Add remote control modules to default config file #101

Jamstah · 2012-09-02T11:57:23Z

As so many people are using the pi for a media center, could we add the remove controll modules (eg, mceusb) to the default config file for the kernel build?

Would involve turning all these to m:

# CONFIG_RC_ATI_REMOTE is not set
# CONFIG_IR_IMON is not set
# CONFIG_IR_MCEUSB is not set
# CONFIG_IR_REDRAT3 is not set
# CONFIG_IR_STREAMZAP is not set
# CONFIG_RC_LOOPBACK is not set

The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:

Jamstah · 2012-09-04T13:59:05Z

Just spotted this was done

Thanks, will save me rolling my own in the future.

78f82bc

We need to make sure that the USB serial driver we find matches the USB driver whose probe we are currently executing. Otherwise we will end up with USB serial devices bound to the correct serial driver but wrong USB driver. An example of such cross-probing, where the usbserial_generic USB driver has found the sierra serial driver: May 29 18:26:15 nemi kernel: [ 4442.559246] usbserial_generic 4-4:1.0: Sierra USB modem converter detected May 29 18:26:20 nemi kernel: [ 4447.556747] usbserial_generic 4-4:1.2: Sierra USB modem converter detected May 29 18:26:25 nemi kernel: [ 4452.557288] usbserial_generic 4-4:1.3: Sierra USB modem converter detected sysfs view of the same problem: bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb/drivers/sierra/ total 0 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:23 module -> ../../../../module/usbserial --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 unbind bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/sierra/ total 0 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:23 module -> ../../../../module/sierra -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 new_id lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:32 ttyUSB0 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.0/ttyUSB0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:32 ttyUSB1 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.2/ttyUSB1 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:32 ttyUSB2 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.3/ttyUSB2 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 unbind bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb/drivers/usbserial_generic/ total 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 4-4:1.0 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 4-4:1.2 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.2 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 4-4:1.3 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.3 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 module -> ../../../../module/usbserial --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:22 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 unbind bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/generic/ total 0 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 module -> ../../../../module/usbserial -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 new_id --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:22 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 unbind So we end up with a mismatch between the USB driver and the USB serial driver. The reason for the above is simple: The USB driver probe will succeed if *any* registered serial driver matches, and will use that serial driver for all serial driver functions. This makes ref counting go wrong. We count the USB driver as used, but not the USB serial driver. This may result in Oops'es as demonstrated by Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>: [11811.646396] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: get_free_serial 1 [11811.646443] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: get_free_serial - minor base = 0 [11811.646460] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: usb_serial_probe - registering ttyUSB0 [11811.646766] usb 6-1: pl2303 converter now attached to ttyUSB0 [11812.264197] USB Serial deregistering driver FTDI USB Serial Device [11812.264865] usbcore: deregistering interface driver ftdi_sio [11812.282180] USB Serial deregistering driver pl2303 [11812.283141] pl2303 ttyUSB0: pl2303 converter now disconnected from ttyUSB0 [11812.283272] usbcore: deregistering interface driver pl2303 [11812.301056] USB Serial deregistering driver generic [11812.301186] usbcore: deregistering interface driver usbserial_generic [11812.301259] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: usb_serial_disconnect [11812.301823] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f8e7438c [11812.301845] IP: [<f8e38445>] usb_serial_disconnect+0xb5/0x100 [usbserial] [11812.301871] *pde = 357ef067 *pte = 00000000 [11812.301957] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [11812.301983] Modules linked in: usbserial(-) [last unloaded: pl2303] [11812.302008] [11812.302019] Pid: 1323, comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 3.4.0-rc7+ #101 Dell Inc. Vostro 1520/0T816J [11812.302115] EIP: 0060:[<f8e38445>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 1 [11812.302130] EIP is at usb_serial_disconnect+0xb5/0x100 [usbserial] [11812.302141] EAX: f508a180 EBX: f508a180 ECX: 00000000 EDX: f8e74300 [11812.302151] ESI: f5050800 EDI: 00000001 EBP: f5141e78 ESP: f5141e58 [11812.302160] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [11812.302170] CR0: 8005003b CR2: f8e7438c CR3: 34848000 CR4: 000007d0 [11812.302180] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [11812.302189] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [11812.302199] Process modprobe (pid: 1323, ti=f5140000 task=f61e2bc0 task.ti=f5140000) [11812.302209] Stack: [11812.302216] f8e3be0f f8e3b29c f8e3ae00 00000000 f513641c f5136400 f513641c f507a540 [11812.302325] f5141e98 c133d2c1 00000000 00000000 f509c400 f513641c f507a590 f5136450 [11812.302372] f5141ea8 c12f0344 f513641c f507a590 f5141ebc c12f0c67 00000000 f507a590 [11812.302419] Call Trace: [11812.302439] [<c133d2c1>] usb_unbind_interface+0x51/0x190 [11812.302456] [<c12f0344>] __device_release_driver+0x64/0xb0 [11812.302469] [<c12f0c67>] driver_detach+0x97/0xa0 [11812.302483] [<c12f001c>] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xe0 [11812.302500] [<c145938d>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xcd/0x140 [11812.302514] [<c12f0ff9>] driver_unregister+0x49/0x80 [11812.302528] [<c1457df6>] ? printk+0x1d/0x1f [11812.302540] [<c133c50d>] usb_deregister+0x5d/0xb0 [11812.302557] [<f8e37c55>] ? usb_serial_deregister+0x45/0x50 [usbserial] [11812.302575] [<f8e37c8d>] usb_serial_deregister_drivers+0x2d/0x40 [usbserial] [11812.302593] [<f8e3a6e2>] usb_serial_generic_deregister+0x12/0x20 [usbserial] [11812.302611] [<f8e3acf0>] usb_serial_exit+0x8/0x32 [usbserial] [11812.302716] [<c1080b48>] sys_delete_module+0x158/0x260 [11812.302730] [<c110594e>] ? mntput+0x1e/0x30 [11812.302746] [<c145c3c3>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x18 [11812.302746] [<c107777c>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xec/0x170 [11812.302746] [<c145c390>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x36 [11812.302746] Code: 24 02 00 00 e8 dd f3 20 c8 f6 86 74 02 00 00 02 74 b4 8d 86 4c 02 00 00 47 e8 78 55 4b c8 0f b6 43 0e 39 f8 7f a9 8b 53 04 89 d8 <ff> 92 8c 00 00 00 89 d8 e8 0e ff ff ff 8b 45 f0 c7 44 24 04 2f [11812.302746] EIP: [<f8e38445>] usb_serial_disconnect+0xb5/0x100 [usbserial] SS:ESP 0068:f5141e58 [11812.302746] CR2: 00000000f8e7438c Fix by only evaluating serial drivers pointing back to the USB driver we are currently probing. This still allows two or more drivers to match the same device, running their serial driver probes to sort out which one to use. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.0, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Reviewed-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 954c3f8 upstream. We need to make sure that the USB serial driver we find matches the USB driver whose probe we are currently executing. Otherwise we will end up with USB serial devices bound to the correct serial driver but wrong USB driver. An example of such cross-probing, where the usbserial_generic USB driver has found the sierra serial driver: May 29 18:26:15 nemi kernel: [ 4442.559246] usbserial_generic 4-4:1.0: Sierra USB modem converter detected May 29 18:26:20 nemi kernel: [ 4447.556747] usbserial_generic 4-4:1.2: Sierra USB modem converter detected May 29 18:26:25 nemi kernel: [ 4452.557288] usbserial_generic 4-4:1.3: Sierra USB modem converter detected sysfs view of the same problem: bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb/drivers/sierra/ total 0 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:23 module -> ../../../../module/usbserial --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 unbind bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/sierra/ total 0 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:23 module -> ../../../../module/sierra -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 new_id lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:32 ttyUSB0 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.0/ttyUSB0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:32 ttyUSB1 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.2/ttyUSB1 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:32 ttyUSB2 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.3/ttyUSB2 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:23 unbind bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb/drivers/usbserial_generic/ total 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 4-4:1.0 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 4-4:1.2 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.2 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 4-4:1.3 -> ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb4/4-4/4-4:1.3 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 module -> ../../../../module/usbserial --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:22 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 unbind bjorn@nemi:~$ ls -l /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/generic/ total 0 --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 bind lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 May 29 18:33 module -> ../../../../module/usbserial -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 new_id --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:22 uevent --w------- 1 root root 4096 May 29 18:33 unbind So we end up with a mismatch between the USB driver and the USB serial driver. The reason for the above is simple: The USB driver probe will succeed if *any* registered serial driver matches, and will use that serial driver for all serial driver functions. This makes ref counting go wrong. We count the USB driver as used, but not the USB serial driver. This may result in Oops'es as demonstrated by Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>: [11811.646396] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: get_free_serial 1 [11811.646443] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: get_free_serial - minor base = 0 [11811.646460] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: usb_serial_probe - registering ttyUSB0 [11811.646766] usb 6-1: pl2303 converter now attached to ttyUSB0 [11812.264197] USB Serial deregistering driver FTDI USB Serial Device [11812.264865] usbcore: deregistering interface driver ftdi_sio [11812.282180] USB Serial deregistering driver pl2303 [11812.283141] pl2303 ttyUSB0: pl2303 converter now disconnected from ttyUSB0 [11812.283272] usbcore: deregistering interface driver pl2303 [11812.301056] USB Serial deregistering driver generic [11812.301186] usbcore: deregistering interface driver usbserial_generic [11812.301259] drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial.c: usb_serial_disconnect [11812.301823] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f8e7438c [11812.301845] IP: [<f8e38445>] usb_serial_disconnect+0xb5/0x100 [usbserial] [11812.301871] *pde = 357ef067 *pte = 00000000 [11812.301957] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [11812.301983] Modules linked in: usbserial(-) [last unloaded: pl2303] [11812.302008] [11812.302019] Pid: 1323, comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 3.4.0-rc7+ raspberrypi#101 Dell Inc. Vostro 1520/0T816J [11812.302115] EIP: 0060:[<f8e38445>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 1 [11812.302130] EIP is at usb_serial_disconnect+0xb5/0x100 [usbserial] [11812.302141] EAX: f508a180 EBX: f508a180 ECX: 00000000 EDX: f8e74300 [11812.302151] ESI: f5050800 EDI: 00000001 EBP: f5141e78 ESP: f5141e58 [11812.302160] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [11812.302170] CR0: 8005003b CR2: f8e7438c CR3: 34848000 CR4: 000007d0 [11812.302180] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [11812.302189] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [11812.302199] Process modprobe (pid: 1323, ti=f5140000 task=f61e2bc0 task.ti=f5140000) [11812.302209] Stack: [11812.302216] f8e3be0f f8e3b29c f8e3ae00 00000000 f513641c f5136400 f513641c f507a540 [11812.302325] f5141e98 c133d2c1 00000000 00000000 f509c400 f513641c f507a590 f5136450 [11812.302372] f5141ea8 c12f0344 f513641c f507a590 f5141ebc c12f0c67 00000000 f507a590 [11812.302419] Call Trace: [11812.302439] [<c133d2c1>] usb_unbind_interface+0x51/0x190 [11812.302456] [<c12f0344>] __device_release_driver+0x64/0xb0 [11812.302469] [<c12f0c67>] driver_detach+0x97/0xa0 [11812.302483] [<c12f001c>] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xe0 [11812.302500] [<c145938d>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xcd/0x140 [11812.302514] [<c12f0ff9>] driver_unregister+0x49/0x80 [11812.302528] [<c1457df6>] ? printk+0x1d/0x1f [11812.302540] [<c133c50d>] usb_deregister+0x5d/0xb0 [11812.302557] [<f8e37c55>] ? usb_serial_deregister+0x45/0x50 [usbserial] [11812.302575] [<f8e37c8d>] usb_serial_deregister_drivers+0x2d/0x40 [usbserial] [11812.302593] [<f8e3a6e2>] usb_serial_generic_deregister+0x12/0x20 [usbserial] [11812.302611] [<f8e3acf0>] usb_serial_exit+0x8/0x32 [usbserial] [11812.302716] [<c1080b48>] sys_delete_module+0x158/0x260 [11812.302730] [<c110594e>] ? mntput+0x1e/0x30 [11812.302746] [<c145c3c3>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x18 [11812.302746] [<c107777c>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xec/0x170 [11812.302746] [<c145c390>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x36 [11812.302746] Code: 24 02 00 00 e8 dd f3 20 c8 f6 86 74 02 00 00 02 74 b4 8d 86 4c 02 00 00 47 e8 78 55 4b c8 0f b6 43 0e 39 f8 7f a9 8b 53 04 89 d8 <ff> 92 8c 00 00 00 89 d8 e8 0e ff ff ff 8b 45 f0 c7 44 24 04 2f [11812.302746] EIP: [<f8e38445>] usb_serial_disconnect+0xb5/0x100 [usbserial] SS:ESP 0068:f5141e58 [11812.302746] CR2: 00000000f8e7438c Fix by only evaluating serial drivers pointing back to the USB driver we are currently probing. This still allows two or more drivers to match the same device, running their serial driver probes to sort out which one to use. Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Reviewed-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush() removes a nf_ct_gre_keymap object from net_gre->keymap_list and frees the object. But it doesn't clean a reference on this object from ct_pptp_info->keymap[dir]. Then nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy() may release the same object again. So nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush() can be called only when we are sure that when nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy will not be called. nf_ct_gre_keymap is created by nf_ct_gre_keymap_add() and the right way to destroy it is to call nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy(). This patch marks nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush() as static, so this patch can break compilation of third party modules, which use nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush. I'm not sure this is the right way to deprecate this function. [ 226.540793] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 226.541750] Modules linked in: nf_nat_pptp nf_nat_proto_gre nf_conntrack_pptp nf_conntrack_proto_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre ppp_deflate bsd_comp ppp_async crc_ccitt ppp_generic slhc xt_nat iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack veth tun bridge stp llc ppdev microcode joydev pcspkr serio_raw virtio_console virtio_balloon floppy parport_pc parport pvpanic i2c_piix4 virtio_net drm_kms_helper ttm ata_generic virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio drm i2c_core pata_acpi [last unloaded: ip_tunnel] [ 226.541776] CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc8+ #101 [ 226.541776] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 226.541776] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 226.541776] task: ffff8800371e0000 ti: ffff88003730c000 task.ti: ffff88003730c000 [ 226.541776] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81389ba9>] [<ffffffff81389ba9>] __list_del_entry+0x29/0xd0 [ 226.541776] RSP: 0018:ffff88003730dbd0 EFLAGS: 00010a83 [ 226.541776] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8800374e6c40 RCX: dead000000200200 [ 226.541776] RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: ffff8800371e07d0 RDI: ffff8800374e6c40 [ 226.541776] RBP: ffff88003730dbd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 226.541776] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88003730d92e R12: 0000000000000002 [ 226.541776] R13: ffff88007a4c42d0 R14: ffff88007aef0000 R15: ffff880036cf0018 [ 226.541776] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 226.541776] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 226.541776] CR2: 00007f07f643f7d0 CR3: 0000000036fd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 226.541776] Stack: [ 226.541776] ffff88003730dbe8 ffffffff81389c5d ffff8800374ffbe4 ffff88003730dc28 [ 226.541776] ffffffffa0162a43 ffffffffa01627c5 ffff88007a4c42d0 ffff88007aef0000 [ 226.541776] ffffffffa01651c0 ffff88007a4c45e0 ffff88007aef0000 ffff88003730dc40 [ 226.541776] Call Trace: [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff81389c5d>] list_del+0xd/0x30 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa0162a43>] nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy+0x283/0x2d0 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa01627c5>] ? nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy+0x5/0x2d0 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa0162ab7>] gre_destroy+0x27/0x70 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa0117de3>] destroy_conntrack+0x83/0x200 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa0117d87>] ? destroy_conntrack+0x27/0x200 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa0117d60>] ? nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert+0x2e0/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff81630142>] nf_conntrack_destroy+0x72/0x180 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff816300d5>] ? nf_conntrack_destroy+0x5/0x180 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa011ef80>] ? kill_l3proto+0x20/0x20 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa011847e>] nf_ct_iterate_cleanup+0x14e/0x170 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa011f74b>] nf_ct_l4proto_pernet_unregister+0x5b/0x90 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffffa0162409>] proto_gre_net_exit+0x19/0x30 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff815edf89>] ops_exit_list.isra.1+0x39/0x60 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff815eecc0>] cleanup_net+0x100/0x1d0 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810a608a>] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x4f0 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810a6028>] ? process_one_work+0x188/0x4f0 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810a64ab>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810a6390>] ? process_one_work+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810af42d>] kthread+0xed/0x110 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff8173d4dc>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810af340>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff8174747c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 226.541776] [<ffffffff810af340>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 226.541776] Code: 00 00 55 48 8b 17 48 b9 00 01 10 00 00 00 ad de 48 8b 47 08 48 89 e5 48 39 ca 74 29 48 b9 00 02 20 00 00 00 ad de 48 39 c8 74 7a <4c> 8b 00 4c 39 c7 75 53 4c 8b 42 08 4c 39 c7 75 2b 48 89 42 08 [ 226.541776] RIP [<ffffffff81389ba9>] __list_del_entry+0x29/0xd0 [ 226.541776] RSP <ffff88003730dbd0> [ 226.612193] ---[ end trace 985ae23ddfcc357c ]--- Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

In certain probe conditions the interrupt came right after registering the handler causing a NULL pointer exception because of uninitialized waitqueue: $ udevadm trigger i2c-gpio i2c-gpio-1: using pins 143 (SDA) and 144 (SCL) i2c-gpio i2c-gpio-3: using pins 53 (SDA) and 52 (SCL) Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = e8b38000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: snd_soc_i2s(+) i2c_gpio(+) snd_soc_idma snd_soc_s3c_dma snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore ac97_bus spi_s3c64xx pwm_samsung dwc2 exynos_adc phy_exynos_usb2 exynosdrm exynos_rng rng_core rtc_s3c CPU: 0 PID: 717 Comm: data-provider-m Not tainted 4.6.0-rc1-next-20160401-00011-g1b8d87473b9e-dirty #101 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) (...) (__wake_up_common) from [<c0379624>] (__wake_up+0x38/0x4c) (__wake_up) from [<c0a41d30>] (ak8975_irq_handler+0x28/0x30) (ak8975_irq_handler) from [<c0386720>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x140) (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c038681c>] (handle_irq_event+0x44/0x68) (handle_irq_event) from [<c0389c40>] (handle_edge_irq+0xf0/0x19c) (handle_edge_irq) from [<c0385e04>] (generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x34) (generic_handle_irq) from [<c05ee360>] (exynos_eint_gpio_irq+0x50/0x68) (exynos_eint_gpio_irq) from [<c0386720>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x140) (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c038681c>] (handle_irq_event+0x44/0x68) (handle_irq_event) from [<c0389a70>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb4/0x194) (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0385e04>] (generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x34) (generic_handle_irq) from [<c03860b4>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x5c/0xb4) (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0301774>] (gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x94) (gic_handle_irq) from [<c030c910>] (__irq_usr+0x50/0x80) The bug was reproduced on exynos4412-trats2 (with a max77693 device also using i2c-gpio) after building max77693 as a module. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 94a6d5c ("iio:ak8975 Implement data ready interrupt handling") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com> Tested-by: Gregor Boirie <gregor.boirie@parrot.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>

commit 07d2390 upstream. In certain probe conditions the interrupt came right after registering the handler causing a NULL pointer exception because of uninitialized waitqueue: $ udevadm trigger i2c-gpio i2c-gpio-1: using pins 143 (SDA) and 144 (SCL) i2c-gpio i2c-gpio-3: using pins 53 (SDA) and 52 (SCL) Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = e8b38000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: snd_soc_i2s(+) i2c_gpio(+) snd_soc_idma snd_soc_s3c_dma snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore ac97_bus spi_s3c64xx pwm_samsung dwc2 exynos_adc phy_exynos_usb2 exynosdrm exynos_rng rng_core rtc_s3c CPU: 0 PID: 717 Comm: data-provider-m Not tainted 4.6.0-rc1-next-20160401-00011-g1b8d87473b9e-dirty #101 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) (...) (__wake_up_common) from [<c0379624>] (__wake_up+0x38/0x4c) (__wake_up) from [<c0a41d30>] (ak8975_irq_handler+0x28/0x30) (ak8975_irq_handler) from [<c0386720>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x140) (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c038681c>] (handle_irq_event+0x44/0x68) (handle_irq_event) from [<c0389c40>] (handle_edge_irq+0xf0/0x19c) (handle_edge_irq) from [<c0385e04>] (generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x34) (generic_handle_irq) from [<c05ee360>] (exynos_eint_gpio_irq+0x50/0x68) (exynos_eint_gpio_irq) from [<c0386720>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x140) (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c038681c>] (handle_irq_event+0x44/0x68) (handle_irq_event) from [<c0389a70>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb4/0x194) (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0385e04>] (generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x34) (generic_handle_irq) from [<c03860b4>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x5c/0xb4) (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0301774>] (gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x94) (gic_handle_irq) from [<c030c910>] (__irq_usr+0x50/0x80) The bug was reproduced on exynos4412-trats2 (with a max77693 device also using i2c-gpio) after building max77693 as a module. Fixes: 94a6d5c ("iio:ak8975 Implement data ready interrupt handling") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com> Tested-by: Gregor Boirie <gregor.boirie@parrot.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

We cannot do printk() from tk_debug_account_sleep_time(), because tk_debug_account_sleep_time() is called under tk_core seq lock. The reason why printk() is unsafe there is that console_sem may invoke scheduler (up()->wake_up_process()->activate_task()), which, in turn, can return back to timekeeping code, for instance, via get_time()->ktime_get(), deadlocking the system on tk_core seq lock. [ 48.950592] ====================================================== [ 48.950622] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 48.950622] 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170213+ #101 Not tainted [ 48.950622] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 48.950622] kworker/0:0/3 is trying to acquire lock: [ 48.950653] (tk_core){----..}, at: [<c01cc624>] retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90 [ 48.950683] but task is already holding lock: [ 48.950683] (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<c01cc610>] retrigger_next_event+0x38/0x90 [ 48.950714] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 48.950714] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 48.950714] -> #5 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}: [ 48.950744] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.950775] lock_hrtimer_base+0x28/0x58 [ 48.950775] hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x20/0x5c8 [ 48.950775] __enqueue_rt_entity+0x320/0x360 [ 48.950805] enqueue_rt_entity+0x2c/0x44 [ 48.950805] enqueue_task_rt+0x24/0x94 [ 48.950836] ttwu_do_activate+0x54/0xc0 [ 48.950836] try_to_wake_up+0x248/0x5c8 [ 48.950836] __setup_irq+0x420/0x5f0 [ 48.950836] request_threaded_irq+0xdc/0x184 [ 48.950866] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x58/0xa4 [ 48.950866] omap_i2c_probe+0x530/0x6a0 [ 48.950897] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xb0 [ 48.950897] driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2cc [ 48.950897] __driver_attach+0xc0/0xc4 [ 48.950927] bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xa0 [ 48.950927] bus_add_driver+0x100/0x210 [ 48.950927] driver_register+0x78/0xf4 [ 48.950958] do_one_initcall+0x3c/0x16c [ 48.950958] kernel_init_freeable+0x20c/0x2d8 [ 48.950958] kernel_init+0x8/0x110 [ 48.950988] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.950988] -> #4 (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock){-.-...}: [ 48.951019] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50 [ 48.951019] rq_offline_rt+0x9c/0x2bc [ 48.951019] set_rq_offline.part.2+0x2c/0x58 [ 48.951049] rq_attach_root+0x134/0x144 [ 48.951049] cpu_attach_domain+0x18c/0x6f4 [ 48.951049] build_sched_domains+0xba4/0xd80 [ 48.951080] sched_init_smp+0x68/0x10c [ 48.951080] kernel_init_freeable+0x160/0x2d8 [ 48.951080] kernel_init+0x8/0x110 [ 48.951080] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951110] -> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}: [ 48.951110] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50 [ 48.951141] task_fork_fair+0x30/0x124 [ 48.951141] sched_fork+0x194/0x2e0 [ 48.951141] copy_process.part.5+0x448/0x1a20 [ 48.951171] _do_fork+0x98/0x7e8 [ 48.951171] kernel_thread+0x2c/0x34 [ 48.951171] rest_init+0x1c/0x18c [ 48.951202] start_kernel+0x35c/0x3d4 [ 48.951202] 0x8000807c [ 48.951202] -> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}: [ 48.951232] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.951232] try_to_wake_up+0x30/0x5c8 [ 48.951232] up+0x4c/0x60 [ 48.951263] __up_console_sem+0x2c/0x58 [ 48.951263] console_unlock+0x3b4/0x650 [ 48.951263] vprintk_emit+0x270/0x474 [ 48.951293] vprintk_default+0x20/0x28 [ 48.951293] printk+0x20/0x30 [ 48.951324] kauditd_hold_skb+0x94/0xb8 [ 48.951324] kauditd_thread+0x1a4/0x56c [ 48.951324] kthread+0x104/0x148 [ 48.951354] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951354] -> #1 ((console_sem).lock){-.....}: [ 48.951385] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.951385] down_trylock+0xc/0x2c [ 48.951385] __down_trylock_console_sem+0x24/0x80 [ 48.951385] console_trylock+0x10/0x8c [ 48.951416] vprintk_emit+0x264/0x474 [ 48.951416] vprintk_default+0x20/0x28 [ 48.951416] printk+0x20/0x30 [ 48.951446] tk_debug_account_sleep_time+0x5c/0x70 [ 48.951446] __timekeeping_inject_sleeptime.constprop.3+0x170/0x1a0 [ 48.951446] timekeeping_resume+0x218/0x23c [ 48.951477] syscore_resume+0x94/0x42c [ 48.951477] suspend_enter+0x554/0x9b4 [ 48.951477] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xd8/0x4b4 [ 48.951507] enter_state+0x934/0xbd4 [ 48.951507] pm_suspend+0x14/0x70 [ 48.951507] state_store+0x68/0xc8 [ 48.951538] kernfs_fop_write+0xf4/0x1f8 [ 48.951538] __vfs_write+0x1c/0x114 [ 48.951538] vfs_write+0xa0/0x168 [ 48.951568] SyS_write+0x3c/0x90 [ 48.951568] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10 [ 48.951568] -> #0 (tk_core){----..}: [ 48.951599] lock_acquire+0xe0/0x294 [ 48.951599] ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x5c/0x1d4 [ 48.951629] retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90 [ 48.951629] on_each_cpu+0x40/0x7c [ 48.951629] clock_was_set_work+0x14/0x20 [ 48.951660] process_one_work+0x2b4/0x808 [ 48.951660] worker_thread+0x3c/0x550 [ 48.951660] kthread+0x104/0x148 [ 48.951690] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951690] other info that might help us debug this: [ 48.951690] Chain exists of: tk_core --> &rt_b->rt_runtime_lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock [ 48.951721] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 48.951721] CPU0 CPU1 [ 48.951721] ---- ---- [ 48.951721] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); [ 48.951751] lock(&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock); [ 48.951751] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); [ 48.951751] lock(tk_core); [ 48.951782] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 48.951782] 3 locks held by kworker/0:0/3: [ 48.951782] #0: ("events"){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0156590>] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x808 [ 48.951812] #1: (hrtimer_work){+.+...}, at: [<c0156590>] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x808 [ 48.951843] #2: (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<c01cc610>] retrigger_next_event+0x38/0x90 [ 48.951843] stack backtrace: [ 48.951873] CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170213+ [ 48.951904] Workqueue: events clock_was_set_work [ 48.951904] [<c0110208>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010c224>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 48.951934] [<c010c224>] (show_stack) from [<c04ca6c0>] (dump_stack+0xac/0xe0) [ 48.951934] [<c04ca6c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c019b5cc>] (print_circular_bug+0x1d0/0x308) [ 48.951965] [<c019b5cc>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c019d2a8>] (validate_chain+0xf50/0x1324) [ 48.951965] [<c019d2a8>] (validate_chain) from [<c019ec18>] (__lock_acquire+0x468/0x7e8) [ 48.951995] [<c019ec18>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c019f634>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0x294) [ 48.951995] [<c019f634>] (lock_acquire) from [<c01d0ea0>] (ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x5c/0x1d4) [ 48.952026] [<c01d0ea0>] (ktime_get_update_offsets_now) from [<c01cc624>] (retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90) [ 48.952026] [<c01cc624>] (retrigger_next_event) from [<c01e4e24>] (on_each_cpu+0x40/0x7c) [ 48.952056] [<c01e4e24>] (on_each_cpu) from [<c01cafc4>] (clock_was_set_work+0x14/0x20) [ 48.952056] [<c01cafc4>] (clock_was_set_work) from [<c015664c>] (process_one_work+0x2b4/0x808) [ 48.952087] [<c015664c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0157774>] (worker_thread+0x3c/0x550) [ 48.952087] [<c0157774>] (worker_thread) from [<c015d644>] (kthread+0x104/0x148) [ 48.952087] [<c015d644>] (kthread) from [<c0107830>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) Replace printk() with printk_deferred(), which does not call into the scheduler. Fixes: 0bf43f1 ("timekeeping: Prints the amounts of time spent during suspend") Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: "[4.9+]" <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170215044332.30449-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit f222449 upstream. We cannot do printk() from tk_debug_account_sleep_time(), because tk_debug_account_sleep_time() is called under tk_core seq lock. The reason why printk() is unsafe there is that console_sem may invoke scheduler (up()->wake_up_process()->activate_task()), which, in turn, can return back to timekeeping code, for instance, via get_time()->ktime_get(), deadlocking the system on tk_core seq lock. [ 48.950592] ====================================================== [ 48.950622] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 48.950622] 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170213+ #101 Not tainted [ 48.950622] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 48.950622] kworker/0:0/3 is trying to acquire lock: [ 48.950653] (tk_core){----..}, at: [<c01cc624>] retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90 [ 48.950683] but task is already holding lock: [ 48.950683] (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<c01cc610>] retrigger_next_event+0x38/0x90 [ 48.950714] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 48.950714] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 48.950714] -> #5 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}: [ 48.950744] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.950775] lock_hrtimer_base+0x28/0x58 [ 48.950775] hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x20/0x5c8 [ 48.950775] __enqueue_rt_entity+0x320/0x360 [ 48.950805] enqueue_rt_entity+0x2c/0x44 [ 48.950805] enqueue_task_rt+0x24/0x94 [ 48.950836] ttwu_do_activate+0x54/0xc0 [ 48.950836] try_to_wake_up+0x248/0x5c8 [ 48.950836] __setup_irq+0x420/0x5f0 [ 48.950836] request_threaded_irq+0xdc/0x184 [ 48.950866] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x58/0xa4 [ 48.950866] omap_i2c_probe+0x530/0x6a0 [ 48.950897] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xb0 [ 48.950897] driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2cc [ 48.950897] __driver_attach+0xc0/0xc4 [ 48.950927] bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xa0 [ 48.950927] bus_add_driver+0x100/0x210 [ 48.950927] driver_register+0x78/0xf4 [ 48.950958] do_one_initcall+0x3c/0x16c [ 48.950958] kernel_init_freeable+0x20c/0x2d8 [ 48.950958] kernel_init+0x8/0x110 [ 48.950988] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.950988] -> #4 (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock){-.-...}: [ 48.951019] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50 [ 48.951019] rq_offline_rt+0x9c/0x2bc [ 48.951019] set_rq_offline.part.2+0x2c/0x58 [ 48.951049] rq_attach_root+0x134/0x144 [ 48.951049] cpu_attach_domain+0x18c/0x6f4 [ 48.951049] build_sched_domains+0xba4/0xd80 [ 48.951080] sched_init_smp+0x68/0x10c [ 48.951080] kernel_init_freeable+0x160/0x2d8 [ 48.951080] kernel_init+0x8/0x110 [ 48.951080] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951110] -> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}: [ 48.951110] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50 [ 48.951141] task_fork_fair+0x30/0x124 [ 48.951141] sched_fork+0x194/0x2e0 [ 48.951141] copy_process.part.5+0x448/0x1a20 [ 48.951171] _do_fork+0x98/0x7e8 [ 48.951171] kernel_thread+0x2c/0x34 [ 48.951171] rest_init+0x1c/0x18c [ 48.951202] start_kernel+0x35c/0x3d4 [ 48.951202] 0x8000807c [ 48.951202] -> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}: [ 48.951232] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.951232] try_to_wake_up+0x30/0x5c8 [ 48.951232] up+0x4c/0x60 [ 48.951263] __up_console_sem+0x2c/0x58 [ 48.951263] console_unlock+0x3b4/0x650 [ 48.951263] vprintk_emit+0x270/0x474 [ 48.951293] vprintk_default+0x20/0x28 [ 48.951293] printk+0x20/0x30 [ 48.951324] kauditd_hold_skb+0x94/0xb8 [ 48.951324] kauditd_thread+0x1a4/0x56c [ 48.951324] kthread+0x104/0x148 [ 48.951354] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951354] -> #1 ((console_sem).lock){-.....}: [ 48.951385] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.951385] down_trylock+0xc/0x2c [ 48.951385] __down_trylock_console_sem+0x24/0x80 [ 48.951385] console_trylock+0x10/0x8c [ 48.951416] vprintk_emit+0x264/0x474 [ 48.951416] vprintk_default+0x20/0x28 [ 48.951416] printk+0x20/0x30 [ 48.951446] tk_debug_account_sleep_time+0x5c/0x70 [ 48.951446] __timekeeping_inject_sleeptime.constprop.3+0x170/0x1a0 [ 48.951446] timekeeping_resume+0x218/0x23c [ 48.951477] syscore_resume+0x94/0x42c [ 48.951477] suspend_enter+0x554/0x9b4 [ 48.951477] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xd8/0x4b4 [ 48.951507] enter_state+0x934/0xbd4 [ 48.951507] pm_suspend+0x14/0x70 [ 48.951507] state_store+0x68/0xc8 [ 48.951538] kernfs_fop_write+0xf4/0x1f8 [ 48.951538] __vfs_write+0x1c/0x114 [ 48.951538] vfs_write+0xa0/0x168 [ 48.951568] SyS_write+0x3c/0x90 [ 48.951568] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10 [ 48.951568] -> #0 (tk_core){----..}: [ 48.951599] lock_acquire+0xe0/0x294 [ 48.951599] ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x5c/0x1d4 [ 48.951629] retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90 [ 48.951629] on_each_cpu+0x40/0x7c [ 48.951629] clock_was_set_work+0x14/0x20 [ 48.951660] process_one_work+0x2b4/0x808 [ 48.951660] worker_thread+0x3c/0x550 [ 48.951660] kthread+0x104/0x148 [ 48.951690] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951690] other info that might help us debug this: [ 48.951690] Chain exists of: tk_core --> &rt_b->rt_runtime_lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock [ 48.951721] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 48.951721] CPU0 CPU1 [ 48.951721] ---- ---- [ 48.951721] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); [ 48.951751] lock(&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock); [ 48.951751] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); [ 48.951751] lock(tk_core); [ 48.951782] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 48.951782] 3 locks held by kworker/0:0/3: [ 48.951782] #0: ("events"){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0156590>] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x808 [ 48.951812] #1: (hrtimer_work){+.+...}, at: [<c0156590>] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x808 [ 48.951843] #2: (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<c01cc610>] retrigger_next_event+0x38/0x90 [ 48.951843] stack backtrace: [ 48.951873] CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170213+ [ 48.951904] Workqueue: events clock_was_set_work [ 48.951904] [<c0110208>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010c224>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 48.951934] [<c010c224>] (show_stack) from [<c04ca6c0>] (dump_stack+0xac/0xe0) [ 48.951934] [<c04ca6c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c019b5cc>] (print_circular_bug+0x1d0/0x308) [ 48.951965] [<c019b5cc>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c019d2a8>] (validate_chain+0xf50/0x1324) [ 48.951965] [<c019d2a8>] (validate_chain) from [<c019ec18>] (__lock_acquire+0x468/0x7e8) [ 48.951995] [<c019ec18>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c019f634>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0x294) [ 48.951995] [<c019f634>] (lock_acquire) from [<c01d0ea0>] (ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x5c/0x1d4) [ 48.952026] [<c01d0ea0>] (ktime_get_update_offsets_now) from [<c01cc624>] (retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90) [ 48.952026] [<c01cc624>] (retrigger_next_event) from [<c01e4e24>] (on_each_cpu+0x40/0x7c) [ 48.952056] [<c01e4e24>] (on_each_cpu) from [<c01cafc4>] (clock_was_set_work+0x14/0x20) [ 48.952056] [<c01cafc4>] (clock_was_set_work) from [<c015664c>] (process_one_work+0x2b4/0x808) [ 48.952087] [<c015664c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0157774>] (worker_thread+0x3c/0x550) [ 48.952087] [<c0157774>] (worker_thread) from [<c015d644>] (kthread+0x104/0x148) [ 48.952087] [<c015d644>] (kthread) from [<c0107830>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) Replace printk() with printk_deferred(), which does not call into the scheduler. Fixes: 0bf43f1 ("timekeeping: Prints the amounts of time spent during suspend") Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170215044332.30449-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Unbind the vma may happen at any time, outside of the normal GT wakeref. As such it relies on having a wakeref of its own. However, we can forgo clearing the register whilst the device is asleep and just mark it as unused - so that when we do wake up the device, we will clear the unused fence register (see i915_gem_restore_fences). [22423.944631] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 26178 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_drv.h:1739 i915_vma_put_fence+0xf3/0x100 [i915] [22423.946053] RPM wakelock ref not held during HW access [22423.946056] Modules linked in: vgem(E) i915(E) nls_ascii(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) x86_pkg_temp_thermal(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) intel_gtt(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) drm_kms_helper(E) syscopyarea(E) sysfillrect(E) evdev(E) aesni_intel(E) aes_x86_64(E) crypto_simd(E) cryptd(E) glue_helper(E) sysimgblt(E) fb_sys_fops(E) prime_numbers(E) drm(E) efivars(E) mei_me(E) lpc_ich(E) mei(E) mfd_core(E) battery(E) video(E) acpi_pad(E) button(E) tpm_tis(E) tpm_tis_core(E) tpm(E) autofs4(E) i2c_i801(E) thermal(E) fan(E) i2c_designware_platform(E) i2c_designware_core(E) [22423.946438] CPU: 2 PID: 26178 Comm: gem_concurrent_ Tainted: G E 4.10.0+ #101 [22423.946513] Hardware name: �� /��, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0246.2 [22423.946600] Call Trace: [22423.946641] dump_stack+0x68/0x9f [22423.946703] __warn+0x107/0x130 [22423.946763] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xe0 [22423.946825] ? __warn+0x130/0x130 [22423.946868] ? free_hot_cold_page_list+0x53/0x70 [22423.946942] ? mark_lock+0xcc/0x7f0 [22423.946997] ? __lock_is_held+0x84/0x100 [22423.947115] ? i915_vma_put_fence+0x64/0x100 [i915] [22423.947224] i915_vma_put_fence+0xf3/0x100 [i915] [22423.947335] i915_vma_unbind+0x4da/0x560 [i915] [22423.947387] ? rb_erase+0x812/0x8a0 [22423.947439] ? kfree+0xa2/0xd0 [22423.947562] i915_vma_close+0x159/0x180 [i915] [22423.947674] intel_ring_free+0x31/0x50 [i915] [22423.947776] i915_gem_context_free+0x1ff/0x3d0 [i915] [22423.947887] context_close+0x106/0x110 [i915] [22423.947989] context_idr_cleanup+0xc/0x10 [i915] [22423.948041] idr_for_each+0x14d/0x1d0 [22423.948158] ? context_close+0x110/0x110 [i915] [22423.948206] ? get_from_free_list+0x70/0x70 [22423.948261] ? __lock_is_held+0x84/0x100 [22423.948325] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xd4/0x400 [22423.948448] i915_gem_context_close+0x4b/0x90 [i915] [22423.948544] i915_driver_preclose+0x28/0x50 [i915] [22423.948620] drm_release+0x175/0x690 [drm] [22423.948681] ? fcntl_setlk+0x5e0/0x5e0 [22423.948746] __fput+0x17d/0x300 [22423.948807] ____fput+0x9/0x10 [22423.948859] task_work_run+0xa7/0xe0 [22423.948924] do_exit+0x4d2/0x13e0 [22423.948986] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x320/0x320 [22423.949051] ? __do_page_fault+0x209/0x5c0 [22423.949110] ? mark_held_locks+0x23/0xc0 [22423.949166] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xb1 [22423.949232] do_group_exit+0x93/0x160 [22423.949289] SyS_exit_group+0x18/0x20 [22423.949350] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1c/0xb1 [22423.949403] RIP: 0033:0x7f9cc2e154c8 [22423.949484] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7e81b448 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 [22423.949557] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffff810ef1f0 RCX: 00007f9cc2e154c8 [22423.949617] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000003c RDI: 0000000000000000 [22423.949677] RBP: ffff880367e9ff98 R08: 00000000000000e7 R09: ffffffffffffff88 [22423.949741] R10: 00007f9cc1d5c000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cc30f6c30 [22423.949798] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f9cc30f6c20 R15: 0000000000000003 [22423.949868] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0xc0/0x110 v2: Move the rpm check down a layer so that we still perform the vma/fence update required for the deferred mmio write on resume. v3: Don't touch i915_gem_object_set_cache_level() and leave the rpm to the low level routines (such as i915_vma_put_fence). v4: vma may be null in fence_write, so extract drm_i915_private from fence->i915 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170306092916.11623-3-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>

On RT we run into circular locking with pendingb_lock (workqueue), port_lock_key (uart) and the primary_crng (random): ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] ------------------------------------------------------- irq/4-serial/512 is trying to acquire lock: ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108d48d>] queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 but task is already holding lock: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> raspberrypi#3 (&port_lock_key){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 serial8250_console_write+0x211/0x220 univ8250_console_write+0x1c/0x20 console_unlock+0x563/0x5c0 vprintk_emit+0x277/0x320 vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20 vprintk_func+0x20/0x80 printk+0x3e/0x46 crng_fast_load+0xde/0xe0 add_interrupt_randomness+0x16c/0x1a0 irq_thread+0x15c/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> raspberrypi#2 (primary_crng.lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 _extract_crng+0x39/0xa0 extract_crng+0x3a/0x40 get_random_u32+0x120/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 __kmalloc+0x254/0x3a0 pcpu_mem_zalloc+0x3a/0x70 percpu_init_late+0x4f/0x8a start_kernel+0x1ec/0x3b8 x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0x13d/0x14c verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc -> #1 ((batched_entropy_u32_lock).lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock__no_mg+0x41/0x50 get_random_u32+0x64/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x26a/0x370 __debug_object_init+0x325/0x460 debug_object_activate+0x11c/0x1f0 __queue_work+0x2c/0x770 queue_work_on+0x12a/0x190 serio_queue_event+0xd3/0x140 __serio_register_port+0x17e/0x1a0 i8042_probe+0x623/0x687 platform_drv_probe+0x36/0x90 driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2e0 __driver_attach+0x96/0xa0 bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0x90 driver_attach+0x19/0x20 bus_add_driver+0x125/0x220 driver_register+0x5b/0xd0 __platform_driver_probe+0x5b/0x120 __platform_create_bundle+0xaa/0xd0 i8042_init+0x3f1/0x430 do_one_initcall+0x3e/0x180 kernel_init_freeable+0x212/0x295 kernel_init+0x9/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #0 ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}: __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (pendingb_lock).lock --> primary_crng.lock --> &port_lock_key Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&port_lock_key); lock(primary_crng.lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock((pendingb_lock).lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by irq/4-serial/512: #0: (&i->lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b0400>] serial8250_interrupt+0x30/0xd0 #1: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 512 Comm: irq/4-serial Not tainted 4.11.3-rt0+ raspberrypi#101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xc1 print_circular_bug+0x1be/0x210 __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 It should work if we delay that printk after dropping the lock but we also could skip it. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

On RT we run into circular locking with pendingb_lock (workqueue), port_lock_key (uart) and the primary_crng (random): ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] ------------------------------------------------------- irq/4-serial/512 is trying to acquire lock: ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108d48d>] queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 but task is already holding lock: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&port_lock_key){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 serial8250_console_write+0x211/0x220 univ8250_console_write+0x1c/0x20 console_unlock+0x563/0x5c0 vprintk_emit+0x277/0x320 vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20 vprintk_func+0x20/0x80 printk+0x3e/0x46 crng_fast_load+0xde/0xe0 add_interrupt_randomness+0x16c/0x1a0 irq_thread+0x15c/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #2 (primary_crng.lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 _extract_crng+0x39/0xa0 extract_crng+0x3a/0x40 get_random_u32+0x120/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 __kmalloc+0x254/0x3a0 pcpu_mem_zalloc+0x3a/0x70 percpu_init_late+0x4f/0x8a start_kernel+0x1ec/0x3b8 x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0x13d/0x14c verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc -> #1 ((batched_entropy_u32_lock).lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock__no_mg+0x41/0x50 get_random_u32+0x64/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x26a/0x370 __debug_object_init+0x325/0x460 debug_object_activate+0x11c/0x1f0 __queue_work+0x2c/0x770 queue_work_on+0x12a/0x190 serio_queue_event+0xd3/0x140 __serio_register_port+0x17e/0x1a0 i8042_probe+0x623/0x687 platform_drv_probe+0x36/0x90 driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2e0 __driver_attach+0x96/0xa0 bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0x90 driver_attach+0x19/0x20 bus_add_driver+0x125/0x220 driver_register+0x5b/0xd0 __platform_driver_probe+0x5b/0x120 __platform_create_bundle+0xaa/0xd0 i8042_init+0x3f1/0x430 do_one_initcall+0x3e/0x180 kernel_init_freeable+0x212/0x295 kernel_init+0x9/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #0 ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}: __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (pendingb_lock).lock --> primary_crng.lock --> &port_lock_key Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&port_lock_key); lock(primary_crng.lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock((pendingb_lock).lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by irq/4-serial/512: #0: (&i->lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b0400>] serial8250_interrupt+0x30/0xd0 #1: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 512 Comm: irq/4-serial Not tainted 4.11.3-rt0+ #101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xc1 print_circular_bug+0x1be/0x210 __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 It should work if we delay that printk after dropping the lock but we also could skip it. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

[ Upstream commit eae5f70 ] __printf is useful to verify format and arguments. Fix arg mismatch reported by gcc, remove the following warnings (with W=1): arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1467:31: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1471:31: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1504:33: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1505:33: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1506:33: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1507:33: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1508:33: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1509:33: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1975:39: error: format ‘%lu’ expects argument of type ‘long unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1986:27: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:2567:38: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:2567:46: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 3 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:2569:38: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long unsigned int’ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:2569:46: error: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 3 has type ‘long unsigned int’ The patch also include arg mismatch fix for case with #define DEBUG_PROM (warning not listed here). This patch fix also the following warnings revealed by checkpatch: WARNING: Prefer using '"%s...", __func__' to using 'alloc_up', this function's name, in a string #101: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1235: + prom_debug("alloc_up(%lx, %lx)\n", size, align); and WARNING: Prefer using '"%s...", __func__' to using 'alloc_down', this function's name, in a string #138: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:1278: + prom_debug("alloc_down(%lx, %lx, %s)\n", size, align, Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

On RT we run into circular locking with pendingb_lock (workqueue), port_lock_key (uart) and the primary_crng (random): ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] ------------------------------------------------------- irq/4-serial/512 is trying to acquire lock: ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108d48d>] queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 but task is already holding lock: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&port_lock_key){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 serial8250_console_write+0x211/0x220 univ8250_console_write+0x1c/0x20 console_unlock+0x563/0x5c0 vprintk_emit+0x277/0x320 vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20 vprintk_func+0x20/0x80 printk+0x3e/0x46 crng_fast_load+0xde/0xe0 add_interrupt_randomness+0x16c/0x1a0 irq_thread+0x15c/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #2 (primary_crng.lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 _extract_crng+0x39/0xa0 extract_crng+0x3a/0x40 get_random_u32+0x120/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 __kmalloc+0x254/0x3a0 pcpu_mem_zalloc+0x3a/0x70 percpu_init_late+0x4f/0x8a start_kernel+0x1ec/0x3b8 x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0x13d/0x14c verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc -> #1 ((batched_entropy_u32_lock).lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock__no_mg+0x41/0x50 get_random_u32+0x64/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x26a/0x370 __debug_object_init+0x325/0x460 debug_object_activate+0x11c/0x1f0 __queue_work+0x2c/0x770 queue_work_on+0x12a/0x190 serio_queue_event+0xd3/0x140 __serio_register_port+0x17e/0x1a0 i8042_probe+0x623/0x687 platform_drv_probe+0x36/0x90 driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2e0 __driver_attach+0x96/0xa0 bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0x90 driver_attach+0x19/0x20 bus_add_driver+0x125/0x220 driver_register+0x5b/0xd0 __platform_driver_probe+0x5b/0x120 __platform_create_bundle+0xaa/0xd0 i8042_init+0x3f1/0x430 do_one_initcall+0x3e/0x180 kernel_init_freeable+0x212/0x295 kernel_init+0x9/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #0 ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}: __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (pendingb_lock).lock --> primary_crng.lock --> &port_lock_key Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&port_lock_key); lock(primary_crng.lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock((pendingb_lock).lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by irq/4-serial/512: #0: (&i->lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b0400>] serial8250_interrupt+0x30/0xd0 #1: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 512 Comm: irq/4-serial Not tainted 4.11.3-rt0+ #101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xc1 print_circular_bug+0x1be/0x210 __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 It should work if we delay that printk after dropping the lock but we also could skip it. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

redundant copy_from_user in rds_sendmsg system call expose rds to issue where rds_rdma_extra_size walk the rds iovec and and calculate the number pf pages (sgs) it need to add to the tail of rds message and later rds_cmsg_rdma_args copy the rds iovec again and re calculate the same number and get different result causing WARN_ON in rds_message_alloc_sgs. fix this by doing the copy_from_user only once per rds_sendmsg system call. When issue occur the below dump is seen: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 19789 at net/rds/message.c:316 rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 19789 Comm: syz-executor827 Not tainted 4.19.0-next-20181030+ #101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2ad/0x55c kernel/panic.c:188 __warn.cold.8+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:540 report_bug+0x254/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271 do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:969 RIP: 0010:rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316 Code: c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 6c 44 01 ab 78 01 00 00 e8 2b 9e 35 fa 4c 89 e0 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 14 9e 35 fa <0f> 0b 31 ff 44 89 ee e8 18 9f 35 fa 45 85 ed 75 1b e8 fe 9d 35 fa RSP: 0018:ffff8801c51b7460 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801bc412080 RBX: ffff8801d7bf4040 RCX: ffffffff8749c9e6 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8749ca5c RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: ffff8801c51b7490 R08: ffff8801bc412080 R09: ffffed003b5c5b67 R10: ffffed003b5c5b67 R11: ffff8801dae2db3b R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000007165c R14: 000000000007165c R15: 0000000000000005 rds_cmsg_rdma_args+0x82d/0x1510 net/rds/rdma.c:623 rds_cmsg_send net/rds/send.c:971 [inline] rds_sendmsg+0x19a2/0x3180 net/rds/send.c:1273 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:632 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2117 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2155 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2162 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x44a859 Code: e8 dc e6 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 6b cb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f1d4710ada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dcc28 RCX: 000000000044a859 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001600 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006dcc20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 00000000006dcc2c R13: 646e732f7665642f R14: 00007f1d4710b9c0 R15: 00000000006dcd2c Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Reported-by: syzbot+26de17458aeda9d305d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: shamir rabinovitch <shamir.rabinovitch@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

On RT we run into circular locking with pendingb_lock (workqueue), port_lock_key (uart) and the primary_crng (random): ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] ------------------------------------------------------- irq/4-serial/512 is trying to acquire lock: ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108d48d>] queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 but task is already holding lock: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&port_lock_key){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 serial8250_console_write+0x211/0x220 univ8250_console_write+0x1c/0x20 console_unlock+0x563/0x5c0 vprintk_emit+0x277/0x320 vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20 vprintk_func+0x20/0x80 printk+0x3e/0x46 crng_fast_load+0xde/0xe0 add_interrupt_randomness+0x16c/0x1a0 irq_thread+0x15c/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #2 (primary_crng.lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 _extract_crng+0x39/0xa0 extract_crng+0x3a/0x40 get_random_u32+0x120/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 __kmalloc+0x254/0x3a0 pcpu_mem_zalloc+0x3a/0x70 percpu_init_late+0x4f/0x8a start_kernel+0x1ec/0x3b8 x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0x13d/0x14c verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc -> #1 ((batched_entropy_u32_lock).lock){+.+...}: lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock__no_mg+0x41/0x50 get_random_u32+0x64/0x190 new_slab+0x1d6/0x7c0 ___slab_alloc+0x30b/0x6f0 __slab_alloc.isra.78+0x6c/0xc0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x26a/0x370 __debug_object_init+0x325/0x460 debug_object_activate+0x11c/0x1f0 __queue_work+0x2c/0x770 queue_work_on+0x12a/0x190 serio_queue_event+0xd3/0x140 __serio_register_port+0x17e/0x1a0 i8042_probe+0x623/0x687 platform_drv_probe+0x36/0x90 driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2e0 __driver_attach+0x96/0xa0 bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0x90 driver_attach+0x19/0x20 bus_add_driver+0x125/0x220 driver_register+0x5b/0xd0 __platform_driver_probe+0x5b/0x120 __platform_create_bundle+0xaa/0xd0 i8042_init+0x3f1/0x430 do_one_initcall+0x3e/0x180 kernel_init_freeable+0x212/0x295 kernel_init+0x9/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 -> #0 ((pendingb_lock).lock){+.+...}: __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (pendingb_lock).lock --> primary_crng.lock --> &port_lock_key Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&port_lock_key); lock(primary_crng.lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock((pendingb_lock).lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by irq/4-serial/512: #0: (&i->lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b0400>] serial8250_interrupt+0x30/0xd0 #1: (&port_lock_key){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff815b4bb6>] serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x16/0xb0 stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 512 Comm: irq/4-serial Not tainted 4.11.3-rt0+ #101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xc1 print_circular_bug+0x1be/0x210 __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320 lock_acquire+0xac/0x240 rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50 queue_work_on+0x5d/0x190 tty_flip_buffer_push+0x26/0x30 serial8250_rx_chars+0x120/0x1f0 serial8250_handle_irq.part.27+0x58/0xb0 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x4b/0x60 serial8250_interrupt+0x5f/0xd0 irq_forced_thread_fn+0x1e/0x70 irq_thread+0x137/0x1e0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 It should work if we delay that printk after dropping the lock but we also could skip it. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

[ Upstream commit ea01007 ] redundant copy_from_user in rds_sendmsg system call expose rds to issue where rds_rdma_extra_size walk the rds iovec and and calculate the number pf pages (sgs) it need to add to the tail of rds message and later rds_cmsg_rdma_args copy the rds iovec again and re calculate the same number and get different result causing WARN_ON in rds_message_alloc_sgs. fix this by doing the copy_from_user only once per rds_sendmsg system call. When issue occur the below dump is seen: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 19789 at net/rds/message.c:316 rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 19789 Comm: syz-executor827 Not tainted 4.19.0-next-20181030+ #101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2ad/0x55c kernel/panic.c:188 __warn.cold.8+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:540 report_bug+0x254/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271 do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:969 RIP: 0010:rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316 Code: c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 6c 44 01 ab 78 01 00 00 e8 2b 9e 35 fa 4c 89 e0 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 14 9e 35 fa <0f> 0b 31 ff 44 89 ee e8 18 9f 35 fa 45 85 ed 75 1b e8 fe 9d 35 fa RSP: 0018:ffff8801c51b7460 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801bc412080 RBX: ffff8801d7bf4040 RCX: ffffffff8749c9e6 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8749ca5c RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: ffff8801c51b7490 R08: ffff8801bc412080 R09: ffffed003b5c5b67 R10: ffffed003b5c5b67 R11: ffff8801dae2db3b R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000007165c R14: 000000000007165c R15: 0000000000000005 rds_cmsg_rdma_args+0x82d/0x1510 net/rds/rdma.c:623 rds_cmsg_send net/rds/send.c:971 [inline] rds_sendmsg+0x19a2/0x3180 net/rds/send.c:1273 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:632 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2117 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2155 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2162 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x44a859 Code: e8 dc e6 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 6b cb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f1d4710ada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dcc28 RCX: 000000000044a859 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001600 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006dcc20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 00000000006dcc2c R13: 646e732f7665642f R14: 00007f1d4710b9c0 R15: 00000000006dcd2c Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Reported-by: syzbot+26de17458aeda9d305d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: shamir rabinovitch <shamir.rabinovitch@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 32d3182 ] packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide if it must call tpacket_snd(). Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL. Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can perform the check again to solve the race. syzbot reported : kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ #101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474 Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50 R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline] tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657 ___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 69e3c75 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide if it must call tpacket_snd(). Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL. Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can perform the check again to solve the race. syzbot reported : kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ #101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474 Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50 R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline] tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657 ___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 69e3c75 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 32d3182 ] packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide if it must call tpacket_snd(). Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL. Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can perform the check again to solve the race. syzbot reported : kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ #101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474 Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50 R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline] tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657 ___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 69e3c75 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 32d3182 ] packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide if it must call tpacket_snd(). Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL. Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can perform the check again to solve the race. syzbot reported : kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [raspberrypi#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ raspberrypi#101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474 Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50 R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline] tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657 ___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 69e3c75 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9ac26e9 upstream. With current ALU32 subreg handling and retval refine fix from last patches we see an expected failure in test_verifier. With verbose verifier state being printed at each step for clarity we have the following relavent lines [I omit register states that are not necessarily useful to see failure cause], #101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range FAIL Failed to load prog 'Success'! [..] 14: (85) call bpf_get_stack#67 R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=inv48 15: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 15: (b7) r1 = 0 16: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 16: (bf) r8 = r0 17: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 17: (67) r8 <<= 32 18: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372032559808512, umax_value=18446744069414584320, var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff00000000), s32_min_value=0, s32_max_value=0, u32_max_value=0, var32_off=(0x0; 0x0)) 18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32 19 R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=2147483647, var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (cd) if r1 s< r8 goto pc+16 R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=0, var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 20: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=0, R9=inv48 20: (1f) r9 -= r8 21: (bf) r2 = r7 22: R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0) 22: (0f) r2 += r8 value -2147483648 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds After call bpf_get_stack() on line 14 and some moves we have at line 16 an r8 bound with max_value 48 but an unknown min value. This is to be expected bpf_get_stack call can only return a max of the input size but is free to return any negative error in the 32-bit register space. The C helper is returning an int so will use lower 32-bits. Lines 17 and 18 clear the top 32 bits with a left/right shift but use ARSH so we still have worst case min bound before line 19 of -2147483648. At this point the signed check 'r1 s< r8' meant to protect the addition on line 22 where dst reg is a map_value pointer may very well return true with a large negative number. Then the final line 22 will detect this as an invalid operation and fail the program. What we want to do is proceed only if r8 is positive non-error. So change 'r1 s< r8' to 'r1 s> r8' so that we jump if r8 is negative. Next we will throw an error because we access past the end of the map value. The map value size is 48 and sizeof(struct test_val) is 48 so we walk off the end of the map value on the second call to get bpf_get_stack(). Fix this by changing sizeof(struct test_val) to 24 by using 'sizeof(struct test_val) / 2'. After this everything passes as expected. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158560426019.10843.3285429543232025187.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ no upstream commit ] Switch the comparison, so that is_branch_taken() will recognize that below branch is never taken: [...] 17: [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] 17: (67) r8 <<= 32 18: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=-4294967296,umin_value=9223372036854775808,umax_value=18446744069414584320,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffff00000000)) [...] 18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32 19: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] 19: (6d) if r1 s> r8 goto pc+16 [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] [...] Currently we check for is_branch_taken() only if either K is source, or source is a scalar value that is const. For upstream it would be good to extend this properly to check whether dst is const and src not. For the sake of the test_verifier, it is probably not needed here: # ./test_verifier 101 #101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range OK Summary: 1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED I haven't seen this issue in test_progs* though, they are passing fine: # ./test_progs-no_alu32 -t get_stack Switching to flavor 'no_alu32' subdirectory... #20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED # ./test_progs -t get_stack #20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9ac26e9 upstream. With current ALU32 subreg handling and retval refine fix from last patches we see an expected failure in test_verifier. With verbose verifier state being printed at each step for clarity we have the following relavent lines [I omit register states that are not necessarily useful to see failure cause], #101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range FAIL Failed to load prog 'Success'! [..] 14: (85) call bpf_get_stack#67 R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=inv48 15: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 15: (b7) r1 = 0 16: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 16: (bf) r8 = r0 17: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 17: (67) r8 <<= 32 18: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372032559808512, umax_value=18446744069414584320, var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff00000000), s32_min_value=0, s32_max_value=0, u32_max_value=0, var32_off=(0x0; 0x0)) 18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32 19 R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=2147483647, var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (cd) if r1 s< r8 goto pc+16 R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=0, var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 20: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=0, R9=inv48 20: (1f) r9 -= r8 21: (bf) r2 = r7 22: R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0) 22: (0f) r2 += r8 value -2147483648 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds After call bpf_get_stack() on line 14 and some moves we have at line 16 an r8 bound with max_value 48 but an unknown min value. This is to be expected bpf_get_stack call can only return a max of the input size but is free to return any negative error in the 32-bit register space. The C helper is returning an int so will use lower 32-bits. Lines 17 and 18 clear the top 32 bits with a left/right shift but use ARSH so we still have worst case min bound before line 19 of -2147483648. At this point the signed check 'r1 s< r8' meant to protect the addition on line 22 where dst reg is a map_value pointer may very well return true with a large negative number. Then the final line 22 will detect this as an invalid operation and fail the program. What we want to do is proceed only if r8 is positive non-error. So change 'r1 s< r8' to 'r1 s> r8' so that we jump if r8 is negative. Next we will throw an error because we access past the end of the map value. The map value size is 48 and sizeof(struct test_val) is 48 so we walk off the end of the map value on the second call to get bpf_get_stack(). Fix this by changing sizeof(struct test_val) to 24 by using 'sizeof(struct test_val) / 2'. After this everything passes as expected. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158560426019.10843.3285429543232025187.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ no upstream commit ] Switch the comparison, so that is_branch_taken() will recognize that below branch is never taken: [...] 17: [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] 17: (67) r8 <<= 32 18: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=-4294967296,umin_value=9223372036854775808,umax_value=18446744069414584320,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffff00000000)) [...] 18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32 19: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] 19: (6d) if r1 s> r8 goto pc+16 [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] [...] Currently we check for is_branch_taken() only if either K is source, or source is a scalar value that is const. For upstream it would be good to extend this properly to check whether dst is const and src not. For the sake of the test_verifier, it is probably not needed here: # ./test_verifier 101 #101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range OK Summary: 1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED I haven't seen this issue in test_progs* though, they are passing fine: # ./test_progs-no_alu32 -t get_stack Switching to flavor 'no_alu32' subdirectory... #20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED # ./test_progs -t get_stack #20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ae284d8 ] syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, unmounting an f2fs filesystem could result in the following splat: kobject: 'loop5' ((____ptrval____)): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 250) kobject: 'f2fs_xattr_entry-7:5' ((____ptrval____)): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 750) ------------[ cut here ]------------ ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 699 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 699 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #101 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 show_stack+0x34/0x48 dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 panic+0x360/0x7a0 __warn+0x244/0x2ec report_bug+0x240/0x398 bug_handler+0x50/0xc0 call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8 brk_handler+0x30/0xc0 do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340 el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0 el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8 el1_sync+0x80/0x100 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210 kfree+0x13c/0x460 f2fs_put_super+0x624/0xa58 generic_shutdown_super+0x120/0x300 kill_block_super+0x94/0xf8 kill_f2fs_super+0x244/0x308 deactivate_locked_super+0x104/0x150 deactivate_super+0x118/0x148 cleanup_mnt+0x27c/0x3c0 __cleanup_mnt+0x28/0x38 task_work_run+0x10c/0x248 do_notify_resume+0x9d4/0x1188 work_pending+0x8/0x34c Like the error handling for f2fs_register_sysfs(), we need to wait for the kobject to be destroyed before returning to prevent a potential use-after-free. Fixes: bf9e697 ("f2fs: expose features to sysfs entry") Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c2a04b0 ] syzkaller found the following splat with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y: Read of size 1 at addr ffff000028e896b8 by task kworker/1:2/228 CPU: 1 PID: 228 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ raspberrypi#101 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 show_stack+0x34/0x48 dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5c/0x550 kasan_report+0x13c/0x1c0 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x34/0x60 memcmp+0xd0/0xd8 gfs2_uevent+0xc4/0x188 kobject_uevent_env+0x54c/0x1240 kobject_uevent+0x2c/0x40 __kobject_del+0x190/0x1d8 kobject_delayed_cleanup+0x2bc/0x3b8 process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kthread+0x390/0x498 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 1110: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x58 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.0+0xc8/0xe8 kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1d8/0x2f0 alloc_super+0x64/0x8c0 sget_fc+0x110/0x620 get_tree_bdev+0x190/0x648 gfs2_get_tree+0x50/0x228 vfs_get_tree+0x84/0x2e8 path_mount+0x1134/0x1da8 do_mount+0x124/0x138 __arm64_sys_mount+0x164/0x238 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x15c/0x598 do_el0_svc+0x60/0x150 el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 el0_sync_handler+0xc8/0x5b4 el0_sync+0x15c/0x180 Freed by task 228: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x58 kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48 __kasan_slab_free+0x118/0x190 kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x20 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x6c/0x210 kfree+0x13c/0x460 Use the same pattern as f2fs + ext4 where the kobject destruction must complete before allowing the FS itself to be freed. This means that we need an explicit free_sbd in the callers. Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com> [Also go to fail_free when init_names fails.] Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c2a04b0 ] syzkaller found the following splat with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y: Read of size 1 at addr ffff000028e896b8 by task kworker/1:2/228 CPU: 1 PID: 228 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #101 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 show_stack+0x34/0x48 dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5c/0x550 kasan_report+0x13c/0x1c0 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x34/0x60 memcmp+0xd0/0xd8 gfs2_uevent+0xc4/0x188 kobject_uevent_env+0x54c/0x1240 kobject_uevent+0x2c/0x40 __kobject_del+0x190/0x1d8 kobject_delayed_cleanup+0x2bc/0x3b8 process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kthread+0x390/0x498 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 1110: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x58 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.0+0xc8/0xe8 kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1d8/0x2f0 alloc_super+0x64/0x8c0 sget_fc+0x110/0x620 get_tree_bdev+0x190/0x648 gfs2_get_tree+0x50/0x228 vfs_get_tree+0x84/0x2e8 path_mount+0x1134/0x1da8 do_mount+0x124/0x138 __arm64_sys_mount+0x164/0x238 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x15c/0x598 do_el0_svc+0x60/0x150 el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 el0_sync_handler+0xc8/0x5b4 el0_sync+0x15c/0x180 Freed by task 228: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x58 kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48 __kasan_slab_free+0x118/0x190 kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x20 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x6c/0x210 kfree+0x13c/0x460 Use the same pattern as f2fs + ext4 where the kobject destruction must complete before allowing the FS itself to be freed. This means that we need an explicit free_sbd in the callers. Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com> [Also go to fail_free when init_names fails.] Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Running generic/406 causes the following WARNING in btrfs_destroy_inode() which tells there are outstanding extents left. In btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), we reserve a temporary outstanding extents with btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata() (or indirectly from btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(()). We then release the outstanding extents with btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(). However, the "len" can be modified in the COW case, which releases fewer outstanding extents than expected. Fix it by calling btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() for the original length. To reproduce the warning, the filesystem should be 1 GiB. It's triggering a short-write, due to not being able to allocate a large extent and instead allocating a smaller one. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 757 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8848 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor lzo_compress lzo_decompress raid6_pq zstd zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash zram zsmalloc CPU: 0 PID: 757 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ raspberrypi#101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000327bda8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100548b78 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000026900 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888100548b78 RBP: ffff888100548940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810b48aba8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff8881004eb240 R12: ffff88810b48a800 R13: ffff88810b48ec08 R14: ffff88810b48ed00 R15: ffff888100490c68 FS: 00007f8549ea0b80(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f854a09e733 CR3: 000000010a2e9003 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> destroy_inode+0x33/0x70 dispose_list+0x43/0x60 evict_inodes+0x161/0x1b0 generic_shutdown_super+0x2d/0x110 kill_anon_super+0xf/0x20 btrfs_kill_super+0xd/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x27/0x90 cleanup_mnt+0x12c/0x180 task_work_run+0x54/0x80 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x152/0x160 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f854a000fb7 Fixes: f0bfa76 ("btrfs: fix ENOSPC failure when attempting direct IO write into NOCOW range") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17 Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

commit 6d82ad1 upstream. Running generic/406 causes the following WARNING in btrfs_destroy_inode() which tells there are outstanding extents left. In btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), we reserve a temporary outstanding extents with btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata() (or indirectly from btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(()). We then release the outstanding extents with btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(). However, the "len" can be modified in the COW case, which releases fewer outstanding extents than expected. Fix it by calling btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() for the original length. To reproduce the warning, the filesystem should be 1 GiB. It's triggering a short-write, due to not being able to allocate a large extent and instead allocating a smaller one. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 757 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8848 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor lzo_compress lzo_decompress raid6_pq zstd zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash zram zsmalloc CPU: 0 PID: 757 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ raspberrypi#101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000327bda8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100548b78 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000026900 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888100548b78 RBP: ffff888100548940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810b48aba8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff8881004eb240 R12: ffff88810b48a800 R13: ffff88810b48ec08 R14: ffff88810b48ed00 R15: ffff888100490c68 FS: 00007f8549ea0b80(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f854a09e733 CR3: 000000010a2e9003 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> destroy_inode+0x33/0x70 dispose_list+0x43/0x60 evict_inodes+0x161/0x1b0 generic_shutdown_super+0x2d/0x110 kill_anon_super+0xf/0x20 btrfs_kill_super+0xd/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x27/0x90 cleanup_mnt+0x12c/0x180 task_work_run+0x54/0x80 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x152/0x160 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f854a000fb7 Fixes: f0bfa76 ("btrfs: fix ENOSPC failure when attempting direct IO write into NOCOW range") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17 Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 6d82ad1 upstream. Running generic/406 causes the following WARNING in btrfs_destroy_inode() which tells there are outstanding extents left. In btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), we reserve a temporary outstanding extents with btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata() (or indirectly from btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(()). We then release the outstanding extents with btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(). However, the "len" can be modified in the COW case, which releases fewer outstanding extents than expected. Fix it by calling btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() for the original length. To reproduce the warning, the filesystem should be 1 GiB. It's triggering a short-write, due to not being able to allocate a large extent and instead allocating a smaller one. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 757 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8848 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor lzo_compress lzo_decompress raid6_pq zstd zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash zram zsmalloc CPU: 0 PID: 757 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ #101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000327bda8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100548b78 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000026900 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888100548b78 RBP: ffff888100548940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810b48aba8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff8881004eb240 R12: ffff88810b48a800 R13: ffff88810b48ec08 R14: ffff88810b48ed00 R15: ffff888100490c68 FS: 00007f8549ea0b80(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f854a09e733 CR3: 000000010a2e9003 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> destroy_inode+0x33/0x70 dispose_list+0x43/0x60 evict_inodes+0x161/0x1b0 generic_shutdown_super+0x2d/0x110 kill_anon_super+0xf/0x20 btrfs_kill_super+0xd/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x27/0x90 cleanup_mnt+0x12c/0x180 task_work_run+0x54/0x80 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x152/0x160 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f854a000fb7 Fixes: f0bfa76 ("btrfs: fix ENOSPC failure when attempting direct IO write into NOCOW range") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17 Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Add bpf trampoline support for arm64. Most of the logic is the same as x86. fentry before bpf trampoline hooked: mov x9, x30 nop fentry after bpf trampoline hooked: mov x9, x30 bl <bpf_trampoline> Tested on qemu, result: raspberrypi#18 bpf_tcp_ca:OK raspberrypi#51 dummy_st_ops:OK raspberrypi#55 fentry_fexit:OK raspberrypi#56 fentry_test:OK raspberrypi#57 fexit_bpf2bpf:OK raspberrypi#58 fexit_sleep:OK raspberrypi#59 fexit_stress:OK raspberrypi#60 fexit_test:OK raspberrypi#67 get_func_args_test:OK raspberrypi#68 get_func_ip_test:OK raspberrypi#101 modify_return:OK raspberrypi#233 xdp_bpf2bpf:OK Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>

For leaf dir, In most cases, there should be as many bestfree slots as the dir data blocks that can fit under i_size (except for [1]). Root cause is we don't examin the number bestfree slots, when the slots number less than dir data blocks, if we need to allocate new dir data block and update the bestfree array, we will use the dir block number as index to assign bestfree array, while we did not check the leaf buf boundary which may cause UAF or other memory access problem. This issue can also triggered with test cases xfs/473 from fstests. According to Dave Chinner & Darrick's suggestion, adding buffer verifier to detect this abnormal situation in time. Simplify the testcase for fstest xfs/554 [1] The error log is shown as follows: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in xfs_dir2_leaf_addname+0x1995/0x1ac0 Write of size 2 at addr ffff88810168b000 by task touch/1552 CPU: 5 PID: 1552 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3+ #101 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x66 print_report.cold+0xf6/0x691 kasan_report+0xa8/0x120 xfs_dir2_leaf_addname+0x1995/0x1ac0 xfs_dir_createname+0x58c/0x7f0 xfs_create+0x7af/0x1010 xfs_generic_create+0x270/0x5e0 path_openat+0x270b/0x3450 do_filp_open+0x1cf/0x2b0 do_sys_openat2+0x46b/0x7a0 do_sys_open+0xb7/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fe4d9e9312b Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25 RSP: 002b:00007ffda4c16c20 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fe4d9e9312b RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffda4c17f33 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007ffda4c17f33 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941 R13: 00007fe4d9f631a4 R14: 00007ffda4c17f33 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea000405a2c0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10168b flags: 0x2fffff80000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 002fffff80000000 ffffea0004057788 ffffea000402dbc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000170000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88810168af00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88810168af80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff88810168b000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88810168b080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88810168b100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint 00000000: 58 44 44 33 5b 53 35 c2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 78 XDD3[S5........x XFS (sdb): Internal error xfs_dir2_data_use_free at line 1200 of file fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_data.c. Caller xfs_dir2_data_use_free+0x28a/0xeb0 CPU: 5 PID: 1552 Comm: touch Tainted: G B 6.0.0-rc3+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x66 xfs_corruption_error+0x132/0x150 xfs_dir2_data_use_free+0x198/0xeb0 xfs_dir2_leaf_addname+0xa59/0x1ac0 xfs_dir_createname+0x58c/0x7f0 xfs_create+0x7af/0x1010 xfs_generic_create+0x270/0x5e0 path_openat+0x270b/0x3450 do_filp_open+0x1cf/0x2b0 do_sys_openat2+0x46b/0x7a0 do_sys_open+0xb7/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fe4d9e9312b Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25 RSP: 002b:00007ffda4c16c20 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fe4d9e9312b RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffda4c17f46 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007ffda4c17f46 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941 R13: 00007fe4d9f631a4 R14: 00007ffda4c17f46 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> XFS (sdb): Corruption detected. Unmount and run xfs_repair [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220928095355.2074025-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com/ Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Guo Xuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>

commit 1036f69 upstream. On RZ/Five SMARC EVK, where probing of SDHI is deferred due to probe deferral of the vqmmc-supply regulator: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/time/timer.c:1738 __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4 #101 Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g043f01 (DT) epc : __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 ra : __run_timers.part.0+0x134/0x1e8 epc : ffffffff800771a4 ra : ffffffff80077108 sp : ffffffc800003e60 gp : ffffffff814f5028 tp : ffffffff8140c5c0 t0 : ffffffc800000000 t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : ffffffff81201300 s0 : ffffffc800003f20 s1 : ffffffd8023bc4a0 a0 : 00000000fffee6b0 a1 : 0004010000400000 a2 : ffffffffc0000016 a3 : ffffffff81488640 a4 : ffffffc800003e60 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000004000000 a7 : ffffffc800003e68 s2 : 0000000000000122 s3 : 0000000000200000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : ffffffffffffffff s6 : ffffffff81488678 s7 : ffffffff814886c0 s8 : ffffffff814f49c0 s9 : ffffffff81488640 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: ffffffc800003e60 t3 : 0000000000000240 t4 : 0000000000000a52 t5 : ffffffd8024ae018 t6 : ffffffd8024ae038 status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [<ffffffff800771a4>] __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 [<ffffffff800771e0>] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x4a [<ffffffff80809092>] __do_softirq+0xc6/0x1fa [<ffffffff80028e4c>] irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0x84 [<ffffffff80800f7a>] handle_riscv_irq+0x40/0x4e [<ffffffff80808f48>] call_on_irq_stack+0x1c/0x28 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- What happens? renesas_sdhi_probe() { tmio_mmc_host_alloc() mmc_alloc_host() INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&host->detect, mmc_rescan); devm_request_irq(tmio_mmc_irq); /* * After this, the interrupt handler may be invoked at any time * * tmio_mmc_irq() * { * __tmio_mmc_card_detect_irq() * mmc_detect_change() * _mmc_detect_change() * mmc_schedule_delayed_work(&host->detect, delay); * } */ tmio_mmc_host_probe() tmio_mmc_init_ocr() -EPROBE_DEFER tmio_mmc_host_free() mmc_free_host() } When expire_timers() runs later, it warns because the MMC host structure containing the delayed work was freed, and now contains an invalid work function pointer. Fix this by cancelling any pending delayed work before releasing the MMC host structure. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/205dc4c91b47e31b64392fe2498c7a449e717b4b.1701689330.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

On RZ/Five SMARC EVK, where probing of SDHI is deferred due to probe deferral of the vqmmc-supply regulator: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/time/timer.c:1738 __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4 #101 Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g043f01 (DT) epc : __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 ra : __run_timers.part.0+0x134/0x1e8 epc : ffffffff800771a4 ra : ffffffff80077108 sp : ffffffc800003e60 gp : ffffffff814f5028 tp : ffffffff8140c5c0 t0 : ffffffc800000000 t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : ffffffff81201300 s0 : ffffffc800003f20 s1 : ffffffd8023bc4a0 a0 : 00000000fffee6b0 a1 : 0004010000400000 a2 : ffffffffc0000016 a3 : ffffffff81488640 a4 : ffffffc800003e60 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000004000000 a7 : ffffffc800003e68 s2 : 0000000000000122 s3 : 0000000000200000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : ffffffffffffffff s6 : ffffffff81488678 s7 : ffffffff814886c0 s8 : ffffffff814f49c0 s9 : ffffffff81488640 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: ffffffc800003e60 t3 : 0000000000000240 t4 : 0000000000000a52 t5 : ffffffd8024ae018 t6 : ffffffd8024ae038 status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [<ffffffff800771a4>] __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 [<ffffffff800771e0>] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x4a [<ffffffff80809092>] __do_softirq+0xc6/0x1fa [<ffffffff80028e4c>] irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0x84 [<ffffffff80800f7a>] handle_riscv_irq+0x40/0x4e [<ffffffff80808f48>] call_on_irq_stack+0x1c/0x28 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- What happens? renesas_sdhi_probe() { tmio_mmc_host_alloc() mmc_alloc_host() INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&host->detect, mmc_rescan); devm_request_irq(tmio_mmc_irq); /* * After this, the interrupt handler may be invoked at any time * * tmio_mmc_irq() * { * __tmio_mmc_card_detect_irq() * mmc_detect_change() * _mmc_detect_change() * mmc_schedule_delayed_work(&host->detect, delay); * } */ tmio_mmc_host_probe() tmio_mmc_init_ocr() -EPROBE_DEFER tmio_mmc_host_free() mmc_free_host() } When expire_timers() runs later, it warns because the MMC host structure containing the delayed work was freed, and now contains an invalid work function pointer. Fix this by cancelling any pending delayed work before releasing the MMC host structure. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/205dc4c91b47e31b64392fe2498c7a449e717b4b.1701689330.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>

sched_ext: fix race in scx_move_task() with exiting tasks

commit 1036f69 upstream. On RZ/Five SMARC EVK, where probing of SDHI is deferred due to probe deferral of the vqmmc-supply regulator: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/time/timer.c:1738 __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4 raspberrypi#101 Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g043f01 (DT) epc : __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 ra : __run_timers.part.0+0x134/0x1e8 epc : ffffffff800771a4 ra : ffffffff80077108 sp : ffffffc800003e60 gp : ffffffff814f5028 tp : ffffffff8140c5c0 t0 : ffffffc800000000 t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : ffffffff81201300 s0 : ffffffc800003f20 s1 : ffffffd8023bc4a0 a0 : 00000000fffee6b0 a1 : 0004010000400000 a2 : ffffffffc0000016 a3 : ffffffff81488640 a4 : ffffffc800003e60 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000004000000 a7 : ffffffc800003e68 s2 : 0000000000000122 s3 : 0000000000200000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : ffffffffffffffff s6 : ffffffff81488678 s7 : ffffffff814886c0 s8 : ffffffff814f49c0 s9 : ffffffff81488640 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: ffffffc800003e60 t3 : 0000000000000240 t4 : 0000000000000a52 t5 : ffffffd8024ae018 t6 : ffffffd8024ae038 status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [<ffffffff800771a4>] __run_timers.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e8 [<ffffffff800771e0>] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x4a [<ffffffff80809092>] __do_softirq+0xc6/0x1fa [<ffffffff80028e4c>] irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0x84 [<ffffffff80800f7a>] handle_riscv_irq+0x40/0x4e [<ffffffff80808f48>] call_on_irq_stack+0x1c/0x28 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- What happens? renesas_sdhi_probe() { tmio_mmc_host_alloc() mmc_alloc_host() INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&host->detect, mmc_rescan); devm_request_irq(tmio_mmc_irq); /* * After this, the interrupt handler may be invoked at any time * * tmio_mmc_irq() * { * __tmio_mmc_card_detect_irq() * mmc_detect_change() * _mmc_detect_change() * mmc_schedule_delayed_work(&host->detect, delay); * } */ tmio_mmc_host_probe() tmio_mmc_init_ocr() -EPROBE_DEFER tmio_mmc_host_free() mmc_free_host() } When expire_timers() runs later, it warns because the MMC host structure containing the delayed work was freed, and now contains an invalid work function pointer. Fix this by cancelling any pending delayed work before releasing the MMC host structure. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/205dc4c91b47e31b64392fe2498c7a449e717b4b.1701689330.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 601429c ] Why: The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this caused system hang. [ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume [ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled. [ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000 [ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset! [ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming... [ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset [ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!! [ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet... [ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter [ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations [ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered [ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!! ... [ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded! [ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded! [ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu [ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023 [ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu] [ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu] [ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff <48> 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00 [ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0 [ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010 [ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08 [ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0 [ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554 [ 560.846480] Call Trace: [ 560.849225] <TASK> [ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea [ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea [ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29 [ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60 [ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410 [ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 [ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu] [ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0 How: In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure. Signed-off-by: Stanley.Yang <Stanley.Yang@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Jamstah closed this as completed Sep 4, 2012

0lxb pushed a commit to 0lxb/rpi_linux that referenced this issue Jan 30, 2024

Merge pull request raspberrypi#101 from arighi/fix-move-task-race

79d694e

sched_ext: fix race in scx_move_task() with exiting tasks

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Add remote control modules to default config file #101

Add remote control modules to default config file #101

Jamstah commented Sep 2, 2012

Jamstah commented Sep 4, 2012

Add remote control modules to default config file #101

Add remote control modules to default config file #101

Comments

Jamstah commented Sep 2, 2012

Jamstah commented Sep 4, 2012