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[retry] intro to logic #38
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I've gone as far as line 71. Will pick up asap. So far, reads great.
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### On the Use of the Term Science | ||
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The term `science` (German: _Wissenschaft_) is often used by Hegel throughout his writings and signifies a larger context than what is commonly understood by the use of the term. Typically, science is understood to entail inquiries strictly into the natural world or what can be proven empirically. Science thus is therefore knowledge of empirical reality. Hegel, along with Kant, Fichte and others of his contemporaries, expand the notion to include also what can be proven logically. While science, for Hegel, still concerns empirical knowledge, it is also knowledge of non-empirical items such as logic, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, religion and even knowledge itself. It is perhaps best to think of knowledge whenever Hegel speaks about science, insofar as knowledge is a provable conception (logically or empirically) of something that is neither exclusively objective or subjective. The class of knowledge that is particularly concerned with logic, metaphysics or knowledge as such is frequently connoted as pure knowledge or pure science; "pure" because it is knowledge about knowledge, or science about science, or the subject matter of logic is strictly not intermingled with anything other than logic itself. |
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"While science, for Hegel, still concerns empirical knowledge" - off hand, Hegel does tend to refer to science of empirical objects as natural science or empirical physics. So maybe he does draw a small distinction or at least is careful enough to use different terms. I'm thinking here of the remark of para 246 in the ENCY.
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This is a good point, but I think we'll have to add it in later since §246 is in enc nature section and I don't have that on hand right now.
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Still solid. Lots of good ideas put down.
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Here there are two elements which, although often intertwined, are subtly distinct: the negative and the dialectic. The dialectic has a rich lineage in the history of philosophy and Hegel draws some key comparisons between his usage and that of Plato and Kant. Before turning to that discussion, it is worthwhile to keep in mind how the negative and the dialectic are distinct. | ||
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While no detailed examination can take place of these terms here, some cursory remarks and images can be helpful. When speaking of Hegel's dialectic, consider the negative as a moment of something that activates its transformation into something other. What is makes this change particularly _dialectical_ is the fact that the change is purely internal. The thing in question simply changes on its own account, like a piston engine that is able generate its own pressure to create motion, or, perhaps more appropriately, a heart that generates the pulse necessary for the support system of the heart to in turn keep beating. Now, in absolutely strict terms, one might determine that what the thing first is and then becomes are essentially two different things, such that there is really no change, much less dialectic, since the thing is no longer the same thing should there be any new anything. So it is required inasmuch as something is understood dialectically that the thing in question minimally retains an identity in spite of difference. Moreover, in thinking of dialectic as change, this change entails many categories working together: constitutive moments, spontaneous or self-determined negative moment, integration of that negative moment into a whole. One can see how this idea quickly reveals a wealth of determinations. |
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"question minimally retains an identity in spite of difference." - I wonder if it would be helpful to include sublation at this point since it is not 100% clear why the identity should be retained given what you just said about there being 2 different things. Sublation would help to explain why we continue to think of them minimally identical.
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yeah, but i think sublation should be saved for its own article. this is already quite long. In the future we can drop a link here to "sublation" article once that's up.
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I'm done! Great first article for the intro. Opens a lot of areas of further discussion by touching on most of the main points. I've pointed out areas where I think further discussion could be beneficial.
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