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Only show Trusted Verified Build information #426
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…am authority or trusted signers
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mappedBySigner[entry.signer] = entry; | ||
}); | ||
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// Get the program authority's entry first, then the trusted signers |
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Would it make sense to get these already sorted from the API? Would make this easier to implement for other explorers
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I think it's fair to ask explorers to sort the results because each one is responsible for deciding what "verified" means to them.
app/utils/verified-builds.tsx
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...osecInfo, | ||
message, | ||
signer: osecInfo?.signer || '', | ||
verification_status: VerificationStatus.Verified, |
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Is this always VerificationStatus.Verified or could it also not be verified? I think this would need to come from the osecInfo?
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Great catch! Patched!
Verified Build information was susceptible to a "griefing" attack disclosed by security firm Accretion. The vulnerability stemmed from the fact that anyone could overwrite verified build information in the OSec API by providing a more recent verified build information. This allowed malicious actors to overwrite protocol's GitHub repo url in the OSec API.
This has now been patched by OtterSec. The fix requires that program developers write their verified build arguments on-chain using their program authority.
For previously verified programs, their verification information was uploaded by the OSec team. However, to update previously verified information, teams must deploy their verified build information onchain.
For teams using multisig program authorities, we've described a process to prepare this transaction using
solana-verify
v0.4.0
here: https://solana.com/developers/guides/advanced/verified-builds#how-to-verify-your-program-when-its-controlled-by-a-multisig-like-squads