Fix: GitHub workflow script injection #1936
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Signed-off-by: Joyce Brum <joycebrum@google.com>
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mrasquinha-g
approved these changes
Nov 19, 2024
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Hi! I'm Joyce from Google's Open Source Security Team(GOSST) and I'm reopening the suggestion I've made on #1920, a small fix to prevent from script injection attacks through the GitHub workflows.
You can see further explanation about this kind of threat in this blogpost Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input.
Changes
Parse both github.head_ref and github.event.pull_request.head.ref to envvars to prevent potential script injection.
Any questions, let me know!
(sorry I closed the previous PR, I wanted to check the CLA signing first, but now I'm all set!)