Solodit converter

.scripts/solodit/AAVE_protocol_v2_README_fixed.md

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+## Report
+
+### CRITICAL
+
+Not found
+
+### MAJOR
+
+#### Missing Leading 'F' in LIQUIDATION_BONUS_MASK in ReserveConfiguration.sol
+
+
+##### Description
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol#L18 
+
+One leading `F` is missing in this mask.
+
+```solidity
+uint256 constant LIQUIDATION_BONUS_MASK = 0xFFFFFFF0000FFFFFFFF;
+```
+
+This fact results in the corruption of four bits in the reserve factor field during the operations on the liquidation bonus field. `getLiquidationBonus` is also affected.
+
+##### Recommendation
+
+We suggest fixing the mask. We also recommend adding tests for each `ReserveConfiguration` field which have other fields set to some values, perform some actions, restore the field to the original value and make sure that the entire mask is intact.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/5ddd98c52993cbe0093e4a32d14d2aec62939f00*
+
+#### Improper Bit-Length Validation in Reserve Configuration
+
+
+##### Description
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol#L46
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol#L63
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol#L84
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol#L106
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol#L128
+
+Bit lengths of the provided values are not checked against bit lengths of the corresponding fields in the `data`.
+
+For example, here
+
+```solidity
+function setLtv(ReserveConfiguration.Map memory self, uint256 ltv) internal pure {
+    self.data = (self.data & LTV_MASK) | ltv;
+```
+
+providing a value greater than `65535` as `ltv` will result in a corruption of the liquidation threshold field. 
+
+##### Recommendation
+We recommend making sure that passed values fit in the corresponding fields.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/b3cc9d1a62464998e512cf337c35a87ab459a360*
+
+
+#### Erroneous UserBalance Restriction in Withdrawal Validation
+
+##### Description
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/logic/ValidationLogic.sol#L68
+
+It looks like `userBalance` is erroneously used instead of `amount`. This will result in overly strict restrictions on withdrawals. 
+
+##### Recommendation
+We suggest replacing the argument.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/b4f8592775f41e9e52e0068b3c531a08d0b8750c*
+
+
+#### Uninitialized `availableLiquidity` in Loan Size Calculation.
+##### Description
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/logic/ValidationLogic.sol#L200
+
+The `vars.availableLiquidity` field is not initialized before usage.
+
+```solidity
+//calculate the max available loan size in stable rate mode as a percentage of the
+//available liquidity
+uint256 maxLoanSizeStable = vars.availableLiquidity.percentMul(maxStableLoanPercent);
+```
+##### Recommendation
+Proper initialization should be added.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/3f714b9dc848d28d1753fd8a673038fda4f024ed*
+
+
+#### Decimals Mismatch in Reserve Configuration Update
+##### Description
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol#L533 
+
+Changing the decimals here will not automatically change the decimals either in the aToken or in the debt tokens.
+
+```solidity
+function setReserveDecimals(address asset, uint256 decimals) external onlyAaveAdmin {
+    ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = pool.getConfiguration(asset);
+
+    currentConfig.setDecimals(decimals);
+
+    pool.setConfiguration(asset, currentConfig.data);
+```
+
+Additionally, the oracle must be updated simultaneously to consider the new value of the decimals. Otherwise, significant mispricing and liquidations may occur. 
+##### Recommendation
+We suggest removing this function. Alternatively, the change may be allowed only for inactive reserve and must be propagated to the tokens.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/bfa26634a61347391f5f1251e837c18e2d381c0e*
+
+
+#### Flawed Stable Debt Calculation Due to Timestamp Mismatch
+##### Description
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol#L341-L347 
+
+Value `vars.previousStableDebt` calculated this way is actually the current stable debt and always equals to `vars.currentStableDebt`.
+
+```solidity
+//calculate the stable debt until the last timestamp update
+vars.cumulatedStableInterest = MathUtils.calculateCompoundedInterest(
+  vars.avgStableRate,
+  vars.stableSupplyUpdatedTimestamp
+);
+
+vars.previousStableDebt = vars.principalStableDebt.rayMul(vars.cumulatedStableInterest);
+```
+
+As a result, the stable debt difference is not taken into account. Moreover, the processed stable debt increment is not recorded in any way.
+##### Recommendation
+One possible solution is to treat `vars.principalStableDebt` as the previous stable debt and update `StableDebtToken`'s `_totalSupply` and `_totalSupplyTimestamp` after the operation.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/276dee4918d1b76b236195e674132fa7d4ba2324*
+
+
+#### Overestimation of Liquidity in Interest Rate Update.
+##### Description
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol#L582
+
+```solidity
+IERC20(asset).safeTransferFrom(receiverAddress, vars.aTokenAddress, vars.amountPlusPremium);
+
+reserve.updateState();
+reserve.cumulateToLiquidityIndex(IERC20(vars.aTokenAddress).totalSupply(), vars.premium);
+reserve.updateInterestRates(asset, vars.aTokenAddress, vars.premium, 0);
+```
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolCollateralManager.sol#L521
+
+```solidity
+IERC20(toAsset).safeTransferFrom(
+    receiverAddress,
+    address(vars.toReserveAToken),
+    vars.amountToReceive
+);
+
+if (vars.toReserveAToken.balanceOf(msg.sender) == 0) {
+    _usersConfig[msg.sender].setUsingAsCollateral(toReserve.id, true);
+}
+
+vars.toReserveAToken.mint(msg.sender, vars.amountToReceive, toReserve.liquidityIndex);
+toReserve.updateInterestRates(
+    toAsset,
+    address(vars.toReserveAToken),
+    vars.amountToReceive,
+    0
+);
+```
+
+`updateInterestRates` needs to be called with `liquidityAdded` set to `0` since liquidity was already transferred to the pool's balance. Otherwise, overestimated liquidity would lead to too low debt interest rates.
+
+##### Recommendation
+
+It is recommended to call `updateInterestRates` with `liquidityAdded` set to `0`.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/a2e2450bb351844086f749ee24c005df03bc0e4a*
+
+
+#### Interest Rate Miscalculation Due to Stale Debt Values
+##### Description
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolCollateralManager.sol#L227-L232
+
+```solidity
+principalReserve.updateInterestRates(
+  principal,
+  principalReserve.aTokenAddress,
+  vars.actualAmountToLiquidate,
+  0
+);
+
+if (vars.userVariableDebt >= vars.actualAmountToLiquidate) {
+  IVariableDebtToken(principalReserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
+    user,
+    vars.actualAmountToLiquidate,
+    principalReserve.variableBorrowIndex
+  );
+} else {
+  IVariableDebtToken(principalReserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
+    user,
+    vars.userVariableDebt,
+    principalReserve.variableBorrowIndex
+  );
+
+  IStableDebtToken(principalReserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
+    user,
+    vars.actualAmountToLiquidate.sub(vars.userVariableDebt)
+  );
+}
+```
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/f435b2fa0ac589852ca3dd6ae2b0fbfbc7079d54/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolCollateralManager.sol#L409-L414
+
+```solidity
+debtReserve.updateInterestRates(
+  principal,
+  vars.principalAToken,
+  vars.actualAmountToLiquidate,
+  0
+);
+IERC20(principal).safeTransferFrom(receiver, vars.principalAToken, vars.actualAmountToLiquidate);
+
+if (vars.userVariableDebt >= vars.actualAmountToLiquidate) {
+  IVariableDebtToken(debtReserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
+    user,
+    vars.actualAmountToLiquidate,
+    debtReserve.variableBorrowIndex
+  );
+} else {
+  IVariableDebtToken(debtReserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
+    user,
+    vars.userVariableDebt,
+    debtReserve.variableBorrowIndex
+  );
+  IStableDebtToken(debtReserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
+    user,
+    vars.actualAmountToLiquidate.sub(vars.userVariableDebt)
+  );
+}
+```
+
+Debt reserve interest rates are updated before debt burning takes place.
+
+As a result, stale total debt values are used during interest rates calculation. 
+
+##### Recommendation
+We suggest switching `updateInterestRates` and the `if` statement.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/c5d7bb5e80e08a7c901cd7bb41b7bb839c2e0f0e*
+
+
+#### Inaccurate `liquidityAdded` Parameter Before Flashloan Transfer
+##### Description
+
+https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/56d25e81cb0fdfcac785d669d3577b1ef2d9286e/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol#L511
+
+The `liquidityAdded` parameter of the `updateInterestRates` call seems to be incorrect as the flashloan body is yet to be transferred thus it will not be included in the interest rates calculation.
+
+##### Recommendation
+
+It is recommended to fix the `liquidityAdded` parameter.
+
+##### Status
+*Fixed at https://github.com/aave/protocol-v2/commit/584a567635ad4817c7ef105304d62f25158eb120*
+

.scripts/solodit/README.md

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+# Convert to Solodit
+
+## Install
+```
+pip3 install docopt
+```
+
+## Run
+
+Simply output solidit data:
+```
+python3 convert.py
+```
+
+Additional options can be set via `config.json` or command line:
+```
+python3 convert.py -h
+```

.scripts/solodit/config.json

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+{
+    "index": "../../README.md",
+    "base_path": "../../",
+    "urgency_map": {
+        "critical": "HIGH",
+        "criticals": "HIGH",
+        "highs": "HIGH",
+        "high": "HIGH",
+        "major": "HIGH",
+        "majors": "HIGH",
+        "mediums": "MEDIUM",
+        "medium": "MEDIUM",
+        "lows": "LOW",
+        "low": "LOW",
+        "infos": "LOW",
+        "info": "LOW",
+        "comments": "LOW",
+        "comment": "LOW"
+    },
+    "fix": {
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/AAVE/protocol%20v2/README.md": {
+            "file": "AAVE_protocol_v2_README_fixed.md"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/Lido/Aave%20stETH/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/AAVE/ParaSwap%20Adapter/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/Empower%20the%20DAO/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/Akropolis/Token/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/LTO%20Network/Token%20Sale/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/KickICO/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/Yearn%20Finance/Yearn%20Protocol%20V1/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        },
+        "https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/POA%20Network/POA%20PoPA/README.md": {
+            "file": "EMPTY"
+        }
+    }
+}