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@StollD StollD commented Oct 25, 2019

As discussed on IRC, this modifies IPTS to have the companion driver provide the firmware config directly, instead of loading it from an obscure binary file that was provided by Intel ages ago.

To archive this the companion driver interface has been overhauled to be more easily extensible (just add the things you need to the ipts_companion struct and they will be usable from IPTS).

The public header files for IPTS under include/linux have been updated as well, since it was neccessary to add another one there (ipts-binary.h, formerly ipts-binary-spec.h in the driver).

This makes it easier to extend the companion driver, since everything is
stored in a single struct.

The ipts_companion_t struct is stored in two places, the IPTS main driver,
and the driver registering it. It is still passed through to the functions
that the companion driver implements to allow for device specific behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Dorian Stoll <dorian.stoll@tmsp.io>
Since ipts_fw_config.bin is mapped directly onto C structs by the IPTS
driver, we can declare those values ourselves, instead of putting them
into an obscure binary file that was provided by Intel ages ago.

This could also open up the door to modifying the firmware config in
case anyone ever understands IPTS that much.

Signed-off-by: Dorian Stoll <dorian.stoll@tmsp.io>
@StollD StollD force-pushed the feature/no-ipts-config-file branch from 240ac22 to e1cfd84 Compare October 25, 2019 22:56
@qzed
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qzed commented Oct 25, 2019

CC @GrayHatter, if you want to look at it

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I like this, is look like a generally good change! A good portion of these are nitpicky things, as I'm still learning this code, and haven't had time to read/understand all of it.

if (ret) {
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Adding IPTS firmware handler failed, "
"error: %d\n", ret);
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Adding IPTS companion failed, "

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why is this info and not error?

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Because it could happen that multiple companions get probed, or the user explicitly tells IPTS to ignore the companion. In that case, we didn't really want the companion to error.

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I think multiple companions probing should be at least a warning, if not an error. I'd normally expect that only one companion driver gets loaded for a specific machine. Also, as far as I can tell, if a user sets the modparam to ignore the IPTS companion, ipts_add_companion does not return an error, so I think it's safe to change this to something like dev_warn(..., "IPTS companion driver already present, aborting\n").

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Done, changed dev_info to dev_warn.

bool ipts_companion_available(void)
{
bool ret;
mutex_lock(&ipts_companion_lock);

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is there a reason you picked mutex over spin here?

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Because qzed told me so when writing the original implementation :P (in ipts-fw.c which was deleted).

I am not that familiar with synchronisation inside of the kernel, so I just kept it like that.

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My reasoning was mostly: Mutex is the standard tool and it's initialization code, so we don't need the performance a spin-lock would give us here. Also the lock is being held during IO operations (request_firmware), so not really small critical sections.


if (ipts_companion != NULL) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto add_companion_return;

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This looks awkard, can you rewrite it without the goto?

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I could but then I would have to duplicate the mutex_unlock. I'd rather keep it that way, the kernel coding guidelines explicitly recommend goto in such cases.

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I guess in this case it could be rewritten without gotos (as it's pretty small), but for longer functions that's the usual kernel style.

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Done, used if / else instead of goto. The if condition looks a bit janky, but personally I'm fine with that.

int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&ipts_companion_lock);

if (ipts_companion == NULL || companion == NULL) {

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check companion != NULL before getting a mutex

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Well, the mutex was added to make sure that every access to the companion driver is synchronised, so I am not sure if that wouldn't defeat the purpose of the mutex.

@qzed ?

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Given that we are on x86, accessing ipts_companion outside of the critical section should be safe in this context, but I don't like relying on platform-specifics, especially if unmarked. Also can we guarantee that this will only run on x86? It's IPTS so probably.... Anyways, given that this function is not being called frequently (only during initialization), I don't think optimizations like these make much sense.

}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipts_add_companion);

int ipts_remove_companion(ipts_companion_t *companion)

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shouldn't this function be in the header as well?

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Both, ipts_add_companion and ipts_remove_companion are exported in the public header file (include/linux/ipts-companion.h) for other modules to use. The other functions are internal use by IPTS itself, so they are exported in the local header file inside driver/

return fw_list;
}

int ipts_request_firmware_config(ipts_info_t *ipts, ipts_bin_fw_list_t **cfg)

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this whole function can be written better without any gotos

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See my answer above: Not using gotos would yield duplicated mutex_unlock calls all over the place, and using goto in such a case is what the kernel coding guidelines advise.

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I'm not necessarily for throwing out the gotos, but I think we can reduce the code beneath the mutex. I think actually only the code until (including) *cfg = ipts_alloc_fw_list(ipts_companion->firmware_config); needs to be synchronized. ipts_request_firmware does its own checks and synchronization, and the rest is stuff on data that we own at that point.

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Also with that you'll probably get rid of one goto.

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I looked into how to reduce the amount of gotos in that function, but I found no nice way that allows for all the fallback behaviour that is there, and that doesn't require duplicating the call to mutex_unlock.

If you want me to change it, I will look into it again ofc.

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What I meant was something like this:

int ipts_request_firmware_config(ipts_info_t *ipts, ipts_bin_fw_list_t **cfg)
{
	int ret = 0;
	const struct firmware *config_fw = NULL;
	mutex_lock(&ipts_companion_lock);

	// Check if a companion was registered. If not, skip
	// forward and try to load the firmware config from a file
	if (ipts_modparams.ignore_companion || ipts_companion == NULL) {
		mutex_unlock(&ipts_companion_lock);
		goto config_fallback;
	}

	if (ipts_companion->firmware_config != NULL) {
		*cfg = ipts_alloc_fw_list(ipts_companion->firmware_config);
		mutex_unlock(&ipts_companion_lock);
		return 0;
	}

config_fallback:

	// If fallback loading for the firmware config was disabled, abort.
	// Return -ENOENT as no config file was found.
	if (ipts_modparams.ignore_config_fallback) {
		ret = -ENOENT;
		goto config_return;
	}

	// No firmware config was found by the companion driver,
	// try loading it from a file now
	ret = ipts_request_firmware(&config_fw, IPTS_FW_CONFIG_FILE,
			&ipts->cldev->dev);
	if (ret)
		return ret;

	*cfg = (ipts_bin_fw_list_t *)config_fw->data;
	release_firmware(config_fw);
	return 0;
}

You only need the mutex to guard the direct ipts_companion access, the rest doesn't need to be in the critical section (especially as ipts_request_firmware does all that itself). I'd still keep the goto for the fallback as I don't see a cleaner option.

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Ok, yeah, that is definitly nicer. Updated the function, thank you.

@StollD StollD force-pushed the feature/no-ipts-config-file branch from d9bc633 to 416fcc3 Compare October 27, 2019 20:18
* Removed some of the gotos in the simpler companion function
* Made the companion driver the first parameter in the firmware handler
* Changed ipts-surface to warn when adding the companion driver failed
* Made ipts_alloc_fw_list static
* Streamlined ipts_request_firmware_config
* Added explicit values for ipts_bin_data_file_flags_t elements

Signed-off-by: Dorian Stoll <dorian.stoll@tmsp.io>
@StollD StollD force-pushed the feature/no-ipts-config-file branch from 416fcc3 to 636e23d Compare October 28, 2019 16:41
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2019
There are three places where we access uninitialized memmaps, namely:
- /proc/kpagecount
- /proc/kpageflags
- /proc/kpagecgroup

We have initialized memmaps either when the section is online or when the
page was initialized to the ZONE_DEVICE.  Uninitialized memmaps contain
garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING.

For example, not onlining a DIMM during boot and calling /proc/kpagecount
with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING:

  :/# cat /proc/kpagecount > tmp.test
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffffe
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 114616067 P4D 114616067 PUD 114618067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 469 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004+ #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4
  RIP: 0010:kpagecount_read+0xce/0x1e0
  Code: e8 09 83 e0 3f 48 0f a3 02 73 2d 4c 89 e7 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d ab 51 01 01 74 1d 48 8b 57 08 480
  RSP: 0018:ffffa14e409b7e78 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f76b5595000 RDI: fffff35645000000
  RBP: 00007f76b5595000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000
  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 00007f76b5595000 R15: ffffa14e409b7f08
  FS:  00007f76b577d580(0000) GS:ffff8f41bd400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 0000000078960000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60
   vfs_read+0xc5/0x180
   ksys_read+0x68/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

For now, let's drop support for ZONE_DEVICE from the three pseudo files
in order to fix this.  To distinguish offline memory (with garbage
memmap) from ZONE_DEVICE memory with properly initialized memmaps, we
would have to check get_dev_pagemap() and pfn_zone_device_reserved()
right now.  The usage of both (especially, special casing devmem) is
frowned upon and needs to be reworked.

The fundamental issue we have is:

	if (pfn_to_online_page(pfn)) {
		/* memmap initialized */
	} else if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
		/*
		 * ???
		 * a) offline memory. memmap garbage.
		 * b) devmem: memmap initialized to ZONE_DEVICE.
		 * c) devmem: reserved for driver. memmap garbage.
		 * (d) devmem: memmap currently initializing - garbage)
		 */
	}

We'll leave the pfn_zone_device_reserved() check in stable_page_flags()
in place as that function is also used from memory failure.  We now no
longer dump information about pages that are not in use anymore -
offline.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191009142435.3975-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online")	[visible after d0dc12e]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Toshiki Fukasawa <t-fukasawa@vx.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Pankaj gupta <pagupta@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.13+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2019
commit aad5f69 upstream.

There are three places where we access uninitialized memmaps, namely:
- /proc/kpagecount
- /proc/kpageflags
- /proc/kpagecgroup

We have initialized memmaps either when the section is online or when the
page was initialized to the ZONE_DEVICE.  Uninitialized memmaps contain
garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING.

For example, not onlining a DIMM during boot and calling /proc/kpagecount
with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING:

  :/# cat /proc/kpagecount > tmp.test
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffffe
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 114616067 P4D 114616067 PUD 114618067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 469 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004+ #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4
  RIP: 0010:kpagecount_read+0xce/0x1e0
  Code: e8 09 83 e0 3f 48 0f a3 02 73 2d 4c 89 e7 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d ab 51 01 01 74 1d 48 8b 57 08 480
  RSP: 0018:ffffa14e409b7e78 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f76b5595000 RDI: fffff35645000000
  RBP: 00007f76b5595000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000
  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 00007f76b5595000 R15: ffffa14e409b7f08
  FS:  00007f76b577d580(0000) GS:ffff8f41bd400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 0000000078960000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60
   vfs_read+0xc5/0x180
   ksys_read+0x68/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

For now, let's drop support for ZONE_DEVICE from the three pseudo files
in order to fix this.  To distinguish offline memory (with garbage
memmap) from ZONE_DEVICE memory with properly initialized memmaps, we
would have to check get_dev_pagemap() and pfn_zone_device_reserved()
right now.  The usage of both (especially, special casing devmem) is
frowned upon and needs to be reworked.

The fundamental issue we have is:

	if (pfn_to_online_page(pfn)) {
		/* memmap initialized */
	} else if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
		/*
		 * ???
		 * a) offline memory. memmap garbage.
		 * b) devmem: memmap initialized to ZONE_DEVICE.
		 * c) devmem: reserved for driver. memmap garbage.
		 * (d) devmem: memmap currently initializing - garbage)
		 */
	}

We'll leave the pfn_zone_device_reserved() check in stable_page_flags()
in place as that function is also used from memory failure.  We now no
longer dump information about pages that are not in use anymore -
offline.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191009142435.3975-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online")	[visible after d0dc12e]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Toshiki Fukasawa <t-fukasawa@vx.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Pankaj gupta <pagupta@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.13+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2019
commit aad5f69 upstream.

There are three places where we access uninitialized memmaps, namely:
- /proc/kpagecount
- /proc/kpageflags
- /proc/kpagecgroup

We have initialized memmaps either when the section is online or when the
page was initialized to the ZONE_DEVICE.  Uninitialized memmaps contain
garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING.

For example, not onlining a DIMM during boot and calling /proc/kpagecount
with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING:

  :/# cat /proc/kpagecount > tmp.test
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffffe
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 114616067 P4D 114616067 PUD 114618067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 469 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004+ #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4
  RIP: 0010:kpagecount_read+0xce/0x1e0
  Code: e8 09 83 e0 3f 48 0f a3 02 73 2d 4c 89 e7 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d ab 51 01 01 74 1d 48 8b 57 08 480
  RSP: 0018:ffffa14e409b7e78 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f76b5595000 RDI: fffff35645000000
  RBP: 00007f76b5595000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000
  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 00007f76b5595000 R15: ffffa14e409b7f08
  FS:  00007f76b577d580(0000) GS:ffff8f41bd400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 0000000078960000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60
   vfs_read+0xc5/0x180
   ksys_read+0x68/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

For now, let's drop support for ZONE_DEVICE from the three pseudo files
in order to fix this.  To distinguish offline memory (with garbage
memmap) from ZONE_DEVICE memory with properly initialized memmaps, we
would have to check get_dev_pagemap() and pfn_zone_device_reserved()
right now.  The usage of both (especially, special casing devmem) is
frowned upon and needs to be reworked.

The fundamental issue we have is:

	if (pfn_to_online_page(pfn)) {
		/* memmap initialized */
	} else if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
		/*
		 * ???
		 * a) offline memory. memmap garbage.
		 * b) devmem: memmap initialized to ZONE_DEVICE.
		 * c) devmem: reserved for driver. memmap garbage.
		 * (d) devmem: memmap currently initializing - garbage)
		 */
	}

We'll leave the pfn_zone_device_reserved() check in stable_page_flags()
in place as that function is also used from memory failure.  We now no
longer dump information about pages that are not in use anymore -
offline.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191009142435.3975-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online")	[visible after d0dc12e]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Toshiki Fukasawa <t-fukasawa@vx.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Pankaj gupta <pagupta@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.13+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
@qzed qzed merged commit 93d2b93 into linux-surface:v5.3-surface-devel Nov 4, 2019
@StollD StollD deleted the feature/no-ipts-config-file branch November 8, 2019 21:42
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2019
The incremental build of Linux kernel is pretty slow when lots of
objects are compiled. The rebuild of allmodconfig may take a few
minutes even when none of the objects needs to be rebuilt.

The time-consuming part in the incremental build is the evaluation of
if_changed* macros since they are used in the recipes to compile C and
assembly source files into objects.

I notice the following code in if_changed* is expensive:

  $(filter-out $(PHONY) $(wildcard $^),$^)

In the incremental build, every object has its .*.cmd file, which
contains the auto-generated list of included headers. So, $^ are
expanded into the long list of the source file + included headers,
and $(wildcard $^) checks whether they exist.

It may not be clear why this check exists there.

Here is the record of my research.

[1] The first code addition into Kbuild

This code dates back to 2002. It is the pre-git era. So, I copy-pasted
it from the historical git tree.

| commit 4a6db0791528c220655b063cf13fefc8470dbfee (HEAD)
| Author: Kai Germaschewski <kai@tp1.ruhr-uni-bochum.de>
| Date:   Mon Jun 17 00:22:37 2002 -0500
|
|     kbuild: Handle removed headers
|
|     New and old way to handle dependencies would choke when a file
|     #include'd by other files was removed, since the dependency on it was
|     still recorded, but since it was gone, make has no idea what to do about
|     it (and would complain with "No rule to make <file> ...")
|
|     We now add targets for all the previously included files, so make will
|     just ignore them if they disappear.
|
| diff --git a/Rules.make b/Rules.make
| index 6ef827d3df39..7db5301ea7db 100644
| --- a/Rules.make
| +++ b/Rules.make
| @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ if_changed = $(if $(strip $? \
|  # execute the command and also postprocess generated .d dependencies
|  # file
|
| -if_changed_dep = $(if $(strip $? \
| +if_changed_dep = $(if $(strip $? $(filter-out FORCE $(wildcard $^),$^)\
|                           $(filter-out $(cmd_$(1)),$(cmd_$@))\
|                           $(filter-out $(cmd_$@),$(cmd_$(1)))),\
|         @set -e; \
| diff --git a/scripts/fixdep.c b/scripts/fixdep.c
| index b5d7bee8efc7..db45bd1888c0 100644
| --- a/scripts/fixdep.c
| +++ b/scripts/fixdep.c
| @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ void parse_dep_file(void *map, size_t len)
|                 exit(1);
|         }
|         memcpy(s, m, p-m); s[p-m] = 0;
| -       printf("%s: \\\n", target);
| +       printf("deps_%s := \\\n", target);
|         m = p+1;
|
|         clear_config();
| @@ -314,7 +314,8 @@ void parse_dep_file(void *map, size_t len)
|                 }
|                 m = p + 1;
|         }
| -       printf("\n");
| +       printf("\n%s: $(deps_%s)\n\n", target, target);
| +       printf("$(deps_%s):\n", target);
|  }
|
|  void print_deps(void)

The "No rule to make <file> ..." error can be solved by passing -MP to
the compiler, but I think the detection of header removal is a good
feature. When a header is removed, all source files that previously
included it should be re-compiled. This makes sure we has correctly
got rid of #include directives of it.

This is also related with the behavior of $?. The GNU Make manual says:

  $?
      The names of all the prerequisites that are newer than the target,
      with spaces between them.

This does not explain whether a non-existent prerequisite is considered
to be newer than the target.

At this point of time, GNU Make 3.7x was used, where the $? did not
include non-existent prerequisites. Therefore,

  $(filter-out FORCE $(wildcard $^),$^)

was useful to detect the header removal, and to rebuild the related
objects if it is the case.

[2] Change of $? behavior

Later, the behavior of $? was changed (fixed) to include prerequisites
that did not exist.

First, GNU Make commit 64e16d6c00a5 ("Various changes getting ready for
the release of 3.81.") changed it, but in the release test of 3.81, it
turned out to break the kernel build.

See these:

 - http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-make/2006-03/msg00003.html
 - https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?16002
 - https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?16051

Then, GNU Make commit 6d8d9b74d9c5 ("Numerous updates to tests for
issues found on Cygwin and Windows.") reverted it for the 3.81 release
to give Linux kernel time to adjust to the new behavior.

After the 3.81 release, GNU Make commit 7595f38f62af ("Fixed a number
of documentation bugs, plus some build/install issues:") re-added it.

[3] Adjustment to the new $? behavior on Kbuild side

Meanwhile, the kernel build was changed by commit 4f19336 ("kbuild:
change kbuild to not rely on incorrect GNU make behavior") to adjust to
the new $? behavior.

[4] GNU Make 3.82 released in 2010

GNU Make 3.82 was the first release that integrated the correct $?
behavior. At this point, Kbuild dealt with GNU Make versions with
different $? behaviors.

 3.81 or older:
    $? does not contain any non-existent prerequisite.
    $(filter-out $(PHONY) $(wildcard $^),$^) was useful to detect
    removed include headers.

 3.82 or newer:
    $? contains non-existent prerequisites. When a header is removed,
    it appears in $?. $(filter-out $(PHONY) $(wildcard $^),$^) became
    a redundant check.

With the correct $? behavior, we could have dropped the expensive
check for 3.82 or later, but we did not. (Maybe nobody noticed this
optimization.)

[5] The .SECONDARY special target trips up $?

Some time later, I noticed $? did not work as expected under some
circumstances. As above, $? should contain non-existent prerequisites,
but the ones specified as SECONDARY do not appear in $?.

I asked this in GNU Make ML, and it seems a bug:

  https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-make/2019-01/msg00001.html

Since commit 8e9b61b ("kbuild: move .SECONDARY special target to
Kbuild.include"), all files, including headers listed in .*.cmd files,
are treated as secondary.

So, we are back into the incorrect $? behavior.

If we Kbuild want to react to the header removal, we need to keep
$(filter-out $(PHONY) $(wildcard $^),$^) but this makes the rebuild
so slow.

[Summary]

 - I believe noticing the header removal and recompiling related objects
   is a nice feature for the build system.

 - If $? worked correctly, $(filter-out $(PHONY),$?) would be enough
   to detect the header removal.

 - Currently, $? does not work correctly when used with .SECONDARY,
   and Kbuild is hit by this bug.

 - I filed a bug report for this, but not fixed yet as of writing.

 - Currently, the header removal is detected by the following expensive
   code:

    $(filter-out $(PHONY) $(wildcard $^),$^)

 - I do not want to revert commit 8e9b61b ("kbuild: move
   .SECONDARY special target to Kbuild.include"). Specifying
   .SECONDARY globally is clean, and it matches to the Kbuild policy.

This commit proactively removes the expensive check since it makes the
incremental build faster. A downside is Kbuild will no longer be able
to notice the header removal.

You can confirm it by the full-build followed by a header removal, and
then re-build.

  $ make defconfig all
    [ full build ]
  $ rm include/linux/device.h
  $ make
    CALL    scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    CALL    scripts/atomic/check-atomics.sh
    DESCEND  objtool
    CHK     include/generated/compile.h
  Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#11)
    Building modules, stage 2.
    MODPOST 12 modules

Previously, Kbuild noticed a missing header and emits a build error.
Now, Kbuild is fine with it. This is an unusual corner-case, not a big
deal. Once the $? bug is fixed in GNU Make, everything will work fine.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 18, 2019
Some time ago the block layer was modified such that timeout handlers are
called from thread context instead of interrupt context. Make it safe to
run the iSCSI timeout handler in thread context. This patch fixes the
following lockdep complaint:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.5.1-dbg+ #11 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
kworker/7:1H/206 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff88802d9827e8 (&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock){+.?.}, at: iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0xa6/0x6d0 [libiscsi]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  lock_acquire+0x106/0x240
  _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
  iscsi_check_transport_timeouts+0x3e/0x210 [libiscsi]
  call_timer_fn+0x132/0x470
  __run_timers.part.0+0x39f/0x5b0
  run_timer_softirq+0x63/0xc0
  __do_softirq+0x12d/0x5fd
  irq_exit+0xb3/0x110
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x131/0x3d0
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
  default_idle+0x31/0x230
  arch_cpu_idle+0x13/0x20
  default_idle_call+0x53/0x60
  do_idle+0x38a/0x3f0
  cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x30
  start_secondary+0x222/0x290
  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
irq event stamp: 1383705
hardirqs last  enabled at (1383705): [<ffffffff81aace5c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x50
hardirqs last disabled at (1383704): [<ffffffff81aacb98>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x18/0x50
softirqs last  enabled at (1383690): [<ffffffffa0e2efea>] iscsi_queuecommand+0x76a/0xa20 [libiscsi]
softirqs last disabled at (1383682): [<ffffffffa0e2e998>] iscsi_queuecommand+0x118/0xa20 [libiscsi]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by kworker/7:1H/206:
 #0: ffff8880d57bf928 ((wq_completion)kblockd){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x472/0xab0
 #1: ffff88802b9c7de8 ((work_completion)(&q->timeout_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x476/0xab0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 PID: 206 Comm: kworker/7:1H Not tainted 5.5.1-dbg+ #11
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6
 print_usage_bug.cold+0x232/0x23b
 mark_lock+0x8dc/0xa70
 __lock_acquire+0xcea/0x2af0
 lock_acquire+0x106/0x240
 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
 iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0xa6/0x6d0 [libiscsi]
 scsi_times_out+0xf4/0x440 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_timeout+0x1d/0x20 [scsi_mod]
 blk_mq_check_expired+0x365/0x3a0
 bt_iter+0xd6/0xf0
 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x3de/0x650
 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x1af/0x380
 process_one_work+0x56d/0xab0
 worker_thread+0x7a/0x5d0
 kthread+0x1bc/0x210
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

Fixes: 287922e ("block: defer timeouts to a workqueue")
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Cc: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209173457.187370-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2019
Properly initialize refcount to 1 when hardware queue arrays for
TC-MQPRIO offload have been freshly allocated. Otherwise, following
warning is observed. Also fix up error path to only free hardware
queue arrays when refcount reaches 0.

[  130.075342] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  130.075343] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
[  130.075355] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10870 at lib/refcount.c:25
refcount_warn_saturate+0xe1/0x100
[  130.075356] Modules linked in: sch_mqprio iptable_nat ib_iser
libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad iw_cxgb4 libcxgb
ib_uverbs x86_pkg_temp_thermal cxgb4 igb
[  130.075361] CPU: 0 PID: 10870 Comm: tc Kdump: loaded Not tainted
5.5.0-rc1+ #11
[  130.075362] Hardware name: Supermicro
X9SRE/X9SRE-3F/X9SRi/X9SRi-3F/X9SRE/X9SRE-3F/X9SRi/X9SRi-3F, BIOS 3.2
01/16/2015
[  130.075363] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe1/0x100
[  130.075364] Code: e8 14 41 c1 ff 0f 0b c3 80 3d 44 f4 10 01 00 0f 85
63 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 38 9f 83 8c 31 c0 c6 05 2e f4 10 01 01 e8 ef 40 c1
ff <0f> 0b c3 48 c7 c7 10 9f 83 8c 31 c0 c6 05 17 f4 10 01 01 e8 d7 40
[  130.075365] RSP: 0018:ffffa48d00c0b768 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  130.075366] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX:
0000000000000001
[  130.075366] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI:
ffff8a2e9fa187d0
[  130.075367] RBP: ffff8a2e93890000 R08: 0000000000000398 R09:
000000000000003c
[  130.075367] R10: 00000000000142a0 R11: 0000000000000397 R12:
ffffa48d00c0b848
[  130.075368] R13: ffff8a2e94746498 R14: ffff8a2e966f7000 R15:
0000000000000031
[  130.075368] FS:  00007f689015f840(0000) GS:ffff8a2e9fa00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  130.075369] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  130.075369] CR2: 00000000006762a0 CR3: 00000007cf164005 CR4:
00000000001606f0
[  130.075370] Call Trace:
[  130.075377]  cxgb4_setup_tc_mqprio+0xbee/0xc30 [cxgb4]
[  130.075382]  ? cxgb4_ethofld_restart+0x50/0x50 [cxgb4]
[  130.075384]  ? pfifo_fast_init+0x7e/0xf0
[  130.075386]  mqprio_init+0x5f4/0x630 [sch_mqprio]
[  130.075389]  qdisc_create+0x1bf/0x4a0
[  130.075390]  tc_modify_qdisc+0x1ff/0x770
[  130.075392]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x28b/0x350
[  130.075394]  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.32+0x110/0x110
[  130.075395]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x100
[  130.075396]  netlink_unicast+0x1db/0x330
[  130.075397]  netlink_sendmsg+0x2f5/0x460
[  130.075399]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60
[  130.075400]  sock_sendmsg+0x59/0x70
[  130.075401]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1f0/0x230
[  130.075402]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0xd7/0x140
[  130.075403]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x77/0xb0
[  130.075404]  ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x84/0xb0
[  130.075406]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x377/0xaf0
[  130.075407]  __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0xa0
[  130.075409]  do_syscall_64+0x44/0x130
[  130.075412]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  130.075413] RIP: 0033:0x7f688f13af10
[  130.075414] Code: c3 48 8b 05 82 6f 2c 00 f7 db 64 89 18 48 83 cb ff
eb dd 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 3d 8d d0 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f
05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ae cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
[  130.075414] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6c7d9988 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
[  130.075415] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006703a0 RCX:
00007f688f13af10
[  130.075415] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe6c7d99f0 RDI:
0000000000000003
[  130.075416] RBP: 000000005df38312 R08: 0000000000000002 R09:
0000000000008000
[  130.075416] R10: 00007ffe6c7d93e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
0000000000000000
[  130.075417] R13: 00007ffe6c7e9c50 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
000000000067c600
[  130.075418] ---[ end trace 8fbb3bf36a8671db ]---

v2:
- Move the refcount_set() closer to where the hardware queue arrays
  are being allocated.
- Fix up error path to only free hardware queue arrays when refcount
  reaches 0.

Fixes: 2d0cb84 ("cxgb4: add ETHOFLD hardware queue support")
Signed-off-by: Rahul Lakkireddy <rahul.lakkireddy@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2019
commit 5480e29 upstream.

Some time ago the block layer was modified such that timeout handlers are
called from thread context instead of interrupt context. Make it safe to
run the iSCSI timeout handler in thread context. This patch fixes the
following lockdep complaint:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.5.1-dbg+ #11 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
kworker/7:1H/206 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff88802d9827e8 (&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock){+.?.}, at: iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0xa6/0x6d0 [libiscsi]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  lock_acquire+0x106/0x240
  _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
  iscsi_check_transport_timeouts+0x3e/0x210 [libiscsi]
  call_timer_fn+0x132/0x470
  __run_timers.part.0+0x39f/0x5b0
  run_timer_softirq+0x63/0xc0
  __do_softirq+0x12d/0x5fd
  irq_exit+0xb3/0x110
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x131/0x3d0
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
  default_idle+0x31/0x230
  arch_cpu_idle+0x13/0x20
  default_idle_call+0x53/0x60
  do_idle+0x38a/0x3f0
  cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x30
  start_secondary+0x222/0x290
  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
irq event stamp: 1383705
hardirqs last  enabled at (1383705): [<ffffffff81aace5c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x50
hardirqs last disabled at (1383704): [<ffffffff81aacb98>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x18/0x50
softirqs last  enabled at (1383690): [<ffffffffa0e2efea>] iscsi_queuecommand+0x76a/0xa20 [libiscsi]
softirqs last disabled at (1383682): [<ffffffffa0e2e998>] iscsi_queuecommand+0x118/0xa20 [libiscsi]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by kworker/7:1H/206:
 #0: ffff8880d57bf928 ((wq_completion)kblockd){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x472/0xab0
 #1: ffff88802b9c7de8 ((work_completion)(&q->timeout_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x476/0xab0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 PID: 206 Comm: kworker/7:1H Not tainted 5.5.1-dbg+ #11
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6
 print_usage_bug.cold+0x232/0x23b
 mark_lock+0x8dc/0xa70
 __lock_acquire+0xcea/0x2af0
 lock_acquire+0x106/0x240
 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
 iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0xa6/0x6d0 [libiscsi]
 scsi_times_out+0xf4/0x440 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_timeout+0x1d/0x20 [scsi_mod]
 blk_mq_check_expired+0x365/0x3a0
 bt_iter+0xd6/0xf0
 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x3de/0x650
 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x1af/0x380
 process_one_work+0x56d/0xab0
 worker_thread+0x7a/0x5d0
 kthread+0x1bc/0x210
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

Fixes: 287922e ("block: defer timeouts to a workqueue")
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Cc: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209173457.187370-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2019
commit 5480e29 upstream.

Some time ago the block layer was modified such that timeout handlers are
called from thread context instead of interrupt context. Make it safe to
run the iSCSI timeout handler in thread context. This patch fixes the
following lockdep complaint:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.5.1-dbg+ #11 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
kworker/7:1H/206 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff88802d9827e8 (&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock){+.?.}, at: iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0xa6/0x6d0 [libiscsi]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  lock_acquire+0x106/0x240
  _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
  iscsi_check_transport_timeouts+0x3e/0x210 [libiscsi]
  call_timer_fn+0x132/0x470
  __run_timers.part.0+0x39f/0x5b0
  run_timer_softirq+0x63/0xc0
  __do_softirq+0x12d/0x5fd
  irq_exit+0xb3/0x110
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x131/0x3d0
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
  default_idle+0x31/0x230
  arch_cpu_idle+0x13/0x20
  default_idle_call+0x53/0x60
  do_idle+0x38a/0x3f0
  cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x30
  start_secondary+0x222/0x290
  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
irq event stamp: 1383705
hardirqs last  enabled at (1383705): [<ffffffff81aace5c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x50
hardirqs last disabled at (1383704): [<ffffffff81aacb98>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x18/0x50
softirqs last  enabled at (1383690): [<ffffffffa0e2efea>] iscsi_queuecommand+0x76a/0xa20 [libiscsi]
softirqs last disabled at (1383682): [<ffffffffa0e2e998>] iscsi_queuecommand+0x118/0xa20 [libiscsi]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&(&session->frwd_lock)->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by kworker/7:1H/206:
 #0: ffff8880d57bf928 ((wq_completion)kblockd){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x472/0xab0
 #1: ffff88802b9c7de8 ((work_completion)(&q->timeout_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x476/0xab0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 PID: 206 Comm: kworker/7:1H Not tainted 5.5.1-dbg+ #11
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6
 print_usage_bug.cold+0x232/0x23b
 mark_lock+0x8dc/0xa70
 __lock_acquire+0xcea/0x2af0
 lock_acquire+0x106/0x240
 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
 iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0xa6/0x6d0 [libiscsi]
 scsi_times_out+0xf4/0x440 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_timeout+0x1d/0x20 [scsi_mod]
 blk_mq_check_expired+0x365/0x3a0
 bt_iter+0xd6/0xf0
 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x3de/0x650
 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x1af/0x380
 process_one_work+0x56d/0xab0
 worker_thread+0x7a/0x5d0
 kthread+0x1bc/0x210
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

Fixes: 287922e ("block: defer timeouts to a workqueue")
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Cc: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209173457.187370-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 28, 2020
[ Upstream commit 5eed6f1 ]

Commit 9b6f7e1 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") will
result in fork failing if allocating a kernel stack for a task in
dup_task_struct exceeds the kernel memory allowance for that cgroup.

Unfortunately, it also results in a crash.

This is due to the code jumping to free_stack and calling
free_thread_stack when the memcg kernel stack charge fails, but without
tsk->stack pointing at the freshly allocated stack.

This in turn results in the vfree_atomic in free_thread_stack oopsing
with a backtrace like this:

#5 [ffffc900244efc88] die at ffffffff8101f0ab
 #6 [ffffc900244efcb8] do_general_protection at ffffffff8101cb86
 #7 [ffffc900244efce0] general_protection at ffffffff818ff082
    [exception RIP: llist_add_batch+7]
    RIP: ffffffff8150d487  RSP: ffffc900244efd98  RFLAGS: 00010282
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88085ef55980  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffff88085ef55980  RSI: 343834343531203a  RDI: 343834343531203a
    RBP: ffffc900244efd98   R8: 0000000000000001   R9: ffff8808578c3600
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffff88029f6c21c0
    R13: 0000000000000286  R14: ffff880147759b00  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #8 [ffffc900244efda0] vfree_atomic at ffffffff811df2c7
 #9 [ffffc900244efdb8] copy_process at ffffffff81086e37
#10 [ffffc900244efe98] _do_fork at ffffffff810884e0
#11 [ffffc900244eff10] sys_vfork at ffffffff810887ff
#12 [ffffc900244eff20] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002a43
    RIP: 000000000049b948  RSP: 00007ffcdb307830  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 0000000000896030  RCX: 000000000049b948
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 00007ffcdb307790  RDI: 00000000005d7421
    RBP: 000000000067370f   R8: 00007ffcdb3077b0   R9: 000000000001ed00
    R10: 0000000000000008  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 0000000000000040
    R13: 000000000000000f  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 000000000088d018
    ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003a  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

The simplest fix is to assign tsk->stack right where it is allocated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214231726.7ee4843c@imladris.surriel.com
Fixes: 9b6f7e1 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting")
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 28, 2020
[ Upstream commit 32546a9 ]

This patch moves the final part of the cifsFileInfo_put() logic where we
need a write lock on lock_sem to be processed in a separate thread that
holds no other locks.
This is to prevent deadlocks like the one below:

> there are 6 processes looping to while trying to down_write
> cinode->lock_sem, 5 of them from _cifsFileInfo_put, and one from
> cifs_new_fileinfo
>
> and there are 5 other processes which are blocked, several of them
> waiting on either PG_writeback or PG_locked (which are both set), all
> for the same page of the file
>
> 2 inode_lock() (inode->i_rwsem) for the file
> 1 wait_on_page_writeback() for the page
> 1 down_read(inode->i_rwsem) for the inode of the directory
> 1 inode_lock()(inode->i_rwsem) for the inode of the directory
> 1 __lock_page
>
>
> so processes are blocked waiting on:
>   page flags PG_locked and PG_writeback for one specific page
>   inode->i_rwsem for the directory
>   inode->i_rwsem for the file
>   cifsInodeInflock_sem
>
>
>
> here are the more gory details (let me know if I need to provide
> anything more/better):
>
> [0 00:48:22.765] [UN]  PID: 8863   TASK: ffff8c691547c5c0  CPU: 3
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff9965007e3ba8] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff9965007e3c38] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff9965007e3c48] rwsem_down_write_slowpath at ffffffff9af283d7
>  #3 [ffff9965007e3cb8] legitimize_path at ffffffff9b0f975d
>  #4 [ffff9965007e3d08] path_openat at ffffffff9b0fe55d
>  #5 [ffff9965007e3dd8] do_filp_open at ffffffff9b100a33
>  #6 [ffff9965007e3ee0] do_sys_open at ffffffff9b0eb2d6
>  #7 [ffff9965007e3f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
> * (I think legitimize_path is bogus)
>
> in path_openat
>         } else {
>                 const char *s = path_init(nd, flags);
>                 while (!(error = link_path_walk(s, nd)) &&
>                         (error = do_last(nd, file, op)) > 0) {  <<<<
>
> do_last:
>         if (open_flag & O_CREAT)
>                 inode_lock(dir->d_inode);  <<<<
>         else
> so it's trying to take inode->i_rwsem for the directory
>
>      DENTRY           INODE           SUPERBLK     TYPE PATH
> ffff8c68bb8e79c0 ffff8c691158ef20 ffff8c6915bf9000 DIR  /mnt/vm1_smb/
> inode.i_rwsem is ffff8c691158efc0
>
> <struct rw_semaphore 0xffff8c691158efc0>:
>         owner: <struct task_struct 0xffff8c6914275d00> (UN -   8856 -
> reopen_file), counter: 0x0000000000000003
>         waitlist: 2
>         0xffff9965007e3c90     8863   reopen_file      UN 0  1:29:22.926
>   RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_WRITE
>         0xffff996500393e00     9802   ls               UN 0  1:17:26.700
>   RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_READ
>
>
> the owner of the inode.i_rwsem of the directory is:
>
> [0 00:00:00.109] [UN]  PID: 8856   TASK: ffff8c6914275d00  CPU: 3
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff99650065b828] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff99650065b8b8] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff99650065b8c8] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9b6e9f89
>  #3 [ffff99650065b940] msleep at ffffffff9af573a9
>  #4 [ffff99650065b948] _cifsFileInfo_put.cold.63 at ffffffffc0a42dd6 [cifs]
>  #5 [ffff99650065ba38] cifs_writepage_locked at ffffffffc0a0b8f3 [cifs]
>  #6 [ffff99650065bab0] cifs_launder_page at ffffffffc0a0bb72 [cifs]
>  #7 [ffff99650065bb30] invalidate_inode_pages2_range at ffffffff9b04d4bd
>  #8 [ffff99650065bcb8] cifs_invalidate_mapping at ffffffffc0a11339 [cifs]
>  #9 [ffff99650065bcd0] cifs_revalidate_mapping at ffffffffc0a1139a [cifs]
> #10 [ffff99650065bcf0] cifs_d_revalidate at ffffffffc0a014f6 [cifs]
> #11 [ffff99650065bd08] path_openat at ffffffff9b0fe7f7
> #12 [ffff99650065bdd8] do_filp_open at ffffffff9b100a33
> #13 [ffff99650065bee0] do_sys_open at ffffffff9b0eb2d6
> #14 [ffff99650065bf38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
>
> cifs_launder_page is for page 0xffffd1e2c07d2480
>
> crash> page.index,mapping,flags 0xffffd1e2c07d2480
>       index = 0x8
>       mapping = 0xffff8c68f3cd0db0
>   flags = 0xfffffc0008095
>
>   PAGE-FLAG       BIT  VALUE
>   PG_locked         0  0000001
>   PG_uptodate       2  0000004
>   PG_lru            4  0000010
>   PG_waiters        7  0000080
>   PG_writeback     15  0008000
>
>
> inode is ffff8c68f3cd0c40
> inode.i_rwsem is ffff8c68f3cd0ce0
>      DENTRY           INODE           SUPERBLK     TYPE PATH
> ffff8c68a1f1b480 ffff8c68f3cd0c40 ffff8c6915bf9000 REG
> /mnt/vm1_smb/testfile.8853
>
>
> this process holds the inode->i_rwsem for the parent directory, is
> laundering a page attached to the inode of the file it's opening, and in
> _cifsFileInfo_put is trying to down_write the cifsInodeInflock_sem
> for the file itself.
>
>
> <struct rw_semaphore 0xffff8c68f3cd0ce0>:
>         owner: <struct task_struct 0xffff8c6914272e80> (UN -   8854 -
> reopen_file), counter: 0x0000000000000003
>         waitlist: 1
>         0xffff9965005dfd80     8855   reopen_file      UN 0  1:29:22.912
>   RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_WRITE
>
> this is the inode.i_rwsem for the file
>
> the owner:
>
> [0 00:48:22.739] [UN]  PID: 8854   TASK: ffff8c6914272e80  CPU: 2
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff99650054fb38] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff99650054fbc8] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff99650054fbd8] io_schedule at ffffffff9b6e68e2
>  #3 [ffff99650054fbe8] __lock_page at ffffffff9b03c56f
>  #4 [ffff99650054fc80] pagecache_get_page at ffffffff9b03dcdf
>  #5 [ffff99650054fcc0] grab_cache_page_write_begin at ffffffff9b03ef4c
>  #6 [ffff99650054fcd0] cifs_write_begin at ffffffffc0a064ec [cifs]
>  #7 [ffff99650054fd30] generic_perform_write at ffffffff9b03bba4
>  #8 [ffff99650054fda8] __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff9b04060a
>  #9 [ffff99650054fdf0] cifs_strict_writev.cold.70 at ffffffffc0a4469b [cifs]
> #10 [ffff99650054fe48] new_sync_write at ffffffff9b0ec1dd
> #11 [ffff99650054fed0] vfs_write at ffffffff9b0eed35
> #12 [ffff99650054ff00] ksys_write at ffffffff9b0eefd9
> #13 [ffff99650054ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
>
> the process holds the inode->i_rwsem for the file to which it's writing,
> and is trying to __lock_page for the same page as in the other processes
>
>
> the other tasks:
> [0 00:00:00.028] [UN]  PID: 8859   TASK: ffff8c6915479740  CPU: 2
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff9965007b39d8] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff9965007b3a68] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff9965007b3a78] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9b6e9f89
>  #3 [ffff9965007b3af0] msleep at ffffffff9af573a9
>  #4 [ffff9965007b3af8] cifs_new_fileinfo.cold.61 at ffffffffc0a42a07 [cifs]
>  #5 [ffff9965007b3b78] cifs_open at ffffffffc0a0709d [cifs]
>  #6 [ffff9965007b3cd8] do_dentry_open at ffffffff9b0e9b7a
>  #7 [ffff9965007b3d08] path_openat at ffffffff9b0fe34f
>  #8 [ffff9965007b3dd8] do_filp_open at ffffffff9b100a33
>  #9 [ffff9965007b3ee0] do_sys_open at ffffffff9b0eb2d6
> #10 [ffff9965007b3f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
>
> this is opening the file, and is trying to down_write cinode->lock_sem
>
>
> [0 00:00:00.041] [UN]  PID: 8860   TASK: ffff8c691547ae80  CPU: 2
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
> [0 00:00:00.057] [UN]  PID: 8861   TASK: ffff8c6915478000  CPU: 3
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
> [0 00:00:00.059] [UN]  PID: 8858   TASK: ffff8c6914271740  CPU: 2
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
> [0 00:00:00.109] [UN]  PID: 8862   TASK: ffff8c691547dd00  CPU: 6
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff9965007c3c78] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff9965007c3d08] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff9965007c3d18] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9b6e9f89
>  #3 [ffff9965007c3d90] msleep at ffffffff9af573a9
>  #4 [ffff9965007c3d98] _cifsFileInfo_put.cold.63 at ffffffffc0a42dd6 [cifs]
>  #5 [ffff9965007c3e88] cifs_close at ffffffffc0a07aaf [cifs]
>  #6 [ffff9965007c3ea0] __fput at ffffffff9b0efa6e
>  #7 [ffff9965007c3ee8] task_work_run at ffffffff9aef1614
>  #8 [ffff9965007c3f20] exit_to_usermode_loop at ffffffff9ae03d6f
>  #9 [ffff9965007c3f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae0444c
>
> closing the file, and trying to down_write cifsi->lock_sem
>
>
> [0 00:48:22.839] [UN]  PID: 8857   TASK: ffff8c6914270000  CPU: 7
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff9965006a7cc8] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff9965006a7d58] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff9965006a7d68] io_schedule at ffffffff9b6e68e2
>  #3 [ffff9965006a7d78] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff9b03cac6
>  #4 [ffff9965006a7e10] __filemap_fdatawait_range at ffffffff9b03b028
>  #5 [ffff9965006a7ed8] filemap_write_and_wait at ffffffff9b040165
>  #6 [ffff9965006a7ef0] cifs_flush at ffffffffc0a0c2fa [cifs]
>  #7 [ffff9965006a7f10] filp_close at ffffffff9b0e93f1
>  #8 [ffff9965006a7f30] __x64_sys_close at ffffffff9b0e9a0e
>  #9 [ffff9965006a7f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
>
> in __filemap_fdatawait_range
>                         wait_on_page_writeback(page);
> for the same page of the file
>
>
>
> [0 00:48:22.718] [UN]  PID: 8855   TASK: ffff8c69142745c0  CPU: 7
> COMMAND: "reopen_file"
>  #0 [ffff9965005dfc98] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff9965005dfd28] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff9965005dfd38] rwsem_down_write_slowpath at ffffffff9af283d7
>  #3 [ffff9965005dfdf0] cifs_strict_writev at ffffffffc0a0c40a [cifs]
>  #4 [ffff9965005dfe48] new_sync_write at ffffffff9b0ec1dd
>  #5 [ffff9965005dfed0] vfs_write at ffffffff9b0eed35
>  #6 [ffff9965005dff00] ksys_write at ffffffff9b0eefd9
>  #7 [ffff9965005dff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
>
>         inode_lock(inode);
>
>
> and one 'ls' later on, to see whether the rest of the mount is available
> (the test file is in the root, so we get blocked up on the directory
> ->i_rwsem), so the entire mount is unavailable
>
> [0 00:36:26.473] [UN]  PID: 9802   TASK: ffff8c691436ae80  CPU: 4
> COMMAND: "ls"
>  #0 [ffff996500393d28] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095
>  #1 [ffff996500393db8] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df
>  #2 [ffff996500393dc8] rwsem_down_read_slowpath at ffffffff9b6e9421
>  #3 [ffff996500393e78] down_read_killable at ffffffff9b6e95e2
>  #4 [ffff996500393e88] iterate_dir at ffffffff9b103c56
>  #5 [ffff996500393ec8] ksys_getdents64 at ffffffff9b104b0c
>  #6 [ffff996500393f30] __x64_sys_getdents64 at ffffffff9b104bb6
>  #7 [ffff996500393f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315
>
> in iterate_dir:
>         if (shared)
>                 res = down_read_killable(&inode->i_rwsem);  <<<<
>         else
>                 res = down_write_killable(&inode->i_rwsem);
>

Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 17, 2020
[ Upstream commit 5bebf74 ]

Commit 83ff931 ("bcache: not use hard coded memset size in
bch_cache_accounting_clear()") tries to make the code more easy to
understand by removing the hard coded number with following change,
	void bch_cache_accounting_clear(...)
	{
		memset(&acc->total.cache_hits,
			0,
	-		sizeof(unsigned long) * 7);
	+		sizeof(struct cache_stats));
	}

Unfortunately the change was wrong (it also tells us the original code
was not easy to correctly understand). The hard coded number 7 is used
because in struct cache_stats,
 15 struct cache_stats {
 16         struct kobject          kobj;
 17
 18         unsigned long cache_hits;
 19         unsigned long cache_misses;
 20         unsigned long cache_bypass_hits;
 21         unsigned long cache_bypass_misses;
 22         unsigned long cache_readaheads;
 23         unsigned long cache_miss_collisions;
 24         unsigned long sectors_bypassed;
 25
 26         unsigned int            rescale;
 27 };
only members in LINE 18-24 want to be set to 0. It is wrong to use
'sizeof(struct cache_stats)' to replace 'sizeof(unsigned long) * 7), the
memory objects behind acc->total is staled by this change.

Сорокин Артем Сергеевич reports that by the following steps, kernel
panic will be triggered,
1. Create new set: make-bcache -B /dev/nvme1n1 -C /dev/sda --wipe-bcache
2. Run in /sys/fs/bcache/<uuid>:
   echo 1 > clear_stats && cat stats_five_minute/cache_bypass_hits

I can reproduce the panic and get following dmesg with KASAN enabled,
[22613.172742] ==================================================================
[22613.172862] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.172864] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task cat/6753

[22613.172870] CPU: 1 PID: 6753 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.5.0-rc7-lp151.28.16-default+ #11
[22613.172872] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019
[22613.172873] Call Trace:
[22613.172964]  dump_stack+0x8b/0xbb
[22613.172968]  ? sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.172970]  ? sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.173031]  __kasan_report+0x176/0x192
[22613.173064]  ? pr_cont_kernfs_name+0x40/0x60
[22613.173067]  ? sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.173070]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[22613.173072]  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.173105]  seq_read+0x199/0x6d0
[22613.173110]  vfs_read+0xa5/0x1a0
[22613.173113]  ksys_read+0x110/0x160
[22613.173115]  ? kernel_write+0xb0/0xb0
[22613.173177]  do_syscall_64+0x77/0x290
[22613.173238]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[22613.173241] RIP: 0033:0x7fc2c886ac61
[22613.173244] Code: fe ff ff 48 8d 3d c7 a0 09 00 48 83 ec 08 e8 46 03 02 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 05 ca fb 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89
[22613.173245] RSP: 002b:00007ffebe776d68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[22613.173248] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2c886ac61
[22613.173249] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2c8cca000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[22613.173250] RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[22613.173251] R10: 000000000000038c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc2c8cca000
[22613.173253] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007fc2c8cca00f R15: 0000000000020000
[22613.173255] ==================================================================
[22613.173256] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[22613.173350] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[22613.178380] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[22613.180959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[22613.183444] PGD 0 P4D 0
[22613.184867] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[22613.186797] CPU: 1 PID: 6753 Comm: cat Tainted: G    B             5.5.0-rc7-lp151.28.16-default+ #11
[22613.191253] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019
[22613.196706] RIP: 0010:sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.199097] Code: ff 48 8b 0b 48 8b 44 24 08 48 01 e9 eb a6 31 f6 48 89 cf ba 00 10 00 00 48 89 4c 24 10 e8 b1 e6 e9 ff 4c 89 ff e8 19 07 ea ff <49> 8b 07 48 85 c0 48 89 44 24 08 0f 84 91 00 00 00 49 8b 6d 00 48
[22613.208016] RSP: 0018:ffff8881d4f8fd78 EFLAGS: 00010246
[22613.210448] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881eb99b180 RCX: ffffffff810d9ef6
[22613.213691] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[22613.216893] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: fffffbfff072ddcd R09: fffffbfff072ddcd
[22613.220075] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff072ddcc R12: ffff8881de5c0200
[22613.223256] R13: ffff8881ed175500 R14: ffff8881eb99b198 R15: 0000000000000000
[22613.226290] FS:  00007fc2c8d3d500(0000) GS:ffff8881f2a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[22613.229637] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[22613.231993] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001ec89a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[22613.234909] Call Trace:
[22613.235931]  seq_read+0x199/0x6d0
[22613.237259]  vfs_read+0xa5/0x1a0
[22613.239229]  ksys_read+0x110/0x160
[22613.240590]  ? kernel_write+0xb0/0xb0
[22613.242040]  do_syscall_64+0x77/0x290
[22613.243625]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[22613.245450] RIP: 0033:0x7fc2c886ac61
[22613.246706] Code: fe ff ff 48 8d 3d c7 a0 09 00 48 83 ec 08 e8 46 03 02 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 05 ca fb 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89
[22613.253296] RSP: 002b:00007ffebe776d68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[22613.255835] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2c886ac61
[22613.258472] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2c8cca000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[22613.260807] RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[22613.263188] R10: 000000000000038c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc2c8cca000
[22613.265598] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007fc2c8cca00f R15: 0000000000020000
[22613.268729] Modules linked in: scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock fuse bnep kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel snd_ens1371 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus bcache snd_pcm btusb btrtl btbcm btintel crc64 aesni_intel glue_helper crypto_simd vmw_balloon cryptd bluetooth snd_timer snd_rawmidi snd joydev pcspkr e1000 rfkill vmw_vmci soundcore ecdh_generic ecc gameport i2c_piix4 mptctl ac button hid_generic usbhid sr_mod cdrom ata_generic ehci_pci vmwgfx uhci_hcd drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm ehci_hcd mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih ata_piix mptbase ahci usbcore libahci drm sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua
[22613.292429] CR2: 0000000000000000
[22613.293563] ---[ end trace a074b26a8508f378 ]---
[22613.295138] RIP: 0010:sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.296769] Code: ff 48 8b 0b 48 8b 44 24 08 48 01 e9 eb a6 31 f6 48 89 cf ba 00 10 00 00 48 89 4c 24 10 e8 b1 e6 e9 ff 4c 89 ff e8 19 07 ea ff <49> 8b 07 48 85 c0 48 89 44 24 08 0f 84 91 00 00 00 49 8b 6d 00 48
[22613.303553] RSP: 0018:ffff8881d4f8fd78 EFLAGS: 00010246
[22613.305280] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881eb99b180 RCX: ffffffff810d9ef6
[22613.307924] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[22613.310272] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: fffffbfff072ddcd R09: fffffbfff072ddcd
[22613.312685] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff072ddcc R12: ffff8881de5c0200
[22613.315076] R13: ffff8881ed175500 R14: ffff8881eb99b198 R15: 0000000000000000
[22613.318116] FS:  00007fc2c8d3d500(0000) GS:ffff8881f2a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[22613.320743] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[22613.322628] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001ec89a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0

Here this patch fixes the following problem by explicity set all the 7
members to 0 in bch_cache_accounting_clear().

Reported-by: Сорокин Артем Сергеевич <a.sorokin@bank-hlynov.ru>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2020
When experimenting with bpf_send_signal() helper in our production
environment (5.2 based), we experienced a deadlock in NMI mode:
   #5 [ffffc9002219f770] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8110be24
   #6 [ffffc9002219f770] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff81a43012
   #7 [ffffc9002219f780] try_to_wake_up at ffffffff810e7ecd
   #8 [ffffc9002219f7e0] signal_wake_up_state at ffffffff810c7b55
   #9 [ffffc9002219f7f0] __send_signal at ffffffff810c8602
  #10 [ffffc9002219f830] do_send_sig_info at ffffffff810ca31a
  #11 [ffffc9002219f868] bpf_send_signal at ffffffff8119d227
  #12 [ffffc9002219f988] bpf_overflow_handler at ffffffff811d4140
  #13 [ffffc9002219f9e0] __perf_event_overflow at ffffffff811d68cf
  #14 [ffffc9002219fa10] perf_swevent_overflow at ffffffff811d6a09
  #15 [ffffc9002219fa38] ___perf_sw_event at ffffffff811e0f47
  #16 [ffffc9002219fc30] __schedule at ffffffff81a3e04d
  #17 [ffffc9002219fc90] schedule at ffffffff81a3e219
  #18 [ffffc9002219fca0] futex_wait_queue_me at ffffffff8113d1b9
  #19 [ffffc9002219fcd8] futex_wait at ffffffff8113e529
  #20 [ffffc9002219fdf0] do_futex at ffffffff8113ffbc
  #21 [ffffc9002219fec0] __x64_sys_futex at ffffffff81140d1c
  #22 [ffffc9002219ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002602
  #23 [ffffc9002219ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81c00068

The above call stack is actually very similar to an issue
reported by Commit eac9153 ("bpf/stackmap: Fix deadlock with
rq_lock in bpf_get_stack()") by Song Liu. The only difference is
bpf_send_signal() helper instead of bpf_get_stack() helper.

The above deadlock is triggered with a perf_sw_event.
Similar to Commit eac9153, the below almost identical reproducer
used tracepoint point sched/sched_switch so the issue can be easily caught.
  /* stress_test.c */
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>
  #include <pthread.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <sys/stat.h>
  #include <fcntl.h>

  #define THREAD_COUNT 1000
  char *filename;
  void *worker(void *p)
  {
        void *ptr;
        int fd;
        char *pptr;

        fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
        if (fd < 0)
                return NULL;
        while (1) {
                struct timespec ts = {0, 1000 + rand() % 2000};

                ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096 * 64, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
                usleep(1);
                if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
                        printf("failed to mmap\n");
                        break;
                }
                munmap(ptr, 4096 * 64);
                usleep(1);
                pptr = malloc(1);
                usleep(1);
                pptr[0] = 1;
                usleep(1);
                free(pptr);
                usleep(1);
                nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
        }
        close(fd);
        return NULL;
  }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        void *ptr;
        int i;
        pthread_t threads[THREAD_COUNT];

        if (argc < 2)
                return 0;

        filename = argv[1];

        for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) {
                if (pthread_create(threads + i, NULL, worker, NULL)) {
                        fprintf(stderr, "Error creating thread\n");
                        return 0;
                }
        }

        for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++)
                pthread_join(threads[i], NULL);
        return 0;
  }
and the following command:
  1. run `stress_test /bin/ls` in one windown
  2. hack bcc trace.py with the following change:
     --- a/tools/trace.py
     +++ b/tools/trace.py
     @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(%s);
              __data.tgid = __tgid;
              __data.pid = __pid;
              bpf_get_current_comm(&__data.comm, sizeof(__data.comm));
     +        bpf_send_signal(10);
      %s
      %s
              %s.perf_submit(%s, &__data, sizeof(__data));
  3. in a different window run
     ./trace.py -p $(pidof stress_test) t:sched:sched_switch

The deadlock can be reproduced in our production system.

Similar to Song's fix, the fix is to delay sending signal if
irqs is disabled to avoid deadlocks involving with rq_lock.
With this change, my above stress-test in our production system
won't cause deadlock any more.

I also implemented a scale-down version of reproducer in the
selftest (a subsequent commit). With latest bpf-next,
it complains for the following potential deadlock.
  [   32.832450] -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}:
  [   32.833100]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80
  [   32.833696]        task_rq_lock+0x2c/0xa0
  [   32.834182]        task_sched_runtime+0x59/0xd0
  [   32.834721]        thread_group_cputime+0x250/0x270
  [   32.835304]        thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x2e/0x70
  [   32.835959]        do_task_stat+0x8a7/0xb80
  [   32.836461]        proc_single_show+0x51/0xb0
  ...
  [   32.839512] -> #0 (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){....}:
  [   32.840275]        __lock_acquire+0x1358/0x1a20
  [   32.840826]        lock_acquire+0xc7/0x1d0
  [   32.841309]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80
  [   32.841916]        __lock_task_sighand+0x79/0x160
  [   32.842465]        do_send_sig_info+0x35/0x90
  [   32.842977]        bpf_send_signal+0xa/0x10
  [   32.843464]        bpf_prog_bc13ed9e4d3163e3_send_signal_tp_sched+0x465/0x1000
  [   32.844301]        trace_call_bpf+0x115/0x270
  [   32.844809]        perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4a/0xc0
  [   32.845411]        perf_trace_sched_switch+0x10f/0x180
  [   32.846014]        __schedule+0x45d/0x880
  [   32.846483]        schedule+0x5f/0xd0
  ...

  [   32.853148] Chain exists of:
  [   32.853148]   &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock
  [   32.853148]
  [   32.854451]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [   32.854451]
  [   32.855173]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [   32.855745]        ----                    ----
  [   32.856278]   lock(&rq->lock);
  [   32.856671]                                lock(&p->pi_lock);
  [   32.857332]                                lock(&rq->lock);
  [   32.857999]   lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock);

  Deadlock happens on CPU0 when it tries to acquire &sighand->siglock
  but it has been held by CPU1 and CPU1 tries to grab &rq->lock
  and cannot get it.

  This is not exactly the callstack in our production environment,
  but sympotom is similar and both locks are using spin_lock_irqsave()
  to acquire the lock, and both involves rq_lock. The fix to delay
  sending signal when irq is disabled also fixed this issue.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200304191104.2796501-1-yhs@fb.com
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 2, 2020
commit ca4463b upstream.

The VT_DISALLOCATE ioctl can free a virtual console while tty_release()
is still running, causing a use-after-free in con_shutdown().  This
occurs because VT_DISALLOCATE considers a virtual console's
'struct vc_data' to be unused as soon as the corresponding tty's
refcount hits 0.  But actually it may be still being closed.

Fix this by making vc_data be reference-counted via the embedded
'struct tty_port'.  A newly allocated virtual console has refcount 1.
Opening it for the first time increments the refcount to 2.  Closing it
for the last time decrements the refcount (in tty_operations::cleanup()
so that it happens late enough), as does VT_DISALLOCATE.

Reproducer:
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <linux/vt.h>
	#include <sys/ioctl.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	int main()
	{
		if (fork()) {
			for (;;)
				close(open("/dev/tty5", O_RDWR));
		} else {
			int fd = open("/dev/tty10", O_RDWR);

			for (;;)
				ioctl(fd, VT_DISALLOCATE, 5);
		}
	}

KASAN report:
	BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in con_shutdown+0x76/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3278
	Write of size 8 at addr ffff88806a4ec108 by task syz_vt/129

	CPU: 0 PID: 129 Comm: syz_vt Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2 #11
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20191223_100556-anatol 04/01/2014
	Call Trace:
	 [...]
	 con_shutdown+0x76/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3278
	 release_tty+0xa8/0x410 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1514
	 tty_release_struct+0x34/0x50 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1629
	 tty_release+0x984/0xed0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1789
	 [...]

	Allocated by task 129:
	 [...]
	 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
	 vc_allocate drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1085 [inline]
	 vc_allocate+0x1ac/0x680 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1066
	 con_install+0x4d/0x3f0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3229
	 tty_driver_install_tty drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1228 [inline]
	 tty_init_dev+0x94/0x350 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1341
	 tty_open_by_driver drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1987 [inline]
	 tty_open+0x3ca/0xb30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2035
	 [...]

	Freed by task 130:
	 [...]
	 kfree+0xbf/0x1e0 mm/slab.c:3757
	 vt_disallocate drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:300 [inline]
	 vt_ioctl+0x16dc/0x1e30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:818
	 tty_ioctl+0x9db/0x11b0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660
	 [...]

Fixes: 4001d7b ("vt: push down the tty lock so we can see what is left to tackle")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reported-by: syzbot+522643ab5729b0421998@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200322034305.210082-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 2, 2020
commit ca4463b upstream.

The VT_DISALLOCATE ioctl can free a virtual console while tty_release()
is still running, causing a use-after-free in con_shutdown().  This
occurs because VT_DISALLOCATE considers a virtual console's
'struct vc_data' to be unused as soon as the corresponding tty's
refcount hits 0.  But actually it may be still being closed.

Fix this by making vc_data be reference-counted via the embedded
'struct tty_port'.  A newly allocated virtual console has refcount 1.
Opening it for the first time increments the refcount to 2.  Closing it
for the last time decrements the refcount (in tty_operations::cleanup()
so that it happens late enough), as does VT_DISALLOCATE.

Reproducer:
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <linux/vt.h>
	#include <sys/ioctl.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	int main()
	{
		if (fork()) {
			for (;;)
				close(open("/dev/tty5", O_RDWR));
		} else {
			int fd = open("/dev/tty10", O_RDWR);

			for (;;)
				ioctl(fd, VT_DISALLOCATE, 5);
		}
	}

KASAN report:
	BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in con_shutdown+0x76/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3278
	Write of size 8 at addr ffff88806a4ec108 by task syz_vt/129

	CPU: 0 PID: 129 Comm: syz_vt Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2 #11
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20191223_100556-anatol 04/01/2014
	Call Trace:
	 [...]
	 con_shutdown+0x76/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3278
	 release_tty+0xa8/0x410 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1514
	 tty_release_struct+0x34/0x50 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1629
	 tty_release+0x984/0xed0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1789
	 [...]

	Allocated by task 129:
	 [...]
	 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
	 vc_allocate drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1085 [inline]
	 vc_allocate+0x1ac/0x680 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1066
	 con_install+0x4d/0x3f0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3229
	 tty_driver_install_tty drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1228 [inline]
	 tty_init_dev+0x94/0x350 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1341
	 tty_open_by_driver drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1987 [inline]
	 tty_open+0x3ca/0xb30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2035
	 [...]

	Freed by task 130:
	 [...]
	 kfree+0xbf/0x1e0 mm/slab.c:3757
	 vt_disallocate drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:300 [inline]
	 vt_ioctl+0x16dc/0x1e30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:818
	 tty_ioctl+0x9db/0x11b0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660
	 [...]

Fixes: 4001d7b ("vt: push down the tty lock so we can see what is left to tackle")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reported-by: syzbot+522643ab5729b0421998@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200322034305.210082-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 2, 2020
commit ca4463b upstream.

The VT_DISALLOCATE ioctl can free a virtual console while tty_release()
is still running, causing a use-after-free in con_shutdown().  This
occurs because VT_DISALLOCATE considers a virtual console's
'struct vc_data' to be unused as soon as the corresponding tty's
refcount hits 0.  But actually it may be still being closed.

Fix this by making vc_data be reference-counted via the embedded
'struct tty_port'.  A newly allocated virtual console has refcount 1.
Opening it for the first time increments the refcount to 2.  Closing it
for the last time decrements the refcount (in tty_operations::cleanup()
so that it happens late enough), as does VT_DISALLOCATE.

Reproducer:
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <linux/vt.h>
	#include <sys/ioctl.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	int main()
	{
		if (fork()) {
			for (;;)
				close(open("/dev/tty5", O_RDWR));
		} else {
			int fd = open("/dev/tty10", O_RDWR);

			for (;;)
				ioctl(fd, VT_DISALLOCATE, 5);
		}
	}

KASAN report:
	BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in con_shutdown+0x76/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3278
	Write of size 8 at addr ffff88806a4ec108 by task syz_vt/129

	CPU: 0 PID: 129 Comm: syz_vt Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2 #11
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20191223_100556-anatol 04/01/2014
	Call Trace:
	 [...]
	 con_shutdown+0x76/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3278
	 release_tty+0xa8/0x410 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1514
	 tty_release_struct+0x34/0x50 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1629
	 tty_release+0x984/0xed0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1789
	 [...]

	Allocated by task 129:
	 [...]
	 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
	 vc_allocate drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1085 [inline]
	 vc_allocate+0x1ac/0x680 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1066
	 con_install+0x4d/0x3f0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3229
	 tty_driver_install_tty drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1228 [inline]
	 tty_init_dev+0x94/0x350 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1341
	 tty_open_by_driver drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1987 [inline]
	 tty_open+0x3ca/0xb30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2035
	 [...]

	Freed by task 130:
	 [...]
	 kfree+0xbf/0x1e0 mm/slab.c:3757
	 vt_disallocate drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:300 [inline]
	 vt_ioctl+0x16dc/0x1e30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:818
	 tty_ioctl+0x9db/0x11b0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660
	 [...]

Fixes: 4001d7b ("vt: push down the tty lock so we can see what is left to tackle")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reported-by: syzbot+522643ab5729b0421998@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200322034305.210082-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2020
Stefano reported a crash with using SQPOLL with io_uring:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003b0
  CPU: 2 PID: 1307 Comm: io_uring-sq Not tainted 5.7.0-rc7 #11
  RIP: 0010:task_numa_work+0x4f/0x2c0
  Call Trace:
   task_work_run+0x68/0xa0
   io_sq_thread+0x252/0x3d0
   kthread+0xf9/0x130
   ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

which is task_numa_work() oopsing on current->mm being NULL.

The task work is queued by task_tick_numa(), which checks if current->mm is
NULL at the time of the call. But this state isn't necessarily persistent,
if the kthread is using use_mm() to temporarily adopt the mm of a task.

Change the task_tick_numa() check to exclude kernel threads in general,
as it doesn't make sense to attempt ot balance for kthreads anyway.

Reported-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/865de121-8190-5d30-ece5-3b097dc74431@kernel.dk
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit ede72dc ]

Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
                       \___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events

 Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]

    -e, --event <event>   event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events

=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
    #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
    #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
    #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
    #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
    #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
    #7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
    #8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
    #9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
    #10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
    #11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
    #12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
    #13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
    #14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
    #15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.

Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
Couple of error paths in do_core_test() was returning directly without
doing a necessary cpus_read_unlock().

Following lockdep warning was observed when exercising these scenarios
with PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING enabled:

[  139.304775] ================================================
[  139.311185] WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
[  139.317593] 6.6.0-rc2ifs01+ #11 Tainted: G S      W I
[  139.324499] ------------------------------------------------
[  139.330908] bash/11476 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[  139.338000] 1 lock held by bash/11476:
[  139.342262]  #0: ffffffffaa26c930 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at:
do_core_test+0x35/0x1c0 [intel_ifs]

Fix the flow so that all scenarios release the lock prior to returning
from the function.

Fixes: 5210fb4 ("platform/x86/intel/ifs: Sysfs interface for Array BIST")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927184824.2566086-1-jithu.joseph@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2023
[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ]

Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write,
nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read,
memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw,
C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency,
C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency,
C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would
trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX.

```
==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98
READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0
    #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12
    #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6
    #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9
    #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31
    #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18
    #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3
    #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5
    #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2
    #8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3
    #9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11
    #10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8
    #11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2
    #12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3
```

The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using
empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1
results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately
overflows when any member is accessed.

Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2023
[ Upstream commit ede72dc ]

Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
                       \___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events

 Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]

    -e, --event <event>   event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events

=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
    #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
    #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
    #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
    #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
    #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
    #7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
    #8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
    #9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
    #10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
    #11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
    #12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
    #13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
    #14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
    #15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.

Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2023
commit 864fb5d upstream.

[ 8743.393379] ======================================================
[ 8743.393385] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 8743.393391] 6.4.0-rc1+ #11 Tainted: G           OE
[ 8743.393397] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 8743.393402] kworker/0:2/12921 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 8743.393408] ffff888127a14460 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksmbd_vfs_setxattr+0x3d/0xd0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393510]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 8743.393515] ffff8880360d97f0 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_locked+0x181/0x670 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393618]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 8743.393623]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 8743.393628]
               -> #1 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 8743.393648]        down_write_nested+0x9a/0x1b0
[ 8743.393660]        filename_create+0x128/0x270
[ 8743.393670]        do_mkdirat+0xab/0x1f0
[ 8743.393680]        __x64_sys_mkdir+0x47/0x60
[ 8743.393690]        do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
[ 8743.393701]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 8743.393711]
               -> #0 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 8743.393728]        __lock_acquire+0x2201/0x3b80
[ 8743.393737]        lock_acquire+0x18f/0x440
[ 8743.393746]        mnt_want_write+0x5f/0x240
[ 8743.393755]        ksmbd_vfs_setxattr+0x3d/0xd0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393839]        ksmbd_vfs_set_dos_attrib_xattr+0xcc/0x110 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393924]        compat_ksmbd_vfs_set_dos_attrib_xattr+0x39/0x50 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.394010]        smb2_open+0x3432/0x3cc0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.394099]        handle_ksmbd_work+0x2c9/0x7b0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.394187]        process_one_work+0x65a/0xb30
[ 8743.394198]        worker_thread+0x2cf/0x700
[ 8743.394209]        kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
[ 8743.394218]        ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50

This patch add mnt_want_write() above parent inode lock and remove
nested mnt_want_write calls in smb2_open().

Fixes: 40b268d ("ksmbd: add mnt_want_write to ksmbd vfs functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marios Makassikis <mmakassikis@freebox.fr>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 13, 2023
[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ]

When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 30, 2023
[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ]

When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 864fb5d ]

[ 8743.393379] ======================================================
[ 8743.393385] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 8743.393391] 6.4.0-rc1+ #11 Tainted: G           OE
[ 8743.393397] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 8743.393402] kworker/0:2/12921 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 8743.393408] ffff888127a14460 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksmbd_vfs_setxattr+0x3d/0xd0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393510]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 8743.393515] ffff8880360d97f0 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_locked+0x181/0x670 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393618]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 8743.393623]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 8743.393628]
               -> #1 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 8743.393648]        down_write_nested+0x9a/0x1b0
[ 8743.393660]        filename_create+0x128/0x270
[ 8743.393670]        do_mkdirat+0xab/0x1f0
[ 8743.393680]        __x64_sys_mkdir+0x47/0x60
[ 8743.393690]        do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
[ 8743.393701]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 8743.393711]
               -> #0 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 8743.393728]        __lock_acquire+0x2201/0x3b80
[ 8743.393737]        lock_acquire+0x18f/0x440
[ 8743.393746]        mnt_want_write+0x5f/0x240
[ 8743.393755]        ksmbd_vfs_setxattr+0x3d/0xd0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393839]        ksmbd_vfs_set_dos_attrib_xattr+0xcc/0x110 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.393924]        compat_ksmbd_vfs_set_dos_attrib_xattr+0x39/0x50 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.394010]        smb2_open+0x3432/0x3cc0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.394099]        handle_ksmbd_work+0x2c9/0x7b0 [ksmbd]
[ 8743.394187]        process_one_work+0x65a/0xb30
[ 8743.394198]        worker_thread+0x2cf/0x700
[ 8743.394209]        kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
[ 8743.394218]        ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50

This patch add mnt_want_write() above parent inode lock and remove
nested mnt_want_write calls in smb2_open().

Fixes: 40b268d ("ksmbd: add mnt_want_write to ksmbd vfs functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marios Makassikis <mmakassikis@freebox.fr>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit f546c42 ]

[BUG]
There is a bug report that, on a ext4-converted btrfs, scrub leads to
various problems, including:

- "unable to find chunk map" errors
  BTRFS info (device vdb): scrub: started on devid 1
  BTRFS critical (device vdb): unable to find chunk map for logical 2214744064 length 4096
  BTRFS critical (device vdb): unable to find chunk map for logical 2214744064 length 45056

  This would lead to unrepariable errors.

- Use-after-free KASAN reports:
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __blk_rq_map_sg+0x18f/0x7c0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881013c9040 by task btrfs/909
  CPU: 0 PID: 909 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.7.0-x64v3-dbg #11 c50636e9419a8354555555245df535e380563b2b
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 2023.11-2 12/24/2023
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x43/0x60
   print_report+0xcf/0x640
   kasan_report+0xa6/0xd0
   __blk_rq_map_sg+0x18f/0x7c0
   virtblk_prep_rq.isra.0+0x215/0x6a0 [virtio_blk 19a65eeee9ae6fcf02edfad39bb9ddee07dcdaff]
   virtio_queue_rqs+0xc4/0x310 [virtio_blk 19a65eeee9ae6fcf02edfad39bb9ddee07dcdaff]
   blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+0x780/0x860
   __blk_flush_plug+0x1ba/0x220
   blk_finish_plug+0x3b/0x60
   submit_initial_group_read+0x10a/0x290 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   flush_scrub_stripes+0x38e/0x430 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   scrub_stripe+0x82a/0xae0 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   scrub_chunk+0x178/0x200 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x4bc/0xa30 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   btrfs_scrub_dev+0x398/0x810 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x4b9/0x3020 [btrfs e57987a360bed82fe8756dcd3e0de5406ccfe965]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0xbd/0x100
   do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xe0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
  RIP: 0033:0x7f47e5e0952b

- Crash, mostly due to above use-after-free

[CAUSE]
The converted fs has the following data chunk layout:

    item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 2214658048) itemoff 16025 itemsize 80
        length 86016 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|single

For above logical bytenr 2214744064, it's at the chunk end
(2214658048 + 86016 = 2214744064).

This means btrfs_submit_bio() would split the bio, and trigger endio
function for both of the two halves.

However scrub_submit_initial_read() would only expect the endio function
to be called once, not any more.
This means the first endio function would already free the bbio::bio,
leaving the bvec freed, thus the 2nd endio call would lead to
use-after-free.

[FIX]
- Make sure scrub_read_endio() only updates bits in its range
  Since we may read less than 64K at the end of the chunk, we should not
  touch the bits beyond chunk boundary.

- Make sure scrub_submit_initial_read() only to read the chunk range
  This is done by calculating the real number of sectors we need to
  read, and add sector-by-sector to the bio.

Thankfully the scrub read repair path won't need extra fixes:

- scrub_stripe_submit_repair_read()
  With above fixes, we won't update error bit for range beyond chunk,
  thus scrub_stripe_submit_repair_read() should never submit any read
  beyond the chunk.

Reported-by: Rongrong <i@rong.moe>
Fixes: e02ee89 ("btrfs: scrub: switch scrub_simple_mirror() to scrub_stripe infrastructure")
Tested-by: Rongrong <i@rong.moe>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 16, 2024
commit d21d406 upstream.

syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during
netlink socket destruction.  [1]

From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then
the response was generated.  The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump
for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due
to the fault injection.  [0]

  12:01:34 executing program 3:
  r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0)
  sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...)
  recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8)

Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call
of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3].  syzkaller stopped
receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct()
called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done().

fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it
is still not NULL.  fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by
nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling
itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page.

To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc().

[0]:
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117)
 should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153)
 should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733)
 kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992)
 inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662)
 rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029)
 netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269)
 netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988)
 ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801)
 ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846)
 do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943)
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034)

[1]:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb)
stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work
RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570)
Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3
RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358
RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <#DF>
 </#DF>
 <TASK>
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 ...
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401)
 __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2))
 sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224)
 __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235)
 sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246)
 process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259)
 worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416)
 kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388)
 ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153)
 ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:256)
Modules linked in:

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401211003.25274-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
StollD pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2024
…PLES event"

commit 5b3cde1 upstream.

This reverts commit 7d1405c.

This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian:

  ```
  sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e
  raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls
  ...
  [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ]
  malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)
  Aborted
  ```

  Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod:

  ```
  malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)

  Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6,
  no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c
  44            return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO
  (ret) : 0;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>,
  signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  #1  0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>,
  signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78
  #2  0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/
  raise.c:26
  #3  0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
  #4  0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea
  "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132
  #5  0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850
  "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772
  #6  0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0
  <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081
  #7  0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>,
  elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754
  #8  0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header ()
  #9  0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 ()
  #10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record ()
  #11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin ()
  #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main ()
  ```

  Valgrind memcheck:
  ```
  ==45136== Invalid write of size 8
  ==45136==    at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==  Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
  ==45136==    at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
  ==45136==    by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==
  ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s)
  ==45136==    at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26)
  ==45136==    by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24)
  ==45136==    by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==  Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
  ==45136==    at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
  ==45136==    by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==
 -----

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/
Reported-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Tested-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.8+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2024
commit 9d274c1 upstream.

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2024
[ Upstream commit 491aee8 ]

In the XDP_TX path, ionic driver sends a packet to the TX path with rx
page and corresponding dma address.
After tx is done, ionic_tx_clean() frees that page.
But RX ring buffer isn't reset to NULL.
So, it uses a freed page, which causes kernel panic.

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881576c110c
PGD 773801067 P4D 773801067 PUD 87f086067 PMD 87efca067 PTE 800ffffea893e060
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 25 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.9.0+ #11
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_f0b8caeac1068a55_balancer_ingress+0x3b/0x44f
Code: 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 b8 01 00 00 00 48 8b 5f 08 4c 8b 77 00 4c 89 f7 48 83 c7 0e 48 39 d8
RSP: 0018:ffff888104e6fa28 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8881576c1140 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffffffffc0051f64 RSI: ffffc90002d33048 RDI: ffff8881576c110e
RBP: ffff888104e6fa88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027a04a23
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881b03a21a8
R13: ffff8881589f800f R14: ffff8881576c1100 R15: 00000001576c1100
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88881ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff8881576c110c CR3: 0000000767a90000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x254/0x790
? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? search_bpf_extables+0x165/0x260
? fixup_exception+0x4a/0x970
? exc_page_fault+0xcb/0xe0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? 0xffffffffc0051f64
? bpf_prog_f0b8caeac1068a55_balancer_ingress+0x3b/0x44f
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220
ionic_rx_service+0x11ab/0x3010 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? ionic_tx_clean+0x29b/0xc60 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? __pfx_ionic_tx_clean+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? __pfx_ionic_rx_service+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? ionic_tx_cq_service+0x25d/0xa00 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? __pfx_ionic_rx_service+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
ionic_cq_service+0x69/0x150 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
ionic_txrx_napi+0x11a/0x540 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa0/0x440
net_rx_action+0x7e7/0xc30
? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10

Fixes: 8eeed83 ("ionic: Add XDP_TX support")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 18, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit eef0532 ]

Run bpf_tcp_ca selftests (./test_progs -t bpf_tcp_ca) on a Loongarch
platform, some "Segmentation fault" errors occur:

'''
 test_dctcp:PASS:bpf_dctcp__open_and_load 0 nsec
 test_dctcp:FAIL:bpf_map__attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 #29/1    bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp:FAIL
 test_cubic:PASS:bpf_cubic__open_and_load 0 nsec
 test_cubic:FAIL:bpf_map__attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 #29/2    bpf_tcp_ca/cubic:FAIL
 test_dctcp_fallback:PASS:dctcp_skel 0 nsec
 test_dctcp_fallback:PASS:bpf_dctcp__load 0 nsec
 test_dctcp_fallback:FAIL:dctcp link unexpected error: -524
 #29/4    bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp_fallback:FAIL
 test_write_sk_pacing:PASS:open_and_load 0 nsec
 test_write_sk_pacing:FAIL:attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 #29/6    bpf_tcp_ca/write_sk_pacing:FAIL
 test_update_ca:PASS:open 0 nsec
 test_update_ca:FAIL:attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 settcpca:FAIL:setsockopt unexpected setsockopt: \
					actual -1 == expected -1
 (network_helpers.c:99: errno: No such file or directory) \
					Failed to call post_socket_cb
 start_test:FAIL:start_server_str unexpected start_server_str: \
					actual -1 == expected -1
 test_update_ca:FAIL:ca1_ca1_cnt unexpected ca1_ca1_cnt: \
					actual 0 <= expected 0
 #29/9    bpf_tcp_ca/update_ca:FAIL
 #29      bpf_tcp_ca:FAIL
 Caught signal #11!
 Stack trace:
 ./test_progs(crash_handler+0x28)[0x5555567ed91c]
 linux-vdso.so.1(__vdso_rt_sigreturn+0x0)[0x7ffffee408b0]
 ./test_progs(bpf_link__update_map+0x80)[0x555556824a78]
 ./test_progs(+0x94d68)[0x5555564c4d68]
 ./test_progs(test_bpf_tcp_ca+0xe8)[0x5555564c6a88]
 ./test_progs(+0x3bde54)[0x5555567ede54]
 ./test_progs(main+0x61c)[0x5555567efd54]
 /usr/lib64/libc.so.6(+0x22208)[0x7ffff2aaa208]
 /usr/lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xac)[0x7ffff2aaa30c]
 ./test_progs(_start+0x48)[0x55555646bca8]
 Segmentation fault
'''

This is because BPF trampoline is not implemented on Loongarch yet,
"link" returned by bpf_map__attach_struct_ops() is NULL. test_progs
crashs when this NULL link passes to bpf_link__update_map(). This
patch adds NULL checks for all links in bpf_tcp_ca to fix these errors.
If "link" is NULL, goto the newly added label "out" to destroy the skel.

v2:
 - use "goto out" instead of "return" as Eduard suggested.

Fixes: 06da9f3 ("selftests/bpf: Test switching TCP Congestion Control algorithms.")
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b4c841492bd4ed97964e4e61e92827ce51bf1dc9.1720615848.git.tanggeliang@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2024
Remove the dma_unmap_page_attrs() call in the driver's XDP_REDIRECT
code path.  This should have been removed when we let the page pool
handle the DMA mapping.  This bug causes the warning:

WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 59 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1198 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
CPU: 7 PID: 59 Comm: ksoftirqd/7 Tainted: G        W          6.8.0-1010-gcp #11-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7525/0PYVT1, BIOS 2.15.2 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
Code: 89 ee 48 89 df e8 cb f2 69 ff 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 e9 ab 17 71 00 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9
RSP: 0018:ffffab1fc0597a48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99ff838280c8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffab1fc0597a78 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffffab1fc0597c1c
R10: ffffab1fc0597cd3 R11: ffff99ffe375acd8 R12: 00000000e65b9000
R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000002
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9a06efb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000565c34c37210 CR3: 00000005c7e3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
? __warn+0x89/0x150
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
? report_bug+0x16a/0x190
? handle_bug+0x51/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x80
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x35/0x100
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x55/0x220
? bpf_prog_4d7e87c0d30db711_xdp_dispatcher+0x64/0x9f
bnxt_rx_xdp+0x237/0x520 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_rx_pkt+0x640/0xdd0 [bnxt_en]
__bnxt_poll_work+0x1a1/0x3d0 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_poll+0xaa/0x1e0 [bnxt_en]
__napi_poll+0x33/0x1e0
net_rx_action+0x18a/0x2f0

Fixes: 578fcfd ("bnxt_en: Let the page pool manage the DMA mapping")
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <andrew.gospodarek@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820203415.168178-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2024
A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2024
[ Upstream commit 8baeef7 ]

Remove the dma_unmap_page_attrs() call in the driver's XDP_REDIRECT
code path.  This should have been removed when we let the page pool
handle the DMA mapping.  This bug causes the warning:

WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 59 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1198 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
CPU: 7 PID: 59 Comm: ksoftirqd/7 Tainted: G        W          6.8.0-1010-gcp #11-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7525/0PYVT1, BIOS 2.15.2 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
Code: 89 ee 48 89 df e8 cb f2 69 ff 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 e9 ab 17 71 00 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9
RSP: 0018:ffffab1fc0597a48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99ff838280c8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffab1fc0597a78 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffffab1fc0597c1c
R10: ffffab1fc0597cd3 R11: ffff99ffe375acd8 R12: 00000000e65b9000
R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000002
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9a06efb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000565c34c37210 CR3: 00000005c7e3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
? __warn+0x89/0x150
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
? report_bug+0x16a/0x190
? handle_bug+0x51/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x80
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x35/0x100
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x55/0x220
? bpf_prog_4d7e87c0d30db711_xdp_dispatcher+0x64/0x9f
bnxt_rx_xdp+0x237/0x520 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_rx_pkt+0x640/0xdd0 [bnxt_en]
__bnxt_poll_work+0x1a1/0x3d0 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_poll+0xaa/0x1e0 [bnxt_en]
__napi_poll+0x33/0x1e0
net_rx_action+0x18a/0x2f0

Fixes: 578fcfd ("bnxt_en: Let the page pool manage the DMA mapping")
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <andrew.gospodarek@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820203415.168178-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2024
[ Upstream commit a699781 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2024
commit 23dfdb5 upstream.

The following kernel trace can be triggered with fstest generic/629 when
executed against a filesystem with fast-commit feature enabled:

INFO: trying to register non-static key.
The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe
you didn't initialize this object before use?
turning off the locking correctness validator.
CPU: 0 PID: 866 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.10.0+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0x90
 register_lock_class+0x759/0x7d0
 __lock_acquire+0x85/0x2630
 ? __find_get_block+0xb4/0x380
 lock_acquire+0xd1/0x2d0
 ? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0xd5/0x160
 _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40
 ? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0xd5/0x160
 __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0xd5/0x160
 ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x61/0xb0
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x79/0x270
 ? ext4_ext_replay_set_iblocks+0x2f8/0x450
 ext4_ext_replay_set_iblocks+0x330/0x450
 ext4_fc_replay+0x14c8/0x1540
 ? jread+0x88/0x2e0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x40
 do_one_pass+0x447/0xd00
 jbd2_journal_recover+0x139/0x1b0
 jbd2_journal_load+0x96/0x390
 ext4_load_and_init_journal+0x253/0xd40
 ext4_fill_super+0x2cc6/0x3180
...

In the replay path there's an attempt to lock sbi->s_bdev_wb_lock in
function ext4_check_bdev_write_error().  Unfortunately, at this point this
spinlock has not been initialized yet.  Moving it's initialization to an
earlier point in __ext4_fill_super() fixes this splat.

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <luis.henriques@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240718094356.7863-1-luis.henriques@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2024
commit ac01c8c upstream.

AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which
manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

  ==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80
  READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193
      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol
reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67 ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"),
the symbol objects were leaked until c087e94 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so
the bug was masked.

Fixes: c087e94 ("perf machine: Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL")
Reported-by: Yunzhao Li <yunzhao@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming (Cloudflare) <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815142212.3834625-1-matt@readmodwrite.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2024
commit 9af2efe upstream.

The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  #8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  #9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2024
commit e972b08 upstream.

We're seeing crashes from rq_qos_wake_function that look like this:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffafe180a40084
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10027c067 PMD 10115d067 PTE 0
  Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00013-geca631b8fe80 #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1d/0x40
  Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 65 ff 05 62 97 30 4c 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 0a 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 89 c6 e8 2c 0b 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffafe180580ca0 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffafe180a3f7a8 RCX: 0000000000000011
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffafe180a40084
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000001e7240 R09: 0000000000000011
  R10: 0000000000000028 R11: 0000000000000888 R12: 0000000000000002
  R13: ffffafe180a40084 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aaf1f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffafe180a40084 CR3: 000000010e428002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   try_to_wake_up+0x5a/0x6a0
   rq_qos_wake_function+0x71/0x80
   __wake_up_common+0x75/0xa0
   __wake_up+0x36/0x60
   scale_up.part.0+0x50/0x110
   wb_timer_fn+0x227/0x450
   ...

So rq_qos_wake_function() calls wake_up_process(data->task), which calls
try_to_wake_up(), which faults in raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&p->pi_lock).

p comes from data->task, and data comes from the waitqueue entry, which
is stored on the waiter's stack in rq_qos_wait(). Analyzing the core
dump with drgn, I found that the waiter had already woken up and moved
on to a completely unrelated code path, clobbering what was previously
data->task. Meanwhile, the waker was passing the clobbered garbage in
data->task to wake_up_process(), leading to the crash.

What's happening is that in between rq_qos_wake_function() deleting the
waitqueue entry and calling wake_up_process(), rq_qos_wait() is finding
that it already got a token and returning. The race looks like this:

rq_qos_wait()                           rq_qos_wake_function()
==============================================================
prepare_to_wait_exclusive()
                                        data->got_token = true;
                                        list_del_init(&curr->entry);
if (data.got_token)
        break;
finish_wait(&rqw->wait, &data.wq);
  ^- returns immediately because
     list_empty_careful(&wq_entry->entry)
     is true
... return, go do something else ...
                                        wake_up_process(data->task)
                                          (NO LONGER VALID!)-^

Normally, finish_wait() is supposed to synchronize against the waker.
But, as noted above, it is returning immediately because the waitqueue
entry has already been removed from the waitqueue.

The bug is that rq_qos_wake_function() is accessing the waitqueue entry
AFTER deleting it. Note that autoremove_wake_function() wakes the waiter
and THEN deletes the waitqueue entry, which is the proper order.

Fix it by swapping the order. We also need to use
list_del_init_careful() to match the list_empty_careful() in
finish_wait().

Fixes: 38cfb5a ("blk-wbt: improve waking of tasks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3bee2463a67b1ee597211823bf7ad3721c26e41.1729014591.git.osandov@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 3deb12c ]

Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST with its dependence CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT
creates this splat when an MPTCP socket is created:

  =============================
  WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
  6.12.0-rc2+ #11 Not tainted
  -----------------------------
  net/mptcp/sched.c:44 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

  other info that might help us debug this:

  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
  no locks held by mptcp_connect/176.

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #11
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
   lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)
   mptcp_sched_find (net/mptcp/sched.c:44 (discriminator 7))
   mptcp_init_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2867 (discriminator 1))
   ? sock_init_data_uid (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28)
   inet_create.part.0.constprop.0 (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:386)
   ? __sock_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 (discriminator 1))
   __sock_create (net/socket.c:1576)
   __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1671)
   ? __pfx___sys_socket (net/socket.c:1712)
   ? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1419 (discriminator 1))
   __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1728)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1))
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

That's because when the socket is initialised, rcu_read_lock() is not
used despite the explicit comment written above the declaration of
mptcp_sched_find() in sched.c. Adding the missing lock/unlock avoids the
warning.

Fixes: 1730b2b ("mptcp: add sched in mptcp_sock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#523
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241021-net-mptcp-sched-lock-v1-1-637759cf061c@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2024
commit 5b188cc upstream.

Disable strict aliasing, as has been done in the kernel proper for decades
(literally since before git history) to fix issues where gcc will optimize
away loads in code that looks 100% correct, but is _technically_ undefined
behavior, and thus can be thrown away by the compiler.

E.g. arm64's vPMU counter access test casts a uint64_t (unsigned long)
pointer to a u64 (unsigned long long) pointer when setting PMCR.N via
u64p_replace_bits(), which gcc-13 detects and optimizes away, i.e. ignores
the result and uses the original PMCR.

The issue is most easily observed by making set_pmcr_n() noinline and
wrapping the call with printf(), e.g. sans comments, for this code:

  printf("orig = %lx, next = %lx, want = %lu\n", pmcr_orig, pmcr, pmcr_n);
  set_pmcr_n(&pmcr, pmcr_n);
  printf("orig = %lx, next = %lx, want = %lu\n", pmcr_orig, pmcr, pmcr_n);

gcc-13 generates:

 0000000000401c90 <set_pmcr_n>:
  401c90:       f9400002        ldr     x2, [x0]
  401c94:       b3751022        bfi     x2, x1, #11, #5
  401c98:       f9000002        str     x2, [x0]
  401c9c:       d65f03c0        ret

 0000000000402660 <test_create_vpmu_vm_with_pmcr_n>:
  402724:       aa1403e3        mov     x3, x20
  402728:       aa1503e2        mov     x2, x21
  40272c:       aa1603e0        mov     x0, x22
  402730:       aa1503e1        mov     x1, x21
  402734:       940060ff        bl      41ab30 <_IO_printf>
  402738:       aa1403e1        mov     x1, x20
  40273c:       910183e0        add     x0, sp, #0x60
  402740:       97fffd54        bl      401c90 <set_pmcr_n>
  402744:       aa1403e3        mov     x3, x20
  402748:       aa1503e2        mov     x2, x21
  40274c:       aa1503e1        mov     x1, x21
  402750:       aa1603e0        mov     x0, x22
  402754:       940060f7        bl      41ab30 <_IO_printf>

with the value stored in [sp + 0x60] ignored by both printf() above and
in the test proper, resulting in a false failure due to vcpu_set_reg()
simply storing the original value, not the intended value.

  $ ./vpmu_counter_access
  Random seed: 0x6b8b4567
  orig = 3040, next = 3040, want = 0
  orig = 3040, next = 3040, want = 0
  ==== Test Assertion Failure ====
    aarch64/vpmu_counter_access.c:505: pmcr_n == get_pmcr_n(pmcr)
    pid=71578 tid=71578 errno=9 - Bad file descriptor
       1        0x400673: run_access_test at vpmu_counter_access.c:522
       2         (inlined by) main at vpmu_counter_access.c:643
       3        0x4132d7: __libc_start_call_main at libc-start.o:0
       4        0x413653: __libc_start_main at ??:0
       5        0x40106f: _start at ??:0
    Failed to update PMCR.N to 0 (received: 6)

Somewhat bizarrely, gcc-11 also exhibits the same behavior, but only if
set_pmcr_n() is marked noinline, whereas gcc-13 fails even if set_pmcr_n()
is inlined in its sole caller.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116912
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 5bf1557 ]

test_progs uses glibc specific functions backtrace() and
backtrace_symbols_fd() to print backtrace in case of SIGSEGV.

Recent commit (see fixes) updated test_progs.c to define stub versions
of the same functions with attriubte "weak" in order to allow linking
test_progs against musl libc. Unfortunately this broke the backtrace
handling for glibc builds.

As it turns out, glibc defines backtrace() and backtrace_symbols_fd()
as weak:

  $ llvm-readelf --symbols /lib64/libc.so.6 \
     | grep -P '( backtrace_symbols_fd| backtrace)$'
  4910: 0000000000126b40   161 FUNC    WEAK   DEFAULT    16 backtrace
  6843: 0000000000126f90   852 FUNC    WEAK   DEFAULT    16 backtrace_symbols_fd

So does test_progs:

 $ llvm-readelf --symbols test_progs \
    | grep -P '( backtrace_symbols_fd| backtrace)$'
  2891: 00000000006ad190    15 FUNC    WEAK   DEFAULT    13 backtrace
 11215: 00000000006ad1a0    41 FUNC    WEAK   DEFAULT    13 backtrace_symbols_fd

In such situation dynamic linker is not obliged to favour glibc
implementation over the one defined in test_progs.

Compiling with the following simple modification to test_progs.c
demonstrates the issue:

  $ git diff
  ...
  \--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
  \+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
  \@@ -1817,6 +1817,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
          if (err)
                  return err;

  +       *(int *)0xdeadbeef  = 42;
          err = cd_flavor_subdir(argv[0]);
          if (err)
                  return err;

  $ ./test_progs
  [0]: Caught signal #11!
  Stack trace:
  <backtrace not supported>
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Resolve this by hiding stub definitions behind __GLIBC__ macro check
instead of using "weak" attribute.

Fixes: c9a83e7 ("selftests/bpf: Fix compile if backtrace support missing in libc")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tony Ambardar <tony.ambardar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Ambardar <tony.ambardar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241003210307.3847907-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 888751e ]

perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error

 # ./perf test -Fv 11
 --- start ---
 ---- end ----
 11.1: Basic parsing test             : Ok
 --- start ---
 Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1'
 Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f
 temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/
 FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
    'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361
 ---- end ----
 11.2: Parsing without PMU name       : FAILED!
 --- start ---
 Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/'
 FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
    'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/',
    292470092988416 != 655361
 ---- end ----
 11.3: Parsing with PMU name          : FAILED!
 #

The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized
to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing
functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack:

 #0  hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623
 #1  hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662
 #2  0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0,
	attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false,
	apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519
 #3  0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8)
	at util/pmu.c:1545
 #4  0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090,
	auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10)
	at util/parse-events.c:1508
 #5  0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10,
	const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0)
	at util/parse-events.c:1592
 #6  0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293
 #7  0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8
	"temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8)
	at util/parse-events.c:1867
 #8  0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
	str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0,
	err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true,
	fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136
 #9  0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
	str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8)
	at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41
 #10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false)
	at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164
 #11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false)
	at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219
 #12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368
	<suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23

where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000
in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c:

   attr->config = key.type_and_num;

However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field:

   union hwmon_pmu_event_key {
        long type_and_num;
        struct {
                int num :16;
                enum hwmon_type type :8;
        };
   };

s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture.
The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and
type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10).
On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of
0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above
trace output.

Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key
so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing
functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid
endianess issues on all platforms.

Output after:
 # ./perf test -F 11
 11.1: Basic parsing test         : Ok
 11.2: Parsing without PMU name   : Ok
 11.3: Parsing with PMU name      : Ok
 #

Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131112400.568975-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 20, 2025
[ Upstream commit 888751e ]

perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error

 # ./perf test -Fv 11
 --- start ---
 ---- end ----
 11.1: Basic parsing test             : Ok
 --- start ---
 Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1'
 Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f
 temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/
 FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
    'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361
 ---- end ----
 11.2: Parsing without PMU name       : FAILED!
 --- start ---
 Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/'
 FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
    'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/',
    292470092988416 != 655361
 ---- end ----
 11.3: Parsing with PMU name          : FAILED!
 #

The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized
to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing
functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack:

 #0  hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623
 #1  hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662
 #2  0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0,
	attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false,
	apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519
 #3  0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8)
	at util/pmu.c:1545
 #4  0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090,
	auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10)
	at util/parse-events.c:1508
 #5  0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10,
	const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0)
	at util/parse-events.c:1592
 #6  0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293
 #7  0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8
	"temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8)
	at util/parse-events.c:1867
 #8  0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
	str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0,
	err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true,
	fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136
 #9  0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
	str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8)
	at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41
 #10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false)
	at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164
 #11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false)
	at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219
 #12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368
	<suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23

where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000
in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c:

   attr->config = key.type_and_num;

However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field:

   union hwmon_pmu_event_key {
        long type_and_num;
        struct {
                int num :16;
                enum hwmon_type type :8;
        };
   };

s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture.
The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and
type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10).
On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of
0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above
trace output.

Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key
so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing
functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid
endianess issues on all platforms.

Output after:
 # ./perf test -F 11
 11.1: Basic parsing test         : Ok
 11.2: Parsing without PMU name   : Ok
 11.3: Parsing with PMU name      : Ok
 #

Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131112400.568975-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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