pkey: __eq__() should not use hash() #106
Merged
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... because
hash()
is too weak and not intended for this.Also simplify
__cmp__()
(which did work fine).This fixes a security flaw. If you are using Paramiko with Python 2, or a Python 3 which is running with PYTHONHASHSEED=0, it is possible for an attacker to craft a new keypair from an exfiltrated public key, which Paramiko would consider equal to the original key.
This could enable attacks such as:
Reported by @jun66j5 in paramiko#908
Vulnerability description by Jeff Forcier jeff@bitprophet.org
see also https://www.paramiko.org/changelog.html#2.8.1