Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

sound/arm/Makefile out of sync with drivers/misc/vc04_services/Makefile #13

Closed
nomis opened this issue May 5, 2012 · 1 comment
Closed

Comments

@nomis
Copy link
Contributor

nomis commented May 5, 2012

There's a definition of __VCCOREVER__ in drivers/misc/vc04_services/Makefile used by drivers/misc/vc04_services/interface/vchi/vchi_cfg.h included by sound/arm/Makefile that isn't in sound/arm/Makefile

bootc pushed a commit to bootc/linux-rpi-orig that referenced this issue May 8, 2012
…S block during isolation for migration

commit 0bf380b upstream.

When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone
which is not necessarily pageblock aligned.  Further, it stops isolating
when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally
not aligned.  This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on
an invalid PFN which can result in a crash.  This was originally reported
against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump.

PID: 9902   TASK: d47aecd0  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "memcg_process_s"
 #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb
 raspberrypi#1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322
 raspberrypi#2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60
 raspberrypi#3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6
 raspberrypi#4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72ec
 raspberrypi#5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4
    EAX: 00000000  EBX: 000c0000  ECX: 00000001  EDX: 00000807  EBP: 000c0000
    DS:  007b      ESI: 00000001  ES:  007b      EDI: f3000a80  GS:  6f50
    CS:  0060      EIP: c030b15a  ERR: ffffffff  EFLAGS: 00010002
 raspberrypi#6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a
 raspberrypi#7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb
 raspberrypi#8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8de
 raspberrypi#9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1
raspberrypi#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84
raspberrypi#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7
raspberrypi#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7
raspberrypi#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97
raspberrypi#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845
raspberrypi#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb
raspberrypi#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6
raspberrypi#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed
raspberrypi#18 [d72d3fb0] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4
    EAX: b71ff00  EBX: 00000001  ECX: 00001600  EDX: 00000431
    DS:  007b      ESI: 08048950  ES:  007b      EDI: bfaa3788
    SS:  007b      ESP: bfaa36e0  EBP: bfaa3828  GS:  6f50
    CS:  0073      EIP: 080487c8  ERR: ffffffff  EFLAGS: 00010202

It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel
with the following snippet from the console log.

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008
IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390
*pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000

It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline.

The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being
checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned.  Lets say we have a case
like this

H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary
| = pageblock boundary
m = cc->migrate_pfn
f = cc->free_pfn
o = memory hole

H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H

The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond
the hole.  When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to
migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole.  It checks
pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are
not necessarily valid struct pages.

This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when
necessary.

Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
@popcornmix
Copy link
Collaborator

2466e92

@nomis nomis closed this as completed May 16, 2012
popcornmix pushed a commit to popcornmix/linux that referenced this issue Aug 16, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     raspberrypi#1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     raspberrypi#2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     raspberrypi#3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     raspberrypi#4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     raspberrypi#5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     raspberrypi#6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     raspberrypi#7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     raspberrypi#8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     raspberrypi#9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    raspberrypi#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    raspberrypi#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    raspberrypi#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    raspberrypi#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    raspberrypi#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    raspberrypi#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    raspberrypi#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    raspberrypi#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    raspberrypi#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    raspberrypi#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    raspberrypi#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    raspberrypi#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    raspberrypi#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    raspberrypi#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    raspberrypi#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    raspberrypi#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
Printing the "start_ip" for every secondary cpu is very noisy on a large
system - and doesn't add any value. Drop this message.

Console log before:
Booting Node   0, Processors  #1
smpboot cpu 1: start_ip = 96000
 #2
smpboot cpu 2: start_ip = 96000
 #3
smpboot cpu 3: start_ip = 96000
 #4
smpboot cpu 4: start_ip = 96000
       ...
 #31
smpboot cpu 31: start_ip = 96000
Brought up 32 CPUs

Console log after:
Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 Ok.
Booting Node   1, Processors  #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 Ok.
Booting Node   0, Processors  #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 Ok.
Booting Node   1, Processors  #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31
Brought up 32 CPUs

Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@amd64.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f452eb42507460426@agluck-desktop.sc.intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
On some machines the number of possible CPUS is not the same as the
number of CPUs that is on the machine. Ftrace uses possible_cpus to
update the tracing structures but the ring buffer only allocates
per cpu buffers for online CPUs when they come up.

When the wakeup tracer was enabled in such a case, the ftrace code
enabled all possible cpu buffers, but the code in ring_buffer_resize()
did not check to see if the buffer in question was allocated. Since
boot up CPUs did not match possible CPUs it caused the following
crash:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000020
IP: [<c1097851>] ring_buffer_resize+0x16a/0x28d
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in: [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]

Pid: 1387, comm: bash Not tainted 3.4.0-test+ #13                  /DG965MQ
EIP: 0060:[<c1097851>] EFLAGS: 00010217 CPU: 0
EIP is at ring_buffer_resize+0x16a/0x28d
EAX: f5a14340 EBX: f6026b80 ECX: 00000ff4 EDX: 00000ff3
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000002 EBP: f4275ecc ESP: f4275eb0
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000020 CR3: 34396000 CR4: 000007d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process bash (pid: 1387, ti=f4274000 task=f4380cb0 task.ti=f4274000)
Stack:
 c109cf9a f6026b98 00000162 00160f68 00000006 00160f68 00000002 f4275ef0
 c109d013 f4275ee8 c123b72a c1c0bf00 c1cc81dc 00000005 f4275f98 00000007
 f4275f70 c109d0c7 7700000e 75656b61 00000070 f5e90900 f5c4e198 00000301
Call Trace:
 [<c109cf9a>] ? tracing_set_tracer+0x115/0x1e9
 [<c109d013>] tracing_set_tracer+0x18e/0x1e9
 [<c123b72a>] ? _copy_from_user+0x30/0x46
 [<c109d0c7>] tracing_set_trace_write+0x59/0x7f
 [<c10ec01e>] ? fput+0x18/0x1c6
 [<c11f8732>] ? security_file_permission+0x27/0x2b
 [<c10eaacd>] ? rw_verify_area+0xcf/0xf2
 [<c10ec01e>] ? fput+0x18/0x1c6
 [<c109d06e>] ? tracing_set_tracer+0x1e9/0x1e9
 [<c10ead77>] vfs_write+0x8b/0xe3
 [<c10ebead>] ? fget_light+0x30/0x81
 [<c10eaf54>] sys_write+0x42/0x63
 [<c1834fbf>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x28

This happens with the latency tracer as the ftrace code updates the
saved max buffer via its cpumask and not with a global setting.

Adding a check in ring_buffer_resize() to make sure the buffer being resized
exists, fixes the problem.

Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
Fix bug introduced by 169ebd9.  We have to have wb_list_lock locked when
restarting writeback loop after having waited for inode writeback.

Bug description by Ted Tso:

  I can reproduce this fairly easily by using ext4 w/o a journal, running
  under KVM with 1024megs memory, with fsstress (xfstests #13):

  [   45.153294] =====================================
  [   45.154784] [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
  [   45.155591] 3.5.0-rc1-00002-gb22b1f1 #124 Not tainted
  [   45.155591] -------------------------------------
  [   45.155591] flush-254:16/2499 is trying to release lock (&(&wb->list_lock)->rlock) at:
  [   45.155591] [<c022c3da>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x160/0x327
  [   45.155591] but there are no more locks to release!

Reported-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
The warning below triggers on AMD MCM packages because physical package
IDs on the cores of a _physical_ socket are the same. I.e., this field
says which CPUs belong to the same physical package.

However, the same two CPUs belong to two different internal, i.e.
"logical" nodes in the same physical socket which is reflected in the
CPU-to-node map on x86 with NUMA.

Which makes this check wrong on the above topologies so circumvent it.

[    0.444413] Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Ok.
[    0.461388] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.465997] WARNING: at arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:310 topology_sane.clone.1+0x6e/0x81()
[    0.473960] Hardware name: Dinar
[    0.477170] sched: CPU #6's mc-sibling CPU #0 is not on the same node! [node: 1 != 0]. Ignoring dependency.
[    0.486860] Booting Node   1, Processors  #6
[    0.491104] Modules linked in:
[    0.494141] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/6 Not tainted 3.4.0+ #1
[    0.499510] Call Trace:
[    0.501946]  [<ffffffff8144bf92>] ? topology_sane.clone.1+0x6e/0x81
[    0.508185]  [<ffffffff8102f1fc>] warn_slowpath_common+0x85/0x9d
[    0.514163]  [<ffffffff8102f2b7>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48
[    0.519881]  [<ffffffff8144bf92>] topology_sane.clone.1+0x6e/0x81
[    0.525943]  [<ffffffff8144c234>] set_cpu_sibling_map+0x251/0x371
[    0.532004]  [<ffffffff8144c4ee>] start_secondary+0x19a/0x218
[    0.537729] ---[ end trace 4eaa2a86a8e2da22 ]---
[    0.628197]  #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 Ok.
[    0.807108] Booting Node   3, Processors  #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 Ok.
[    0.897587] Booting Node   2, Processors  #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 Ok.
[    0.917443] Brought up 24 CPUs

We ran a topology sanity check test we have here on it and
it all looks ok... hopefully :).

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
Cc: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120529135442.GE29157@aftab.osrc.amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
Clear the WDM_READ flag on empty reads to avoid running
forever in an infinite tight loop, causing lockups:

Jul  1 21:58:11 nemi kernel: [ 3658.898647] qmi_wwan 2-1:1.2: Unexpected error -71
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072021] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [qmi.pl:12235]
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072212] CPU 0
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072355]
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072367] Pid: 12235, comm: qmi.pl Tainted: P           O 3.5.0-rc2+ #13 LENOVO 2776LEG/2776LEG
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072383] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0635008>]  [<ffffffffa0635008>] spin_unlock_irq+0x8/0xc [cdc_wdm]
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072388] RSP: 0018:ffff88022dca1e70  EFLAGS: 00000282
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072393] RAX: ffff88022fc3f650 RBX: ffffffff811c56f7 RCX: 00000001000ce8c1
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072398] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 000000000267d810 RDI: ffff88022fc3f650
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072403] RBP: ffff88022dca1eb0 R08: ffffffffa063578e R09: 0000000000000000
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072407] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072412] R13: 0000000000000246 R14: ffffffff00000002 R15: ffff8802281d8c88
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072418] FS:  00007f666a260700(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072423] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072428] CR2: 000000000270d9d8 CR3: 000000022e865000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072438] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072444] Process qmi.pl (pid: 12235, threadinfo ffff88022dca0000, task ffff88022ff76380)
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072448] Stack:
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072458]  ffffffffa063592e 0000000100020000 ffff88022fc3f650 ffff88022fc3f6a8
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072466]  0000000000000200 0000000100000000 000000000267d810 0000000000000000
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072475]  0000000000000000 ffff880212cfb6d0 0000000000000200 ffff880212cfb6c0
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072479] Call Trace:
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072489]  [<ffffffffa063592e>] ? wdm_read+0x1a0/0x263 [cdc_wdm]
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072500]  [<ffffffff8110adb7>] ? vfs_read+0xa1/0xfb
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072509]  [<ffffffff81040589>] ? alarm_setitimer+0x35/0x64
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072517]  [<ffffffff8110aec7>] ? sys_read+0x45/0x6e
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072525]  [<ffffffff813725f9>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Jul  1 21:58:36 nemi kernel: [ 3684.072557] Code: <66> 66 90 c3 83 ff ed 89 f8 74 16 7f 06 83 ff a1 75 0a c3 83 ff f4

The WDM_READ flag is normally cleared by wdm_int_callback
before resubmitting the read urb, and set by wdm_in_callback
when this urb returns with data or an error.  But a crashing
device may cause both a read error and cancelling all urbs.
Make sure that the flag is cleared by wdm_read if the buffer
is empty.

We don't clear the flag on errors, as there may be pending
data in the buffer which should be processed.  The flag will
instead be cleared on the next wdm_read call.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
…d reasons

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    #10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    #11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    #12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    #13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    #14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    #15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    #16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    #17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    #18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    #19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    #20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    #21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    #22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    #23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    #24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    #25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2012
Murali Nalajala reports a regression that ioremapping address zero
results in an oops dump:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fa200000
pgd = d4f80000
[fa200000] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0    Tainted: G        W (3.4.0-g3b5f728-00009-g638207a #13)
PC is at msm_pm_config_rst_vector_before_pc+0x8/0x30
LR is at msm_pm_boot_config_before_pc+0x18/0x20
pc : [<c0078f84>]    lr : [<c007903c>]    psr: a0000093
sp : c0837ef0  ip : cfe00000  fp : 0000000d
r10: da7efc17  r9 : 225c4278  r8 : 00000006
r7 : 0003c000  r6 : c085c824  r5 : 00000001  r4 : fa101000
r3 : fa200000  r2 : c095080c  r1 : 002250fc  r0 : 00000000
Flags: NzCv  IRQs off  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM Segment kernel
Control: 10c5387d  Table: 25180059  DAC: 00000015
[<c0078f84>] (msm_pm_config_rst_vector_before_pc+0x8/0x30) from [<c007903c>] (msm_pm_boot_config_before_pc+0x18/0x20)
[<c007903c>] (msm_pm_boot_config_before_pc+0x18/0x20) from [<c007a55c>] (msm_pm_power_collapse+0x410/0xb04)
[<c007a55c>] (msm_pm_power_collapse+0x410/0xb04) from [<c007b17c>] (arch_idle+0x294/0x3e0)
[<c007b17c>] (arch_idle+0x294/0x3e0) from [<c000eed8>] (default_idle+0x18/0x2c)
[<c000eed8>] (default_idle+0x18/0x2c) from [<c000f254>] (cpu_idle+0x90/0xe4)
[<c000f254>] (cpu_idle+0x90/0xe4) from [<c057231c>] (rest_init+0x88/0xa0)
[<c057231c>] (rest_init+0x88/0xa0) from [<c07ff890>] (start_kernel+0x3a8/0x40c)
Code: c0704256 e12fff1e e59f2020 e5923000 (e5930000)

This is caused by the 'reserved' entries which we insert (see
19b52ab - ARM: 7438/1: fill possible PMD empty section gaps)
which get matched for physical address zero.

Resolve this by marking these reserved entries with a different flag.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Murali Nalajala <mnalajal@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 28, 2013
commit c79c498 upstream.

The git commit 8eaffa6
(xen/pat: Disable PAT support for now) explains in details why
we want to disable PAT for right now. However that
change was not enough and we should have also disabled
the pat_enabled value. Otherwise we end up with:

mmap-example:3481 map pfn expected mapping type write-back for
[mem 0x00010000-0x00010fff], got uncached-minus
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at /build/buildd/linux-3.8.0/arch/x86/mm/pat.c:774 untrack_pfn+0xb8/0xd0()
mem 0x00010000-0x00010fff], got uncached-minus
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at /build/buildd/linux-3.8.0/arch/x86/mm/pat.c:774
untrack_pfn+0xb8/0xd0()
...
Pid: 3481, comm: mmap-example Tainted: GF 3.8.0-6-generic #13-Ubuntu
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8105879f>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0xc0
 [<ffffffff810587fa>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
 [<ffffffff8104bcc8>] untrack_pfn+0xb8/0xd0
 [<ffffffff81156c1c>] unmap_single_vma+0xac/0x100
 [<ffffffff81157459>] unmap_vmas+0x49/0x90
 [<ffffffff8115f808>] exit_mmap+0x98/0x170
 [<ffffffff810559a4>] mmput+0x64/0x100
 [<ffffffff810560f5>] dup_mm+0x445/0x660
 [<ffffffff81056d9f>] copy_process.part.22+0xa5f/0x1510
 [<ffffffff81057931>] do_fork+0x91/0x350
 [<ffffffff81057c76>] sys_clone+0x16/0x20
 [<ffffffff816ccbf9>] stub_clone+0x69/0x90
 [<ffffffff816cc89d>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
---[ end trace 4918cdd0a4c9fea4 ]---

(a similar message shows up if you end up launching 'mcelog')

The call chain is (as analyzed by Liu, Jinsong):
do_fork
  --> copy_process
    --> dup_mm
      --> dup_mmap
       	--> copy_page_range
          --> track_pfn_copy
            --> reserve_pfn_range
              --> line 624: flags != want_flags
It comes from different memory types of page table (_PAGE_CACHE_WB) and MTRR
(_PAGE_CACHE_UC_MINUS).

Stefan Bader dug in this deep and found out that:
"That makes it clearer as this will do

reserve_memtype(...)
--> pat_x_mtrr_type
  --> mtrr_type_lookup
    --> __mtrr_type_lookup

And that can return -1/0xff in case of MTRR not being enabled/initialized. Which
is not the case (given there are no messages for it in dmesg). This is not equal
to MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK and thus becomes _PAGE_CACHE_UC_MINUS.

It looks like the problem starts early in reserve_memtype:

       	if (!pat_enabled) {
                /* This is identical to page table setting without PAT */
                if (new_type) {
                        if (req_type == _PAGE_CACHE_WC)
                                *new_type = _PAGE_CACHE_UC_MINUS;
                        else
                               	*new_type = req_type & _PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
               	}
                return 0;
        }

This would be what we want, that is clearing the PWT and PCD flags from the
supported flags - if pat_enabled is disabled."

This patch does that - disabling PAT.

Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 28, 2013
[ Upstream commit 9cb6cb7 ]

The following script will produce a kernel oops:

    sudo ip netns add v
    sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo
    sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up
    sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo
    sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo
    sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up
    sudo ip netns del v

where inspect by gdb:

    Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
    [Switching to Thread 107]
    0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? ()
    (gdb) bt
    #0  vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533
    #1  vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087
    #2  0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299
    #3  0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335
    #4  0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851
    #5  0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752
    #6  0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170
    #7  0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302
    #8  0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157
    #9  0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276
    #10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168
    #11 <signal handler called>
    #12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
    #13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
    (gdb) fr 0
    #0  vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533
    533		struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk;
    (gdb) l
    528	static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev)
    529	{
    530		struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
    531		struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id);
    532		int err = 0;
    533		struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk;
    534		struct ip_mreqn mreq = {
    535			.imr_multiaddr.s_addr	= vxlan->gaddr,
    536			.imr_ifindex		= vxlan->link,
    537		};
    (gdb) p vn->sock
    $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0

The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down
vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock`
is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces
before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does.

Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 13, 2013
…s struct file

commit e4daf1f upstream.

The following call chain:
------------------------------------------------------------
nfs4_get_vfs_file
- nfsd_open
  - dentry_open
    - do_dentry_open
      - __get_file_write_access
        - get_write_access
          - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY;
------------------------------------------------------------

can result in the following state:
------------------------------------------------------------
struct nfs4_file {
...
  fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0},
  fi_access = {{
      counter = 0x1
    }, {
      counter = 0x0
    }},
...
------------------------------------------------------------

1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is
NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error
and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach
nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented.

2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is
NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but
nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented.
Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in
an incorrect state.

3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds
fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls
nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY.
------------------------------------------------------------
...
     [exception RIP: fput+0x9]
     RIP: ffffffff81177fa9  RSP: ffff88062e365c90  RFLAGS: 00010282
     RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc  RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978  RCX: 0000000000000002
     RDX: dead000000100101  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: ffffffffffffffe6
     RBP: ffff88062e365c90   R8: ffff88041fe797d8   R9: ffff88062e365d58
     R10: 0000000000000008  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: 0000000000000001
     R13: 0000000000000007  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd]
 #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd]
 #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd]
 #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd]
 #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd]
 #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd]
 #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd]
 #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc]
 #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc]
 #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd]
 #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886
 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a
------------------------------------------------------------

Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 4, 2013
…s struct file

The following call chain:
------------------------------------------------------------
nfs4_get_vfs_file
- nfsd_open
  - dentry_open
    - do_dentry_open
      - __get_file_write_access
        - get_write_access
          - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY;
------------------------------------------------------------

can result in the following state:
------------------------------------------------------------
struct nfs4_file {
...
  fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0},
  fi_access = {{
      counter = 0x1
    }, {
      counter = 0x0
    }},
...
------------------------------------------------------------

1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is
NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error
and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach
nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented.

2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is
NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but
nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented.
Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in
an incorrect state.

3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds
fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls
nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY.
------------------------------------------------------------
...
     [exception RIP: fput+0x9]
     RIP: ffffffff81177fa9  RSP: ffff88062e365c90  RFLAGS: 00010282
     RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc  RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978  RCX: 0000000000000002
     RDX: dead000000100101  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: ffffffffffffffe6
     RBP: ffff88062e365c90   R8: ffff88041fe797d8   R9: ffff88062e365d58
     R10: 0000000000000008  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: 0000000000000001
     R13: 0000000000000007  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd]
 #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd]
 #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd]
 #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd]
 #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd]
 #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd]
 #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd]
 #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc]
 #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc]
 #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd]
 #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886
 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a
------------------------------------------------------------

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 4, 2013
Since commit ac4e4af ("macvtap: Consistently use rcu functions"),
Thomas gets two different warnings :

BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: vhost-45891/45892
caller is macvtap_do_read+0x45c/0x600 [macvtap]
CPU: 1 PID: 45892 Comm: vhost-45891 Not tainted 3.11.0-bisecttest #13
Call Trace:
([<00000000001126ee>] show_trace+0x126/0x144)
 [<00000000001127d2>] show_stack+0xc6/0xd4
 [<000000000068bcec>] dump_stack+0x74/0xd8
 [<0000000000481066>] debug_smp_processor_id+0xf6/0x114
 [<000003ff802e9a18>] macvtap_do_read+0x45c/0x600 [macvtap]
 [<000003ff802e9c1c>] macvtap_recvmsg+0x60/0x88 [macvtap]
 [<000003ff80318c5e>] handle_rx+0x5b2/0x800 [vhost_net]
 [<000003ff8028f77c>] vhost_worker+0x15c/0x1c4 [vhost]
 [<000000000015f3ac>] kthread+0xd8/0xe4
 [<00000000006934a6>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc
 [<00000000006934a0>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc

And

BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: vhost-45897/45898
caller is macvlan_start_xmit+0x10a/0x1b4 [macvlan]
CPU: 1 PID: 45898 Comm: vhost-45897 Not tainted 3.11.0-bisecttest #16
Call Trace:
([<00000000001126ee>] show_trace+0x126/0x144)
 [<00000000001127d2>] show_stack+0xc6/0xd4
 [<000000000068bdb8>] dump_stack+0x74/0xd4
 [<0000000000481132>] debug_smp_processor_id+0xf6/0x114
 [<000003ff802b72ca>] macvlan_start_xmit+0x10a/0x1b4 [macvlan]
 [<000003ff802ea69a>] macvtap_get_user+0x982/0xbc4 [macvtap]
 [<000003ff802ea92a>] macvtap_sendmsg+0x4e/0x60 [macvtap]
 [<000003ff8031947c>] handle_tx+0x494/0x5ec [vhost_net]
 [<000003ff8028f77c>] vhost_worker+0x15c/0x1c4 [vhost]
 [<000000000015f3ac>] kthread+0xd8/0xe4
 [<000000000069356e>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc
 [<0000000000693568>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc
2 locks held by vhost-45897/45898:
 #0:  (&vq->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<000003ff8031903c>] handle_tx+0x54/0x5ec [vhost_net]
 #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<000003ff802ea53c>] macvtap_get_user+0x824/0xbc4 [macvtap]

In the first case, macvtap_put_user() calls macvlan_count_rx()
in a preempt-able context, and this is not allowed.

In the second case, macvtap_get_user() calls
macvlan_start_xmit() with BH enabled, and this is not allowed.

Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Bisected-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 4, 2013
When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has
been brought up. For example:

[    0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK
[    0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 OK
[    0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 OK
[    0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23

But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum
possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all
CPUs booted up.

Signed-off-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <wangyijing@huawei.com>
Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1378378676-18276-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com
[ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 4, 2014
This patch tries to fix this crash:

 #5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5
 #6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de
    [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359]
    RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27  RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 000000000000000c  RSI: ffff880027a95000  RDI: ffff88003c79b540
    RBP: ffff88003c1cd858   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: ffffffff815f6ba0
    R10: 00000000000001c9  R11: 00000000000001c9  R12: ffff88002d271500
    R13: 0000000000000001  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000001000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b
 #8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c
 #9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764
#10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc
#11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2]
#12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935
#13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2]
#14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c
#15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4
#16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880
#17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238
#18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437
#19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530
#20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159

It crashes at
        BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED));
in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks.

ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in
ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken
during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after
ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks().

It can happen in this case:

Node A(which crashes)				Node B
------------------------                 ---------------------------
ocfs2_file_aio_write
  ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write
    ocfs2_inode_lock
    ...
    ocfs2_inode_unlock
  #no refcount found
....					ocfs2_reflink
                                          ocfs2_inode_lock
                                          ...
                                          ocfs2_inode_unlock
                                          #now, refcount flag set on extent

                                        ...
                                        flush change to disk

ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks
  ocfs2_get_clusters
    #extent map miss
    #buffer_head miss
    read extents from disk
  found refcount flag on extent
  crash..

Fix:
Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path

Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 8, 2014
Fix the following warning when DMA-API debug is enabled by checking ib_dma_map_single result:
[ 1455.345548] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1455.346863] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3929 at /home/yanb/kernel/net-next/lib/dma-debug.c:1140 check_unmap+0x4e5/0x990()
[ 1455.349350] mlx4_core 0000:00:07.0: DMA-API: device driver failed to check map error[device address=0x000000007c9f2090] [size=2656 bytes] [mapped as single]
[ 1455.349350] Modules linked in: xprtrdma netconsole configfs nfsv3 nfs_acl ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm autofs4 auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfsv4 nfs fscache lockd sunrpc dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log microcode pcspkr mlx4_ib ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr mlx4_en ipv6 ptp pps_core vxlan mlx4_core virtio_balloon cirrus ttm drm_kms_helper drm sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea i2c_piix4 i2c_core button ext3 jbd virtio_blk virtio_net virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio uhci_hcd ata_generic ata_piix libata
[ 1455.349350] CPU: 3 PID: 3929 Comm: mount.nfs Not tainted 3.15.0-rc1-dbg+ #13
[ 1455.349350] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2007
[ 1455.349350]  0000000000000474 ffff880069dcf628 ffffffff8151c341 ffffffff817b69d8
[ 1455.349350]  ffff880069dcf678 ffff880069dcf668 ffffffff8105b5fc 0000000069dcf658
[ 1455.349350]  ffff880069dcf778 ffff88007b0c9f00 ffffffff8255ec40 0000000000000a60
[ 1455.349350] Call Trace:
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff8151c341>] dump_stack+0x52/0x81
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff8105b5fc>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff8105b6e6>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff812e6305>] check_unmap+0x4e5/0x990
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff81521fb0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x60
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff812e6a0a>] debug_dma_unmap_page+0x5a/0x60
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0389583>] rpcrdma_deregister_internal+0xb3/0xd0 [xprtrdma]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa038a639>] rpcrdma_buffer_destroy+0x69/0x170 [xprtrdma]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa03872ff>] xprt_rdma_destroy+0x3f/0xb0 [xprtrdma]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a95ff>] xprt_destroy+0x6f/0x80 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a9625>] xprt_put+0x15/0x20 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a899a>] rpc_free_client+0x8a/0xe0 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a8a58>] rpc_release_client+0x68/0xa0 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a9060>] rpc_shutdown_client+0xb0/0xc0 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a8f5d>] ? rpc_ping+0x5d/0x70 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a91ab>] rpc_create_xprt+0xbb/0xd0 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa04a9273>] rpc_create+0xb3/0x160 [sunrpc]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff81129749>] ? __probe_kernel_read+0x69/0xb0
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa053851c>] nfs_create_rpc_client+0xdc/0x100 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0538cfa>] nfs_init_client+0x3a/0x90 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa05391c8>] nfs_get_client+0x478/0x5b0 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0538e50>] ? nfs_get_client+0x100/0x5b0 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff81172c6d>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x24d/0x260
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa05393f3>] nfs_create_server+0xf3/0x4c0 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0545ff0>] ? nfs_request_mount+0xf0/0x1a0 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa031c0c3>] nfs3_create_server+0x13/0x30 [nfsv3]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0546293>] nfs_try_mount+0x1f3/0x230 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff8108ea21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff812d6343>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff810d632b>] ? try_module_get+0x6b/0x190
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa05449f7>] nfs_fs_mount+0x187/0x9d0 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0545940>] ? nfs_clone_super+0x140/0x140 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffffa0543b20>] ? nfs_auth_info_match+0x40/0x40 [nfs]
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff8117e360>] mount_fs+0x20/0xe0
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff811a1c16>] vfs_kern_mount+0x76/0x160
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff811a29a8>] do_mount+0x428/0xae0
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff811a30f0>] SyS_mount+0x90/0xe0
[ 1455.349350]  [<ffffffff8152af52>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1455.349350] ---[ end trace f1f31572972e211d ]---

Signed-off-by: Yan Burman <yanb@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 8, 2014
… queue"

This reverts commit a923207.

It introduced a dead lock, and did not fix anything.

it made netif_tx_lock() be called in IRQ context, but in softirq context,
the same lock is locked without disabling IRQ. In fact, the commit a923207
did not fix anything, since netif_stop_queue did not free the any resource

[   10.154920] =================================
[   10.156026] [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
[   10.156026] 3.16.0-rc5+ #13 Not tainted
[   10.156026] ---------------------------------
[   10.156026] inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage.
[   10.156026] swapper/1/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[5]:HE1:SE0] takes:
[   10.156026]  (_xmit_ETHER){?.-...}, at: [<80948b6a>] sch_direct_xmit+0x7a/0x250
[   10.156026] {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at:
[   10.156026]   [<804811f0>] __lock_acquire+0x800/0x17a0
[   10.156026]   [<804828ba>] lock_acquire+0x6a/0xf0
[   10.156026]   [<809ed477>] _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
[   10.156026]   [<8088d508>] gether_disconnect+0x68/0x280
[   10.156026]   [<8088e777>] eem_set_alt+0x37/0xc0
[   10.156026]   [<808847ce>] composite_setup+0x30e/0x1240
[   10.156026]   [<8088b8ae>] pch_udc_isr+0xa6e/0xf50
[   10.156026]   [<8048abe8>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x38/0x1e0
[   10.156026]   [<8048adc1>] handle_irq_event+0x31/0x50
[   10.156026]   [<8048d94b>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0x6b/0x140
[   10.156026]   [<804040a5>] handle_irq+0x65/0x80
[   10.156026]   [<80403cfc>] do_IRQ+0x3c/0xc0
[   10.156026]   [<809ee6ae>] common_interrupt+0x2e/0x34
[   10.156026]   [<804668c5>] finish_task_switch+0x65/0xd0
[   10.156026]   [<809e89df>] __schedule+0x20f/0x7d0
[   10.156026]   [<809e94aa>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x2a/0x70
[   10.156026]   [<8047bf03>] cpu_startup_entry+0x143/0x410
[   10.156026]   [<809e2e61>] rest_init+0xa1/0xb0
[   10.156026]   [<80ce2a3b>] start_kernel+0x336/0x33b
[   10.156026]   [<80ce22ab>] i386_start_kernel+0x79/0x7d
[   10.156026] irq event stamp: 52070
[   10.156026] hardirqs last  enabled at (52070): [<809375de>] neigh_resolve_output+0xee/0x2a0
[   10.156026] hardirqs last disabled at (52069): [<809375a8>] neigh_resolve_output+0xb8/0x2a0
[   10.156026] softirqs last  enabled at (52020): [<8044401f>] _local_bh_enable+0x1f/0x50
[   10.156026] softirqs last disabled at (52021): [<80404036>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x26/0x30
[   10.156026]
[   10.156026] other info that might help us debug this:
[   10.156026]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   10.156026]
[   10.156026]        CPU0
[   10.156026]        ----
[   10.156026]   lock(_xmit_ETHER);
[   10.156026]   <Interrupt>
[   10.156026]     lock(_xmit_ETHER);
[   10.156026]
[   10.156026]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   10.156026]
[   10.156026] 4 locks held by swapper/1/0:
[   10.156026]  #0:  (((&idev->mc_ifc_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<8044b100>] call_timer_fn+0x0/0x190
[   10.156026]  #1:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<a0577c40>] mld_sendpack+0x0/0x590 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  #2:  (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<a055680c>] ip6_finish_output2+0x4c/0x7f0 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  #3:  (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<8092e510>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x5f0
[   10.156026]
[   10.156026] stack backtrace:
[   10.156026] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc5+ #13
[   10.156026]  811dbb10 00000000 9e919d10 809e6785 9e8b8000 9e919d3c 809e561e 80b95511
[   10.156026]  80b9545a 80b9543d 80b95450 80b95441 80b957e4 9e8b84e0 00000002 8047f7b0
[   10.156026]  9e919d5c 8048043b 00000002 00000000 9e8b8000 00000001 00000004 9e8b8000
[   10.156026] Call Trace:
[   10.156026]  [<809e6785>] dump_stack+0x48/0x69
[   10.156026]  [<809e561e>] print_usage_bug+0x18f/0x19c
[   10.156026]  [<8047f7b0>] ? print_shortest_lock_dependencies+0x170/0x170
[   10.156026]  [<8048043b>] mark_lock+0x53b/0x5f0
[   10.156026]  [<804810cf>] __lock_acquire+0x6df/0x17a0
[   10.156026]  [<804828ba>] lock_acquire+0x6a/0xf0
[   10.156026]  [<80948b6a>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x7a/0x250
[   10.156026]  [<809ed477>] _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
[   10.156026]  [<80948b6a>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x7a/0x250
[   10.156026]  [<80948b6a>] sch_direct_xmit+0x7a/0x250
[   10.156026]  [<8092e6bf>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1af/0x5f0
[   10.156026]  [<80947fc0>] ? ether_setup+0x80/0x80
[   10.156026]  [<8092eb0f>] dev_queue_xmit+0xf/0x20
[   10.156026]  [<8093764c>] neigh_resolve_output+0x15c/0x2a0
[   10.156026]  [<a0556927>] ip6_finish_output2+0x167/0x7f0 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<a0559b05>] ip6_finish_output+0x85/0x1c0 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<a0559cb7>] ip6_output+0x77/0x240 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<a0578163>] mld_sendpack+0x523/0x590 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<80480501>] ? mark_held_locks+0x11/0x90
[   10.156026]  [<a057947d>] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x15d/0x280 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<8044b168>] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x190
[   10.156026]  [<a0579320>] ? igmp6_group_added+0x150/0x150 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<8044b3fa>] run_timer_softirq+0x16a/0x240
[   10.156026]  [<a0579320>] ? igmp6_group_added+0x150/0x150 [ipv6]
[   10.156026]  [<80444984>] __do_softirq+0xd4/0x2f0
[   10.156026]  [<804448b0>] ? tasklet_action+0x100/0x100
[   10.156026]  [<80404036>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x26/0x30
[   10.156026]  <IRQ>  [<80444d05>] irq_exit+0x65/0x70
[   10.156026]  [<8042d758>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x38/0x50
[   10.156026]  [<809ee91f>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x2f/0x34
[   10.156026]  [<8048007b>] ? mark_lock+0x17b/0x5f0
[   10.156026]  [<8040a912>] ? default_idle+0x22/0xf0
[   10.156026]  [<8040b13e>] arch_cpu_idle+0xe/0x10
[   10.156026]  [<8047bfc6>] cpu_startup_entry+0x206/0x410
[   10.156026]  [<8042bfbd>] start_secondary+0x19d/0x1e0

Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jeff Westfahl <jeff.westfahl@ni.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <linux-usb@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 8, 2014
Richard and Daniel reported that UML is broken due to changes to
resource traversal functions.  Problem is that iomem_resource.child can
be null and new code does not consider that possibility.  Old code used
a for loop and that loop will not even execute if p was null.

Revert back to for() loop logic and bail out if p is null.

I also moved sibling_only check out of resource_lock. There is no
reason to keep it inside the lock.

Following is backtrace of the UML crash.

RIP: 0033:[<0000000060039b9f>]
RSP: 0000000081459da0  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000219b3fff RCX: 000000006010d1d9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000602dfb94 RDI: 0000000081459df8
RBP: 0000000081459de0 R08: 00000000601b59f4 R09: ffffffff0000ff00
R10: ffffffff0000ff00 R11: 0000000081459e88 R12: 0000000081459df8
R13: 00000000219b3fff R14: 00000000602dfb94 R15: 0000000000000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Segfault with no mm
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.16.0-10454-g58d08e3 #13
Stack:
 00000000 000080d0 81459df0 219b3fff
 81459e70 6010d1d9 ffffffff 6033e010
 81459e50 6003a269 81459e30 00000000
Call Trace:
 [<6010d1d9>] ? kclist_add_private+0x0/0xe7
 [<6003a269>] walk_system_ram_range+0x61/0xb7
 [<6000e859>] ? proc_kcore_init+0x0/0xf1
 [<6010d574>] kcore_update_ram+0x4c/0x168
 [<6010d72e>] ? kclist_add+0x0/0x2e
 [<6000e943>] proc_kcore_init+0xea/0xf1
 [<6000e859>] ? proc_kcore_init+0x0/0xf1
 [<6000e859>] ? proc_kcore_init+0x0/0xf1
 [<600189f0>] do_one_initcall+0x13c/0x204
 [<6004ca46>] ? parse_args+0x1df/0x2e0
 [<6004c82d>] ? parameq+0x0/0x3a
 [<601b5990>] ? strcpy+0x0/0x18
 [<60001e1a>] kernel_init_freeable+0x240/0x31e
 [<6026f1c0>] kernel_init+0x12/0x148
 [<60019fad>] new_thread_handler+0x81/0xa3

Fixes 8c86e70 ("resource: provide new functions to walk
through resources").

Reported-by: Daniel Walter <sahne@0x90.at>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Daniel Walter <sahne@0x90.at>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
anholt referenced this issue in anholt/linux May 13, 2015
When link statistics is dumped over netlink, we iterate over
the list of peer nodes and append each links statistics to
the netlink msg. In the case where the dump is resumed after
filling up a nlmsg, the node refcnt is decremented without
having been incremented previously which may cause the node
reference to be freed. When this happens, the following
info/stacktrace will be generated, followed by a crash or
undefined behavior.
We fix this by removing the erroneous call to tipc_node_put
inside the loop that iterates over nodes.

[  384.312303] INFO: trying to register non-static key.
[  384.313110] the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
[  384.313290] turning off the locking correctness validator.
[  384.313290] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.0.0+ #13
[  384.313290] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  384.313290]  ffff88003c6d0290 ffff88003cc03ca8 ffffffff8170adf1 0000000000000007
[  384.313290]  ffffffff82728730 ffff88003cc03d38 ffffffff810a6a6d 00000000001d7200
[  384.313290]  ffff88003c6d0ab0 ffff88003cc03ce8 0000000000000285 0000000000000001
[  384.313290] Call Trace:
[  384.313290]  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff8170adf1>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff810a6a6d>] __lock_acquire+0xf3d/0xf50
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff810a7375>] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x290
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffffa0043e8c>] ? link_timeout+0x1c/0x170 [tipc]
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffffa0043e70>] ? link_state_event+0x4e0/0x4e0 [tipc]
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff81712890>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x40/0x80
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffffa0043e8c>] ? link_timeout+0x1c/0x170 [tipc]
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffffa0043e8c>] link_timeout+0x1c/0x170 [tipc]
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff810c4698>] call_timer_fn+0xb8/0x490
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff810c45e0>] ? process_timeout+0x10/0x10
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff810c5a2c>] run_timer_softirq+0x21c/0x420
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffffa0043e70>] ? link_state_event+0x4e0/0x4e0 [tipc]
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff8105a954>] __do_softirq+0xf4/0x630
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff8105afdd>] irq_exit+0x5d/0x60
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff8103ade1>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x41/0x50
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff817144a0>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
[  384.313290]  <EOI>  [<ffffffff8100db10>] ? default_idle+0x20/0x210
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff8100db0e>] ? default_idle+0x1e/0x210
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff8100e61a>] arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff81099803>] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c3/0x530
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff810d2893>] ? clockevents_register_device+0x113/0x200
[  384.313290]  [<ffffffff81038b0f>] start_secondary+0x13f/0x170

Fixes: 8a0f6eb ("tipc: involve reference counter for node structure")
Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 4, 2015
The commit 98b5a0f introduces jumbo frame support, but also it assumes
that macb_config present which is not always true.

The configuration without macb_config fails to boot.

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000010
 ptbr = 90350000 pgd = 00000000
 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
 FRAME_POINTER chip: 0x01f:0x1e82 rev 2
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.2.0-rc3-next-20150723+ #13
 task: 91c26000 ti: 91c28000 task.ti: 91c28000
 PC is at macb_probe+0x140/0x61c

Fixes: 98b5a0f (net: macb: Add support for jumbo frames)
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
davet321 pushed a commit to davet321/rpi-linux that referenced this issue Aug 17, 2015
commit ecf5fc6 upstream.

Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the
following backtrace:

PID: 18308  TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "rsync"
  #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152
  raspberrypi#1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e
  raspberrypi#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5
  raspberrypi#3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a
  raspberrypi#4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6
  raspberrypi#5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5
  raspberrypi#6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f
  raspberrypi#7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445
  raspberrypi#8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845
  raspberrypi#9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead
 raspberrypi#10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3
 raspberrypi#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff
 raspberrypi#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f
 raspberrypi#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be
 raspberrypi#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423
 raspberrypi#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5
 raspberrypi#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d
 raspberrypi#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618
 raspberrypi#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b
 raspberrypi#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297
 raspberrypi#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6
 raspberrypi#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1
 raspberrypi#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c
 raspberrypi#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8
 raspberrypi#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09
 raspberrypi#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848
 raspberrypi#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7
 raspberrypi#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa
 raspberrypi#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b
 raspberrypi#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5
 raspberrypi#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490
 raspberrypi#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199
 raspberrypi#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c
 raspberrypi#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1
 raspberrypi#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91
 raspberrypi#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32
 raspberrypi#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5
 raspberrypi#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc
 raspberrypi#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e
 raspberrypi#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e
 raspberrypi#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89

Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the
reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by
PG_writeback right away.

The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM
with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs
was specified.  The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg:
further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the
__GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs
code.  But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't
necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away.

ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily
submit the bio.  Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and
mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up
waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted
yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes.

Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2)
before we go to wait on the writeback.  The page fault path, which is
the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't
require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM
killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic.

As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already
so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem.  Moreover he notes:

: For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion
: which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The
: writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten
: extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on
: page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not
: safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+
[tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow]
Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 20, 2015
Alex reported the following crash when using fq_codel
with htb:

  crash> bt
  PID: 630839  TASK: ffff8823c990d280  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "tc"
   [... snip ...]
   #8 [ffff8820ceec17a0] page_fault at ffffffff8160a8c2
      [exception RIP: htb_qlen_notify+24]
      RIP: ffffffffa0841718  RSP: ffff8820ceec1858  RFLAGS: 00010282
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: ffff88241747b400
      RDX: ffff88241747b408  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: ffff8811fb27d000
      RBP: ffff8820ceec1868   R8: ffff88120cdeff24   R9: ffff88120cdeff30
      R10: 0000000000000bd4  R11: ffffffffa0840919  R12: ffffffffa0843340
      R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000001  R15: ffff8808dae5c2e8
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #9 [...] qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen at ffffffff81565375
  #10 [...] fq_codel_dequeue at ffffffffa084e0a0 [sch_fq_codel]
  #11 [...] fq_codel_reset at ffffffffa084e2f8 [sch_fq_codel]
  #12 [...] qdisc_destroy at ffffffff81560d2d
  #13 [...] htb_destroy_class at ffffffffa08408f8 [sch_htb]
  #14 [...] htb_put at ffffffffa084095c [sch_htb]
  #15 [...] tc_ctl_tclass at ffffffff815645a3
  #16 [...] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffff81552cb0
  [... snip ...]

As Jamal pointed out, there is actually no need to call dequeue
to purge the queued skb's in reset, data structures can be just
reset explicitly. Therefore, we reset everything except config's
and stats, so that we would have a fresh start after device flipping.

Fixes: 4b549a2 ("fq_codel: Fair Queue Codel AQM")
Reported-by: Alex Gartrell <agartrell@fb.com>
Cc: Alex Gartrell <agartrell@fb.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
[xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com: added codel_vars_init() and qdisc_qstats_backlog_dec()]
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 20, 2015
Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the
following backtrace:

PID: 18308  TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "rsync"
  #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152
  #1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e
  #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5
  #3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a
  #4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6
  #5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5
  #6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f
  #7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445
  #8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845
  #9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead
 #10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3
 #11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff
 #12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f
 #13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be
 #14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423
 #15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5
 #16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d
 #17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618
 #18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b
 #19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297
 #20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6
 #21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1
 #22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c
 #23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8
 #24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09
 #25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848
 #26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7
 #27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa
 #28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b
 #29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5
 #30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490
 #31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199
 #32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c
 #33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1
 #34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91
 #35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32
 #36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5
 #37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc
 #38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e
 #39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e
 #40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89

Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the
reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by
PG_writeback right away.

The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM
with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs
was specified.  The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg:
further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the
__GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs
code.  But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't
necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away.

ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily
submit the bio.  Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and
mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up
waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted
yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes.

Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2)
before we go to wait on the writeback.  The page fault path, which is
the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't
require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM
killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic.

As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already
so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem.  Moreover he notes:

: For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion
: which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The
: writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten
: extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on
: page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not
: safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+
[tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow]
Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 13, 2015
commit 78e1c89 upstream.

The Intel Baytrail pinctrl driver implements irqchip callbacks which are
called with desc->lock raw_spinlock held. In mainline this is fine because
spinlock resolves to raw_spinlock. However, running the same code in -rt we
get:

 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
 Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff81092e9f>] cpu_startup_entry+0x17f/0x480

 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.1.5-rt5 #13
  ...
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff816283c6>] dump_stack+0x4a/0x61
  [<ffffffff81077e17>] ___might_sleep+0xe7/0x170
  [<ffffffff8162d6cf>] rt_spin_lock+0x1f/0x50
  [<ffffffff812e3b88>] byt_gpio_clear_triggering+0x38/0x60
  [<ffffffff812e3bc1>] byt_irq_mask+0x11/0x20
  [<ffffffff810a7013>] handle_level_irq+0x83/0x150
  [<ffffffff810a3457>] generic_handle_irq+0x27/0x40
  [<ffffffff812e3a5f>] byt_gpio_irq_handler+0x7f/0xc0
  [<ffffffff810050aa>] handle_irq+0xaa/0x190
  ...

This is because in -rt spinlocks are preemptible so taking the driver
private spinlock in irqchip callbacks causes might_sleep() to trigger.

In order to keep -rt happy but at the same time make sure that register
accesses get serialized, convert the driver to use raw_spinlock instead.

Also shorten the critical section a bit in few places.

Suggested-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.de.marchi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 13, 2015
commit 78e1c89 upstream.

The Intel Baytrail pinctrl driver implements irqchip callbacks which are
called with desc->lock raw_spinlock held. In mainline this is fine because
spinlock resolves to raw_spinlock. However, running the same code in -rt we
get:

 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
 Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff81092e9f>] cpu_startup_entry+0x17f/0x480

 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.1.5-rt5 #13
  ...
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff816283c6>] dump_stack+0x4a/0x61
  [<ffffffff81077e17>] ___might_sleep+0xe7/0x170
  [<ffffffff8162d6cf>] rt_spin_lock+0x1f/0x50
  [<ffffffff812e3b88>] byt_gpio_clear_triggering+0x38/0x60
  [<ffffffff812e3bc1>] byt_irq_mask+0x11/0x20
  [<ffffffff810a7013>] handle_level_irq+0x83/0x150
  [<ffffffff810a3457>] generic_handle_irq+0x27/0x40
  [<ffffffff812e3a5f>] byt_gpio_irq_handler+0x7f/0xc0
  [<ffffffff810050aa>] handle_irq+0xaa/0x190
  ...

This is because in -rt spinlocks are preemptible so taking the driver
private spinlock in irqchip callbacks causes might_sleep() to trigger.

In order to keep -rt happy but at the same time make sure that register
accesses get serialized, convert the driver to use raw_spinlock instead.

Also shorten the critical section a bit in few places.

Suggested-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.de.marchi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anholt referenced this issue in anholt/linux Dec 22, 2015
We're consistently hitting deadlocks here with XFS on recent kernels.
After some digging through the crash files, it looks like everyone in
the system is waiting for XFS to reclaim memory.

Something like this:

PID: 2733434  TASK: ffff8808cd242800  CPU: 19  COMMAND: "java"
 #0 [ffff880019c53588] __schedule at ffffffff818c4df2
 #1 [ffff880019c535d8] schedule at ffffffff818c5517
 #2 [ffff880019c535f8] _xfs_log_force_lsn at ffffffff81316348
 #3 [ffff880019c53688] xfs_log_force_lsn at ffffffff813164fb
 #4 [ffff880019c536b8] xfs_iunpin_wait at ffffffff8130835e
 #5 [ffff880019c53728] xfs_reclaim_inode at ffffffff812fd453
 #6 [ffff880019c53778] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag at ffffffff812fd8c7
 #7 [ffff880019c53928] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr at ffffffff812fe433
 #8 [ffff880019c53958] xfs_fs_free_cached_objects at ffffffff8130d3b9
 #9 [ffff880019c53968] super_cache_scan at ffffffff811a6f73
#10 [ffff880019c539c8] shrink_slab at ffffffff811460e6
#11 [ffff880019c53aa8] shrink_zone at ffffffff8114a53f
#12 [ffff880019c53b48] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8114a8ba
#13 [ffff880019c53be8] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8114ad5a
#14 [ffff880019c53c78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8113e1b8
#15 [ffff880019c53d88] alloc_kmem_pages_node at ffffffff8113e671
#16 [ffff880019c53dd8] copy_process at ffffffff8104f781
#17 [ffff880019c53ec8] do_fork at ffffffff8105129c
#18 [ffff880019c53f38] sys_clone at ffffffff810515b6
#19 [ffff880019c53f48] stub_clone at ffffffff818c8e4d

xfs_log_force_lsn is waiting for logs to get cleaned, which is waiting
for IO, which is waiting for workers to complete the IO which is waiting
for worker threads that don't exist yet:

PID: 2752451  TASK: ffff880bd6bdda00  CPU: 37  COMMAND: "kworker/37:1"
 #0 [ffff8808d20abbb0] __schedule at ffffffff818c4df2
 #1 [ffff8808d20abc00] schedule at ffffffff818c5517
 #2 [ffff8808d20abc20] schedule_timeout at ffffffff818c7c6c
 #3 [ffff8808d20abcc0] wait_for_completion_killable at ffffffff818c6495
 #4 [ffff8808d20abd30] kthread_create_on_node at ffffffff8106ec82
 #5 [ffff8808d20abdf0] create_worker at ffffffff8106752f
 #6 [ffff8808d20abe40] worker_thread at ffffffff810699be
 #7 [ffff8808d20abec0] kthread at ffffffff8106ef59
 #8 [ffff8808d20abf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff818c8ac8

I think we should be using WQ_MEM_RECLAIM to make sure this thread
pool makes progress when we're not able to allocate new workers.

[dchinner: make all workqueues WQ_MEM_RECLAIM]

Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 15, 2016
Fixes segmentation fault using, for instance:

  (gdb) run record -I -e intel_pt/tsc=1,noretcomp=1/u /bin/ls
  Starting program: /home/acme/bin/perf record -I -e intel_pt/tsc=1,noretcomp=1/u /bin/ls
  Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install glibc-2.22-7.fc23.x86_64
  [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
  Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".

 Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0 x00000000004b9ea5 in tracepoint_error (e=0x0, err=13, sys=0x19b1370 "sched", name=0x19a5d00 "sched_switch") at util/parse-events.c:410
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000004b9ea5 in tracepoint_error (e=0x0, err=13, sys=0x19b1370 "sched", name=0x19a5d00 "sched_switch") at util/parse-events.c:410
  #1  0x00000000004b9fc5 in add_tracepoint (list=0x19a5d20, idx=0x7fffffffb8c0, sys_name=0x19b1370 "sched", evt_name=0x19a5d00 "sched_switch", err=0x0, head_config=0x0)
      at util/parse-events.c:433
  #2  0x00000000004ba334 in add_tracepoint_event (list=0x19a5d20, idx=0x7fffffffb8c0, sys_name=0x19b1370 "sched", evt_name=0x19a5d00 "sched_switch", err=0x0, head_config=0x0)
      at util/parse-events.c:498
  #3  0x00000000004bb699 in parse_events_add_tracepoint (list=0x19a5d20, idx=0x7fffffffb8c0, sys=0x19b1370 "sched", event=0x19a5d00 "sched_switch", err=0x0, head_config=0x0)
      at util/parse-events.c:936
  #4  0x00000000004f6eda in parse_events_parse (_data=0x7fffffffb8b0, scanner=0x19a49d0) at util/parse-events.y:391
  #5  0x00000000004bc8e5 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x663ff2 "sched:sched_switch", data=0x7fffffffb8b0, start_token=258) at util/parse-events.c:1361
  #6  0x00000000004bca57 in parse_events (evlist=0x19a5220, str=0x663ff2 "sched:sched_switch", err=0x0) at util/parse-events.c:1401
  #7  0x0000000000518d5f in perf_evlist__can_select_event (evlist=0x19a3b90, str=0x663ff2 "sched:sched_switch") at util/record.c:253
  #8  0x0000000000553c42 in intel_pt_track_switches (evlist=0x19a3b90) at arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c:364
  #9  0x00000000005549d1 in intel_pt_recording_options (itr=0x19a2c40, evlist=0x19a3b90, opts=0x8edf68 <record+232>) at arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c:664
  #10 0x000000000051e076 in auxtrace_record__options (itr=0x19a2c40, evlist=0x19a3b90, opts=0x8edf68 <record+232>) at util/auxtrace.c:539
  #11 0x0000000000433368 in cmd_record (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffde60, prefix=0x0) at builtin-record.c:1264
  #12 0x000000000049bec2 in run_builtin (p=0x8fa2a8 <commands+168>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:390
  #13 0x000000000049c12a in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:451
  #14 0x000000000049c278 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdcbc, argv=0x7fffffffdcb0) at perf.c:495
  #15 0x000000000049c60a in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:618
(gdb)

Intel PT attempts to find the sched:sched_switch tracepoint but that seg
faults if tracefs is not readable, because the error reporting structure
is null, as errors are not reported when automatically adding
tracepoints.  Fix by checking before using.

Committer note:

This doesn't take place in a kernel that supports
perf_event_attr.context_switch, that is the default way that will be
used for tracking context switches, only in older kernels, like 4.2, in
a machine with Intel PT (e.g. Broadwell) for non-priviledged users.

Further info from a similar patch by Wang:

The error is in tracepoint_error: it assumes the 'e' parameter is valid.

However, there are many situation a parse_event() can be called without
parse_events_error. See result of

  $ grep 'parse_events(.*NULL)' ./tools/perf/ -r'

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Tong Zhang <ztong@vt.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Fixes: 1965817 ("perf tools: Enhance parsing events tracepoint error output")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453809921-24596-2-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 23, 2024
vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 29, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 29, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 10, 2024
We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 17, 2024
commit 9d274c1 upstream.

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 17, 2024
commit 9d274c1 upstream.

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 17, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 8, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 8, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 16, 2024
syzkaller triggered the warning [0] in udp_v4_early_demux().

In udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), we do not touch the refcount
of the looked-up sk and use sock_pfree() as skb->destructor, so we check
SOCK_RCU_FREE to ensure that the sk is safe to access during the RCU grace
period.

Currently, SOCK_RCU_FREE is flagged for a bound socket after being put
into the hash table.  Moreover, the SOCK_RCU_FREE check is done too early
in udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), so there could be a small race
window:

  CPU1                                 CPU2
  ----                                 ----
  udp_v4_early_demux()                 udp_lib_get_port()
  |                                    |- hlist_add_head_rcu()
  |- sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup()    |
  |- DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(sk_is_refcounted(sk));
                                       `- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE)

We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b ("net:
set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable").

Let's apply the same fix for UDP.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 at net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 11198 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-g93bda33046e7 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Code: c5 7a 15 fe bb 01 00 00 00 44 89 e9 31 ff d3 e3 81 e3 bf ef ff ff 89 de e8 2c 74 15 fe 85 db 0f 85 02 06 00 00 e8 9f 7a 15 fe <0f> 0b e8 98 7a 15 fe 49 8d 7e 60 e8 4f 39 2f fe 49 c7 46 60 20 52
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ce3fa58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8318c92c
RDX: ffff888036ccde00 RSI: ffffffff8318c2f1 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88805a2dd6e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0001ffffffffffff R12: ffff88805a2dd680
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffff88800923f900 R15: ffff88805456004e
FS:  00007fc449127640(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc449126e38 CR3: 000000003de4b002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0xbdd/0xd20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:349
 ip_rcv_finish+0xda/0x150 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0x16c/0x180 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb3/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5624
 __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:5738
 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5824 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb+0x271/0x300 net/core/dev.c:5884
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1549 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x24db/0x2c50 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x107/0x1a0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x76f/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:590
 ksys_write+0xbf/0x190 fs/read_write.c:643
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:652
 x64_sys_call+0xe66/0x1990 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fc44a68bc1f
Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 e9 cf f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 3c d0 f5 ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc449126c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007fc44a68bc1f
RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 00000000000000c8
RBP: 00000000004bc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000032 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc44a5ec530 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: 6acc9b4 ("bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240709191356.24010-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
ncopa pushed a commit to ncopa/linux that referenced this issue Jul 18, 2024
[ Upstream commit 5c0b485 ]

syzkaller triggered the warning [0] in udp_v4_early_demux().

In udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), we do not touch the refcount
of the looked-up sk and use sock_pfree() as skb->destructor, so we check
SOCK_RCU_FREE to ensure that the sk is safe to access during the RCU grace
period.

Currently, SOCK_RCU_FREE is flagged for a bound socket after being put
into the hash table.  Moreover, the SOCK_RCU_FREE check is done too early
in udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), so there could be a small race
window:

  CPU1                                 CPU2
  ----                                 ----
  udp_v4_early_demux()                 udp_lib_get_port()
  |                                    |- hlist_add_head_rcu()
  |- sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup()    |
  |- DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(sk_is_refcounted(sk));
                                       `- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE)

We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b ("net:
set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable").

Let's apply the same fix for UDP.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 at net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 11198 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-g93bda33046e7 raspberrypi#13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Code: c5 7a 15 fe bb 01 00 00 00 44 89 e9 31 ff d3 e3 81 e3 bf ef ff ff 89 de e8 2c 74 15 fe 85 db 0f 85 02 06 00 00 e8 9f 7a 15 fe <0f> 0b e8 98 7a 15 fe 49 8d 7e 60 e8 4f 39 2f fe 49 c7 46 60 20 52
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ce3fa58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8318c92c
RDX: ffff888036ccde00 RSI: ffffffff8318c2f1 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88805a2dd6e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0001ffffffffffff R12: ffff88805a2dd680
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffff88800923f900 R15: ffff88805456004e
FS:  00007fc449127640(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc449126e38 CR3: 000000003de4b002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0xbdd/0xd20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:349
 ip_rcv_finish+0xda/0x150 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0x16c/0x180 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb3/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5624
 __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:5738
 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5824 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb+0x271/0x300 net/core/dev.c:5884
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1549 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x24db/0x2c50 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x107/0x1a0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x76f/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:590
 ksys_write+0xbf/0x190 fs/read_write.c:643
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:652
 x64_sys_call+0xe66/0x1990 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fc44a68bc1f
Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 e9 cf f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 3c d0 f5 ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc449126c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007fc44a68bc1f
RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 00000000000000c8
RBP: 00000000004bc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000032 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc44a5ec530 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: 6acc9b4 ("bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240709191356.24010-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 19, 2024
[ Upstream commit 5c0b485 ]

syzkaller triggered the warning [0] in udp_v4_early_demux().

In udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), we do not touch the refcount
of the looked-up sk and use sock_pfree() as skb->destructor, so we check
SOCK_RCU_FREE to ensure that the sk is safe to access during the RCU grace
period.

Currently, SOCK_RCU_FREE is flagged for a bound socket after being put
into the hash table.  Moreover, the SOCK_RCU_FREE check is done too early
in udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), so there could be a small race
window:

  CPU1                                 CPU2
  ----                                 ----
  udp_v4_early_demux()                 udp_lib_get_port()
  |                                    |- hlist_add_head_rcu()
  |- sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup()    |
  |- DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(sk_is_refcounted(sk));
                                       `- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE)

We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b ("net:
set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable").

Let's apply the same fix for UDP.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 at net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 11198 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-g93bda33046e7 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Code: c5 7a 15 fe bb 01 00 00 00 44 89 e9 31 ff d3 e3 81 e3 bf ef ff ff 89 de e8 2c 74 15 fe 85 db 0f 85 02 06 00 00 e8 9f 7a 15 fe <0f> 0b e8 98 7a 15 fe 49 8d 7e 60 e8 4f 39 2f fe 49 c7 46 60 20 52
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ce3fa58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8318c92c
RDX: ffff888036ccde00 RSI: ffffffff8318c2f1 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88805a2dd6e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0001ffffffffffff R12: ffff88805a2dd680
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffff88800923f900 R15: ffff88805456004e
FS:  00007fc449127640(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc449126e38 CR3: 000000003de4b002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0xbdd/0xd20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:349
 ip_rcv_finish+0xda/0x150 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0x16c/0x180 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb3/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5624
 __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:5738
 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5824 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb+0x271/0x300 net/core/dev.c:5884
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1549 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x24db/0x2c50 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x107/0x1a0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x76f/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:590
 ksys_write+0xbf/0x190 fs/read_write.c:643
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:652
 x64_sys_call+0xe66/0x1990 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fc44a68bc1f
Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 e9 cf f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 3c d0 f5 ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc449126c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007fc44a68bc1f
RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 00000000000000c8
RBP: 00000000004bc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000032 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc44a5ec530 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: 6acc9b4 ("bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240709191356.24010-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pelwell pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 2, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 2, 2024
A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
ncopa pushed a commit to ncopa/linux that referenced this issue Sep 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit a699781 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  raspberrypi#8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  raspberrypi#9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 raspberrypi#10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 raspberrypi#11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 raspberrypi#12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 raspberrypi#13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 raspberrypi#14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 raspberrypi#15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 raspberrypi#16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 raspberrypi#17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 6, 2024
[ Upstream commit a699781 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 10, 2024
commit ac01c8c upstream.

AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which
manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

  ==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80
  READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193
      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol
reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67 ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"),
the symbol objects were leaked until c087e94 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so
the bug was masked.

Fixes: c087e94 ("perf machine: Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL")
Reported-by: Yunzhao Li <yunzhao@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming (Cloudflare) <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815142212.3834625-1-matt@readmodwrite.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 10, 2024
commit 9af2efe upstream.

The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  #8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  #9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 10, 2024
commit ac01c8c upstream.

AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which
manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

  ==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80
  READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193
      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol
reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67 ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"),
the symbol objects were leaked until c087e94 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so
the bug was masked.

Fixes: c087e94 ("perf machine: Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL")
Reported-by: Yunzhao Li <yunzhao@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming (Cloudflare) <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815142212.3834625-1-matt@readmodwrite.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 10, 2024
commit 9af2efe upstream.

The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  #8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  #9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 10, 2024
commit ac01c8c upstream.

AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which
manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

  ==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80
  READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193
      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol
reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67 ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"),
the symbol objects were leaked until c087e94 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so
the bug was masked.

Fixes: c087e94 ("perf machine: Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL")
Reported-by: Yunzhao Li <yunzhao@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming (Cloudflare) <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815142212.3834625-1-matt@readmodwrite.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 10, 2024
commit 9af2efe upstream.

The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  #8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  #9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 17, 2024
[ Upstream commit d1bc560 ]

Add nested locking with I_MUTEX_XATTR subclass to avoid lockdep warning
while handling xattr inode on file open syscall at ext4_xattr_inode_iget.

Backtrace
EXT4-fs (loop0): Ignoring removed oldalloc option
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor543/2794 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
       down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
       ext4_update_i_disksize fs/ext4/ext4.h:3267 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_write fs/ext4/xattr.c:1390 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1538 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x331a/0x3d80 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1662
       ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x124/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2228
       ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xc27/0x14e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2385
       ext4_xattr_set+0x219/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498
       ext4_xattr_user_set+0xc9/0xf0 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40
       __vfs_setxattr+0x404/0x450 fs/xattr.c:177
       __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11d/0x4f0 fs/xattr.c:208
       __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1f9/0x210 fs/xattr.c:266
       vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x2c0 fs/xattr.c:283
       setxattr+0x1db/0x3e0 fs/xattr.c:548
       path_setxattr+0x15a/0x240 fs/xattr.c:567
       __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:582 [inline]
       __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:578 [inline]
       __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc5/0xe0 fs/xattr.c:578
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb

-> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
       __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
       lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
       down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
       inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
       ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
       ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
       ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
       __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
       ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
       __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
       ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
       notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
       do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
       handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
       do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
       path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
       do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
       do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
       __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
       __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
       __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
                               lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);
                               lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
  lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by syz-executor543/2794:
 #0: ffff888026fbc448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x4a/0x2a0 fs/namespace.c:365
 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x1cf/0x2c0 fs/open.c:62
 #2: ffff8880215e3310 (&ei->i_mmap_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xec4/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5519
 #3: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr fs/ext4/xattr.h:162 [inline]
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5938 [inline]
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4fb/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2794 Comm: syz-executor543 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x177/0x211 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_circular_bug+0x146/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2002
 check_noncircular+0x2cc/0x390 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2123
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
 ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
 ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
 do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
 path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7f0cde4ea229
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd81d1c978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0030656c69662f30 RCX: 00007f0cde4ea229
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 00000000000a0a00 RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 2f30656c69662f2e R08: 0000000000208000 R09: 0000000000208000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd81d1c9c0
R13: 00007ffd81d1ca00 R14: 0000000000080000 R15: 0000000000000003
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea:2730: inode #13: comm syz-executor543: corrupted in-inode xattr

Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240801143827.19135-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 17, 2024
[ Upstream commit d1bc560 ]

Add nested locking with I_MUTEX_XATTR subclass to avoid lockdep warning
while handling xattr inode on file open syscall at ext4_xattr_inode_iget.

Backtrace
EXT4-fs (loop0): Ignoring removed oldalloc option
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor543/2794 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
       down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
       ext4_update_i_disksize fs/ext4/ext4.h:3267 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_write fs/ext4/xattr.c:1390 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1538 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x331a/0x3d80 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1662
       ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x124/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2228
       ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xc27/0x14e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2385
       ext4_xattr_set+0x219/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498
       ext4_xattr_user_set+0xc9/0xf0 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40
       __vfs_setxattr+0x404/0x450 fs/xattr.c:177
       __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11d/0x4f0 fs/xattr.c:208
       __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1f9/0x210 fs/xattr.c:266
       vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x2c0 fs/xattr.c:283
       setxattr+0x1db/0x3e0 fs/xattr.c:548
       path_setxattr+0x15a/0x240 fs/xattr.c:567
       __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:582 [inline]
       __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:578 [inline]
       __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc5/0xe0 fs/xattr.c:578
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb

-> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
       __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
       lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
       down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
       inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
       ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
       ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
       ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
       __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
       ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
       __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
       ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
       notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
       do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
       handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
       do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
       path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
       do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
       do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
       __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
       __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
       __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
                               lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);
                               lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
  lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by syz-executor543/2794:
 #0: ffff888026fbc448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x4a/0x2a0 fs/namespace.c:365
 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x1cf/0x2c0 fs/open.c:62
 #2: ffff8880215e3310 (&ei->i_mmap_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xec4/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5519
 #3: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr fs/ext4/xattr.h:162 [inline]
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5938 [inline]
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4fb/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2794 Comm: syz-executor543 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x177/0x211 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_circular_bug+0x146/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2002
 check_noncircular+0x2cc/0x390 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2123
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
 ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
 ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
 do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
 path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7f0cde4ea229
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd81d1c978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0030656c69662f30 RCX: 00007f0cde4ea229
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 00000000000a0a00 RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 2f30656c69662f2e R08: 0000000000208000 R09: 0000000000208000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd81d1c9c0
R13: 00007ffd81d1ca00 R14: 0000000000080000 R15: 0000000000000003
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea:2730: inode #13: comm syz-executor543: corrupted in-inode xattr

Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240801143827.19135-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
6by9 pushed a commit to 6by9/linux that referenced this issue Nov 5, 2024
An issue was identified in the dcn21_link_encoder_create function where
an out-of-bounds access could occur when the hpd_source index was used
to reference the link_enc_hpd_regs array. This array has a fixed size
and the index was not being checked against the array's bounds before
accessing it.

This fix adds a conditional check to ensure that the hpd_source index is
within the valid range of the link_enc_hpd_regs array. If the index is
out of bounds, the function now returns NULL to prevent undefined
behavior.

References:

[   65.920507] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   65.920510] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/resource/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c:1312:29
[   65.920519] index 7 is out of range for type 'dcn10_link_enc_hpd_registers [5]'
[   65.920523] CPU: 3 PID: 1178 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           OE      6.8.0-cleanershaderfeatureresetasdntipmi200nv2132 raspberrypi#13
[   65.920525] Hardware name: AMD Majolica-RN/Majolica-RN, BIOS WMJ0429N_Weekly_20_04_2 04/29/2020
[   65.920527] Call Trace:
[   65.920529]  <TASK>
[   65.920532]  dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70
[   65.920541]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[   65.920543]  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xa2/0xe0
[   65.920549]  dcn21_link_encoder_create+0xd9/0x140 [amdgpu]
[   65.921009]  link_create+0x6d3/0xed0 [amdgpu]
[   65.921355]  create_links+0x18a/0x4e0 [amdgpu]
[   65.921679]  dc_create+0x360/0x720 [amdgpu]
[   65.921999]  ? dmi_matches+0xa0/0x220
[   65.922004]  amdgpu_dm_init+0x2b6/0x2c90 [amdgpu]
[   65.922342]  ? console_unlock+0x77/0x120
[   65.922348]  ? dev_printk_emit+0x86/0xb0
[   65.922354]  dm_hw_init+0x15/0x40 [amdgpu]
[   65.922686]  amdgpu_device_init+0x26a8/0x33a0 [amdgpu]
[   65.922921]  amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1b/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b7/0x630 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0
[   65.923087]  pci_device_probe+0xc8/0x280
[   65.923087]  really_probe+0x187/0x300
[   65.923087]  __driver_probe_device+0x85/0x130
[   65.923087]  driver_probe_device+0x24/0x110
[   65.923087]  __driver_attach+0xac/0x1d0
[   65.923087]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[   65.923087]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xd0
[   65.923087]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[   65.923087]  bus_add_driver+0xf2/0x200
[   65.923087]  driver_register+0x64/0x130
[   65.923087]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_init+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  __pci_register_driver+0x61/0x70
[   65.923087]  amdgpu_init+0x7d/0xff0 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  do_one_initcall+0x49/0x310
[   65.923087]  ? kmalloc_trace+0x136/0x360
[   65.923087]  do_init_module+0x6a/0x270
[   65.923087]  load_module+0x1fce/0x23a0
[   65.923087]  init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0
[   65.923087]  ? init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0
[   65.923087]  idempotent_init_module+0x179/0x230
[   65.923087]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5d/0xa0
[   65.923087]  do_syscall_64+0x76/0x120
[   65.923087]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[   65.923087] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d80f1e88d
[   65.923087] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[   65.923087] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7bc1aa78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[   65.923087] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564c9c1db130 RCX: 00007f2d80f1e88d
[   65.923087] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000564c9c1e5480 RDI: 000000000000000f
[   65.923087] RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
[   65.923087] R10: 000000000000000f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000564c9c1e5480
[   65.923087] R13: 0000564c9c1db260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000564c9c1e54b0
[   65.923087]  </TASK>
[   65.923927] ---[ end trace ]---

Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung@amd.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com>
Cc: Roman Li <roman.li@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com>
Cc: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com>
Cc: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamza.mahfooz@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Li <roman.li@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 16, 2024
[ Upstream commit 63de35a ]

An issue was identified in the dcn21_link_encoder_create function where
an out-of-bounds access could occur when the hpd_source index was used
to reference the link_enc_hpd_regs array. This array has a fixed size
and the index was not being checked against the array's bounds before
accessing it.

This fix adds a conditional check to ensure that the hpd_source index is
within the valid range of the link_enc_hpd_regs array. If the index is
out of bounds, the function now returns NULL to prevent undefined
behavior.

References:

[   65.920507] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   65.920510] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/resource/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c:1312:29
[   65.920519] index 7 is out of range for type 'dcn10_link_enc_hpd_registers [5]'
[   65.920523] CPU: 3 PID: 1178 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           OE      6.8.0-cleanershaderfeatureresetasdntipmi200nv2132 #13
[   65.920525] Hardware name: AMD Majolica-RN/Majolica-RN, BIOS WMJ0429N_Weekly_20_04_2 04/29/2020
[   65.920527] Call Trace:
[   65.920529]  <TASK>
[   65.920532]  dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70
[   65.920541]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[   65.920543]  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xa2/0xe0
[   65.920549]  dcn21_link_encoder_create+0xd9/0x140 [amdgpu]
[   65.921009]  link_create+0x6d3/0xed0 [amdgpu]
[   65.921355]  create_links+0x18a/0x4e0 [amdgpu]
[   65.921679]  dc_create+0x360/0x720 [amdgpu]
[   65.921999]  ? dmi_matches+0xa0/0x220
[   65.922004]  amdgpu_dm_init+0x2b6/0x2c90 [amdgpu]
[   65.922342]  ? console_unlock+0x77/0x120
[   65.922348]  ? dev_printk_emit+0x86/0xb0
[   65.922354]  dm_hw_init+0x15/0x40 [amdgpu]
[   65.922686]  amdgpu_device_init+0x26a8/0x33a0 [amdgpu]
[   65.922921]  amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1b/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b7/0x630 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0
[   65.923087]  pci_device_probe+0xc8/0x280
[   65.923087]  really_probe+0x187/0x300
[   65.923087]  __driver_probe_device+0x85/0x130
[   65.923087]  driver_probe_device+0x24/0x110
[   65.923087]  __driver_attach+0xac/0x1d0
[   65.923087]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[   65.923087]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xd0
[   65.923087]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[   65.923087]  bus_add_driver+0xf2/0x200
[   65.923087]  driver_register+0x64/0x130
[   65.923087]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_init+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  __pci_register_driver+0x61/0x70
[   65.923087]  amdgpu_init+0x7d/0xff0 [amdgpu]
[   65.923087]  do_one_initcall+0x49/0x310
[   65.923087]  ? kmalloc_trace+0x136/0x360
[   65.923087]  do_init_module+0x6a/0x270
[   65.923087]  load_module+0x1fce/0x23a0
[   65.923087]  init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0
[   65.923087]  ? init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0
[   65.923087]  idempotent_init_module+0x179/0x230
[   65.923087]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5d/0xa0
[   65.923087]  do_syscall_64+0x76/0x120
[   65.923087]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[   65.923087] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d80f1e88d
[   65.923087] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[   65.923087] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7bc1aa78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[   65.923087] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564c9c1db130 RCX: 00007f2d80f1e88d
[   65.923087] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000564c9c1e5480 RDI: 000000000000000f
[   65.923087] RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
[   65.923087] R10: 000000000000000f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000564c9c1e5480
[   65.923087] R13: 0000564c9c1db260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000564c9c1e54b0
[   65.923087]  </TASK>
[   65.923927] ---[ end trace ]---

Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung@amd.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com>
Cc: Roman Li <roman.li@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com>
Cc: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com>
Cc: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamza.mahfooz@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Li <roman.li@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

No branches or pull requests

2 participants