Make BCLK configurable #19

ghost · 2013-09-16T18:35:29Z

The driver should have a function that allows to configure the BCLK as master or slave with out having to modify the code.

maximus21 · 2013-09-23T11:11:46Z

.dai_fmt in dai link description defines who is master who is slave for both BCLK and FS (LRCLK). I believe the driver processes that correctly although, perhaps, in a wrong place.

koalo · 2013-09-23T12:23:18Z

The selection of master and slave is implemented as usual, but the BCLK frequency configuration is not properly implemented.

…s struct file commit e4daf1f upstream. The following call chain: ------------------------------------------------------------ nfs4_get_vfs_file - nfsd_open - dentry_open - do_dentry_open - __get_file_write_access - get_write_access - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY; ------------------------------------------------------------ can result in the following state: ------------------------------------------------------------ struct nfs4_file { ... fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0}, fi_access = {{ counter = 0x1 }, { counter = 0x0 }}, ... ------------------------------------------------------------ 1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented. 2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented. Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in an incorrect state. 3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY. ------------------------------------------------------------ ... [exception RIP: fput+0x9] RIP: ffffffff81177fa9 RSP: ffff88062e365c90 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: dead000000100101 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffffffffe6 RBP: ffff88062e365c90 R8: ffff88041fe797d8 R9: ffff88062e365d58 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd] #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd] #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd] #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd] #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd] #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd] #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd] #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc] #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc] #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd] #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a ------------------------------------------------------------ Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 42d64e1 upstream. The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below. This patch corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted ------------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by ping/731: #0: (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500 ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000 000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120 [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190 [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190 [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170 [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130 [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

When exercising error injection on IBM pseries machine, I hit the following warning: [ 251.450043] RTAS: event: 89, Type: Platform Error, Severity: 2 [ 253.549822] cxgb3 0006:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 253.713560] cxgb3 0006:01:00.0: adapter recovering, PEX ERR 0x100 [ 254.895437] RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (2031) [ 254.895467] CPU: 6 PID: 5449 Comm: eehd Tainted: G W 3.10.0-rc7-00157-gea461ab #19 [ 254.895474] Call Trace: [ 254.895483] [c000000fac56f7d0] [c000000000014dcc] .show_stack+0x7c/0x1f0 (unreliable) [ 254.895493] [c000000fac56f8a0] [c0000000007ba318] .dump_stack+0x28/0x3c [ 254.895500] [c000000fac56f910] [c0000000006c0384] .netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x224/0x230 [ 254.895515] [c000000fac56f9b0] [d00000000ef35510] .cxgb_open+0x80/0x3f0 [cxgb3] [ 254.895525] [c000000fac56fa50] [d00000000ef35914] .t3_resume_ports+0x94/0x100 [cxgb3] [ 254.895533] [c000000fac56fae0] [c00000000005fc8c] .eeh_report_resume+0x8c/0xd0 [ 254.895539] [c000000fac56fb60] [c00000000005e9fc] .eeh_pe_dev_traverse+0x9c/0x190 [ 254.895545] [c000000fac56fc10] [c000000000060000] .eeh_handle_event+0x110/0x330 [ 254.895551] [c000000fac56fca0] [c000000000060350] .eeh_event_handler+0x130/0x1a0 [ 254.895558] [c000000fac56fd30] [c0000000000ad758] .kthread+0xe8/0xf0 [ 254.895566] [c000000fac56fe30] [c00000000000a05c] .ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x80 It appears that t3_resume_ports() is called with the rtnl_lock held from the fatal error task but not from the PCI error callbacks. This fixes it. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!" and the stack trace is: #7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905 #8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge] #9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge] #10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge] #11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge] #12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc #13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6 #14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad #15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17 #16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68 #17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101 #18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8 #19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun] #20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun] #21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1 #22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe #23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f #24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1 #25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292 this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by commit 9f00b2e (bridge: only expire the mdb entry when query is received). Same for __br_mdb_del(). Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com> Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com> Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…s struct file The following call chain: ------------------------------------------------------------ nfs4_get_vfs_file - nfsd_open - dentry_open - do_dentry_open - __get_file_write_access - get_write_access - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY; ------------------------------------------------------------ can result in the following state: ------------------------------------------------------------ struct nfs4_file { ... fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0}, fi_access = {{ counter = 0x1 }, { counter = 0x0 }}, ... ------------------------------------------------------------ 1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented. 2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented. Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in an incorrect state. 3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY. ------------------------------------------------------------ ... [exception RIP: fput+0x9] RIP: ffffffff81177fa9 RSP: ffff88062e365c90 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: dead000000100101 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffffffffe6 RBP: ffff88062e365c90 R8: ffff88041fe797d8 R9: ffff88062e365d58 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd] #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd] #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd] #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd] #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd] #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd] #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd] #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc] #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc] #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd] #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a ------------------------------------------------------------ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

The SDVO code tries to compare the encoder's and crtc's idea of the pixel_multiplier. Normally they have to match, but when transitioning to DPMS off, we turn off the pipe before reading out the pipe_config, so the pixel_multiplier in the pipe_config will be 0, whereas the encoder will still have its pixel_multiplier set to whatever value we were using when the display was active. This leads to a warning from intel_modeset_check_state(). WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2846 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_sdvo.c:1378 intel_sdvo_get_config+0x158/0x160() SDVO pixel multiplier mismatch, port: 0, encoder: 1 Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_idt snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep CPU: 1 PID: 2846 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3-00208-gbe1e8d7-dirty #19 Hardware name: Apple Computer, Inc. Macmini1,1/Mac-F4208EC8, BIOS MM11.88Z.0055.B03.0604071521 04/07/06 00000000 00000000 ef0afa54 c1597bbb c1737ea4 ef0afa84 c10392ca c1737e6c ef0afab0 00000b1e c1737ea4 00000562 c12dfbe8 c12dfbe8 ef0afb14 00000000 f697ec00 ef0afa9c c103936e 00000009 ef0afa94 c1737e6c ef0afab0 ef0afadc Call Trace: [<c1597bbb>] dump_stack+0x41/0x56 [<c10392ca>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7a/0xa0 [<c103936e>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2e/0x30 [<c12dfbe8>] intel_sdvo_get_config+0x158/0x160 [<c12c3220>] check_crtc_state+0x1e0/0xb10 [<c12cdc7d>] intel_modeset_check_state+0x29d/0x7c0 [<c12dfe5c>] intel_sdvo_dpms+0x5c/0xa0 [<c12985de>] drm_mode_obj_set_property_ioctl+0x40e/0x420 [<c1298625>] drm_mode_connector_property_set_ioctl+0x35/0x40 [<c1289294>] drm_ioctl+0x3e4/0x540 [<c10fc1a2>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x72/0x570 [<c10fc72f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xa0 [<c159b7fa>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22 ---[ end trace 7ce940aff1366d60 ]--- Fix the problem by skipping the encoder get_config() function for inactive encoders. Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>

When a CPU is hot removed we'll cancel all the delayed work items via gov_cancel_work(). Normally this will just cancels a delayed timer on each CPU that the policy is managing and the work won't run, but if the work is already running the workqueue code will wait for the work to finish before continuing to prevent the work items from re-queuing themselves like they normally do. This scheme will work most of the time, except for the case where the work function determines that it should adjust the delay for all other CPUs that the policy is managing. If this scenario occurs, the canceling CPU will cancel its own work but queue up the other CPUs works to run. For example: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- cpu_down() ... __cpufreq_remove_dev() cpufreq_governor_dbs() case CPUFREQ_GOV_STOP: gov_cancel_work(dbs_data, policy); cpu0 work is canceled timer is canceled cpu1 work is canceled <work runs> <waits for cpu1> od_dbs_timer() gov_queue_work(*, *, true); cpu0 work queued cpu1 work queued cpu2 work queued ... cpu1 work is canceled cpu2 work is canceled ... At the end of the GOV_STOP case cpu0 still has a work queued to run although the code is expecting all of the works to be canceled. __cpufreq_remove_dev() will then proceed to re-initialize all the other CPUs works except for the CPU that is going down. The CPUFREQ_GOV_START case in cpufreq_governor_dbs() will trample over the queued work and debugobjects will spit out a warning: WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_print_object+0x94/0xbc() ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x10 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1491 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.10.0 #19 [<c010c178>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c0109dec>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c0109dec>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c01904cc>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x4c/0x6c) [<c01904cc>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x4c/0x6c) from [<c019056c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2c/0x3c) [<c019056c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2c/0x3c) from [<c0388a7c>] (debug_print_object+0x94/0xbc) [<c0388a7c>] (debug_print_object+0x94/0xbc) from [<c0388e34>] (__debug_object_init+0x2d0/0x340) [<c0388e34>] (__debug_object_init+0x2d0/0x340) from [<c019e3b0>] (init_timer_key+0x14/0xb0) [<c019e3b0>] (init_timer_key+0x14/0xb0) from [<c0635f78>] (cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x3e8/0x5f8) [<c0635f78>] (cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x3e8/0x5f8) from [<c06325a0>] (__cpufreq_governor+0xdc/0x1a4) [<c06325a0>] (__cpufreq_governor+0xdc/0x1a4) from [<c0633704>] (__cpufreq_remove_dev.isra.10+0x3b4/0x434) [<c0633704>] (__cpufreq_remove_dev.isra.10+0x3b4/0x434) from [<c08989f4>] (cpufreq_cpu_callback+0x60/0x80) [<c08989f4>] (cpufreq_cpu_callback+0x60/0x80) from [<c08a43c0>] (notifier_call_chain+0x38/0x68) [<c08a43c0>] (notifier_call_chain+0x38/0x68) from [<c01938e0>] (__cpu_notify+0x28/0x40) [<c01938e0>] (__cpu_notify+0x28/0x40) from [<c0892ad4>] (_cpu_down+0x7c/0x2c0) [<c0892ad4>] (_cpu_down+0x7c/0x2c0) from [<c0892d3c>] (cpu_down+0x24/0x40) [<c0892d3c>] (cpu_down+0x24/0x40) from [<c0893ea8>] (store_online+0x2c/0x74) [<c0893ea8>] (store_online+0x2c/0x74) from [<c04519d8>] (dev_attr_store+0x18/0x24) [<c04519d8>] (dev_attr_store+0x18/0x24) from [<c02a69d4>] (sysfs_write_file+0x100/0x148) [<c02a69d4>] (sysfs_write_file+0x100/0x148) from [<c0255c18>] (vfs_write+0xcc/0x174) [<c0255c18>] (vfs_write+0xcc/0x174) from [<c0255f70>] (SyS_write+0x38/0x64) [<c0255f70>] (SyS_write+0x38/0x64) from [<c0106120>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has been brought up. For example: [ 0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK [ 0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 OK [ 0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 OK [ 0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all CPUs booted up. Signed-off-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: <guohanjun@huawei.com> Cc: <wangyijing@huawei.com> Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1378378676-18276-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com [ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Hello, Jens. The original thread can be read from http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.cgroups/8937 While it leads to oops, given that it only triggers under specific configurations which aren't common. I don't think it's necessary to backport it through -stable and merging it during the coming merge window should be enough. Thanks! ----- 8< ----- Currently, q->root_blkg and q->root_rl.blkg are set from blkcg_activate_policy() and cleared from blkg_destroy_all(). This doesn't necessarily coincide with the lifetime of the root blkcg_gq leading to the following oops when blkcg is enabled but no policy is activated because __blk_queue_next_rl() malfunctions expecting the root_blkg pointers to be set. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff810c58cb>] __wake_up_common+0x2b/0x90 PGD 60f7a9067 PUD 60f4c9067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_tcindex cls_prioshift sch_dsmark xt_multiport iptable_mangle sata_mv elephant elephant_dev_num cdc_acm uhci_hcd ehci_hcd i2c_d CPU: 9 PID: 41382 Comm: iSCSI-write- Not tainted 3.11.0-dbg-DEV #19 Hardware name: Intel XXX task: ffff88060d16eec0 ti: ffff88060d170000 task.ti: ffff88060d170000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810c58cb>] [<ffffffff810c58cb>] __wake_up_common+0x2b/0x90 RSP: 0000:ffff88060d171818 EFLAGS: 00010096 RAX: 0000000000000082 RBX: ffff880baa3dee60 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff880baa3dee60 RBP: ffff88060d171858 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff880baa3dee98 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 00007f977cba6700(0000) GS:ffff880c79c60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000060f7a5000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 Stack: 0000000000000082 0000000000000000 ffff88060d171858 ffff880baa3dee60 0000000000000082 0000000000000003 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88060d171898 ffffffff810c7848 ffff88060d171888 ffff880bde4bc4b8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810c7848>] __wake_up+0x48/0x70 [<ffffffff8131da53>] __blk_drain_queue+0x123/0x190 [<ffffffff8131dbb5>] blk_cleanup_queue+0xf5/0x210 [<ffffffff8141877a>] __scsi_remove_device+0x5a/0xd0 [<ffffffff81418824>] scsi_remove_device+0x34/0x50 [<ffffffff814189cb>] scsi_remove_target+0x16b/0x220 [<ffffffff814210f1>] __iscsi_unbind_session+0xd1/0x1b0 [<ffffffff814212b2>] iscsi_remove_session+0xe2/0x1c0 [<ffffffff814213a6>] iscsi_destroy_session+0x16/0x60 [<ffffffff81423a59>] iscsi_session_teardown+0xd9/0x100 [<ffffffff8142b75a>] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0x5a/0xb0 [<ffffffff81420948>] iscsi_if_rx+0x10e8/0x1560 [<ffffffff81573335>] netlink_unicast+0x145/0x200 [<ffffffff815736f3>] netlink_sendmsg+0x303/0x410 [<ffffffff81528196>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff815294bc>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x38c/0x3a0 [<ffffffff811ea840>] ? fget_light+0x40/0x160 [<ffffffff811ea899>] ? fget_light+0x99/0x160 [<ffffffff811ea840>] ? fget_light+0x40/0x160 [<ffffffff8152bc79>] __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x90 [<ffffffff8152bcd2>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 [<ffffffff815fb642>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 89 f7 41 56 41 89 ce 41 55 41 54 4c 8d 67 38 53 48 83 ec 18 89 55 c4 48 8b 57 38 4c 89 45 c8 <4c> 8b 2a 48 8d 42 e8 49 Fix it by moving r->root_blkg and q->root_rl.blkg setting to blkg_create() and clearing to blkg_destroy() so that they area initialized when a root blkg is created and cleared when destroyed. Reported-and-tested-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

The clk_init_data.flags of clk-fixup-mux is left there without initialization. It may hold some random data and cause clock framework interpret the clock in an unexpected way. At least on imx6sl, the following division by zero error with sched_clock is seen because of it. Division by zero in kernel. CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Backtrace: [<80011af0>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x10c) from [<80011c90>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) r6:3b9aca00 r5:00000020 r4:00000000 r3:00000000 [<80011c78>] (show_stack+0x0/0x1c) from [<8055e02c>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x94) [<8055dfb4>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x94) from [<80011924>] (__div0+0x18/0x20) r4:00000000 r3:00000000 [<8001190c>] (__div0+0x0/0x20) from [<8026c408>] (Ldiv0_64+0x8/0x18) [<8006330c>] (clocks_calc_mult_shift+0x0/0xf8) from [<8072f604>] (setup_sched_clock+0x88/0x1f0) [<8072f57c>] (setup_sched_clock+0x0/0x1f0) from [<8071ad48>] (mxc_timer_init+0xe8/0x17c) [<8071ac60>] (mxc_timer_init+0x0/0x17c) from [<807290b0>] (imx6sl_clocks_init+0x1db8/0x1dc0) r8:807a9ca4 r7:00000000 r6:80777564 r5:8100c1f4 r4:c0820000 [<807272f8>] (imx6sl_clocks_init+0x0/0x1dc0) from [<807420ac>] (of_clk_init+0x40/0x6c) [<8074206c>] (of_clk_init+0x0/0x6c) from [<807290cc>] (imx6sl_timer_init+0x14/0x18) r5:807a8e80 r4:ffffffff [<807290b8>] (imx6sl_timer_init+0x0/0x18) from [<80716e1c>] (time_init+0x24/0x34) [<80716df8>] (time_init+0x0/0x34) from [<80713738>] (start_kernel+0x1b0/0x310) [<80713588>] (start_kernel+0x0/0x310) from [<80008074>] (0x80008074) r7:80770b08 r6:80754cd4 r5:8076c8c4 r4:10c53c7d sched_clock: 32 bits at 0 Hz, resolution 0ns, wraps every 0ms Fix the bug by initializing init.flags as zero. Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>

commit 42d64e1 upstream. The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below. This patch corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted ------------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by ping/731: #0: (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500 ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000 000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120 [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190 [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190 [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170 [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130 [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7cd2b0a upstream. Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000 RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120 RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010 RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50 R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060 R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800 FS: 00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0 proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20 vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0 SyS_write+0x46/0xb0 tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user cannot write 0 to the sysctl. This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior. It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as stated by the documentation for sanity. If a value in the range [1, 7] is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL. This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reported-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

koalo mentioned this issue Sep 23, 2013

bcm2708-i2s frame settings #21

Closed

koalo closed this as completed Nov 22, 2013

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Make BCLK configurable #19

Make BCLK configurable #19

ghost commented Sep 16, 2013

maximus21 commented Sep 23, 2013

koalo commented Sep 23, 2013

Make BCLK configurable #19

Make BCLK configurable #19

Comments

ghost commented Sep 16, 2013

maximus21 commented Sep 23, 2013

koalo commented Sep 23, 2013