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add nip-42: authentication #141

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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions 42.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
NIP-42
======

Authentication of clients to relays
-----------------------------------

`draft` `optional` `author:Semisol` `author:fiatjaf`

This NIP defines a way for clients to authenticate to relays by signing an ephemeral event.

## Motivation

A relay may want to require clients to authenticate to access restricted resources. For example,

- A relay may request payment or other forms of whitelisting to publish events -- this can naïvely be achieved by limiting publication
to events signed by the whitelisted key, but with this NIP they may choose to accept any events as long as they are published from an
authenticated user;
- A relay may limit access to `kind: 4` DMs to only the parties involved in the chat exchange, and for that it may require authentication
before clients can query for that kind.
- A relay may limit subscriptions of any kind to paying users or users whitelisted through any other means, and require authentication.

## Definitions

This NIP defines a new message, `AUTH`, which relays can send when they support authentication and clients can send to relays when they want
to authenticate. When sent by relays, the message is of the following form:

```
["AUTH", <challenge-string>]
```
Comment on lines +22 to +29
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I think we need a way to client initiate it. An AUTH command with no arguments could make the relay send this and normal flow follows

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We can add that later if necessary.

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So I would implement the challenge upon a socket being established. If the client somehow lost the nonce, it could always re-connect.

The nip is vague about when the relay might challenge indeed. Also a client might want to switch authentication, so while authed as Alice it might want to switch to auth as Bob now, so both for un-authed and authed clients there is a need to request a new nonce. Semisol's empty AUTH message triggering this has my support.

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I agree and it's so simple to implement we should try to have it from the start.

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I think it is unnecessary bloat. How does that work on the relay side? The relay is emitting events for identity A at a given websocket, then that websocket changes to identity B, now the relay has to shove that inside the code it might have for handling the subscriptions, maybe cancel a subscription that was valid?

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The client should just open a new websocket if it wants a new identity -- which is also an edge case I see no use for and we shouldn't be complicating this for 99.9% of the cases.

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@fiatjaf fiatjaf Jan 13, 2023

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The nip is vague about when the relay might challenge indeed

This is because it is irrelevant. All clients would just set up a listener like when("AUTH") => send("AUTH") and be done with it. Most relays will send the AUTH challenge when a connection is established, but why specify that if it changes nothing on the code side (the client has to wait anyway)?

Also, if you think the client sending an empty AUTH request fixes it, consider that the relay may still take 5 minutes to reply to that with a challenge -- or may never reply, so really nothing is changed.


And, when sent by clients, of the following form:

```
["AUTH", <signed-event-json>]
```

The signed event is an ephemeral event not meant to be published or queried, it must be of `kind: 22242` and it should have at least two tags,
one for the relay URL and one for the challenge string as received from the relay. `created_at` should be the current time. Example:
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Suggested change
one for the relay URL and one for the challenge string as received from the relay. `created_at` should be the current time. Example:
one for the relay URL and one for the challenge string as received from the relay. `created_at` should be the current time. Relays should use a maximum acceptable clock skew between its own clock and the client's clock, and to reject signed events with `created_at` timestamps that are outside of this acceptable range. Example:


```json
{
"id": "...",
"pubkey": "...",
"created_at": 1669695536,
"kind": 22242,
"tags": [
["relay", "wss://relay.example.com/"],
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Yes, otherwise one malicious relay can reuse your auth event with it to login on a different relay.

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What is this a reply to? My suggestion to drop the commitment to a relay name?

If your relay doesn't re-use challenge nonces, it will associate each nonce with only one websocket connection ever. That websocket connection implicitly commits to the relay already, so naming the relay is not necessary.

["challenge", "challengestringhere"]
],
"content": "",
"sig": "..."
}
```

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A proposal for what @Semisol suggested.

Suggested change
Clients can also send an empty `["AUTH"]` message. With this, relays should end any existing authentication of the websocket and must offer a new authentication challenge.

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I agree with this. This shouldn't reset the authentication of the socket though, that could be done through ["AUTH", false] most likely

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Nevermind, that makes it simpler and I get it now

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@Semisol Semisol Jan 15, 2023

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Suggested change
A client may initiate the AUTH flow themselves by sending an AUTH command with no parameters, which the relay should respond to with a challenge string which should also deauthenticate the websocket:
```
["AUTH"]
```

## Protocol flow

At any moment the relay may send an `AUTH` message to the client containing a challenge. After receiving that the client may decide to
authenticate itself or not. The challenge is expected to be valid for the duration of the connection or until a next challenge is sent by
the relay.

The client may send an auth message right before performing an action for which it knows authentication will be required -- for example, right
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Suggested change
The client may send an auth message right before performing an action for which it knows authentication will be required -- for example, right
The client may initiate the auth flow right before performing an action for which it knows authentication will be required -- for example, right

before requesting `kind: 4` chat messages --, or it may do right on connection start or at some other moment it deems best. The authentication
is expected to last for the duration of the WebSocket connection.

Upon receiving a message from an unauthenticated user it can't fulfill without authentication, a relay may choose to notify the client. For
that it can use a `NOTICE` or `OK` message with a standard prefix `"restricted: "` that is readable both by humans and machines, for example:

```
["NOTICE", "restricted: we can't serve DMs to unauthenticated users, does your client implement NIP-42?"]
```

or it can return an `OK` message noting the reason an event was not written using the same prefix:

```
["OK", <event-id>, false, "restricted: we do not accept events from unauthenticated users, please sign up at https://example.com/"]
```

## Signed Event Verification

To verify `AUTH` messages, relays must ensure:

- that the `kind` is `22242`;
- that the event `created_at` is close (e.g. within ~10 minutes) of the current time;
- that the `"challenge"` tag matches the challenge sent before;
- that the `"relay"` tag matches the relay URL:
- URL normalization techniques can be applied. For most cases just checking if the domain name is correct should be enough.
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14 changes: 9 additions & 5 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ NIPs stand for **Nostr Implementation Possibilities**. They exist to document wh
- [NIP-35: User Discovery](35.md)
- [NIP-36: Sensitive Content](36.md)
- [NIP-40: Expiration Timestamp](40.md)
- [NIP-42: Authentication of clients to relays](42.md)

## Event Kinds

Expand All @@ -47,18 +48,20 @@ NIPs stand for **Nostr Implementation Possibilities**. They exist to document wh
| 43 | Channel Hide Message | [28](28.md) |
| 44 | Channel Mute User | [28](28.md) |
| 45-49 | Public Chat Reserved | [28](28.md) |
| 22242 | Client Authentication | [42](42.md) |
| 10000-19999 | Replaceable Events Reserved | [16](16.md) |
| 20000-29999 | Ephemeral Events Reserved | [16](16.md) |


## Message types

### Client to Relay
| type | description | NIP |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------|
| EVENT | used to publish events | [1](01.md) |
| REQ | used to request events and subscribe to new updates | [1](01.md) |
| CLOSE | used to stop previous subscriptions | [1](01.md) |
| type | description | NIP |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| EVENT | used to publish events | [1](01.md) |
| REQ | used to request events and subscribe to new updates | [1](01.md) |
| CLOSE | used to stop previous subscriptions | [1](01.md) |
| AUTH | used to send authentication events | [42](42.md) |

### Relay to Client
| type | description | NIP |
Expand All @@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ NIPs stand for **Nostr Implementation Possibilities**. They exist to document wh
| NOTICE | used to send human-readable messages to clients | [1](01.md) |
| EOSE | used to notify clients all stored events have been sent | [15](15.md) |
| OK | used to notify clients if an EVENT was successuful | [20](20.md) |
| AUTH | used to send authentication challenges | [42](42.md) |

Please update these lists when proposing NIPs introducing new event kinds.

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