Add SCMP_ACT_LOG as a valid Seccomp action #1951
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REF moby/moby#38333 |
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This is failing because it requires seccomp/libseccomp-golang#29 to be merged 😢 |
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😁 🎉 |
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@justincormack PTAL |
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@justincormack do you need me to do anything else? |
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ping @justincormack |
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ping @justincormack |
thaJeztah
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Jun 17, 2019
Dockerfile
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| @@ -67,4 +67,4 @@ ENTRYPOINT ["/tmpmount"] | |||
| ADD . /go/src/github.com/opencontainers/runc | |||
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| RUN . tests/integration/multi-arch.bash \ | |||
| && curl -o- -sSL `get_busybox` | tar xfJC - ${ROOTFS} | |||
| && curl -o- -sSL `get_busybox` | tar xfJC - ${ROOTFS} | |||
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Looks like this inadvertently removed a newline
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I have removed them and learned more about git squashing ;)
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Signed-off-by: blacktop <blacktop@users.noreply.github.com>
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Thanks for squashing 👍 Perhaps you can change to your real name? (see contributing.md;
Changes themselves SGTM, but I'll try to get @justincormack and/or @crosbymichael to have a look |
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LGTM |
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@crosbymichael @thaJeztah @justincormack is there anything else left before we can merge this? |
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@crosbymichael @thaJeztah @justincormack I have rebased so we should be good to go now? |
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Looks like there's a merge-commit in your branch; did you do a rebase, or a merge? |
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LGTM |
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LGTM |
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We did it!!!! 👍 😎 👍 |
thaJeztah
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full diff: opencontainers/runc@3e425f8...v1.0.0-rc9 - opencontainers/runc#1951 Add SCMP_ACT_LOG as a valid Seccomp action - opencontainers/runc#2130 *: verify operations on /proc/... are on procfs This is an additional mitigation for CVE-2019-16884. The primary problem is that Docker can be coerced into bind-mounting a file system on top of /proc (resulting in label-related writes to /proc no longer happening). While we are working on mitigations against permitting the mounts, this helps avoid our code from being tricked into writing to non-procfs files. This is not a perfect solution (after all, there might be a bind-mount of a different procfs file over the target) but in order to exploit that you would need to be able to tweak a config.json pretty specifically (which thankfully Docker doesn't allow). Specifically this stops AppArmor from not labeling a process silently due to /proc/self/attr/... being incorrectly set, and stops any accidental fd leaks because /proc/self/fd/... is not real. Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
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full diff: opencontainers/runc@3e425f8...v1.0.0-rc9 - opencontainers/runc#1951 Add SCMP_ACT_LOG as a valid Seccomp action - opencontainers/runc#2130 *: verify operations on /proc/... are on procfs This is an additional mitigation for CVE-2019-16884. The primary problem is that Docker can be coerced into bind-mounting a file system on top of /proc (resulting in label-related writes to /proc no longer happening). While we are working on mitigations against permitting the mounts, this helps avoid our code from being tricked into writing to non-procfs files. This is not a perfect solution (after all, there might be a bind-mount of a different procfs file over the target) but in order to exploit that you would need to be able to tweak a config.json pretty specifically (which thankfully Docker doesn't allow). Specifically this stops AppArmor from not labeling a process silently due to /proc/self/attr/... being incorrectly set, and stops any accidental fd leaks because /proc/self/fd/... is not real. Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl> Upstream-commit: efcd84e47c6bc3f5e52eb2cce518f55501d60ce7 Component: engine
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This enables logging of all system calls in a container. This could be useful for creating minimal seccomp profiles, and is the only Seccomp action runc doesn't support at present.