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edits and headings for first section of SRVvsIRV #20

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This only covers the first part of the page. Don't have time to go further. Please try to also add headings like this throughout the rest of the site, and incorporate other points and notes I've suggested recently in multiple places.


<p>In IRV, the final contestants are determined by successively eliminating the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes amongst the voters. With each elimination, the votes of those who chose the eliminated candidate in top position transfer to the next choice on the ballot, until the final instant runoff that gives one candidate a majority of first choice votes amongst the ballots that remain.
<p>IRV determines the final contestants through a series of elimination rounds. In the first round, IRV counts only the top choice from each ballot. If no candidate has a majority, then the candidate with the fewest top votes gets eliminated. The ballots for that candidate are moved to their 2nd choice (if any is marked). In each successive round, the candidate with the fewest ballots in their column gets eliminated. Ballots from that column then move to their next choice among the candidates still remaining (if any). Once some candidate has a majority of the still-active ballots, they win the election.</p>
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@wolftune wolftune Feb 27, 2017

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This line has wording updates that I like and think are valuable to be considered for inclusion still (given that some things like headers have been copied over already)

The current live text is really not accurate. Stuff like "majority of first choice votes" isn't right, since the winner may have almost entirely non-first-choice votes in their column. My wording is much more clear and correct.

<div id="IRV"></div>
Traditional Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is the Ranked Choice O.G. - it's been used around the world and the states for more than a century. Score Runoff Voting (SRV) is a new kid on the block that uses an instant runoff to determine the final winner.
Traditional Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is the classic form of Ranked Choice — over more than a century, it's been used on and off in various places around the world. Score Runoff Voting (SRV) is a new hybrid version that combines score voting with an instant runoff to determine the final winner.
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I still think the O.G. bit isn't great, but please consider the other parts of this line's updates. I think the "over more than a century, it's been used on and off in various places around the world" reads really well to give an honest picture.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ

<p>IRV advocates argue that <a href="http://www.fairvote.org/new_lessons_from_problems_with_approval_voting_in_practice">rating systems are vulnerable to tactical 'bullet voting'</a> - that is, support of just one candidate on the ballot in order to maximize the chance of one's favorite choice winning. Rating advocates have demonstrated that in a significant number of IRV elections, giving full support to your favorite can actually help elect your least favorite candidate.
<h4>Plain score voting has potential strategic issues</h4>
<p>IRV advocates argue that <a href="http://www.fairvote.org/new_lessons_from_problems_with_approval_voting_in_practice">rating systems are vulnerable to tactical 'bullet voting'</a> — that is, support of just one candidate on the ballot in order to maximize the chance of one's favorite choice winning. Another strategic degrading that could happen with score is maximizing and minimizing the scores of all the candidates in order to play it safe. That means score voting would become simply approval voting.
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I still like emphasizing that extremed scores just equals approval, i.e. it doesn't degrade down to plurality or worse, just not not-ideal. So I like my added sentence here.

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Note about current page headers I didn't get to:

"IRV doesn't pass the test" is unclear in quick skimming, so it should be updated to "IRV doesn't pass the equal weight test" or at least "equality test" so skimmers don't have to carefully figure out which "the test" is referring to.

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