libbpf: replace size_t with __u32 in xsk interfaces #415
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Master branch: fb35581 |
Replace size_t with __u32 in the xsk interfaces that contain
this. There is no reason to have size_t since the internal variable
that is manipulated is a __u32. The following APIs are affected:
__u32 xsk_ring_prod__reserve(struct xsk_ring_prod *prod, __u32 nb,
__u32 *idx)
void xsk_ring_prod__submit(struct xsk_ring_prod *prod, __u32 nb)
__u32 xsk_ring_cons__peek(struct xsk_ring_cons *cons, __u32 nb, __u32 *idx)
void xsk_ring_cons__cancel(struct xsk_ring_cons *cons, __u32 nb)
void xsk_ring_cons__release(struct xsk_ring_cons *cons, __u32 nb)
The "nb" variable and the return values have been changed from size_t
to __u32.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
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Master branch: 830382e |
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=391439 irrelevant now. Closing PR. |
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Jul 22, 2025
The private stack is allocated in bpf_int_jit_compile() with 16-byte
alignment. It includes additional guard regions to detect stack
overflows and underflows at runtime.
Memory layout:
+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (overflow guard - stack top) |
| [ detects writes beyond top of stack ] |
BPF FP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| BPF private stack (sized by verifier) |
| [ 16-byte aligned ] |
| |
BPF PRIV SP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (underflow guard - stack bottom) |
| [ detects accesses before start of stack ] |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
On detection of an overflow or underflow, the kernel emits messages
like:
BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog <prog_name>
After commit bd737fc ("bpf, arm64: Get rid of fpb"), Jited BPF
programs use the stack in two ways:
1. Via the BPF frame pointer (top of stack), using negative offsets.
2. Via the stack pointer (bottom of stack), using positive offsets in
LDR/STR instructions.
When a private stack is used, ARM64 callee-saved register x27 replaces
the stack pointer. The BPF frame pointer usage remains unchanged; but it
now points to the top of the private stack.
Relevant tests:
kernel-patches#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
kernel-patches#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
kernel-patches#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
kernel-patches#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
kernel-patches#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
kernel-patches#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
kernel-patches#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
kernel-patches#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
kernel-patches#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in main prog:OK
kernel-patches#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
kernel-patches#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
kernel-patches#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
kernel-patches#549 verifier_private_stack:OK
Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 22, 2025
The private stack is allocated in bpf_int_jit_compile() with 16-byte
alignment. It includes additional guard regions to detect stack
overflows and underflows at runtime.
Memory layout:
+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (overflow guard - stack top) |
| [ detects writes beyond top of stack ] |
BPF FP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| BPF private stack (sized by verifier) |
| [ 16-byte aligned ] |
| |
BPF PRIV SP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (underflow guard - stack bottom) |
| [ detects accesses before start of stack ] |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
On detection of an overflow or underflow, the kernel emits messages
like:
BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog <prog_name>
After commit bd737fc ("bpf, arm64: Get rid of fpb"), Jited BPF
programs use the stack in two ways:
1. Via the BPF frame pointer (top of stack), using negative offsets.
2. Via the stack pointer (bottom of stack), using positive offsets in
LDR/STR instructions.
When a private stack is used, ARM64 callee-saved register x27 replaces
the stack pointer. The BPF frame pointer usage remains unchanged; but it
now points to the top of the private stack.
Relevant tests:
#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in main prog:OK
#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
#549 verifier_private_stack:OK
Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
puranjaymohan
added a commit
to puranjaymohan/bpf
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
The private stack is allocated in bpf_int_jit_compile() with 16-byte
alignment. It includes additional guard regions to detect stack
overflows and underflows at runtime.
Memory layout:
+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (overflow guard - stack top) |
| [ detects writes beyond top of stack ] |
BPF FP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| BPF private stack (sized by verifier) |
| [ 16-byte aligned ] |
| |
BPF PRIV SP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (underflow guard - stack bottom) |
| [ detects accesses before start of stack ] |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
On detection of an overflow or underflow, the kernel emits messages
like:
BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog <prog_name>
After commit bd737fc ("bpf, arm64: Get rid of fpb"), Jited BPF
programs use the stack in two ways:
1. Via the BPF frame pointer (top of stack), using negative offsets.
2. Via the stack pointer (bottom of stack), using positive offsets in
LDR/STR instructions.
When a private stack is used, ARM64 callee-saved register x27 replaces
the stack pointer. The BPF frame pointer usage remains unchanged; but it
now points to the top of the private stack.
Relevant tests (Enabled in following patch):
kernel-patches#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
kernel-patches#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
kernel-patches#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
kernel-patches#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
kernel-patches#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
kernel-patches#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
kernel-patches#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
kernel-patches#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
kernel-patches#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in main prog:OK
kernel-patches#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
kernel-patches#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
kernel-patches#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
kernel-patches#549 verifier_private_stack:OK
Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
puranjaymohan
added a commit
to puranjaymohan/bpf
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
As arm64 JIT now supports private stack, make sure all relevant tests run on arm64 architecture Relevant tests: kernel-patches#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK kernel-patches#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK kernel-patches#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK kernel-patches#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK kernel-patches#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK kernel-patches#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK kernel-patches#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK kernel-patches#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK kernel-patches#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in mainprog:OK kernel-patches#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK kernel-patches#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK kernel-patches#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK kernel-patches#549 verifier_private_stack:OK Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
The private stack is allocated in bpf_int_jit_compile() with 16-byte
alignment. It includes additional guard regions to detect stack
overflows and underflows at runtime.
Memory layout:
+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (overflow guard - stack top) |
| [ detects writes beyond top of stack ] |
BPF FP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| BPF private stack (sized by verifier) |
| [ 16-byte aligned ] |
| |
BPF PRIV SP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (underflow guard - stack bottom) |
| [ detects accesses before start of stack ] |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
On detection of an overflow or underflow, the kernel emits messages
like:
BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog <prog_name>
After commit bd737fc ("bpf, arm64: Get rid of fpb"), Jited BPF
programs use the stack in two ways:
1. Via the BPF frame pointer (top of stack), using negative offsets.
2. Via the stack pointer (bottom of stack), using positive offsets in
LDR/STR instructions.
When a private stack is used, ARM64 callee-saved register x27 replaces
the stack pointer. The BPF frame pointer usage remains unchanged; but it
now points to the top of the private stack.
Relevant tests (Enabled in following patch):
#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in main prog:OK
#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
#549 verifier_private_stack:OK
Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
As arm64 JIT now supports private stack, make sure all relevant tests run on arm64 architecture Relevant tests: #415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK #415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK #415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK #415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK #549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK #549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK #549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK #549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK #549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in mainprog:OK #549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK #549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK #549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK #549 verifier_private_stack:OK Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
The private stack is allocated in bpf_int_jit_compile() with 16-byte
alignment. It includes additional guard regions to detect stack
overflows and underflows at runtime.
Memory layout:
+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (overflow guard - stack top) |
| [ detects writes beyond top of stack ] |
BPF FP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| BPF private stack (sized by verifier) |
| [ 16-byte aligned ] |
| |
BPF PRIV SP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (underflow guard - stack bottom) |
| [ detects accesses before start of stack ] |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
On detection of an overflow or underflow, the kernel emits messages
like:
BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog <prog_name>
After commit bd737fc ("bpf, arm64: Get rid of fpb"), Jited BPF
programs use the stack in two ways:
1. Via the BPF frame pointer (top of stack), using negative offsets.
2. Via the stack pointer (bottom of stack), using positive offsets in
LDR/STR instructions.
When a private stack is used, ARM64 callee-saved register x27 replaces
the stack pointer. The BPF frame pointer usage remains unchanged; but it
now points to the top of the private stack.
Relevant tests (Enabled in following patch):
#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in main prog:OK
#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
#549 verifier_private_stack:OK
Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
As arm64 JIT now supports private stack, make sure all relevant tests run on arm64 architecture Relevant tests: #415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK #415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK #415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK #415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK #549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK #549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK #549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK #549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK #549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in mainprog:OK #549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK #549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK #549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK #549 verifier_private_stack:OK Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
The private stack is allocated in bpf_int_jit_compile() with 16-byte
alignment. It includes additional guard regions to detect stack
overflows and underflows at runtime.
Memory layout:
+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (overflow guard - stack top) |
| [ detects writes beyond top of stack ] |
BPF FP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| BPF private stack (sized by verifier) |
| [ 16-byte aligned ] |
| |
BPF PRIV SP ->+------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 16 bytes padding (underflow guard - stack bottom) |
| [ detects accesses before start of stack ] |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
On detection of an overflow or underflow, the kernel emits messages
like:
BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog <prog_name>
After commit bd737fc ("bpf, arm64: Get rid of fpb"), Jited BPF
programs use the stack in two ways:
1. Via the BPF frame pointer (top of stack), using negative offsets.
2. Via the stack pointer (bottom of stack), using positive offsets in
LDR/STR instructions.
When a private stack is used, ARM64 callee-saved register x27 replaces
the stack pointer. The BPF frame pointer usage remains unchanged; but it
now points to the top of the private stack.
Relevant tests (Enabled in following patch):
#415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
#415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
#415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
#415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
#549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
#549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
#549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
#549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
#549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in main prog:OK
#549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
#549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
#549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
#549 verifier_private_stack:OK
Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
As arm64 JIT now supports private stack, make sure all relevant tests run on arm64 architecture Relevant tests: #415/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK #415/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK #415/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK #415 struct_ops_private_stack:OK #549/1 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK #549/2 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK #549/3 verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK #549/4 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK #549/5 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in mainprog:OK #549/6 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK #549/7 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK #549/8 verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK #549 verifier_private_stack:OK Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
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Pull request for series with
subject: libbpf: replace size_t with __u32 in xsk interfaces
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=391439