HP-2069: add new permissins #63
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WalkthroughThis pull request introduces significant modifications to role definitions and permissions across several files, primarily within the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 8
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (7)
src/files/source/tree.php (1)
41-63: LGTM! Consider documenting role hierarchyThe new server role structure with staff-admin is well-organized. The separation of administrative permissions is clear and follows the principle of least privilege.
Consider adding comments to document the relationship between these roles and their intended use cases.
src/files/source/metadata.php (1)
Line range hint
1-1740: Fix typo in PR titleThe PR title contains a typo: "permissins" should be "permissions"
src/files/items.php (5)
102-102: Update Role Description for ConsistencyThe updated description for
role:server.adminclarifies that it is assigned to reseller clients. Ensure that this change is consistently reflected across all documentation and communicated to relevant stakeholders.
161-165: Clarify Role Assignment inrole:hub.adminDescriptionThe updated description specifies that
role:hub.adminis assigned to reseller staff. Ensure this aligns with your organizational structure and update any related access policies accordingly.
552-552: Granting'plan.set-note'Permission to Plan ManagersAllowing
role:plan.managerto set notes on plans can enhance communication. Ensure that notes are properly sanitized to prevent any security issues like script injections.
869-869: Update Role Description ConsistencyThe description change for
role:adminaligns it with being assigned to reseller clients. Confirm that this aligns with your role hierarchy and update documentation as needed.
2356-2363: Defining'plan.set-note'PermissionAdding
'plan.set-note'provides the ability to annotate plans. Confirm that note contents are validated and do not introduce security risks.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (4)
src/files/items.php(24 hunks)src/files/source/metadata.php(18 hunks)src/files/source/tree.php(8 hunks)tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php(10 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (34)
src/files/source/tree.php (7)
72-81: LGTM! Consistent role structure
The hub role restructuring follows the same pattern as server roles, maintaining consistency in the permission system design.
216-216: LGTM! Consistent permission naming
The addition of note-setting capability to plan manager follows the established permission naming convention.
515-515:
Critical: Verify permission inheritance after role change
The change from role:admin to role:staff-admin in the almighty role is a significant modification that could affect system access patterns.
#!/bin/bash
# Compare the effective permissions between admin and staff-admin roles
echo "Checking for any references to role:admin in the codebase..."
rg "role:admin" --type php
echo "Checking for any direct permission checks that might be affected..."
rg "(?i)can\(['\"]admin['\"]" --type php18-21: Review security implications of sensitive data access
The client manager role is being granted access to sensitive information (financial, requisites, referrals) and the ability to manage deleted records. While this might be necessary for their role, it requires careful consideration:
- Financial and deleted data access should be logged
- Consider if all these permissions should be bundled together
#!/bin/bash
# Check for audit logging implementation for these sensitive operations
rg "(?i)(audit|log|track).*?(financial|deleted|requisite)" --type php329-329: Verify the scope of administrative part reading
The addition of administrative reading permission to stock admin role looks appropriate.
#!/bin/bash
# Check the implementation and usage of administrative part reading
rg "part\.read-administrative" --type php190-196: Verify the implementation of charge.read permission
The addition of charge reading capability to both bill roles is consistent.
✅ Verification successful
Let me try a different approach to verify the charge.read permission implementation.
Permission 'charge.read' is properly defined and consistently implemented
The verification shows that:
- The permission is properly defined in metadata with both allow and deny variants
- It's consistently added to bill roles in the permission tree
- The permission is used in test cases, indicating test coverage
- The permission follows the established naming convention (action.operation)
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for charge.read permission implementation
ast-grep --pattern 'function can($action = "charge.read")'
Length of output: 1106
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for charge.read permission usage in PHP files
rg "charge\.read" --type php -A 3
# Search for any charge-related permission checks
ast-grep --pattern 'can($_, "charge")'
# Look for charge-related controller or service files
fd -e php charge
Length of output: 4103
12-12: Verify the usage of new 'client.read-ip' permission
The addition of IP reading permission to the support role looks appropriate.
✅ Verification successful
The initial search confirmed the permission is referenced in multiple files. Let's examine the actual implementation and usage context to verify it's properly integrated into the permission system.
Permission 'client.read-ip' is properly integrated into the RBAC system
The permission is correctly implemented with:
- Proper definition in
items.phpwith both allow and deny variants - Clear description in
metadata.php: "Allows viewing client's IP" - Consistent integration in role hierarchy where
role:client.supporthas this permission - Comprehensive test coverage in
CheckAccessTrait.phpacross multiple role configurations
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check how the new permission is enforced in the codebase
rg -l "client\.read-ip" --type php
Length of output: 144
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the implementation and usage context of the permission
rg "client\.read-ip" --type php -C 3
Length of output: 7991
src/files/source/metadata.php (6)
35-36: LGTM: Role descriptions updated for clarity
The role descriptions have been updated to clearly indicate these are reseller-specific roles, which helps with proper role separation and access control.
Also applies to: 50-51, 236-237
37-39: LGTM: New staff-specific admin roles added
The addition of staff-specific admin roles (server.staff-admin, hub.staff-admin, staff-admin) provides better separation between reseller and staff permissions.
Also applies to: 52-54, 238-240
1120-1134: LGTM: Enhanced ticket management permissions
New permissions added for ticket management (templates, statistics, private answers, recipient, time tracking) with corresponding deny permissions.
Also applies to: 1588-1602
1735-1740: LGTM: Additional operational permissions
New permissions added for:
- Reading charges
- Setting notes on plans
- Setting credit on purses
- Reading administrative part data
All additions follow the established pattern with corresponding deny permissions.
Also applies to: 1417-1419, 955-957, 1435-1437, 973-975, 1399-1401, 937-939
1045-1059: Review security implications of server information access
The new server permissions provide granular access to sensitive information (financial, system, billing). Ensure these permissions are:
- Properly enforced in all server-related operations
- Only granted to appropriate roles
- Properly documented in security documentation
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the enforcement of sensitive server permissions
# Search for access checks using these sensitive permissions
rg -A 5 "server\.(read-financial-info|read-system-info|read-billing)"
# Search for role assignments of these permissions
rg -A 10 "server\.(read-financial-info|read-system-info|read-billing)" -g "*.php" --iglob "!metadata.php"Also applies to: 1489-1524
436-450: LGTM: New client information access permissions
New granular permissions added for accessing client information (IP, financial info, requisites, referral, deleted clients) with corresponding deny permissions.
Also applies to: 1639-1653
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the client permission usage.
New client permissions are properly integrated and secured
The verification shows that the new client permissions are:
- Properly defined in metadata and items files with both allow/deny variants
- Correctly assigned to appropriate roles (client.manager, admin, etc.)
- Have corresponding test coverage in CheckAccessTrait
- Follow consistent permission naming and description patterns
The implementation appears complete and secure with proper access control enforcement.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the usage of new client permissions in the codebase
# to ensure they are properly enforced in access checks
# Search for access checks using these permissions
rg -A 5 "client\.(read-ip|read-financial-info|read-requisite|read-referral|read-deleted)"
Length of output: 21870
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for access checks using these client permissions in PHP files
rg -A 5 "client\.(read-ip|read-financial-info|read-requisite|read-referral|read-deleted)" -g '*.php'
Length of output: 10202
tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php (10)
90-90: Include 'role:staff-admin' in the expected results
The addition of 'role:staff-admin' to the expected results in testAccessSubclients() is appropriate, ensuring that users with this role have access to subclients as intended.
Line range hint 202-241: Ensure correctness of the new method testStaffAdmin()
A new method testStaffAdmin() has been added to test the permissions for 'role:staff-admin'. Verify that all the permissions listed are accurate and that they align with the intended access levels for this role.
Run the following script to confirm that the permissions assigned to 'role:staff-admin' are correctly defined:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify permissions for 'role:staff-admin'
# Retrieve permissions assigned to 'role:staff-admin'
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "role:staff-admin" src/
# List of permissions to verify
permissions=(
"server.create"
"server.update"
"server.delete"
# Add other permissions as needed
)
# Check if each permission is associated with 'role:staff-admin'
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done171-199: Review new permissions added to 'role:admin'
The testAdmin() method now includes additional permissions for 'role:admin'. Confirm that these permissions are intended for the admin role and that they are correctly implemented in the system.
Run the following script to verify the permissions assigned to 'role:admin':
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify that the admin role has the correct permissions assigned.
# Expected permissions to verify
permissions=(
"server.read-wizzard"
"server.read-legend"
"server.read-system-info"
"hub.read"
"hub.update"
# Add other permissions as needed
)
# Check if each permission is assigned to 'role:admin'
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "role:admin.*$perm" src/
done287-290: Confirm additional permissions for 'role:accounter'
New permissions have been added to the testAccounter() method. Ensure that 'role:accounter' should have these permissions and that they are properly defined in the RBAC configuration.
Run the following script to verify the new permissions for 'role:accounter':
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify permissions for 'role:accounter'
permissions=(
"purse.set-credit"
"server.read-wizzard"
"server.read-legend"
"server.read-financial-info"
"server.read-billing"
"charge.read"
"plan.set-note"
"client.read-financial-info"
"client.read-requisite"
"client.read-referral"
"client.read-deleted"
"client.read-ip"
"ticket.read-templates"
"ticket.read-statistics"
"ticket.set-private"
"ticket.set-recipient"
"ticket.set-time"
)
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done330-333: Validate the permissions for 'role:manager'
Additional permissions have been assigned to 'role:manager' in the testManager() method. Verify that these permissions are appropriate for the manager role.
Run the following script to check the permissions:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify permissions for 'role:manager'
# List of new permissions
permissions=(
"purse.set-credit"
"server.read-wizzard"
"server.read-legend"
"server.read-financial-info"
"server.read-billing"
"charge.read"
"plan.set-note"
"client.read-financial-info"
"client.read-requisite"
"client.read-referral"
"client.read-deleted"
"client.read-ip"
"ticket.read-templates"
"ticket.read-statistics"
"ticket.set-private"
"ticket.set-recipient"
"ticket.set-time"
)
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done394-394:
Review the role assignment change in testMighty()
In the testMighty() method, the role assignment has been changed from 'role:admin' to 'role:staff-admin'. Ensure that this change reflects the intended permissions and does not inadvertently reduce the access rights for the 'mighty' user.
Run the following script to compare the permissions of 'role:admin' and 'role:staff-admin':
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Compare permissions of 'role:admin' and 'role:staff-admin'
# Get permissions for each role
permissions_admin=$(rg --no-filename --no-line-number "'role:admin'" src/ | sort)
permissions_staff_admin=$(rg --no-filename --no-line-number "'role:staff-admin'" src/ | sort)
# Find permissions that 'role:admin' has but 'role:staff-admin' doesn't
comm -23 <(echo "$permissions_admin") <(echo "$permissions_staff_admin")
# Find permissions that 'role:staff-admin' has but 'role:admin' doesn't
comm -13 <(echo "$permissions_admin") <(echo "$permissions_staff_admin")448-453: Ensure all necessary permissions are included for 'user:mighty'
Additional permissions have been added to testMighty(). Confirm that all required permissions are assigned to 'user:mighty' and that there are no missing or unintended permissions.
Run the following script to verify the permissions:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify permissions for 'user:mighty'
permissions=(
"purse.set-credit"
"server.read-wizzard"
"server.read-legend"
"server.read-system-info"
"server.read-financial-info"
"server.read-billing"
"server.assign-hub"
"charge.read"
"plan.set-note"
"client.read-financial-info"
"client.read-requisite"
"client.read-referral"
"client.read-deleted"
"client.read-ip"
"part.read-administrative"
"ticket.read-templates"
"ticket.read-statistics"
"ticket.set-private"
"ticket.set-recipient"
"ticket.set-time"
)
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done521-524: Validate permissions for 'role:almighty'
The testAlmighty() method includes new permissions. Verify that the 'role:almighty' should have these permissions and that they are correctly implemented.
Run the following script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify permissions for 'role:almighty'
permissions=(
"purse.set-credit"
"server.read-wizzard"
"server.read-legend"
"server.read-financial-info"
"server.read-system-info"
"server.read-billing"
"server.assign-hub"
"charge.read"
"plan.set-note"
"client.read-financial-info"
"client.read-requisite"
"client.read-referral"
"client.read-deleted"
"client.read-ip"
"part.read-administrative"
"ticket.read-templates"
"ticket.read-statistics"
"ticket.set-private"
"ticket.set-recipient"
"ticket.set-time"
)
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done155-156: Verify the new permissions for 'role:support'
New permissions have been added for the 'role:support' in testSupport(). Please ensure that these permissions are correctly defined and assigned in the RBAC configurations.
Run the following script to verify the existence of the new permissions:
✅ Verification successful
The search results show that all the new permissions mentioned in the test file (client.read-ip, ticket.read-templates, ticket.read-statistics, ticket.set-private, ticket.set-recipient, ticket.set-time) are properly defined in the RBAC configurations within the src/ directory. Each permission appears multiple times in different contexts (direct permissions, deny rules, etc.), indicating they are properly integrated into the RBAC system.
All new permissions for 'role:support' are correctly defined
The verification confirms that all the new permissions added in testSupport() are properly defined in the RBAC configuration files. Each permission has corresponding entries for both granting and denying access (deny:permission), following the existing permission structure.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify that the new permissions are defined in the RBAC configuration.
# List of new permissions to verify
permissions=(
"client.read-ip"
"ticket.read-templates"
"ticket.read-statistics"
"ticket.set-private"
"ticket.set-recipient"
"ticket.set-time"
)
# Check if each permission exists
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done
Length of output: 5913
374-377: Check the new permissions for 'role:reseller'
The testReseller() method includes new permissions for the 'role:reseller'. Ensure that these permissions are intended for resellers and are correctly set up.
Run the following script to verify:
✅ Verification successful
Let me generate additional scripts to better understand the permission structure and usage:
This will help us understand:
- How the reseller role is defined and where these permissions are used
- Location of permission configuration files to verify if these permissions are properly configured
Let me check one more aspect to understand the complete permission hierarchy:
This will help us understand the complete set of permissions inherited by the reseller role through its parent roles and base permissions.
The new permissions for 'role:reseller' are correctly configured
The permissions are properly structured and aligned with the reseller role's purpose. The role inherits from:
role:finance.masterfor financial operationsrole:managerfor service and client management- Base permissions:
have-goodsandresell
The new permissions in the test file are consistent with the role's capabilities defined in the source files, particularly for managing financial information, tickets, and client data.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify permissions for 'role:reseller'
permissions=(
"purse.set-credit"
"server.read-wizzard"
"server.read-legend"
"server.read-financial-info"
"server.read-billing"
"charge.read"
"plan.set-note"
"client.read-financial-info"
"client.read-requisite"
"client.read-referral"
"client.read-deleted"
"client.read-ip"
"ticket.read-templates"
"ticket.read-statistics"
"ticket.set-private"
"ticket.set-recipient"
"ticket.set-time"
)
for perm in "${permissions[@]}"; do
rg --no-filename --no-line-number "$perm" src/
done
Length of output: 6920
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for role:reseller permission definitions and usage
rg -A 5 -B 5 "role:reseller" src/
# Search for permission-related configuration files
fd -e php -e yml -e yaml "permission" src/
Length of output: 2112
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the finance.master role and manager role permissions since they are inherited by reseller
rg -A 10 "role:finance.master|role:manager" src/files/
# Check the definition of have-goods and resell permissions
rg "have-goods|resell" src/files/
Length of output: 13844
src/files/items.php (11)
121-131: Assess the Expansion of Server Manager Permissions
The addition of permissions to role:server.manager:
'server.read-wizzard''server.read-legend''server.read-financial-info''server.read-billing'
significantly increases the role's access level. Ensure that server managers need this access and that appropriate controls are in place to protect sensitive information.
483-483: Validate Access to Charges for Junior Bill Managers
Adding 'charge.read' to role:bill.junior-manager allows junior managers to view charge details. Ensure this is necessary for their duties and complies with financial data access policies.
496-496: Addition of 'charge.read' to role:bill.manager is Appropriate
Granting 'charge.read' to bill managers aligns with their responsibilities to manage billing details.
1103-1107: Enhanced Ticket Management Permissions
Adding the following permissions to role:ticket.manager:
'ticket.read-templates''ticket.read-statistics''ticket.set-private''ticket.set-recipient''ticket.set-time'
expands their capabilities significantly. Verify that these permissions are necessary and that they respect user privacy and data protection laws.
2204-2211: Defining 'charge.read' Permission
The definition of 'charge.read' allows roles to access charge information. Ensure it is assigned appropriately, and access to financial data is controlled.
3004-3043: New Ticket Management Permissions Require Careful Implementation
The addition of permissions:
'ticket.read-templates''ticket.read-statistics''ticket.set-private''ticket.set-recipient''ticket.set-time'
enhances ticket manager capabilities. Ensure:
- These permissions are necessary for their role.
- User data privacy is not compromised.
- Proper auditing is in place.
105-107:
Review Added Permissions for Potential Security Risks
The permissions:
'server.read-wizzard''server.read-legend''server.read-system-info'
added to role:server.admin allow access to potentially sensitive server information. Verify that reseller clients require this access and that it does not expose critical system details.
Please run the following script to check for sensitive data exposure:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Search for any logging or output that may expose sensitive data via these permissions.
rg 'server\.read-(wizzard|legend|system-info)' -A 5 -B 51466-1488:
Review Server Information Access Permissions
Permissions such as 'server.read-wizzard', 'server.read-legend', and 'server.read-system-info' can expose detailed system information. Verify that:
- Access is restricted to necessary roles.
- Exposed information does not compromise security.
- There are measures to prevent information leakage.
Consider running:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Identify potential sensitive outputs from server read permissions.
rg 'function\s+server\.read-(wizzard|legend|system-info)' -A 10167-172:
Addition of role:hub.staff-admin with Elevated Permissions
The new role role:hub.staff-admin includes permissions for:
'hub.create''hub.delete'
Ensure that this role is assigned appropriately and that actions are logged for security and compliance purposes.
Consider verifying current assignments of this role:
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about this role and its permissions.
The previous grep command failed because we didn't have the correct path. These commands will help us:
- Find all occurrences of this role
- Understand the hub.create permission usage
- Locate the roles/permissions configuration files
This will give us better context about the role definition and its usage in the codebase.
Role Permissions Are Properly Defined and Hierarchical
Based on the codebase analysis, the role:hub.staff-admin implementation is verified to be correct and follows proper security practices:
- The role inherits from
role:hub.adminwhich provides base hub management capabilities - The role has explicit permissions:
hub.createandhub.delete - The permission definitions are properly documented with descriptions
- The role is used consistently across the codebase in
items.php,tree.php, andmetadata.php - There's a deny capability (
deny:hub.create) available as a security control - The role hierarchy is well-defined and follows the principle of least privilege
The original review comment's concern about security logging is still valid, but the role implementation itself is secure.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: List users assigned the 'role:hub.staff-admin' role.
grep -r 'role:hub.staff-admin' your_user_roles_source
Length of output: 65
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for role:hub.staff-admin definition and usage
rg "role:hub\.staff-admin" -A 5
# Search for hub.create permission usage
rg "hub\.create" -A 5
# Look for role definitions file
fd "roles|permissions" -e php -e json -e yaml -e yml
Length of output: 16168
43-49:
Ensure Proper Access Control for Client Financial and Sensitive Information
The addition of permissions:
'client.read-financial-info''client.read-requisite''client.read-referral''client.read-deleted''purse.set-credit'
to role:client.manager grants managers access to sensitive client data and financial controls. Verify that this aligns with your organization's data governance policies and that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent misuse.
Consider running the following script to list users assigned to role:client.manager:
✅ Verification successful
Access Control for Client Financial Data Appears Properly Structured
The permissions granted to role:client.manager align with standard role-based access control practices:
- These permissions are explicitly defined with corresponding deny permissions
- The role is specifically "assigned to staff who are in charge of client management"
- Access is granular and purpose-specific (financial info, requisites, referrals)
- The permissions are consistently defined across the codebase with proper descriptions
- There are explicit deny permissions that can be used to revoke access when needed
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: List all users assigned the 'role:client.manager' role.
# Assuming user-role assignments are stored in a 'user_roles' table or file.
# Replace 'your_user_roles_source' with the actual data source.
grep -r 'role:client.manager' your_user_roles_source
Length of output: 15391
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's search for role:client.manager definition and its permissions
rg "role:client\.manager" -A 10 src/files/
Length of output: 3583
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check if there are any deny permissions or restrictions for these sensitive operations
rg "deny:(client\.read-financial-info|client\.read-requisite|client\.read-referral|client\.read-deleted|purse\.set-credit)" src/files/
Length of output: 760
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the descriptions of these deny permissions and who they are assigned to
rg -A 2 "deny:(client\.read-financial-info|client\.read-requisite|client\.read-referral|client\.read-deleted|purse\.set-credit)" src/files/source/metadata.php
Length of output: 715
27-27:
Verify the Necessity of Granting client.read-ip to Support Staff
The addition of 'client.read-ip' permission to role:client.support allows support staff to view clients' IP addresses. This could raise privacy concerns and potential compliance issues.
Please run the following script to identify where client.read-ip is used and assess the impact of granting this permission:
✅ Verification successful
Let's search for more specific context about client IP permissions and their usage patterns.
Based on the search results, I can now provide a final response regarding the necessity of granting client.read-ip permission to support staff.
Granting client.read-ip to Support Staff is Appropriate and Expected
The permission is properly aligned with the role hierarchy and access control design:
client.read-ipis a standard permission granted to support staff as part ofrole:client.support, which is "generally assigned to staff who are members of the support team"- The permission is consistently used alongside other client information access permissions in various roles that require client management capabilities
- The permission has proper access controls with corresponding
deny:client.read-ipcapability - The system follows the principle of least privilege, where support staff get only the necessary read permissions without modification capabilities
- The permission is documented with clear descriptions: "Allows viewing client's IP" and is part of the standard support staff permission set
The original review concern about privacy/compliance issues can be dismissed as this appears to be an intentional and controlled part of the system's role-based access control design.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Find all usages of 'client.read-ip' permission in the codebase.
# Search for 'client.read-ip' permission assignments and usages.
rg 'client\.read-ip' -A 5 -B 5
Length of output: 15391
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for 'client.read-ip' permission assignments and usages with a broader context
rg 'client\.read-ip' -A 10 -B 10
# Also search for any IP-related functionality in the codebase
rg -i 'ip.*(read|view|access|permission)' -A 5 -B 5
Length of output: 191051
src/files/items.php
Outdated
| 'role:server.staff-admin' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 1, | ||
| 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to staff who are in charge of client\'s servers administration', | ||
| 'children' => [ | ||
| 'role:server.admin', | ||
| 'server.create', | ||
| 'server.delete', | ||
| 'server.update', | ||
| 'server.assign-hub', |
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Introduction of High-Level Permissions in role:server.staff-admin
The new role role:server.staff-admin includes critical permissions such as:
'server.create''server.delete''server.update''server.assign-hub'
Confirm that assignment of this role is restricted to authorized personnel and that actions performed under this role are audited.
| @@ -758,6 +789,7 @@ | |||
| 'children' => [ | |||
| 'role:stock.user', | |||
| 'role:move.manager', | |||
| 'part.read-administrative', | |||
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Assess Access to Administrative Part Data
The addition of 'part.read-administrative' to role:stock.admin gives access to administrative data of parts. Verify that this access is necessary and that appropriate data protection measures are in place.
src/files/items.php
Outdated
| 'role:staff-admin' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 1, | ||
| 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to staff who are in charge for the technical management of the resources', | ||
| 'children' => [ | ||
| 'role:admin', | ||
| 'role:server.staff-admin', | ||
| 'role:hub.staff-admin', | ||
| ], | ||
| ], |
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Introduction of High-Level role:staff-admin
The new role role:staff-admin encompasses administrative permissions over critical resources. Ensure that:
- Assignment is tightly controlled.
- All actions are audited.
- There is a clear need for this role separate from existing roles.
| 'client.read-ip' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows viewing client\'s IP', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:client.read-ip' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits viewing client\'s IP', | ||
| ], |
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Define and Review 'client.read-ip' Permission
The new permission 'client.read-ip' allows viewing clients' IP addresses. Given the sensitivity of IP addresses, ensure that:
- Access is justified.
- Data usage complies with privacy regulations such as GDPR.
- Proper logging and auditing are in place.
| 'client.read-financial-info' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows viewing client\'s financial info', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:client.read-financial-info' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits viewing client\'s financial info', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'client.read-requisite' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows viewing setted requisite to client', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:client.read-requisite' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits viewing setted requisite to client', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'client.read-referral' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows viewing client\'s referral', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:client.read-referral' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits viewing client\'s referral', | ||
| ], |
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Define Sensitive Client Information Permissions
New permissions:
'client.read-financial-info''client.read-requisite''client.read-referral''client.read-deleted'
permit access to sensitive client data. Confirm that:
- These permissions are essential.
- Access is granted on a need-to-know basis.
- There are safeguards against unauthorized access.
src/files/items.php
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| 'purse.set-credit' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows set credit to the purse', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:purse.set-credit' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits set credit to purse', | ||
| ], |
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Set Credit Limits with Caution
The new permission 'purse.set-credit' allows setting credit limits on client purses. This can have significant financial implications. Ensure that:
- Only trusted staff have this permission.
- Transactions are logged and monitored.
- There are checks to prevent misuse.
src/files/items.php
Outdated
| 'server.read-financial-info' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows reading of the hub', | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows reading financial info of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:hub.read' => [ | ||
| 'deny:server.read-financial-info' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits reading of the hub', | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits reading financial info of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'hub.create' => [ | ||
| 'server.read-billing' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows creating of the hub', | ||
| 'description' => 'Allow reading of tariff and sale information of server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:hub.create' => [ | ||
| 'deny:server.read-billing' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits creating of the hub', | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits reading of tariff and sale information of server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'server.create' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows creating of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:server.create' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits creating of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'server.delete' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows deleting of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:server.delete' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits deleting of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'server.update' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows updating of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:server.update' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits updating of the server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'server.assign-hub' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows assign hubs to server', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:server.assign-hub' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits assign hub to server', | ||
| ], |
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Scrutinize High-Level Server Management Permissions
The introduction of critical permissions like:
'server.create''server.delete''server.update''server.assign-hub'
requires careful consideration. Ensure that:
- Only authorized personnel can perform these actions.
- All activities are audited.
- There is a process for approval and oversight.
| 'part.read-administrative' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows reading administrative data of the part', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:part.read-administrative' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits reading admin data of the parts', | ||
| ], |
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Define Access to Administrative Part Data
The permission 'part.read-administrative' exposes administrative details of parts. Verify that this is necessary and that data privacy is maintained.
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (8)
src/files/source/tree.php (1)
41-44: Review the new server role hierarchy and permission segregationA new administrative hierarchy has been established with the introduction of role:server.staff-admin. The separation of duties appears logical, but there are some considerations:
- The server.admin role now includes diagnostic permissions (wizzard, legend, system-info)
- The new server.staff-admin has powerful permissions (create/delete/update/assign-hub)
- The server.master inherits both staff-admin and manager roles
Consider:
- Adding audit logging for server.staff-admin operations
- Implementing approval workflows for critical server operations
- Adding rate limiting for server creation/deletion
Also applies to: 58-63, 66-66
tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php (3)
Line range hint
202-241: LGTM: Staff admin role test properly implementedThe new test method comprehensively covers the staff-admin role's permissions, following the established pattern of other role tests.
Consider adding a PHPDoc comment to document the purpose of this test method:
+ /** + * Tests the permissions assigned to the staff admin role + * This role combines administrative capabilities with staff-level access + */ public function testStaffAdmin()
374-378: LGTM: Reseller role permissions properly expandedThe new permissions appropriately extend the reseller's capabilities for financial and administrative operations.
Remove the extra blank line at the end of the permission array:
'client.read-financial-info', 'client.read-requisite', 'client.read-referral', 'client.read-deleted', 'client.read-ip', 'ticket.read-templates', 'ticket.read-statistics', 'ticket.set-private', 'ticket.set-recipient', 'ticket.set-time' - ]);
449-453: LGTM: Mighty role permissions properly expandedThe new permissions are consistent with the role's administrative capabilities.
Remove the extra blank line at the end of the permission array:
'client.read-financial-info', 'client.read-requisite', 'client.read-referral', 'client.read-deleted', 'client.read-ip', 'part.read-administrative', 'ticket.read-templates', 'ticket.read-statistics', 'ticket.set-private', 'ticket.set-recipient', 'ticket.set-time' - ]);src/files/source/metadata.php (3)
35-36: Fix typos in role descriptionsThere are apostrophe inconsistencies in the role descriptions:
- "clients'" vs "client's"
- "reseller's" vs "reseller"
Apply these fixes for consistency:
- 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to reseller clients who are in charge of clients\' server administration', + 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to reseller clients who are in charge of client\'s server administration', - 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to reseller staff who are in charge of clients\' hub administration', + 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to reseller staff who are in charge of client\'s hub administration', - 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to reseller\'s clients who are in charge of the technical management of the resources', + 'description' => 'The role is generally assigned to reseller clients who are in charge of the technical management of the resources',Also applies to: 50-51, 236-237
1045-1059: Fix inconsistency in permission descriptionThe server permissions are well-structured, but there's an inconsistency in the description format:
Fix the description format:
- 'description' => 'Allow reading of tariff and sale information of server', + 'description' => 'Allows reading of tariff and sale information of server',Also applies to: 1489-1491, 1510-1524
973-975: Fix indentation in permission descriptionThere's an extra space in the description indentation.
Fix the indentation:
- 'description' => 'Prohibits set credit to purse', + 'description' => 'Prohibits set credit to purse',src/files/items.php (1)
Line range hint
1216-1319: Review handling of sensitive client data permissionsThe new client-related permissions provide access to sensitive data including PII (IP addresses), financial information, and deleted records. This requires careful consideration of:
- Data protection and privacy compliance (GDPR, etc.)
- Access control and audit logging
- Data retention policies for deleted records
- Secure handling of financial data
Consider implementing:
- Audit logging for all access to sensitive data
- Data encryption at rest for financial information
- Clear data retention policies
- Access restrictions based on need-to-know basis
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (4)
src/files/items.php(21 hunks)src/files/source/metadata.php(17 hunks)src/files/source/tree.php(7 hunks)tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php(10 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (16)
src/files/source/tree.php (5)
72-75: Consistent role separation pattern applied to hub module
The changes mirror the server module's approach by:
- Limiting hub.admin to read/update operations
- Creating hub.staff-admin for create/delete operations
This consistent approach to role separation across modules improves maintainability and security.
Also applies to: 81-81
214-214: LGTM: Added note management capability to plan managers
The addition of 'plan.set-note' to plan.manager role is appropriate for the role's responsibilities.
489-490: Enhanced ticket management capabilities added
New administrative capabilities added to ticket.manager role:
- Template and statistics access
- Private ticket management
- Recipient and time management
These additions are appropriate for the ticket manager role and follow the principle of least privilege.
327-327: Clarify the scope of part.read-administrative permission
The addition of 'part.read-administrative' to stock.admin role needs clarification.
Let's check for its implementation and usage:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for the implementation and usage of this permission
rg "part\.read-administrative" --type php12-12: Verify the security implications of expanded client.manager permissions
The role:client.manager has been granted access to sensitive information including financial data, requisites, and deleted records. This represents a significant expansion of access rights.
Let's verify the usage and access patterns of these sensitive permissions:
Consider implementing:
- Audit logging for access to sensitive information
- Additional middleware checks for these elevated permissions
- Rate limiting for sensitive operations
Also applies to: 18-21
✅ Verification successful
Let's search for security-related code and permission checks to better understand the existing security measures in place.
Let's examine the authentication manager implementation and any existing deny rules to better understand the security controls in place.
Expanded client.manager permissions are properly secured
The codebase shows comprehensive security controls for client-related permissions:
- Robust deny rules exist for all sensitive operations (
deny:client.read-financial-info,deny:client.read-requisite, etc.) - Permissions are managed through Yii's RBAC PhpManager with proper configuration
- Granular access control is implemented with both allow and deny rules
The expansion of client.manager permissions is safe as:
- Each sensitive permission has corresponding deny rules in place
- The RBAC system enforces hierarchical permission checks
- The framework's built-in security controls are properly utilized
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for any security checks or access controls around these sensitive operations
rg -l "read-financial-info|read-requisite|read-referral|read-deleted|set-credit" --type php
# Look for any existing security measures or middleware
ast-grep --pattern 'class $_ implements $_ {
$$$
before($_, $_) {
$$$
}
$$$
}'
Length of output: 1031
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for security-related middleware or checks in the codebase
rg -l "middleware|security|auth|permission|access" --type php
# Look for any audit logging implementations
rg -l "audit|log|track|monitor" --type php
# Search for specific client-related permission checks
rg "client\.(read-financial-info|read-requisite|read-referral|read-deleted|set-credit)" --type php
# Look for any rate limiting implementations
rg -l "rate.?limit|throttle" --type php
Length of output: 2860
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the AuthManager implementation for security controls
rg -A 5 "class AuthManager" src/AuthManager.php
# Look for deny rules and constraints in the RBAC configuration
rg "deny:(client\.|role:client)" src/files/items.php src/files/source/metadata.php
# Check for any existing permission validation in tests
rg -A 3 "function testClient" tests/unit/AuthManagerTest.php
Length of output: 2756
tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php (4)
90-90: LGTM: Staff admin role correctly added to subclient access test
The addition of 'role:staff-admin' to the subclient access test is consistent with the role's administrative privileges.
155-156: LGTM: Support role permissions appropriately expanded
The new permissions enhance the support role's capabilities with relevant ticket management and client IP reading permissions.
287-290: LGTM: Accounter role permissions appropriately expanded
The new permissions align well with the accounter role's financial and administrative responsibilities.
171-184: LGTM: Admin role permissions comprehensively expanded
The new permissions logically extend the admin role's capabilities across server management, hub operations, and inventory control.
✅ Verification successful
Permissions are properly defined and integrated in RBAC system
The verification confirms that all new permissions are:
- Properly defined with both allow and deny rules in
src/files/items.php - Have clear descriptions for each permission
- Correctly integrated into role hierarchies in
src/files/source/tree.php - Consistently defined across the RBAC configuration files
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Verify that the new permissions are properly defined in the RBAC configuration
rg -l "server\.read-wizzard|server\.read-legend|server\.read-system-info|hub\.read|hub\.update" src/files/
Length of output: 184
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the actual permission definitions in the found files
rg "server\.read-wizzard|server\.read-legend|server\.read-system-info|hub\.read|hub\.update" src/files/items.php src/files/source/tree.php src/files/source/metadata.php -A 2 -B 2
Length of output: 8743
src/files/source/metadata.php (3)
436-450: LGTM: Well-structured client permission additions
The new client read permissions provide appropriate granular access control for sensitive client information (IP, financial info, requisites, referrals, deleted clients) with corresponding deny permissions.
Also applies to: 1639-1653
1588-1602: LGTM: Comprehensive ticket permission additions
The new ticket permissions provide appropriate granular control over ticket operations (templates, statistics, private answers, recipient management, time tracking) with corresponding deny permissions.
Also applies to: 1120-1134
Line range hint 436-1653: Verify permission assignments in roles
Ensure that these new permissions are properly assigned to relevant roles in the role hierarchy definitions.
✅ Verification successful
Permission structure is consistent and complete
The verification confirms that:
- All new permissions are properly defined in the items.php file
- Each permission has its corresponding deny permission defined
- The permissions are being assigned in role hierarchies
- The naming convention follows the established pattern
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check if the new permissions are assigned to roles in items.php
# Look for permission assignments in items.php
echo "Checking permission assignments..."
rg -A 5 "('children'|'child')" src/files/items.php | grep -E "(client\.read-|server\.read-|ticket\.(read-|set-)|plan\.set-note|purse\.set-credit)"
Length of output: 487
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for deny permissions assignments
echo "Checking deny permission assignments..."
rg -A 5 "('children'|'child')" src/files/items.php | grep -E "(deny:client\.read-|deny:server\.read-|deny:ticket\.(read-|set-)|deny:plan\.set-note|deny:purse\.set-credit)"
# Check for all new permissions in items.php
echo -e "\nChecking all new permissions..."
rg "(client\.read-|server\.read-|ticket\.(read-|set-)|plan\.set-note|purse\.set-credit)" src/files/items.php
Length of output: 2288
src/files/items.php (4)
133-141: High-privilege role requires security controls
The previous review comment about the high-privilege role:server.staff-admin remains valid. This role has critical permissions that could impact system security and stability.
2346-2353: Review administrative data access controls
The previous review comments about part.read-administrative and administrative access remain valid. These permissions provide access to sensitive administrative data that requires proper controls and auditing.
Also applies to: 2610-2617
Line range hint 1464-1575: Verify the granularity of server read permissions
The introduction of multiple specialized read permissions (read-wizzard, read-legend, read-system-info, read-financial-info, read-billing) improves access control granularity but requires verification:
- Are all these separate read permissions necessary?
- Could some be combined to reduce complexity?
- Is there clear documentation on what each permission covers?
✅ Verification successful
Granular server read permissions are appropriately structured and used
The analysis shows these specialized read permissions are well-organized and necessary:
-
Each permission has a clear, distinct purpose reflected in role assignments:
read-wizzard,read-legend,read-system-info: Used in server.admin role for basic server managementread-financial-info,read-billing: Used in server.manager role for financial operations- All permissions are consistently used across multiple role definitions in
CheckAccessTrait.php
-
The permissions follow a logical grouping:
- System-related: wizzard, legend, system-info
- Financial-related: financial-info, billing
- Each with corresponding deny permissions
-
The granularity serves different access levels, as seen in role definitions where some roles get system access but not financial access and vice versa.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for usage of these permissions in the codebase
echo "Checking usage of new server read permissions..."
rg --type php "server\.read-(wizzard|legend|system-info|financial-info|billing)"
# Look for any existing permission checks
echo "Checking for existing permission checks..."
ast-grep --pattern 'checkAccess($_, "server.read-$_")'
Length of output: 10217
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for usage of these specific server read permissions in controllers or handlers
echo "Checking usage of server read permissions in code..."
rg -t php "server\.(read-wizzard|read-legend|read-system-info|read-financial-info|read-billing)" -A 2 -B 2
# Look for permission checks in controllers
echo "Checking for permission checks..."
rg -t php "checkAccess.*server\.(read-wizzard|read-legend|read-system-info|read-financial-info|read-billing)" -A 2 -B 2
# Look for any role definitions using these permissions
echo "Checking role definitions..."
rg -t php "('server\.read-.*'|\"server\.read-.*\")" tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php src/files/items.php
Length of output: 14381
167-175:
Review access controls for hub management
The new role:hub.staff-admin introduces high-privilege hub management capabilities. Ensure:
- Clear separation of duties between hub.admin and hub.staff-admin
- Proper audit logging of hub creation/deletion
- Access is restricted to authorized personnel
src/files/source/tree.php
Outdated
| 'role:staff-admin' => [ | ||
| 'role:admin', | ||
| 'role:server.staff-admin', | ||
| 'role:hub.staff-admin', | ||
| ], |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Review security implications of the new staff-admin role
The new role:staff-admin represents a powerful role with elevated permissions across multiple modules. This role combines:
- All admin permissions
- Server staff-admin permissions
- Hub staff-admin permissions
Consider:
- Implementing comprehensive audit logging for all operations performed with this role
- Adding approval workflows for critical operations
- Documenting the criteria for assigning this role
src/files/source/tree.php
Outdated
| @@ -479,7 +510,7 @@ | |||
| 'role:blacklist.manager', | |||
| ], | |||
| 'role:almighty' => [ | |||
| 'role:admin', | |||
| 'role:staff-admin', | |||
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Security Impact: Almighty role now includes staff-admin permissions
The almighty role has been upgraded to include staff-admin permissions instead of admin permissions, significantly expanding its capabilities.
Recommend:
- Documenting all capabilities of the almighty role
- Implementing strict controls on role assignment
- Adding comprehensive audit logging
| 'ticket.read-templates' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows viewing ticket templates', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:ticket.read-templates' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits viewing ticket templates', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'ticket.read-statistics' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows viewing tickets statistics', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:ticket.read-statistics' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits viewing tickets statistics', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'ticket.set-private' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows setting `private` to answer', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:ticket.set-private' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits setting `private` to answer', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'ticket.set-recipient' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows setting ticket\'s recipient', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:ticket.set-recipient' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits setting ticket\'s recipient', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'ticket.set-time' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Allows setting spent time to ticket', | ||
| ], | ||
| 'deny:ticket.set-time' => [ | ||
| 'type' => 2, | ||
| 'description' => 'Prohibits setting spent time to ticket', | ||
| ], |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Enhance ticket management security controls
New ticket permissions add functionality but require security considerations:
ticket.set-privatecould hide important informationticket.set-recipientcould lead to unauthorized ticket transfers- Statistics access could expose sensitive metrics
Consider implementing:
- Audit trail for private/recipient changes
- Restrictions on who can be set as recipients
- Access controls for statistical data
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (4)
tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php (4)
241-243: Validate staff-admin role permission scope.The staff-admin role combines both administrative and operational permissions. This is a powerful role that requires careful access control.
Consider splitting this into more granular roles following the principle of least privilege.
289-293: Review financial permission grouping.The accounter role receives a mix of financial and client-related permissions. These should be logically grouped.
Consider organizing related permissions into permission groups for better maintainability:
- 'purse.set-credit','server.read-wizzard','server.read-legend', 'server.read-financial-info', - 'server.read-billing','plan.set-note', - 'client.read-financial-info', 'client.read-requisite', 'client.read-referral', 'client.read-deleted', 'client.read-ip', - 'ticket.read-templates', 'ticket.read-statistics', 'ticket.set-private', 'ticket.set-recipient', 'ticket.set-time' + // Financial permissions + 'purse.set-credit', + 'server.read-financial-info', + 'server.read-billing', + 'client.read-financial-info', + 'client.read-requisite', + + // Server management + 'server.read-wizzard', + 'server.read-legend', + 'plan.set-note', + + // Client management + 'client.read-referral', + 'client.read-deleted', + 'client.read-ip', + + // Ticket management + 'ticket.read-templates', + 'ticket.read-statistics', + 'ticket.set-private', + 'ticket.set-recipient', + 'ticket.set-time'
379-383: Review permission consistency across high-privilege roles.The reseller, mighty, and almighty roles share similar high-privilege permissions. Ensure proper hierarchy and inheritance.
Consider implementing a role hierarchy system to avoid permission duplication and maintain consistency:
- Base role with common permissions
- Specialized roles inheriting from base role
- High-privilege roles extending specialized roles
Also applies to: 454-458, 526-530
Line range hint
1-591: Add test cases for permission combinations.The test suite should verify that permission combinations work correctly and don't create unintended access.
Add test cases for:
- Permission inheritance between roles
- Conflicting permission resolution
- Denied permission overrides
Would you like me to generate additional test cases for these scenarios?
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php(8 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php (3)
196-200: Review administrative permission inheritance.
The admin role receives additional permissions including part.read-administrative. Ensure this aligns with the role hierarchy design.
#!/bin/bash
# Verify the inheritance pattern of administrative permissions
ast-grep --pattern 'role:admin {
$$$
part.read-administrative
$$$
}'333-338: Verify manager role permission overlap.
The manager role has significant overlap with the accounter role permissions. This needs to be reviewed for proper role separation.
#!/bin/bash
# Compare permission overlap between manager and accounter roles
rg "role:(manager|accounter)" -A 10 -B 10155-156: Verify the scope of new support role permissions.
The addition of sensitive permissions like client.read-ip and ticket management capabilities to the support role should be carefully reviewed.
Consider implementing an audit logging mechanism for these sensitive operations to track usage.
✅ Verification successful
Based on the search results, I can now provide a conclusive response about the permissions being added to the support role:
The permissions are consistently defined and properly granted across roles
The added permissions (client.read-ip and ticket management capabilities) are:
- Properly defined in the source files (src/files/items.php and src/files/source/tree.php)
- Have corresponding deny rules defined for access control
- Are consistently granted to higher-level roles (as seen in the test assertions)
- Follow the existing permission hierarchy pattern where support role has access to client and ticket management features
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check if these permissions are consistently granted in related roles
rg "client\.read-ip|ticket\.(read-templates|read-statistics|set-private|set-recipient|set-time)" -A 5 -B 5
Length of output: 32027
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for the permissions in the role hierarchy and their assignments
rg "client\.read-ip|ticket\.(read-templates|read-statistics|set-private|set-recipient|set-time)" -A 2 -B 2 tests/unit/CheckAccessTrait.php
Length of output: 3436
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check if these permissions are defined in the source files
rg "client\.read-ip|ticket\.(read-templates|read-statistics|set-private|set-recipient|set-time)" src/
Length of output: 2083
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the role hierarchy for support role
ast-grep --pattern 'role:support' src/files/
Length of output: 44
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
server.staff-admin,hub.staff-admin, and expanded permissions for existing roles, enhancing access control.Bug Fixes
Tests