Improve build_cts_json.yaml workflow security #105
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Limits the increased permissions to a dedicated job which runs only on push events. The previous implementation was already enough to protect against malicious PRs from forks. However, if Dependabot was used on the repository, it would have increased its default read-only permissions to write permissions, making it easier for compromised dependencies to directly affect the repository.
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If you don't think this is worth it or needed, feel free to close this pull request. As mentioned above, the existing workflow should already be safe against malicious PRs from external forks. |
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Limits the increased permissions to a dedicated job which runs only on push events to
main.The previous implementation was already enough to protect against malicious PRs from forks, see for example this run (not malicious), which only has
Contents: readas desired.However, if Dependabot was used on the repository (at some point in the future), it would have increased its default read-only permissions to write permissions, making it easier for compromised dependencies to directly affect the repository.
With the new changes an unprivileged job builds the
cts.jsonnow, and more privileged job pushes the changes, but only when running onmain. Thects.jsonfile is passed as artifact between the jobs (as described in the documentation).This should hopefully make it more secure.
Side note: These changes have the side effect that the modified
cts.jsonfile now also becomes available in the "Artifacts" section of runs (even for pull requests), see for example https://github.com/jsonpath-standard/jsonpath-compliance-test-suite/actions/runs/14638122807.