net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry

Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with gso size exceeding len.

These packets are dropped in tcp_gso_segment and udp[46]_ufo_fragment.
But they may affect gso size calculations earlier in the path.

Now that we have thlen as of commit 9274124 ("net: stricter
validation of untrusted gso packets"), check gso_size at entry too.

Fixes: bfd5f4a ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

include/linux/virtio_net.h

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
  unsigned int gso_type = 0;
  unsigned int thlen = 0;
+ unsigned int p_off = 0;
  unsigned int ip_proto;
 
  if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
@@ -68,7 +69,8 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
  if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
  return -EINVAL;
 
- if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen > skb_headlen(skb))
+ p_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen;
+ if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb))
  return -EINVAL;
  } else {
  /* gso packets without NEEDS_CSUM do not set transport_offset.
@@ -92,17 +94,25 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
  return -EINVAL;
  }
 
- if (keys.control.thoff + thlen > skb_headlen(skb) ||
+ p_off = keys.control.thoff + thlen;
+ if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb) ||
  keys.basic.ip_proto != ip_proto)
  return -EINVAL;
 
  skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff);
+ } else if (gso_type) {
+ p_off = thlen;
+ if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb))
+ return -EINVAL;
  }
  }
 
  if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
  u16 gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size);
 
+ if (skb->len - p_off <= gso_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
  skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = gso_size;
  skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = gso_type;