] 1320 bytes write_cache_pages at 73dfe8 #41 [9a06e448] 208 bytes xfs_vm_writepages at f7f892 #42 [9a06e518] 88 bytes do_writepages at 73fe6a #43 [9a06e570] 872 bytes __writeback_single_inode at a20cb6 #44 [9a06e8d8] 664 bytes writeback_sb_inodes at a23be2 #45 [9a06eb70] 296 bytes __writeback_inodes_wb at a242e0 #46 [9a06ec98] 928 bytes wb_writeback at a2500e #47 [9a06f038] 848 bytes wb_do_writeback at a260ae #48 [9a06f388] 536 bytes wb_workfn at a28228 #49 [9a06f5a0] 1088 bytes process_one_work at 24a234 #50 [9a06f9e0] 1120 bytes worker_thread at 24ba26 #51 [9a06fe40] 104 bytes kthread at 26545a #52 [9a06fea8] kernel_thread_starter at 21b6b62 To be able to increase the stack size to 64k reuse LLILL instruction in __switch_to function to load 64k - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD - __PT_SIZE (65192) value as unsigned. Reported-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
frank-w
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Apr 22, 2019
…acro [ Upstream commit a4046c0 ] Use offsetof() to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/swapfile.c:3010:38 member access within null pointer of type 'union swap_header' CPU: 6 PID: 1833 Comm: swapon Tainted: G S 4.19.23 #43 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 __se_sys_swapon+0x654/0x1084 __arm64_sys_swapon+0x1c/0x24 el0_svc_common+0xa8/0x150 el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x18 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190312081902.223764-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w
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May 8, 2019
…acro [ Upstream commit a4046c0 ] Use offsetof() to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/swapfile.c:3010:38 member access within null pointer of type 'union swap_header' CPU: 6 PID: 1833 Comm: swapon Tainted: G S 4.19.23 #43 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 __se_sys_swapon+0x654/0x1084 __arm64_sys_swapon+0x1c/0x24 el0_svc_common+0xa8/0x150 el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x18 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190312081902.223764-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w
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May 8, 2019
…acro [ Upstream commit a4046c0 ] Use offsetof() to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/swapfile.c:3010:38 member access within null pointer of type 'union swap_header' CPU: 6 PID: 1833 Comm: swapon Tainted: G S 4.19.23 #43 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 __se_sys_swapon+0x654/0x1084 __arm64_sys_swapon+0x1c/0x24 el0_svc_common+0xa8/0x150 el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x18 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190312081902.223764-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w
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Jul 9, 2019
sysbot reported that we lack appropriate rcu_read_lock()
protection in fib_dump_info_fnhe()
net/ipv4/route.c:2875 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by syz-executor609/8966:
#0: 00000000b7dbe288 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: netlink_dump+0xe7/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2199
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 8966 Comm: syz-executor609 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5+ #43
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5250
fib_dump_info_fnhe+0x9d9/0x1080 net/ipv4/route.c:2875
fn_trie_dump_leaf net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2141 [inline]
fib_table_dump+0x64a/0xd00 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2175
inet_dump_fib+0x83c/0xa90 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1004
rtnl_dump_all+0x295/0x490 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3445
netlink_dump+0x558/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244
__netlink_dump_start+0x5b1/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:226 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73d/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5182
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5237
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:646 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:665
sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:994
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x4d3/0x770 fs/read_write.c:483
__vfs_write+0xe1/0x110 fs/read_write.c:496
vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:558
ksys_write+0x14f/0x290 fs/read_write.c:611
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4401b9
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffc8e134978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401b9
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401a40
R13: 0000000000401ad0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ee28906 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
frank-w
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Jul 9, 2019
syzbot reminded us that rt6_nh_dump_exceptions() needs to be called
with rcu_read_lock()
net/ipv6/route.c:1593 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by syz-executor609/8966:
#0: 00000000b7dbe288 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: netlink_dump+0xe7/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2199
#1: 00000000f2d87c21 (&(&tb->tb6_lock)->rlock){+...}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline]
#1: 00000000f2d87c21 (&(&tb->tb6_lock)->rlock){+...}, at: fib6_dump_table.isra.0+0x37e/0x570 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:533
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 8966 Comm: syz-executor609 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5+ #43
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5250
fib6_nh_get_excptn_bucket+0x18e/0x1b0 net/ipv6/route.c:1593
rt6_nh_dump_exceptions+0x45/0x4d0 net/ipv6/route.c:5541
rt6_dump_route+0x904/0xc50 net/ipv6/route.c:5640
fib6_dump_node+0x168/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:467
fib6_walk_continue+0x4a9/0x8e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1986
fib6_walk+0x9d/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2034
fib6_dump_table.isra.0+0x38a/0x570 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:534
inet6_dump_fib+0x93c/0xb00 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:624
rtnl_dump_all+0x295/0x490 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3445
netlink_dump+0x558/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244
__netlink_dump_start+0x5b1/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:226 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73d/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5182
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5237
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:646 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:665
sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:994
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x4d3/0x770 fs/read_write.c:483
__vfs_write+0xe1/0x110 fs/read_write.c:496
vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:558
ksys_write+0x14f/0x290 fs/read_write.c:611
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4401b9
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffc8e134978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401b9
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 00
Fixes: 1e47b48 ("ipv6: Dump route exceptions if requested")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use offsetof to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: ================================================================== UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/wireless/wext-core.c:525:14 member access within null pointer of type 'struct iw_point' CPU: 3 PID: 165 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G S W 4.19.23 #43 Workqueue: cfg80211 __cfg80211_scan_done [cfg80211] Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 wireless_send_event+0x3cc/0x470 ___cfg80211_scan_done+0x13c/0x220 [cfg80211] __cfg80211_scan_done+0x28/0x34 [cfg80211] process_one_work+0x170/0x35c worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0x13c/0x158 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 =================================================================== Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204081307.138765-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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May 24, 2020
[ Upstream commit 81aabbb ] In bpf_tcp_ingress we used apply_bytes to subtract bytes from sg.size which is used to track total bytes in a message. But this is not correct because apply_bytes is itself modified in the main loop doing the mem_charge. Then at the end of this we have sg.size incorrectly set and out of sync with actual sk values. Then we can get a splat if we try to cork the data later and again try to redirect the msg to ingress. To fix instead of trying to track msg.size do the easy thing and include it as part of the sk_msg_xfer logic so that when the msg is moved the sg.size is always correct. To reproduce the below users will need ingress + cork and hit an error path that will then try to 'free' the skmsg. [ 173.699981] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.699987] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000008 by task test_sockmap/5317 [ 173.700000] CPU: 2 PID: 5317 Comm: test_sockmap Tainted: G I 5.7.0-rc1+ #43 [ 173.700005] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [ 173.700009] Call Trace: [ 173.700021] dump_stack+0x8e/0xcb [ 173.700029] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700034] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700042] __kasan_report+0x102/0x15f [ 173.700052] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700060] kasan_report+0x32/0x50 [ 173.700070] sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700080] __sk_msg_free+0x87/0x150 [ 173.700094] tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x179/0x4f0 [ 173.700109] tcp_bpf_sendpage+0x3ce/0x5d0 Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158861290407.14306.5327773422227552482.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 6989310 upstream. Use offsetof to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: ================================================================== UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/wireless/wext-core.c:525:14 member access within null pointer of type 'struct iw_point' CPU: 3 PID: 165 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G S W 4.19.23 #43 Workqueue: cfg80211 __cfg80211_scan_done [cfg80211] Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 wireless_send_event+0x3cc/0x470 ___cfg80211_scan_done+0x13c/0x220 [cfg80211] __cfg80211_scan_done+0x28/0x34 [cfg80211] process_one_work+0x170/0x35c worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0x13c/0x158 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 =================================================================== Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204081307.138765-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6989310 upstream. Use offsetof to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: ================================================================== UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/wireless/wext-core.c:525:14 member access within null pointer of type 'struct iw_point' CPU: 3 PID: 165 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G S W 4.19.23 #43 Workqueue: cfg80211 __cfg80211_scan_done [cfg80211] Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 wireless_send_event+0x3cc/0x470 ___cfg80211_scan_done+0x13c/0x220 [cfg80211] __cfg80211_scan_done+0x28/0x34 [cfg80211] process_one_work+0x170/0x35c worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0x13c/0x158 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 =================================================================== Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204081307.138765-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6989310 upstream. Use offsetof to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when compiling with Clang: ================================================================== UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/wireless/wext-core.c:525:14 member access within null pointer of type 'struct iw_point' CPU: 3 PID: 165 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G S W 4.19.23 #43 Workqueue: cfg80211 __cfg80211_scan_done [cfg80211] Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194 show_stack+0x20/0x2c __dump_stack+0x20/0x28 dump_stack+0x70/0x94 ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44 ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54 wireless_send_event+0x3cc/0x470 ___cfg80211_scan_done+0x13c/0x220 [cfg80211] __cfg80211_scan_done+0x28/0x34 [cfg80211] process_one_work+0x170/0x35c worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0x13c/0x158 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 =================================================================== Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204081307.138765-1-pihsun@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b8b2f37 ] When adding a PTE a ptesync is needed to order the update of the PTE with subsequent accesses otherwise a spurious fault may be raised. radix__set_pte_at() does not do this for performance gains. For non-kernel memory this is not an issue as any faults of this kind are corrected by the page fault handler. For kernel memory these faults are not handled. The current solution is that there is a ptesync in flush_cache_vmap() which should be called when mapping from the vmalloc region. However, map_kernel_page() does not call flush_cache_vmap(). This is troublesome in particular for code patching with Strict RWX on radix. In do_patch_instruction() the page frame that contains the instruction to be patched is mapped and then immediately patched. With no ordering or synchronization between setting up the PTE and writing to the page it is possible for faults. As the code patching is done using __put_user_asm_goto() the resulting fault is obscured - but using a normal store instead it can be seen: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc008000008f24a3c Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008bd74 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: nop_module(PO+) [last unloaded: nop_module] CPU: 4 PID: 757 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty #43 NIP: c00000000008bd74 LR: c00000000008bd50 CTR: c000000000025810 REGS: c000000016f634a0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000007c68c DAR: c008000008f24a3c DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 1 This results in the kind of issue reported here: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/15AC5B0E-A221-4B8C-9039-FA96B8EF7C88@lca.pw/ Chris Riedl suggested a reliable way to reproduce the issue: $ mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug $ (while true; do echo function > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; echo nop > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; done) & Turning ftrace on and off does a large amount of code patching which in usually less then 5min will crash giving a trace like: ftrace-powerpc: (____ptrval____): replaced (4b473b11) != old (60000000) ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------ ftrace failed to modify [<c000000000bf8e5c>] napi_busy_loop+0xc/0x390 actual: 11:3b:47:4b Setting ftrace call site to call ftrace function ftrace record flags: 80000001 (1) expected tramp: c00000000006c96c ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 809 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2065 ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8 Modules linked in: nop_module(PO-) [last unloaded: nop_module] CPU: 4 PID: 809 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a #1 NIP: c00000000024f334 LR: c00000000024f330 CTR: c0000000001a5af0 REGS: c000000004c8b760 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a) MSR: 900000000282b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28008848 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000001a9c98 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000024f330 c000000004c8b9f0 c000000002770600 0000000000000022 GPR04: 00000000ffff7fff c000000004c8b6d0 0000000000000027 c0000007fe9bcdd8 GPR08: 0000000000000023 ffffffffffffffd8 0000000000000027 c000000002613118 GPR12: 0000000000008000 c0000007fffdca00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000023ec37c5 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 GPR20: c000000004c8bc90 c0000000027a2d20 c000000004c8bcd0 c000000002612fe8 GPR24: 0000000000000038 0000000000000030 0000000000000028 0000000000000020 GPR28: c000000000ff1b68 c000000000bf8e5c c00000000312f700 c000000000fbb9b0 NIP ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8 LR ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8 Call Trace: ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8 (unreliable) ftrace_modify_all_code+0x168/0x210 arch_ftrace_update_code+0x18/0x30 ftrace_run_update_code+0x44/0xc0 ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1c0 register_ftrace_function+0x4c/0xc0 function_trace_init+0x80/0xb0 tracing_set_tracer+0x2a4/0x4f0 tracing_set_trace_write+0xd4/0x130 vfs_write+0xf0/0x330 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x14c/0x230 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c To fix this when updating kernel memory PTEs using ptesync. Fixes: f1cb8f9 ("powerpc/64s/radix: avoid ptesync after set_pte and ptep_set_access_flags") Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> [mpe: Tidy up change log slightly] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210208032957.1232102-1-jniethe5@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b8b2f37 ] When adding a PTE a ptesync is needed to order the update of the PTE with subsequent accesses otherwise a spurious fault may be raised. radix__set_pte_at() does not do this for performance gains. For non-kernel memory this is not an issue as any faults of this kind are corrected by the page fault handler. For kernel memory these faults are not handled. The current solution is that there is a ptesync in flush_cache_vmap() which should be called when mapping from the vmalloc region. However, map_kernel_page() does not call flush_cache_vmap(). This is troublesome in particular for code patching with Strict RWX on radix. In do_patch_instruction() the page frame that contains the instruction to be patched is mapped and then immediately patched. With no ordering or synchronization between setting up the PTE and writing to the page it is possible for faults. As the code patching is done using __put_user_asm_goto() the resulting fault is obscured - but using a normal store instead it can be seen: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc008000008f24a3c Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008bd74 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: nop_module(PO+) [last unloaded: nop_module] CPU: 4 PID: 757 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty #43 NIP: c00000000008bd74 LR: c00000000008bd50 CTR: c000000000025810 REGS: c000000016f634a0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000007c68c DAR: c008000008f24a3c DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 1 This results in the kind of issue reported here: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/15AC5B0E-A221-4B8C-9039-FA96B8EF7C88@lca.pw/ Chris Riedl suggested a reliable way to reproduce the issue: $ mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug $ (while true; do echo function > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; echo nop > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; done) & Turning ftrace on and off does a large amount of code patching which in usually less then 5min will crash giving a trace like: ftrace-powerpc: (____ptrval____): replaced (4b473b11) != old (60000000) ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------ ftrace failed to modify [<c000000000bf8e5c>] napi_busy_loop+0xc/0x390 actual: 11:3b:47:4b Setting ftrace call site to call ftrace function ftrace record flags: 80000001 (1) expected tramp: c00000000006c96c ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 809 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2065 ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8 Modules linked in: nop_module(PO-) [last unloaded: nop_module] CPU: 4 PID: 809 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a #1 NIP: c00000000024f334 LR: c00000000024f330 CTR: c0000000001a5af0 REGS: c000000004c8b760 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a) MSR: 900000000282b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28008848 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000001a9c98 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000024f330 c000000004c8b9f0 c000000002770600 0000000000000022 GPR04: 00000000ffff7fff c000000004c8b6d0 0000000000000027 c0000007fe9bcdd8 GPR08: 0000000000000023 ffffffffffffffd8 0000000000000027 c000000002613118 GPR12: 0000000000008000 c0000007fffdca00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000023ec37c5 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 GPR20: c000000004c8bc90 c0000000027a2d20 c000000004c8bcd0 c000000002612fe8 GPR24: 0000000000000038 0000000000000030 0000000000000028 0000000000000020 GPR28: c000000000ff1b68 c000000000bf8e5c c00000000312f700 c000000000fbb9b0 NIP ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8 LR ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8 Call Trace: ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8 (unreliable) ftrace_modify_all_code+0x168/0x210 arch_ftrace_update_code+0x18/0x30 ftrace_run_update_code+0x44/0xc0 ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1c0 register_ftrace_function+0x4c/0xc0 function_trace_init+0x80/0xb0 tracing_set_tracer+0x2a4/0x4f0 tracing_set_trace_write+0xd4/0x130 vfs_write+0xf0/0x330 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x14c/0x230 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c To fix this when updating kernel memory PTEs using ptesync. Fixes: f1cb8f9 ("powerpc/64s/radix: avoid ptesync after set_pte and ptep_set_access_flags") Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> [mpe: Tidy up change log slightly] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210208032957.1232102-1-jniethe5@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Jun 3, 2021
[ Upstream commit b8b2f37 ] When adding a PTE a ptesync is needed to order the update of the PTE with subsequent accesses otherwise a spurious fault may be raised. radix__set_pte_at() does not do this for performance gains. For non-kernel memory this is not an issue as any faults of this kind are corrected by the page fault handler. For kernel memory these faults are not handled. The current solution is that there is a ptesync in flush_cache_vmap() which should be called when mapping from the vmalloc region. However, map_kernel_page() does not call flush_cache_vmap(). This is troublesome in particular for code patching with Strict RWX on radix. In do_patch_instruction() the page frame that contains the instruction to be patched is mapped and then immediately patched. With no ordering or synchronization between setting up the PTE and writing to the page it is possible for faults. As the code patching is done using __put_user_asm_goto() the resulting fault is obscured - but using a normal store instead it can be seen: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc008000008f24a3c Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008bd74 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: nop_module(PO+) [last unloaded: nop_module] CPU: 4 PID: 757 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty #43 NIP: c00000000008bd74 LR: c00000000008bd50 CTR: c000000000025810 REGS: c000000016f634a0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000007c68c DAR: c008000008f24a3c DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 1 This results in the kind of issue reported here: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/15AC5B0E-A221-4B8C-9039-FA96B8EF7C88@lca.pw/ Chris Riedl suggested a reliable way to reproduce the issue: $ mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug $ (while true; do echo function > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; echo nop > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; done) & Turning ftrace on and off does a large amount of code patching which in usually less then 5min will crash giving a trace like: ftrace-powerpc: (____ptrval____): replaced (4b473b11) != old (60000000) ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------ ftrace failed to modify [<c000000000bf8e5c>] napi_busy_loop+0xc/0x390 actual: 11:3b:47:4b Setting ftrace call site to call ftrace function ftrace record flags: 80000001 (1) expected tramp: c00000000006c96c ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 809 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2065 ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8 Modules linked in: nop_module(PO-) [last unloaded: nop_module] CPU: 4 PID: 809 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a #1 NIP: c00000000024f334 LR: c00000000024f330 CTR: c0000000001a5af0 REGS: c000000004c8b760 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a) MSR: 900000000282b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28008848 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000001a9c98 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000024f330 c000000004c8b9f0 c000000002770600 0000000000000022 GPR04: 00000000ffff7fff c000000004c8b6d0 0000000000000027 c0000007fe9bcdd8 GPR08: 0000000000000023 ffffffffffffffd8 0000000000000027 c000000002613118 GPR12: 0000000000008000 c0000007fffdca00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000023ec37c5 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 GPR20: c000000004c8bc90 c0000000027a2d20 c000000004c8bcd0 c000000002612fe8 GPR24: 0000000000000038 0000000000000030 0000000000000028 0000000000000020 GPR28: c000000000ff1b68 c000000000bf8e5c c00000000312f700 c000000000fbb9b0 NIP ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8 LR ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8 Call Trace: ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8 (unreliable) ftrace_modify_all_code+0x168/0x210 arch_ftrace_update_code+0x18/0x30 ftrace_run_update_code+0x44/0xc0 ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1c0 register_ftrace_function+0x4c/0xc0 function_trace_init+0x80/0xb0 tracing_set_tracer+0x2a4/0x4f0 tracing_set_trace_write+0xd4/0x130 vfs_write+0xf0/0x330 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x14c/0x230 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c To fix this when updating kernel memory PTEs using ptesync. Fixes: f1cb8f9 ("powerpc/64s/radix: avoid ptesync after set_pte and ptep_set_access_flags") Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> [mpe: Tidy up change log slightly] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210208032957.1232102-1-jniethe5@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w
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Jun 24, 2021
This reverts commit 568262b. The commit causes the following panic when shutting down a rockpro64-v2 board: [..] [ 41.684569] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: USB bus 1 deregistered [ 41.686301] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0 [ 41.687096] Mem abort info: [ 41.687345] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 41.687615] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 41.688082] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 41.688352] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 41.688628] Data abort info: [ 41.688882] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 41.689219] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 41.689481] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000073b2000 [ 41.690046] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 41.690654] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 41.691143] Modules linked in: [ 41.691416] CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: shutdown Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4 #43 [ 41.691966] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT) [ 41.692409] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 41.692937] pc : down_read_interruptible+0xec/0x200 [ 41.693373] lr : simple_recursive_removal+0x48/0x280 [ 41.693815] sp : ffff800011fab910 [ 41.694107] x29: ffff800011fab910 x28: ffff0000008fe480 x27: ffff0000008fe4d8 [ 41.694736] x26: ffff800011529a90 x25: 00000000000000a0 x24: ffff800011edd030 [ 41.695364] x23: 0000000000000080 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800011f23994 [ 41.695992] x20: ffff800011f23998 x19: ffff0000008fe480 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 41.696620] x17: 000c0400bb44ffff x16: 0000000000000009 x15: ffff800091faba3d [ 41.697248] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000020 [ 41.697875] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x9 : 6f6c746364716e62 [ 41.698502] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : fefefeff6364626d x6 : 0000000000000440 [ 41.699130] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000000000a0 [ 41.699758] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000000000a0 [ 41.700386] Call trace: [ 41.700602] down_read_interruptible+0xec/0x200 [ 41.701003] debugfs_remove+0x5c/0x80 [ 41.701328] dwc3_debugfs_exit+0x1c/0x6c [ 41.701676] dwc3_remove+0x34/0x1a0 [ 41.701988] platform_remove+0x28/0x60 [ 41.702322] __device_release_driver+0x188/0x22c [ 41.702730] device_release_driver+0x2c/0x44 [ 41.703106] bus_remove_device+0x124/0x130 [ 41.703468] device_del+0x16c/0x424 [ 41.703777] platform_device_del.part.0+0x1c/0x90 [ 41.704193] platform_device_unregister+0x28/0x44 [ 41.704608] of_platform_device_destroy+0xe8/0x100 [ 41.705031] device_for_each_child_reverse+0x64/0xb4 [ 41.705470] of_platform_depopulate+0x40/0x84 [ 41.705853] __dwc3_of_simple_teardown+0x20/0xd4 [ 41.706260] dwc3_of_simple_shutdown+0x14/0x20 [ 41.706652] platform_shutdown+0x28/0x40 [ 41.706998] device_shutdown+0x158/0x330 [ 41.707344] kernel_power_off+0x38/0x7c [ 41.707684] __do_sys_reboot+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 41.708029] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x28/0x34 [ 41.708383] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 41.708716] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xdc [ 41.709131] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 [ 41.709426] el0_svc+0x2c/0x54 [ 41.709698] el0_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130 [ 41.710045] el0_sync+0x198/0x1c0 [ 41.710342] Code: c8047c62 35ffff84 17fffe5f f9800071 (c85ffc60) [ 41.710881] ---[ end trace 406377df5178f75c ]--- [ 41.711299] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b [ 41.712084] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 41.712391] CPU features: 0x10001031,20000846 [ 41.712775] Memory Limit: none [ 41.713049] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- As Felipe explained: "dwc3_shutdown() is just called dwc3_remove() directly, then we end up calling debugfs_remove_recursive() twice." Reverting the commit fixes the panic. Fixes: 568262b ("usb: dwc3: core: Add shutdown callback for dwc3") Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210603151742.298243-1-alexandru.elisei@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
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Oct 22, 2021
Since f35a2a9 ("drm/encoder: make encoder control functions optional") drm_mode_config_validate would print warnings if both cursor plane and cursor functions are provided. Restore separate set of drm_crtc_funcs to be used if separate cursor plane is provided. [ 6.556046] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.556071] [CRTC:93:crtc-0] must not have both a cursor plane and a cursor_set func [ 6.556091] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 76 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:648 drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.567453] Modules linked in: [ 6.577604] CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-dirty #43 [ 6.580557] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT) [ 6.587763] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 6.593926] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 6.599740] pc : drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.606596] lr : drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.611804] sp : ffff8000121b3980 [ 6.616838] x29: ffff8000121b3990 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 6.620140] x26: ffff8000114cde50 x25: ffff8000114cdd40 x24: ffff0000987282d8 [ 6.627258] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 6.634376] x20: ffff000098728000 x19: ffff000080a39000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 6.641494] x17: 3136564e3631564e x16: 0000000000000324 x15: ffff800011c78709 [ 6.648613] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800011a22850 x12: 00000000000009ab [ 6.655730] x11: 0000000000000339 x10: ffff800011a22850 x9 : ffff800011a22850 [ 6.662848] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff800011a7a850 x6 : ffff800011a7a850 [ 6.669966] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 40000000fffff339 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 6.677084] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00008093b800 [ 6.684205] Call trace: [ 6.691319] drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.693577] drm_dev_register+0x17c/0x210 [ 6.698435] msm_drm_bind+0x4b4/0x694 [ 6.702429] try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1d0 [ 6.706075] __component_add+0xa0/0x170 [ 6.710415] component_add+0x14/0x20 [ 6.714234] msm_hdmi_dev_probe+0x1c/0x2c [ 6.718053] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0 [ 6.721959] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c [ 6.725606] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144 [ 6.729600] driver_probe_device+0xc8/0x15c [ 6.734114] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120 [ 6.738106] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xd0 [ 6.742619] __device_attach+0xdc/0x184 [ 6.746351] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 6.750172] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4 [ 6.754337] deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xc0 [ 6.758158] process_one_work+0x1d0/0x370 [ 6.762671] worker_thread+0x2c8/0x470 [ 6.766839] kthread+0x15c/0x170 [ 6.770483] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 6.773870] ---[ end trace 5884eb76cd26d274 ]--- [ 6.777500] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.782043] [CRTC:93:crtc-0] must not have both a cursor plane and a cursor_move func [ 6.782063] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 76 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:654 drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.794362] Modules linked in: [ 6.804600] CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.15.0-rc1-dirty #43 [ 6.807555] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT) [ 6.816148] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 6.822311] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 6.828126] pc : drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.834981] lr : drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.840189] sp : ffff8000121b3980 [ 6.845223] x29: ffff8000121b3990 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 6.848525] x26: ffff8000114cde50 x25: ffff8000114cdd40 x24: ffff0000987282d8 [ 6.855643] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 6.862763] x20: ffff000098728000 x19: ffff000080a39000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 6.869879] x17: 3136564e3631564e x16: 0000000000000324 x15: ffff800011c790c2 [ 6.876998] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800011a22850 x12: 0000000000000a2f [ 6.884116] x11: 0000000000000365 x10: ffff800011a22850 x9 : ffff800011a22850 [ 6.891234] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff800011a7a850 x6 : ffff800011a7a850 [ 6.898351] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 40000000fffff365 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 6.905470] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00008093b800 [ 6.912590] Call trace: [ 6.919702] drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.921960] drm_dev_register+0x17c/0x210 [ 6.926821] msm_drm_bind+0x4b4/0x694 [ 6.930813] try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1d0 [ 6.934459] __component_add+0xa0/0x170 [ 6.938799] component_add+0x14/0x20 [ 6.942619] msm_hdmi_dev_probe+0x1c/0x2c [ 6.946438] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0 [ 6.950345] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c [ 6.953991] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144 [ 6.957984] driver_probe_device+0xc8/0x15c [ 6.962498] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120 [ 6.966492] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xd0 [ 6.971004] __device_attach+0xdc/0x184 [ 6.974737] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 6.978556] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4 [ 6.982722] deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xc0 [ 6.986543] process_one_work+0x1d0/0x370 [ 6.991057] worker_thread+0x2c8/0x470 [ 6.995223] kthread+0x15c/0x170 [ 6.998869] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 7.002255] ---[ end trace 5884eb76cd26d275 ]--- Fixes: aa649e8 ("drm/msm/mdp5: mdp5_crtc: Restore cursor state only if LM cursors are enabled") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210925192824.3416259-1-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
frank-w
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Nov 1, 2021
commit c491a0c upstream. Since f35a2a9 ("drm/encoder: make encoder control functions optional") drm_mode_config_validate would print warnings if both cursor plane and cursor functions are provided. Restore separate set of drm_crtc_funcs to be used if separate cursor plane is provided. [ 6.556046] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.556071] [CRTC:93:crtc-0] must not have both a cursor plane and a cursor_set func [ 6.556091] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 76 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:648 drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.567453] Modules linked in: [ 6.577604] CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-dirty #43 [ 6.580557] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT) [ 6.587763] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 6.593926] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 6.599740] pc : drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.606596] lr : drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.611804] sp : ffff8000121b3980 [ 6.616838] x29: ffff8000121b3990 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 6.620140] x26: ffff8000114cde50 x25: ffff8000114cdd40 x24: ffff0000987282d8 [ 6.627258] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 6.634376] x20: ffff000098728000 x19: ffff000080a39000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 6.641494] x17: 3136564e3631564e x16: 0000000000000324 x15: ffff800011c78709 [ 6.648613] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800011a22850 x12: 00000000000009ab [ 6.655730] x11: 0000000000000339 x10: ffff800011a22850 x9 : ffff800011a22850 [ 6.662848] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff800011a7a850 x6 : ffff800011a7a850 [ 6.669966] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 40000000fffff339 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 6.677084] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00008093b800 [ 6.684205] Call trace: [ 6.691319] drm_mode_config_validate+0x238/0x4d0 [ 6.693577] drm_dev_register+0x17c/0x210 [ 6.698435] msm_drm_bind+0x4b4/0x694 [ 6.702429] try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1d0 [ 6.706075] __component_add+0xa0/0x170 [ 6.710415] component_add+0x14/0x20 [ 6.714234] msm_hdmi_dev_probe+0x1c/0x2c [ 6.718053] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0 [ 6.721959] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c [ 6.725606] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144 [ 6.729600] driver_probe_device+0xc8/0x15c [ 6.734114] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120 [ 6.738106] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xd0 [ 6.742619] __device_attach+0xdc/0x184 [ 6.746351] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 6.750172] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4 [ 6.754337] deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xc0 [ 6.758158] process_one_work+0x1d0/0x370 [ 6.762671] worker_thread+0x2c8/0x470 [ 6.766839] kthread+0x15c/0x170 [ 6.770483] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 6.773870] ---[ end trace 5884eb76cd26d274 ]--- [ 6.777500] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.782043] [CRTC:93:crtc-0] must not have both a cursor plane and a cursor_move func [ 6.782063] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 76 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:654 drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.794362] Modules linked in: [ 6.804600] CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.15.0-rc1-dirty #43 [ 6.807555] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT) [ 6.816148] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 6.822311] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 6.828126] pc : drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.834981] lr : drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.840189] sp : ffff8000121b3980 [ 6.845223] x29: ffff8000121b3990 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 6.848525] x26: ffff8000114cde50 x25: ffff8000114cdd40 x24: ffff0000987282d8 [ 6.855643] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 6.862763] x20: ffff000098728000 x19: ffff000080a39000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 6.869879] x17: 3136564e3631564e x16: 0000000000000324 x15: ffff800011c790c2 [ 6.876998] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800011a22850 x12: 0000000000000a2f [ 6.884116] x11: 0000000000000365 x10: ffff800011a22850 x9 : ffff800011a22850 [ 6.891234] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff800011a7a850 x6 : ffff800011a7a850 [ 6.898351] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 40000000fffff365 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 6.905470] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00008093b800 [ 6.912590] Call trace: [ 6.919702] drm_mode_config_validate+0x290/0x4d0 [ 6.921960] drm_dev_register+0x17c/0x210 [ 6.926821] msm_drm_bind+0x4b4/0x694 [ 6.930813] try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1d0 [ 6.934459] __component_add+0xa0/0x170 [ 6.938799] component_add+0x14/0x20 [ 6.942619] msm_hdmi_dev_probe+0x1c/0x2c [ 6.946438] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0 [ 6.950345] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c [ 6.953991] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144 [ 6.957984] driver_probe_device+0xc8/0x15c [ 6.962498] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120 [ 6.966492] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xd0 [ 6.971004] __device_attach+0xdc/0x184 [ 6.974737] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 6.978556] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4 [ 6.982722] deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xc0 [ 6.986543] process_one_work+0x1d0/0x370 [ 6.991057] worker_thread+0x2c8/0x470 [ 6.995223] kthread+0x15c/0x170 [ 6.998869] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 7.002255] ---[ end trace 5884eb76cd26d275 ]--- Fixes: aa649e8 ("drm/msm/mdp5: mdp5_crtc: Restore cursor state only if LM cursors are enabled") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210925192824.3416259-1-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
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that referenced
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Apr 8, 2022
commit ff8376a upstream. Some function calls are not implemented in rxrpc_no_security, there are preparse_server_key, free_preparse_server_key and destroy_server_key. When rxrpc security type is rxrpc_no_security, user can easily trigger a null-ptr-deref bug via ioctl. So judgment should be added to prevent it The crash log: user@syzkaller:~$ ./rxrpc_preparse_s [ 37.956878][T15626] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 37.957645][T15626] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [ 37.958229][T15626] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [ 37.958762][T15626] PGD 4aadf067 P4D 4aadf067 PUD 4aade067 PMD 0 [ 37.959321][T15626] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 37.959739][T15626] CPU: 0 PID: 15626 Comm: rxrpc_preparse_ Not tainted 5.17.0-01442-gb47d5a4f6b8d #43 [ 37.960588][T15626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 37.961474][T15626] RIP: 0010:0x0 [ 37.961787][T15626] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. [ 37.962480][T15626] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d9abdc0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 37.963018][T15626] RAX: ffffffff84335200 RBX: ffff888012a1ce80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 37.963727][T15626] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff84a736dc RDI: ffffc9000d9abe48 [ 37.964425][T15626] RBP: ffffc9000d9abe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 37.965118][T15626] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff888013145680 [ 37.965836][T15626] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffec R15: ffff8880432aba80 [ 37.966441][T15626] FS: 00007f2177907700(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.966979][T15626] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.967384][T15626] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000004aaf1000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 37.967864][T15626] Call Trace: [ 37.968062][T15626] <TASK> [ 37.968240][T15626] rxrpc_preparse_s+0x59/0x90 [ 37.968541][T15626] key_create_or_update+0x174/0x510 [ 37.968863][T15626] __x64_sys_add_key+0x139/0x1d0 [ 37.969165][T15626] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 [ 37.969451][T15626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 37.969824][T15626] RIP: 0033:0x43a1f9 Signed-off-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> Tested-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2022-March/005069.html Fixes: 12da59f ("rxrpc: Hand server key parsing off to the security class") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164865013439.2941502.8966285221215590921.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements (8, 24) #43: FILE: include/linux/seq_file.h:152: + if (!ret && inode->i_private) { \ + struct seq_file *seq_f = file->private_data; \ total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 25 lines checked NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace. ./patches/seq_file-introduce-define_seq_attribute-helper-macro.patch has style problems, please review. NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
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Mar 18, 2023
[ Upstream commit 7695034 ] When CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is unset, the stack unwinding function walk_stackframe randomly reads the stack and then, when KASAN is enabled, it can lead to the following backtrace: [ 0.000000] ================================================================== [ 0.000000] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0xa6/0x11a [ 0.000000] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff81807c40 by task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.2.0-12919-g24203e6db61f #43 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007ba8>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c49c80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x22/0x36 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c3783e>] print_report+0x198/0x4a8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f68a>] kasan_report+0x9a/0xc8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e99c>] desc_make_final+0x80/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04e>] stack_trace_save+0x88/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099fc2>] filter_irq_stacks+0x72/0x76 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006b95e>] devkmsg_read+0x32a/0x32e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec16>] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x52 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e998>] desc_make_final+0x7c/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04a>] stack_trace_save+0x84/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec52>] kasan_set_track+0x12/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f22e>] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x5e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015e7ea>] __kmem_cache_create+0x21e/0x39a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e133ac>] create_boot_cache+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e17ab2>] kmem_cache_init+0x6c/0x11e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e00fd6>] mm_init+0xd8/0xfe [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e011d8>] start_kernel+0x190/0x3ca [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] and is located at offset 0 in frame: [ 0.000000] stack_trace_save+0x0/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] This frame has 1 object: [ 0.000000] [32, 56) 'c' [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 0.000000] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x81a07 [ 0.000000] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000001000 ff600003f1e3d150 ff600003f1e3d150 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff [ 0.000000] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] >ffffffff81807c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 [ 0.000000] ^ [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ================================================================== Fix that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when reading the stack in imprecise mode. Fixes: 5d8544e ("RISC-V: Generic library routines and assembly") Reported-by: Chathura Rajapaksha <chathura.abeyrathne.lk@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAD7mqryDQCYyJ1gAmtMm8SASMWAQ4i103ptTb0f6Oda=tPY2=A@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308091639.602024-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Mar 18, 2023
[ Upstream commit 7695034 ] When CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is unset, the stack unwinding function walk_stackframe randomly reads the stack and then, when KASAN is enabled, it can lead to the following backtrace: [ 0.000000] ================================================================== [ 0.000000] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0xa6/0x11a [ 0.000000] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff81807c40 by task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.2.0-12919-g24203e6db61f #43 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007ba8>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c49c80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x22/0x36 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c3783e>] print_report+0x198/0x4a8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f68a>] kasan_report+0x9a/0xc8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e99c>] desc_make_final+0x80/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04e>] stack_trace_save+0x88/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099fc2>] filter_irq_stacks+0x72/0x76 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006b95e>] devkmsg_read+0x32a/0x32e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec16>] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x52 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e998>] desc_make_final+0x7c/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04a>] stack_trace_save+0x84/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec52>] kasan_set_track+0x12/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f22e>] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x5e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015e7ea>] __kmem_cache_create+0x21e/0x39a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e133ac>] create_boot_cache+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e17ab2>] kmem_cache_init+0x6c/0x11e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e00fd6>] mm_init+0xd8/0xfe [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e011d8>] start_kernel+0x190/0x3ca [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] and is located at offset 0 in frame: [ 0.000000] stack_trace_save+0x0/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] This frame has 1 object: [ 0.000000] [32, 56) 'c' [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 0.000000] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x81a07 [ 0.000000] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000001000 ff600003f1e3d150 ff600003f1e3d150 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff [ 0.000000] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] >ffffffff81807c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 [ 0.000000] ^ [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ================================================================== Fix that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when reading the stack in imprecise mode. Fixes: 5d8544e ("RISC-V: Generic library routines and assembly") Reported-by: Chathura Rajapaksha <chathura.abeyrathne.lk@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAD7mqryDQCYyJ1gAmtMm8SASMWAQ4i103ptTb0f6Oda=tPY2=A@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308091639.602024-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Mar 18, 2023
[ Upstream commit 7695034 ] When CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is unset, the stack unwinding function walk_stackframe randomly reads the stack and then, when KASAN is enabled, it can lead to the following backtrace: [ 0.000000] ================================================================== [ 0.000000] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0xa6/0x11a [ 0.000000] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff81807c40 by task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.2.0-12919-g24203e6db61f #43 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007ba8>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c49c80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x22/0x36 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c3783e>] print_report+0x198/0x4a8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f68a>] kasan_report+0x9a/0xc8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e99c>] desc_make_final+0x80/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04e>] stack_trace_save+0x88/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099fc2>] filter_irq_stacks+0x72/0x76 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006b95e>] devkmsg_read+0x32a/0x32e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec16>] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x52 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e998>] desc_make_final+0x7c/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04a>] stack_trace_save+0x84/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec52>] kasan_set_track+0x12/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f22e>] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x5e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015e7ea>] __kmem_cache_create+0x21e/0x39a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e133ac>] create_boot_cache+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e17ab2>] kmem_cache_init+0x6c/0x11e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e00fd6>] mm_init+0xd8/0xfe [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e011d8>] start_kernel+0x190/0x3ca [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] and is located at offset 0 in frame: [ 0.000000] stack_trace_save+0x0/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] This frame has 1 object: [ 0.000000] [32, 56) 'c' [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 0.000000] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x81a07 [ 0.000000] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000001000 ff600003f1e3d150 ff600003f1e3d150 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff [ 0.000000] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] >ffffffff81807c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 [ 0.000000] ^ [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ================================================================== Fix that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when reading the stack in imprecise mode. Fixes: 5d8544e ("RISC-V: Generic library routines and assembly") Reported-by: Chathura Rajapaksha <chathura.abeyrathne.lk@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAD7mqryDQCYyJ1gAmtMm8SASMWAQ4i103ptTb0f6Oda=tPY2=A@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308091639.602024-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w
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Mar 18, 2023
[ Upstream commit 7695034 ] When CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is unset, the stack unwinding function walk_stackframe randomly reads the stack and then, when KASAN is enabled, it can lead to the following backtrace: [ 0.000000] ================================================================== [ 0.000000] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0xa6/0x11a [ 0.000000] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff81807c40 by task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.2.0-12919-g24203e6db61f #43 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007ba8>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c49c80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x22/0x36 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c3783e>] print_report+0x198/0x4a8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f68a>] kasan_report+0x9a/0xc8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e99c>] desc_make_final+0x80/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04e>] stack_trace_save+0x88/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099fc2>] filter_irq_stacks+0x72/0x76 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006b95e>] devkmsg_read+0x32a/0x32e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec16>] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x52 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e998>] desc_make_final+0x7c/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04a>] stack_trace_save+0x84/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec52>] kasan_set_track+0x12/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f22e>] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x5e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015e7ea>] __kmem_cache_create+0x21e/0x39a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e133ac>] create_boot_cache+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e17ab2>] kmem_cache_init+0x6c/0x11e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e00fd6>] mm_init+0xd8/0xfe [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e011d8>] start_kernel+0x190/0x3ca [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] and is located at offset 0 in frame: [ 0.000000] stack_trace_save+0x0/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] This frame has 1 object: [ 0.000000] [32, 56) 'c' [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 0.000000] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x81a07 [ 0.000000] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000001000 ff600003f1e3d150 ff600003f1e3d150 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff [ 0.000000] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] >ffffffff81807c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 [ 0.000000] ^ [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ================================================================== Fix that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when reading the stack in imprecise mode. Fixes: 5d8544e ("RISC-V: Generic library routines and assembly") Reported-by: Chathura Rajapaksha <chathura.abeyrathne.lk@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAD7mqryDQCYyJ1gAmtMm8SASMWAQ4i103ptTb0f6Oda=tPY2=A@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308091639.602024-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Apr 1, 2023
When CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is unset, the stack unwinding function walk_stackframe randomly reads the stack and then, when KASAN is enabled, it can lead to the following backtrace: [ 0.000000] ================================================================== [ 0.000000] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0xa6/0x11a [ 0.000000] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff81807c40 by task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.2.0-12919-g24203e6db61f #43 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007ba8>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c49c80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x22/0x36 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c3783e>] print_report+0x198/0x4a8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f68a>] kasan_report+0x9a/0xc8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e99c>] desc_make_final+0x80/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04e>] stack_trace_save+0x88/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099fc2>] filter_irq_stacks+0x72/0x76 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006b95e>] devkmsg_read+0x32a/0x32e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec16>] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x52 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e998>] desc_make_final+0x7c/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04a>] stack_trace_save+0x84/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec52>] kasan_set_track+0x12/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f22e>] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x5e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015e7ea>] __kmem_cache_create+0x21e/0x39a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e133ac>] create_boot_cache+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e17ab2>] kmem_cache_init+0x6c/0x11e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e00fd6>] mm_init+0xd8/0xfe [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e011d8>] start_kernel+0x190/0x3ca [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] and is located at offset 0 in frame: [ 0.000000] stack_trace_save+0x0/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] This frame has 1 object: [ 0.000000] [32, 56) 'c' [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 0.000000] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x81a07 [ 0.000000] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000001000 ff600003f1e3d150 ff600003f1e3d150 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff [ 0.000000] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] >ffffffff81807c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 [ 0.000000] ^ [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ================================================================== Fix that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when reading the stack in imprecise mode. Fixes: 5d8544e ("RISC-V: Generic library routines and assembly") Reported-by: Chathura Rajapaksha <chathura.abeyrathne.lk@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAD7mqryDQCYyJ1gAmtMm8SASMWAQ4i103ptTb0f6Oda=tPY2=A@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308091639.602024-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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Apr 2, 2023
[ Upstream commit bb7a78e ] Under CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y, we can see the following messages on LoongArch, this is because using might_sleep() in preemption disable context. [ 0.001127] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ... [ 0.001222] Booting CPU#1... [ 0.001244] 64-bit Loongson Processor probed (LA464 Core) [ 0.001247] CPU1 revision is: 0014c012 (Loongson-64bit) [ 0.001250] FPU1 revision is: 00000000 [ 0.001252] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:283 [ 0.001255] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 [ 0.001257] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [ 0.001258] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 0.001259] Preemption disabled at: [ 0.001261] [<9000000000223800>] arch_dup_task_struct+0x20/0x110 [ 0.001272] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7+ #43 [ 0.001275] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A5000-7A1000-1w-A2101/Loongson-LS3A5000-7A1000-1w-A2101, BIOS vUDK2018-LoongArch-V4.0.05132-beta10 12/13/202 [ 0.001277] Stack : 0072617764726148 0000000000000000 9000000000222f1c 90000001001e0000 [ 0.001286] 90000001001e3be0 90000001001e3be8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 0.001292] 90000001001e3be8 0000000000000040 90000001001e3cb8 90000001001e3a50 [ 0.001297] 9000000001642000 90000001001e3be8 be694d10ce4139dd 9000000100174500 [ 0.001303] 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 00000000ffffe0a2 0000000000000020 [ 0.001309] 000000000000002f 9000000001354116 00000000056b0000 ffffffffffffffff [ 0.001314] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000014f6e90 9000000001642000 [ 0.001320] 900000000022b69c 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 9000000001736a90 [ 0.001325] 9000000100038000 0000000000000000 9000000000222f34 0000000000000000 [ 0.001331] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000070000 [ 0.001337] ... [ 0.001339] Call Trace: [ 0.001342] [<9000000000222f34>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180 [ 0.001346] [<90000000010bdd80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x88 [ 0.001352] [<9000000000266418>] __might_resched+0x180/0x1cc [ 0.001356] [<90000000010c742c>] mutex_lock+0x20/0x64 [ 0.001359] [<90000000002a8ccc>] irq_find_matching_fwspec+0x48/0x124 [ 0.001364] [<90000000002259c4>] constant_clockevent_init+0x68/0x204 [ 0.001368] [<900000000022acf4>] start_secondary+0x40/0xa8 [ 0.001371] [<90000000010c0124>] smpboot_entry+0x60/0x64 Here are the complete call chains: smpboot_entry() start_secondary() constant_clockevent_init() get_timer_irq() irq_find_matching_fwnode() irq_find_matching_fwspec() mutex_lock() might_sleep() __might_sleep() __might_resched() In order to avoid the above issue, we should break the call chains, using timer_irq_installed variable as check condition to only call get_timer_irq() once in constant_clockevent_init() is a simple and proper way. Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w
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Jan 14, 2024
commit babddbf upstream. when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table. Access such shadow address causes kernel oops. Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA 39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on: [ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003, pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty #43 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90 lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110 ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa. The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range. The generic kasan also has similar oops. It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not the original address. Commit 2f004ee("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP") introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE. This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231009073748.159228-1-haibo.li@mediatek.com Fixes: 2f004ee("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP") Signed-off-by: Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eeb25a0 upstream. .probe() (ahci_init_one()) calls sysfs_add_file_to_group(), however, if probe() fails after this call, we currently never call sysfs_remove_file_from_group(). (The sysfs_remove_file_from_group() call in .remove() (ahci_remove_one()) does not help, as .remove() is not called on .probe() error.) Thus, if probe() fails after the sysfs_add_file_to_group() call, the next time we insmod the module we will get: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/remapped_nvme' CPU: 11 PID: 954 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5 frank-w#43 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x11a/0x130 sysfs_add_file_to_group+0x7e/0xc0 ahci_init_one+0x31f/0xd40 [ahci] Fixes: 894fba7 ("ata: ahci: Add sysfs attribute to show remapped NVMe device count") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240629124210.181537-10-cassel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jul 17, 2024
.probe() (ahci_init_one()) calls sysfs_add_file_to_group(), however, if probe() fails after this call, we currently never call sysfs_remove_file_from_group(). (The sysfs_remove_file_from_group() call in .remove() (ahci_remove_one()) does not help, as .remove() is not called on .probe() error.) Thus, if probe() fails after the sysfs_add_file_to_group() call, the next time we insmod the module we will get: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/remapped_nvme' CPU: 11 PID: 954 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5 #43 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x11a/0x130 sysfs_add_file_to_group+0x7e/0xc0 ahci_init_one+0x31f/0xd40 [ahci] Fixes: 894fba7 ("ata: ahci: Add sysfs attribute to show remapped NVMe device count") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240629124210.181537-10-cassel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
frank-w
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Aug 11, 2024
commit eeb25a0 upstream. .probe() (ahci_init_one()) calls sysfs_add_file_to_group(), however, if probe() fails after this call, we currently never call sysfs_remove_file_from_group(). (The sysfs_remove_file_from_group() call in .remove() (ahci_remove_one()) does not help, as .remove() is not called on .probe() error.) Thus, if probe() fails after the sysfs_add_file_to_group() call, the next time we insmod the module we will get: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/remapped_nvme' CPU: 11 PID: 954 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5 #43 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x11a/0x130 sysfs_add_file_to_group+0x7e/0xc0 ahci_init_one+0x31f/0xd40 [ahci] Fixes: 894fba7 ("ata: ahci: Add sysfs attribute to show remapped NVMe device count") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240629124210.181537-10-cassel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
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Aug 11, 2024
commit eeb25a0 upstream. .probe() (ahci_init_one()) calls sysfs_add_file_to_group(), however, if probe() fails after this call, we currently never call sysfs_remove_file_from_group(). (The sysfs_remove_file_from_group() call in .remove() (ahci_remove_one()) does not help, as .remove() is not called on .probe() error.) Thus, if probe() fails after the sysfs_add_file_to_group() call, the next time we insmod the module we will get: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/remapped_nvme' CPU: 11 PID: 954 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5 #43 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x11a/0x130 sysfs_add_file_to_group+0x7e/0xc0 ahci_init_one+0x31f/0xd40 [ahci] Fixes: 894fba7 ("ata: ahci: Add sysfs attribute to show remapped NVMe device count") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240629124210.181537-10-cassel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
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Aug 11, 2024
commit eeb25a0 upstream. .probe() (ahci_init_one()) calls sysfs_add_file_to_group(), however, if probe() fails after this call, we currently never call sysfs_remove_file_from_group(). (The sysfs_remove_file_from_group() call in .remove() (ahci_remove_one()) does not help, as .remove() is not called on .probe() error.) Thus, if probe() fails after the sysfs_add_file_to_group() call, the next time we insmod the module we will get: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/remapped_nvme' CPU: 11 PID: 954 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5 #43 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x23 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x11a/0x130 sysfs_add_file_to_group+0x7e/0xc0 ahci_init_one+0x31f/0xd40 [ahci] Fixes: 894fba7 ("ata: ahci: Add sysfs attribute to show remapped NVMe device count") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240629124210.181537-10-cassel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Aug 31, 2024
This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ #43 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10 RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000 RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440 ? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0 worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie(); this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv. At the same time, yet another process invoked cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code line: struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres); The next line crashes, obviously: struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache; During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be withdrawn until it drops to zero. The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE"). This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter, the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729162002.3436763-2-dhowells@redhat.com cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Sep 7, 2024
commit f71aa06 upstream. This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [frank-w#1] SMP PTI CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ frank-w#43 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10 RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000 RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440 ? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0 worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie(); this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv. At the same time, yet another process invoked cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code line: struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres); The next line crashes, obviously: struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache; During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be withdrawn until it drops to zero. The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE"). This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter, the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729162002.3436763-2-dhowells@redhat.com cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 14, 2024
commit f71aa06 upstream. This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ #43 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10 RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000 RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440 ? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0 worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie(); this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv. At the same time, yet another process invoked cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code line: struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres); The next line crashes, obviously: struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache; During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be withdrawn until it drops to zero. The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE"). This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter, the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729162002.3436763-2-dhowells@redhat.com cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 14, 2024
commit f71aa06 upstream. This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ #43 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10 RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000 RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440 ? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0 worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie(); this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv. At the same time, yet another process invoked cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code line: struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres); The next line crashes, obviously: struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache; During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be withdrawn until it drops to zero. The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE"). This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter, the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729162002.3436763-2-dhowells@redhat.com cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
frank-w
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Sep 30, 2024
Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a
slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API.
Reproducer:
# mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt
# dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null
...
[ 194.196391] ==================================================================
[ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899
[ 194.197707]
[ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43
[ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
[ 194.200032] Call Trace:
[ 194.200191] <TASK>
[ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
[ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505
[ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0
[ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
[ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210
[ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0
[ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10
[ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340
[ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140
[ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs]
[ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs]
[ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs]
This is because TFM is being used in parallel.
Fix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep
the existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done
in smb3_calc_signature()).
Also remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and
crypto_wait_req() since it's always going to be a synchronous operation.
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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