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SystemSan: arbitrary DNS resolution detection
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catenacyber committed Dec 2, 2022
1 parent 98e0645 commit 707c532
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Showing 8 changed files with 427 additions and 51 deletions.
10 changes: 7 additions & 3 deletions infra/experimental/SystemSan/Makefile
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
CXX = clang++
CFLAGS = -std=c++17 -Wall -Wextra -O3 -g3

all: clean SystemSan target target_file
all: clean SystemSan target target_file target_dns

SystemSan: SystemSan.cpp
SystemSan: SystemSan.cpp inspect_dns.cpp inspect_utils.cpp
$(CXX) $(CFLAGS) -lpthread -o $@ $^

# Needs atheris.
Expand All @@ -17,9 +17,13 @@ target: target.cpp
target_file: target_file.cpp
$(CXX) $(CFLAGS) -fsanitize=address,fuzzer -o $@ $^

target_dns: target_dns.cpp
$(CXX) $(CFLAGS) -fsanitize=address,fuzzer -o $@ $^

test: all vuln.dict
./SystemSan ./target -dict=vuln.dict
./SystemSan ./target_file -dict=vuln.dict
./SystemSan ./target_dns -dict=vuln.dict

pytorch-lightning-1.5.10:
cp SystemSan.cpp PoEs/pytorch-lightning-1.5.10/; \
Expand All @@ -34,4 +38,4 @@ node-shell-quote-v1.7.3:
docker run -t systemsan_node-shell-quote:latest;

clean:
rm -f SystemSan /tmp/tripwire target target_file
rm -f SystemSan /tmp/tripwire target target_file target_dns
53 changes: 5 additions & 48 deletions infra/experimental/SystemSan/SystemSan.cpp
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
#include <string>
#include <vector>

#include "inspect_utils.h"
#include "inspect_dns.h"

#define DEBUG_LOGS 0

#if DEBUG_LOGS
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -77,16 +80,6 @@ constexpr int kRootDirMaxLength = 16;
// The PID of the root process we're fuzzing.
pid_t g_root_pid;

// Structure to know which thread id triggered the bug.
struct ThreadParent {
// Parent thread ID, ie creator.
pid_t parent_tid;
// Current thread ID ran exec to become another process.
bool ran_exec = false;

ThreadParent() : parent_tid(0) {}
ThreadParent(pid_t tid) : parent_tid(tid) {}
};
// Map of a PID/TID its PID/TID creator and wether it ran exec.
std::map<pid_t, ThreadParent> root_pids;

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -162,23 +155,6 @@ pid_t run_child(char **argv) {
return pid;
}

std::vector<std::byte> read_memory(pid_t pid, unsigned long long address,
size_t size) {
std::vector<std::byte> memory;

for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i += sizeof(long)) {
long word = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKTEXT, pid, address + i, 0);
if (word == -1) {
return memory;
}

std::byte *word_bytes = reinterpret_cast<std::byte *>(&word);
memory.insert(memory.end(), word_bytes, word_bytes + sizeof(long));
}

return memory;
}

// Construct a string with the memory specified in a register.
std::string read_string(pid_t pid, unsigned long reg, unsigned long length) {
auto memory = read_memory(pid, reg, length);
Expand All @@ -191,27 +167,6 @@ std::string read_string(pid_t pid, unsigned long reg, unsigned long length) {
return content;
}

void report_bug(std::string bug_type, pid_t tid) {
// Report the bug found based on the bug code.
std::cerr << "===BUG DETECTED: " << bug_type.c_str() << "===\n";
// Rely on sanitizers/libFuzzer to produce a stacktrace by sending SIGABRT
// to the root process.
// Note: this may not be reliable or consistent if shell injection happens
// in an async way.
// Find the thread group id, that is the pid.
pid_t pid = tid;
auto parent = root_pids[tid];
while (!parent.ran_exec) {
// Find the first parent which ran exec syscall.
if (parent.parent_tid == g_root_pid) {
break;
}
pid = parent.parent_tid;
parent = root_pids[parent.parent_tid];
}
tgkill(pid, tid, SIGABRT);
}

void inspect_for_injection(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs) {
// Inspect a PID's registers for the sign of shell injection.
std::string path = read_string(pid, regs.rdi, kTripWire.length());
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -459,6 +414,8 @@ int trace(std::map<pid_t, Tracee> pids) {
}
}

inspect_dns_syscalls(pid, regs);

if (regs.orig_rax == __NR_openat) {
inspect_for_arbitrary_file_open(pid, regs);
}
Expand Down
235 changes: 235 additions & 0 deletions infra/experimental/SystemSan/inspect_dns.cpp
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
/*
* Copyright 2022 Google LLC
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/* A detector that uses ptrace to identify shell injection vulnerabilities. */

/* POSIX */
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <unistd.h>

/* Linux */
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <syscall.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>

#include <iostream>

#include "inspect_utils.h"

// Arbitrary domain name resolution
const std::string kArbitraryDomainNameResolution = "Arbitrary domain name resolution";

// Global constant for one file descriptor about of a DNS socket
int kFdDns = 0;

#define DNS_HEADER_LEN 12


void inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_connect(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs) {
auto memory = read_memory(pid, regs.rsi, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
if (memory.size()) {
struct sockaddr_in * sa = reinterpret_cast<struct sockaddr_in *>(memory.data());
if (sa->sin_family == AF_INET && htons(sa->sin_port) == 53) {
// save file descriptor for later sendmmsg
kFdDns = regs.rdi;
}
}
}

struct DnsHeader {
uint16_t tx_id;
uint16_t flags;
uint16_t questions;
uint16_t answers;
uint16_t nameservers;
uint16_t additional;
};

struct DnsHeader parse_dns_header(std::vector<std::byte> data) {
struct DnsHeader h;
h.tx_id = (((uint16_t) data[0]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[1]);
h.flags = (((uint16_t) data[2]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[3]);
h.questions = (((uint16_t) data[4]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[5]);
h.answers = (((uint16_t) data[6]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[7]);
h.nameservers = (((uint16_t) data[8]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[9]);
h.additional = (((uint16_t) data[10]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[11]);
return h;
}

bool dns_flags_standard_query(uint16_t flags) {
if ((flags & 0x8000) == 0) {
// Query, not response.
if (((flags & 0x7800) >> 11) == 0) {
// Opcode 0 is standard query.
if ((flags & 0x0200) == 0) {
// Message is not truncated.
if ((flags & 0x0040) == 0) {
// Z-bit reserved flag is unset.
return true;
}
}
}
}
return false;
}

struct DnsRequest {
// Start of name in the byte vector.
size_t offset;
// End of name in the byte vector.
size_t end;
// Length of top level domain.
uint8_t tld_size;
// Number of levels/dots in domain name.
size_t nb_levels;
// DNS type like A is 1.
uint16_t dns_type;
// DNS class like IN is 1.
uint16_t dns_class;
};

struct DnsRequest parse_dns_request(std::vector<std::byte> data, size_t offset) {
struct DnsRequest r;
r.offset = offset;
r.tld_size = 0;
r.nb_levels = 0;
while(offset < data.size()) {
uint8_t rlen = uint8_t(data[offset]);
if (rlen == 0) {
break;
}
r.nb_levels++;
offset += rlen+1;
r.tld_size = rlen;
}
if (offset <= 4 + data.size()) {
r.end = offset;
r.dns_type = (((uint16_t) data[offset]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[offset+1]);
r.dns_class = (((uint16_t) data[offset+2]) << 8) | ((uint16_t) data[offset+3]);
} else {
r.end = data.size();
}
return r;
}

void log_dns_request(struct DnsRequest r, std::vector<std::byte> data) {
size_t offset = r.offset;
std::cerr << "===Domain resolved: ";
while(offset < r.end) {
uint8_t rlen = uint8_t(data[offset]);
if (rlen == 0) {
break;
}
std::cerr << '.';
for (uint8_t i = 1; i < rlen+1; i++) {
std::cerr << (char) data[offset + i];
}
offset += rlen+1;
}
std::cerr << "===\n";
std::cerr << "===DNS request type: " << r.dns_type << ", class: " << r.dns_class << "===\n";
}

void inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_pkt(std::vector<std::byte> data, pid_t pid) {
if (data.size() < DNS_HEADER_LEN + 1) {
return;
}
struct DnsHeader h = parse_dns_header(data);
if (h.questions != 1) {
return;
}
if (h.answers != 0 || h.nameservers != 0 || h.additional != 0) {
return;
}
if (!dns_flags_standard_query(h.flags)) {
return;
}

struct DnsRequest req = parse_dns_request(data, DNS_HEADER_LEN);
// Alert if the top level domain is only one character and
// if there is more than just the TLD.
if (req.tld_size == 1 && req.nb_levels > 1 && req.end < data.size()) {
report_bug(kArbitraryDomainNameResolution, pid);
log_dns_request(req, data);
}
}

void inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_fdbuffer(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs) {
if (kFdDns > 0 && kFdDns == (int) regs.rdi) {
auto memory = read_memory(pid, regs.rsi, regs.rdx);
if (memory.size()) {
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_pkt(memory, pid);
}
}
}

void inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_iov(pid_t pid, unsigned long iov) {
auto memory = read_memory(pid, iov, sizeof(struct iovec));
if (memory.size()) {
struct iovec * iovec = reinterpret_cast<struct iovec *>(memory.data());
memory = read_memory(pid, (unsigned long) iovec->iov_base, iovec->iov_len);
if (memory.size()) {
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_pkt(memory, pid);
}
}
}

void inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_sendmsg(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs) {
if (kFdDns > 0 && kFdDns == (int) regs.rdi) {
auto memory = read_memory(pid, regs.rsi, sizeof(struct msghdr));
if (memory.size()) {
struct msghdr * msg = reinterpret_cast<struct msghdr *>(memory.data());
if (msg->msg_iovlen == 1) {
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_iov(pid, (unsigned long) msg->msg_iov);
}
}
}
}

void inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_sendmmsg(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs) {
if (kFdDns > 0 && kFdDns == (int) regs.rdi) {
auto memory = read_memory(pid, regs.rsi, sizeof(struct mmsghdr));
if (memory.size()) {
struct mmsghdr * msg = reinterpret_cast<struct mmsghdr *>(memory.data());
if (msg->msg_hdr.msg_iovlen == 1) {
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_iov(pid, (unsigned long) msg->msg_hdr.msg_iov);
}
}
}
}

void inspect_dns_syscalls(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs) {
switch (regs.orig_rax) {
case __NR_connect:
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_connect(pid, regs);
break;
case __NR_close:
if (kFdDns > 0 && kFdDns == (int) regs.rdi) {
// reset DNS file descriptor on close
kFdDns = 0;
}
break;
case __NR_sendmmsg:
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_sendmmsg(pid, regs);
break;
case __NR_sendmsg:
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_sendmsg(pid, regs);
break;
case __NR_sendto:
// fallthrough
case __NR_write:
inspect_for_arbitrary_dns_fdbuffer(pid, regs);
}
}
26 changes: 26 additions & 0 deletions infra/experimental/SystemSan/inspect_dns.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
/*
* Copyright 2022 Google LLC
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/* A detector that uses ptrace to identify DNS arbitrary resolutions. */


/* POSIX */
#include <unistd.h>

/* Linux */
#include <sys/ptrace.h>


void inspect_dns_syscalls(pid_t pid, const user_regs_struct &regs);
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