[RFC] Support for choosing image to boot in runtime #2044

edersondisouza · 2024-08-21T23:11:53Z

MCUboot assumes that the images being booted live on a flash (or will be loaded to it, in case of serial support) or something that pretends to be a flash. It will usually check version of available images on flash partition slots, and choose the newer one to perform an update, with support to fallback to a previous working image in case the new one fails.

Another use cause for MCUboot, however, is to be able to load an image from an arbitrary source, in fact, not caring about the update facilities. In that case, the application will usually check some hardware straps to decide from which source to get the image to boot.

This RFC PR adds support for such scenarios: it uses single loader to load an image from a set of "sources". The single loader loops through available sources and the first one to succeed signature/validation boots. To access the images, weak functions flash_map_id_get_next() and flash_map_id_get_current() are used. Default implementation keeps current behaviour for single loader, i.e. just loads from FLASH_AREA_IMAGE_PRIMARY(0).

It is expected applications will reimplement these functions, allowing them to define a priority of different sources. As these different storage media may be ready only, MCUboot won't attempt to update them to record last source to succeed or so, it's application responsibility to define the correct priority of sources on every boot.

This PR also moves RAM loading code to its own file, so it's available for single loaders, as well as provide one example of such approach, using two slots on a FRDM-K64F.

While some of the source devices can not be flash devices at all (for instance, image is made available via I2C or eSPI bus), feedback on #2031 supports simply implementing the Flash API for them at Zephyr level, hence this new RFC PR.

Please review - comments and suggestions on how to better achieve this are highly appreciated =D

This is a follow on for #2031.

edersondisouza · 2024-08-28T17:58:12Z

Any comments? @d3zd3z?

nordicjm · 2024-09-04T06:33:59Z

Having a quick read of this description (have not looked at code), I do not think this belongs in MCUboot, it does not deal with firmware updates and deals with selecting which image to boot from a bunch of devices, which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device by manipulating the end product e.g. removing one pin from an external flash device.

I suggest that you create your own bootloader using the MCUboot files by bringing MCUboot in as a module - TF-M does this so can be used as an inspiration for how to do this, or just fork MCUboot into your own bootloader and make changes in that, but I do not envisage this being in MCUboot itself as it really is a separate system you want that does not tie in with MCUboot's fundamentals

butok · 2024-09-04T13:52:07Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

nordicjm · 2024-09-05T06:09:44Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

butok · 2024-09-05T06:50:53Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

OK. So an user can choose full security or the ability to unbrick the device or reset it to factory settings.

nordicjm · 2024-09-05T07:04:01Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

OK. So an user can choose full security or the ability to unbrick the device or reset it to factory settings.

That's what swap using move or directXIP with revert is designed for, you update the application from the application, and check it works before confirming it should stay, the bootloader is a dumb bootloader and just deals with verifying the image, you reduce the attack vector by removing features that are not essential to that and use hardware to enforce those settings, which is what TF-M does with it's MCUboot (called bl2 there) build

butok · 2024-09-05T07:34:16Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

OK. So an user can choose full security or the ability to unbrick the device or reset it to factory settings.

That's what swap using move or directXIP with revert is designed for, you update the application from the application, and check it works before confirming it should stay, the bootloader is a dumb bootloader and just deals with verifying the image, you reduce the attack vector by removing features that are not essential to that and use hardware to enforce those settings, which is what TF-M does with it's MCUboot (called bl2 there) build

Can we merge TFM bl2 features back to MCUBoot? Of cause, make them configurable,

nordicjm · 2024-09-05T07:36:28Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

OK. So an user can choose full security or the ability to unbrick the device or reset it to factory settings.

That's what swap using move or directXIP with revert is designed for, you update the application from the application, and check it works before confirming it should stay, the bootloader is a dumb bootloader and just deals with verifying the image, you reduce the attack vector by removing features that are not essential to that and use hardware to enforce those settings, which is what TF-M does with it's MCUboot (called bl2 there) build

Can we merge TFM bl2 features back to MCUBoot? Of cause, make them configurable,

Not sure what you mean, TF-M's bl2 is MCUboot

butok · 2024-09-05T07:45:44Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

OK. So an user can choose full security or the ability to unbrick the device or reset it to factory settings.

That's what swap using move or directXIP with revert is designed for, you update the application from the application, and check it works before confirming it should stay, the bootloader is a dumb bootloader and just deals with verifying the image, you reduce the attack vector by removing features that are not essential to that and use hardware to enforce those settings, which is what TF-M does with it's MCUboot (called bl2 there) build

Can we merge TFM bl2 features back to MCUBoot? Of cause, make them configurable,

Not sure what you mean, TF-M's bl2 is MCUboot

Not fully, it has own variant: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/tree/main/bl2

nordicjm · 2024-09-05T07:48:36Z

which then adds security issues because downgrades are implicitly allowed and an attacker can therefore boot from a possibly vulnerable device

But MCUBoot has a recovery, with the same security issue ;)

It does, and in no end device to be considered secure should it ever be used

OK. So an user can choose full security or the ability to unbrick the device or reset it to factory settings.

That's what swap using move or directXIP with revert is designed for, you update the application from the application, and check it works before confirming it should stay, the bootloader is a dumb bootloader and just deals with verifying the image, you reduce the attack vector by removing features that are not essential to that and use hardware to enforce those settings, which is what TF-M does with it's MCUboot (called bl2 there) build

Can we merge TFM bl2 features back to MCUBoot? Of cause, make them configurable,

Not sure what you mean, TF-M's bl2 is MCUboot

Not fully, it has own variant: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/tree/main/bl2

Those are the interface files, which is no different then the boot/zephyr folder in MCUboot, it's the shim layer

nashif · 2024-09-06T17:46:51Z

I do not think this belongs in MCUboot, it does not deal with firmware updates

mcuboot is a bootloader, no? why using mcuboot does mean you have to do updates? Bootloader can be used for doing many other things, beside updates.

d3zd3z · 2024-09-06T18:16:01Z

So, to clarify a bit about the purpose of mcuboot. MCUboot really does two things: 1. it validates that the code running in flash has been properly signed, and 2. it performs the last step of an update, the atomic swap of the two images.

The problem is that we need some initial bootloader that is immutable. Because of this, we want it to have as little functionality as possible. It is not, and should never be responsible for getting images from some other location.

So, the question comes down to: what is this change trying to recover from.

MCUboot won't swap or load images that haven't been properly signed. At least some level of testing should be preventing most of the cases of needing any kind of recovery. The revert operation should cover the cases when an image is deployed but is discoverd that it doesn't work on some hardware.

Any case of say power failure during the swap operation causing the device to not properly finish when power is restored should be considered bugs that need to be fixed.

Is there some other scenario where recovery is needed?

Aside from this, additional functionality would be the realm of a second stage bootloader, where this second bootloader would be the image upgraded by mcuboot.

d3zd3z · 2024-09-07T14:50:12Z

That said, I don't actually find the arguments about security of this to be a concern. Allowing multiple sources of boot images isn't going to be less secure. We already make the assumption that the upgrade slot can be written with arbitrary data, and that is the case with these other slots. The images still have to be signed in order to be run.

One possibly security concern is if we are XIP-ing the code, could the flash be changed after the signature verification. This actually applies even with loading to RAM. Fixing that would require changing the way ram loading works, where it would have to very the signature of the image after it has been loaded into RAM. That might be worth fixing anyway. Ram loading in MCUboot doesn't get a lot of love, as there still are a lot of devices that XIP out of flash.

I've enabled the CI run, which so far is showing a failure in mynewt.

nordicjm · 2024-09-09T06:11:44Z

I do not think this belongs in MCUboot, it does not deal with firmware updates

mcuboot is a bootloader, no? why using mcuboot does mean you have to do updates? Bootloader can be used for doing many other things, beside updates.

Using mcuboot without firmware updates is pointless and makes no sense, you would just skip mcuboot entirely and load your application direct to the start of flash.

butok · 2024-09-09T06:58:27Z

The problem is that we need some initial bootloader that is immutable. Because of this, we want it to have as little functionality as possible. It is not, and should never be responsible for getting images from some other location.

If it is configurable. It can have any amount of functionality.

RAM loading code is currently under bootutil/loader.c, and it's not accessible for different loaders, such as the single loaders. Future patches will make use of the RAM loading code outside the bootutil/loader.c context, and this patch prepares for that by making it standalone on boot/bootutil/src/ram_load.c Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

edersondisouza · 2024-09-11T04:43:03Z

[...]
I've enabled the CI run, which so far is showing a failure in mynewt.

Thanks for that! I've fixed those!

v2:

Fix RAM load code separation issues on Zephyr, mynewt and simulator.
Rebased.

edersondisouza · 2024-09-11T18:00:53Z

So, to clarify a bit about the purpose of mcuboot. MCUboot really does two things: 1. it validates that the code running in flash has been properly signed, and 2. it performs the last step of an update, the atomic swap of the two images.
[...]

That is already not the case when some one uses "single application slot"/"single loader", right? In this case, each MCUboot port (at least Zephyr and mynewt, AFAICT) simply verifies the image and then loads/run it, no swap. This PR simply adds some hooks to Zephyr single loader that make it easier for a MCUboot based bootloader to choose, based on some runtime verification, from which source (a flash partition, as any kind of underlying storage will just pretend it's flash) to load the image to run.

That said, I don't actually find the arguments about security of this to be a concern. Allowing multiple sources of boot images isn't going to be less secure. We already make the assumption that the upgrade slot can be written with arbitrary data, and that is the case with these other slots. The images still have to be signed in order to be run.

One possibly security concern is if we are XIP-ing the code, could the flash be changed after the signature verification. This actually applies even with loading to RAM. Fixing that would require changing the way ram loading works, where it would have to very the signature of the image after it has been loaded into RAM. That might be worth fixing anyway. Ram loading in MCUboot doesn't get a lot of love, as there still are a lot of devices that XIP out of flash.
[...]

About the RAM loading, verification is actually done on RAM after loading is done, so this case is already covered. Indeed, the other, and actually bigger, change in this PR is to split the RAM loading code, so that it can be used by single loader (RAM loading code is currently behind the non single loader code path). There's even a part of me that wants to avoid the - possibly - long discussion here, and have another PR just with the RAM loading code split.

Any thoughts, @d3zd3z and @nordicjm?

nashif · 2024-09-12T11:23:18Z

@nordicjm

Using mcuboot without firmware updates is pointless and makes no sense, you would just skip mcuboot entirely and load your application direct to the start of flash.

This is your view of the world and what bootloader should do. mcuboot is defined as a bootloader with update capabilities, does not mean you have to update anything to use mcuboot. There are different usecases that go beyond your own, so please be inclusive here.
If mcuboot is only about updates, then it should not be called a bootloader in the context of zephyr, maybe mcu-updater? in that case we will figure a way to introduce a proper bootloader into zephyr that does more than just updates.

nordicjm · 2024-09-13T13:11:37Z

@nordicjm

Using mcuboot without firmware updates is pointless and makes no sense, you would just skip mcuboot entirely and load your application direct to the start of flash.

This is your view of the world and what bootloader should do. mcuboot is defined as a bootloader with update capabilities, does not mean you have to update anything to use mcuboot. There are different usecases that go beyond your own, so please be inclusive here. If mcuboot is only about updates, then it should not be called a bootloader in the context of zephyr, maybe mcu-updater? in that case we will figure a way to introduce a proper bootloader into zephyr that does more than just updates.

I have been using MCUboot as a user since 2018, I have been a MCUboot developer since 2021, so yes I have a very good idea of what this project is, how it works, what the goal of it is and what features it needs to support. Many people use MCUboot and do their own thing with it, the concept introduced here is in my opinion not a good fit for the project, that's not to say it can't be done, it just means you should have it as a fork or patch in your project, as you say when people post modules to zephyr "as an external module", and people do that with MCUboot. We do that in nordic for the nRF connect SDK, people have their own forks where they do things like have the second image as a file on a filesystem (which, again, is not a good fit for a feature to include in MCUboot but there is no reason someone can't take MCUboot, apply the changes they want for it and use that, then pull in fixes from MCUboot to their fork)

butok · 2024-09-16T06:26:41Z

what the goal of it is and what features it needs to support. Many people use MCUboot and do their own thing with it, the concept introduced here is in my opinion not a good fit for the project, that's not to say it can't be done, it just means you should have it as a fork or patch in your project, as you say when people post modules to zephyr "as an external module", and people do that with MCUboot. We do that in nordic for the nRF connect SDK, people have their own forks where they do things like have the second image as a file on a filesystem (which, again, is not a good fit for a feature to include in MCUboot but there is no reason someone can't take MCUboot, apply the changes they want for it and use that, then pull in fixes from MCUboot to their fork)

It is pity that others have to spend resources to create and maintain their own forks of MCUBoot, such as the nRD SDK.
Where can we find the mentioned goals of the MCUBoot project?

Following the split of RAM code, these definitions will help use it with single slot applications. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

This option basically enables MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD in a single slot configuration, meaning the image on slot0 will be loaded into RAM. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

Now that's possible to load image to RAM on single loaders, add support on Zephyr port for that. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

Instead of normal MCUboot flow, that checks flash slots to find update images, this patch enables an MCUboot application to chose from which available slots to load an image. This allows an application, for instance, to check hardware configuration at runtime (by checking hardware straps, state of GPIOs, etc) and decide from where to load an image to boot. MCUboot will basically loop through provided image sources (flash slots) and boot the first one that succed signature/validation. To provide the image sources, the application need to provide strong implementation for functions flash_map_id_get_next() and flash_map_id_get_current(). The default, weak, implementations just keep current behaviour for single loader, i.e. just load from FLASH_AREA_IMAGE_PRIMARY(0). Note that in this case, MCUboot won't try to record if image succeeded boot, it will only boot the image provided. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

A sample for runtime chose image on FRDM K64F. It provides implementation for Zephyr flash_area_open_custom(), so the right flash map implementation is used, and MCUboot flash_map_id_get_next() and flash_map_id_get_current() to prioritize sources. It should show what is expected from an application to be able to use non-flash sources for images. In this sample, one can influence from which slot image will be loaded by pressing a button on the board. For more details on how to build and test the samples, check the provided README.md. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

teburd · 2024-09-24T17:17:17Z

is it really that uncommon to say, have a jumper that lets you load an image from sd, onboard flash, qspi flash, or some other source? It's a fairly common boot rom feature for example on NXP parts, this would enable mimicking that behavior in mcuboot which would be nice and obviously useful for a case we have at Intel

nordicjm · 2024-09-25T06:07:33Z

is it really that uncommon to say, have a jumper that lets you load an image from sd, onboard flash, qspi flash, or some other source? It's a fairly common boot rom feature for example on NXP parts, this would enable mimicking that behavior in mcuboot which would be nice and obviously useful for a case we have at Intel

You have that, build in firmware loader mode and use a GPIO for selecting if you boot the primary or secondary image. Multiple boot sources are not and should not be supported (in tree)

butok · 2024-09-25T06:47:03Z

Multiple boot sources are not and should not be supported (in tree)

If multiple-boot is configurable, it should be posible.
For example, the NXP ROM Secure Bootloaders have this possibility (if it's enabled).

nordicjm · 2024-09-25T07:29:28Z

Multiple boot sources are not and should not be supported (in tree)

If multiple-boot is configurable, it should be posible. For example, the NXP ROM Secure Bootloaders have this possibility (if it's enabled).

We're talking about MCUboot, not <insert_name_of_completely_unrelated_project_here>, MCUboot is designed around 1 (single slot mode) or 2 (dual slot mode) slots

d3zd3z · 2024-09-25T13:55:16Z

So, I don't have a particular problem with the concept of this change, especially if the feature is optional. As long as we document things meaningful, I don't think the security rollback concerns are an issue. We need to document that it is possible, and that if rollback protection is needed, hardware rollback protection will be needed.

But, the change is also fairly large, so I will need to review it.

nvlsianpu · 2024-09-26T09:50:22Z

I do not think this belongs in MCUboot, it does not deal with firmware updates

mcuboot is a bootloader, no? why using mcuboot does mean you have to do updates? Bootloader can be used for doing many other things, beside updates.

Using mcuboot without firmware updates is pointless and makes no sense, you would just skip mcuboot entirely and load your application direct to the start of flash.

Actually I encountered serious request for MCUboot which is only able to verify and run the given content, It was why single loader was added (yes - it was meant to be used without any MCUboot's recovery, FWU was planed to be done by direct memory programing). That's mean that it was requirement for enable only secure-boot by the MCUboot.

nvlsianpu · 2024-09-26T10:08:00Z

boot/zephyr/single_loader.c

 FIH_DECLARE(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);

- rc = flash_area_open(FLASH_AREA_IMAGE_PRIMARY(0), &_fa_p);
- assert(rc == 0);
+ while (flash_map_id_get_next(&flash_id, reset)) {


avoid looping when feature not enabled.

edersondisouza force-pushed the runtime-source branch from ad5cba6 to 3a54cbc Compare August 27, 2024 16:20

edersondisouza force-pushed the runtime-source branch from 3a54cbc to 24440a4 Compare September 11, 2024 04:40

edersondisouza mentioned this pull request Sep 12, 2024

Make RAM loading available for single loaders #2062

Open

edersondisouza force-pushed the runtime-source branch from 24440a4 to 3a4f3c2 Compare September 13, 2024 22:08

edersondisouza force-pushed the runtime-source branch from 3a4f3c2 to ee1be0d Compare September 16, 2024 19:52

edersondisouza added 4 commits September 18, 2024 11:22

boot/bootutil: Add MCUBOOT_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT_RAM_LOAD mode

f727d55

Following the split of RAM code, these definitions will help use it with single slot applications. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

boot/zephyr: Add CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT_RAM_LOAD

c6a9598

This option basically enables MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD in a single slot configuration, meaning the image on slot0 will be loaded into RAM. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

boot/zephyr: Load image to RAM on single loader

e85fb1c

Now that's possible to load image to RAM on single loaders, add support on Zephyr port for that. Signed-off-by: Ederson de Souza <ederson.desouza@intel.com>

edersondisouza force-pushed the runtime-source branch from ee1be0d to 0ffcf4f Compare September 18, 2024 18:39

nvlsianpu reviewed Sep 26, 2024

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[RFC] Support for choosing image to boot in runtime #2044

[RFC] Support for choosing image to boot in runtime #2044

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[RFC] Support for choosing image to boot in runtime #2044

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[RFC] Support for choosing image to boot in runtime #2044

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