This project argues there is a statistically significant (i.e. discernible from zero) interaction between judicial independence and terror threats on individual-level judicial confidence. I argue citizens in states living under high terror threats lose confidence in their judiciary even when it is honest and fair. Citizens see these institutions that otherwise legitimate democracy and enforce contracts as interference with executive-led counter-terrorism policies. Citizens in states without independent judiciaries gain confidence in these institutions by contrast. Systems in this case have co-opted legal processes provided by independent judiciaries into devices like military tribunals and other legal "black holes".
This is currently forthcoming at Political Research Quarterly. This repository contains the manuscript, appendix, and code for replication.
Independent judiciaries prevent democratic reversals, facilitate peaceful transitions of power, and legitimate democracy among citizens. We believe this judicial independence is important for citizen-level judicial confidence and faith in democratic institutions. I challenge this and argue that citizens living under terror threats lose confidence in their independent judiciaries. Terror threats lead citizens to enable the state leader to provide counter-terrorism for their security, which has important implications for inter-branch relations between the executive and the judiciary. Citizens lose confidence in independent judiciaries that provide due process for suspected terrorists. I test my argument with mixed effects models that incorporate the Global Terrorism Database and four waves of European Values Survey. The analyses demonstrate the negative effects of terror threats on judicial confidence when interacting terror threats with measures of judicial independence. My findings have important implications for the study of democratic confidence and the liberty-security dilemma.