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Move ECDSA-specific signers into ecdsa.rs
To separate out the logic in the `sign` module, which will start to be convoluted with multiple signer types, we're splitting out each signer type into its own submodule, following the taproot.rs example from a previous commit.
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//! Defines ECDSA-specific signer types. | ||
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; | ||
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; | ||
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature; | ||
use bitcoin::secp256k1; | ||
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use crate::util::ser::Writeable; | ||
use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor; | ||
use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage; | ||
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction}; | ||
use crate::ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement; | ||
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use crate::prelude::*; | ||
use crate::sign::ChannelSigner; | ||
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/// A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in | ||
/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md). | ||
/// | ||
/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing | ||
/// policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy | ||
/// Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md) | ||
/// for an example of such policies. | ||
pub trait EcdsaChannelSigner: ChannelSigner { | ||
/// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions. | ||
/// | ||
/// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed. | ||
/// | ||
/// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount | ||
/// sent to us and checking the HTLCs. | ||
/// | ||
/// The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided. | ||
/// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching | ||
/// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored. | ||
/// | ||
/// Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional | ||
/// irrelevant or duplicate preimages. | ||
// | ||
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. | ||
fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, | ||
preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All> | ||
) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>; | ||
/// Validate the counterparty's revocation. | ||
/// | ||
/// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved | ||
/// forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment. | ||
fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()>; | ||
/// Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions. | ||
/// | ||
/// This will be called | ||
/// - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`. | ||
/// - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close. | ||
/// - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC | ||
/// signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`] | ||
/// [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) | ||
/// that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`. | ||
/// | ||
/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction. | ||
/// | ||
/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. | ||
/// | ||
/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor | ||
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. | ||
fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, | ||
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>; | ||
/// Same as [`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs`], but exists only for tests to get access to | ||
/// holder commitment transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved | ||
/// on to a newer state. Thus, needs its own method as [`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs`] may | ||
/// enforce that we only ever get called once. | ||
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] | ||
fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, | ||
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>; | ||
/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output | ||
/// or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. | ||
/// | ||
/// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are | ||
/// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here. | ||
/// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards | ||
/// to an upcoming timelock expiration. | ||
/// | ||
/// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. | ||
/// | ||
/// `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they | ||
/// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does | ||
/// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do | ||
/// so). | ||
fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, | ||
per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All> | ||
) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction | ||
/// HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. | ||
/// | ||
/// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are | ||
/// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here. | ||
/// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards | ||
/// to an upcoming timelock expiration. | ||
/// | ||
/// `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 | ||
/// signature. | ||
/// | ||
/// `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they | ||
/// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does | ||
/// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do | ||
/// so). | ||
/// | ||
/// `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script | ||
/// (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures). | ||
fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, | ||
per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, | ||
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
/// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within | ||
/// `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned | ||
/// must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to | ||
/// sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional | ||
/// inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction. | ||
/// | ||
/// [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All | ||
fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, | ||
htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All> | ||
) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
/// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment | ||
/// transaction, either offered or received. | ||
/// | ||
/// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the | ||
/// preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be | ||
/// signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is | ||
/// needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration. | ||
/// | ||
/// `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC | ||
/// outputs. | ||
/// | ||
/// `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. | ||
/// | ||
/// `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state | ||
/// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive | ||
/// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the | ||
/// BIP 143 signature. | ||
fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, | ||
per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, | ||
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction. | ||
/// | ||
/// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have | ||
/// chosen to forgo their output as dust. | ||
fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, | ||
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
/// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an | ||
/// input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`. | ||
fn sign_holder_anchor_input( | ||
&self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, | ||
) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
/// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the | ||
/// channel participants. | ||
/// | ||
/// Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node | ||
/// signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]. | ||
/// | ||
/// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and | ||
/// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the | ||
/// protocol. | ||
/// | ||
/// [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message | ||
fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key( | ||
&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All> | ||
) -> Result<Signature, ()>; | ||
} | ||
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/// A writeable signer. | ||
/// | ||
/// There will always be two instances of a signer per channel, one occupied by the | ||
/// [`ChannelManager`] and another by the channel's [`ChannelMonitor`]. | ||
/// | ||
/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager | ||
/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor | ||
pub trait WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner + Writeable {} |
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