Signed Certificate Timestamp verification #326
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| // TODO(tnytown): Migrate to const-oid's CT_PRECERT_SCTS when a new release is cut. | ||
| const CT_PRECERT_SCTS: ObjectIdentifier = ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2"); | ||
| const PRECERTIFICATE_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE: ObjectIdentifier = | ||
| ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4"); |
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const-oid 0.10 should include these OIDs, but isn't released yet
| }; | ||
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| match (algo, params) { | ||
| // TODO(tnytown): should we also accept ed25519, p384, ... ? |
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I only saw p256 SCTs while testing this changeset against the public-good prod and staging, do we need to support other key types?
tnytown
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This is ready for review, but we should get #311 in first. |
tnytown
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@tnytown is this one ready to be reviewed? |
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| ), | ||
| fingerprint: { | ||
| let mut hasher = sha2::Sha256::new(); | ||
| spki.encode(&mut hasher).expect("failed to hash key!"); |
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This expect should be safe: the only error that encode should return in this context is IO-related (and hasher shouldn't ever refuse a write.)
| tbs_precert | ||
| .encode_to_vec(&mut tbs_precert_der) | ||
| .expect("failed to re-encode Precertificate!"); |
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This encode_to_vec shouldn't be fallible: all we've done to the tbsCertificate is removed an extension, and it previously decoded correctly.
Yes, thanks for the ping @flavio! |
Co-authored-by: Alex Cameron <alex.cameron@trailofbits.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Pan <andrew.pan@trailofbits.com>
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@flavio gentle ping on this PR :) |
Co-authored-by: Flavio Castelli <flavio@castelli.me> Signed-off-by: Andrew Pan <3821575+tnytown@users.noreply.github.com>
@flavio I applied the changes, thanks! Let me know if there's anything else you need. |
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I think it’s all good. Can you file some issues to keep track of the few TODOs that are left? |
Blocked on #311.Summary
Adds Signed Certificate Timestamp verification and hooks it up to the bundle signing flow. SCT verification ensures that the signing certificate in a given operation has been submitted to the Certificate Transparency log, which aids in the detection of malicious certificates and keeps Certificate Authorities like Fulcio honest.
Release Note
Documentation
No user-facing documentation needed, we automatically perform SCT validation when public
signandverifyAPIs are used.