[readme] update champions

also comment out polyfill section, since that is inappropriate prior to stage 3

README.md

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 # Array.isTemplateObject explainer (stage [2](https://tc39.es/process-document/))
 
 Authors: [@mikesamuel](https://github.com/mikesamuel), [@koto](https://github.com/koto)
-Champion: [@koto](https://github.com/koto)
+Champions: [@littledan](https://github.com/littledan), [@ljharb](https://github.com/ljharb)
 Reviewers: [@erights](https://github.com/erights), [@jridgewell](https://github.com/jridgewell)
 
-Provides a way for template tag functions to tell whether they were
-called with a template string bundle.
+Provides a way for template tag functions to tell whether they were called with a template string bundle.
 
 **Table of Contents**
 
@@ -23,18 +22,15 @@ called with a template string bundle.
 
 ### Distinguishing strings from a trusted developer from strings that may be attacker controlled
 
-Issue [WICG/trusted-types#96](https://github.com/WICG/trusted-types/issues/96)
-describes a scenario where a template tag assumes that the literal strings were
-authored by a trusted developer but that the interpolated values may not be.
+Issue [WICG/trusted-types#96](https://github.com/WICG/trusted-types/issues/96) describes a scenario where a template tag assumes that the literal strings were authored by a trusted developer but that the interpolated values may not be.
 
 ```js
 result = sensitiveOperation`trusted0 ${ untrusted } trusted1`
 // Authored by dev          ^^^^^^^^                ^^^^^^^^
 // May come from outside                ^^^^^^^^^
 ```
 
-This proposal would provide enough context to warn or error out when this
-is not the case.
+This proposal would provide enough context to warn or error out when this is not the case.
 
 ```js
 function (trustedStrings, ...untrustedArguments) {
@@ -60,17 +56,13 @@ let x = eval(attackerControlledString)
 console.log(Array.isTemplateObject(x));
 ```
 
-Many other security assumptions break if an attacker can execute arbitrary code,
-so this check is still useful.
+Many other security assumptions break if an attacker can execute arbitrary code, so this check is still useful.
 
 ## An Example
 
-Here's an example of how `isTemplateObject` lets a tag function wisely
-use a sensitive operation, namely *[Create a Trusted Type][]*.  The
-sensitive operation is not directly accessible to the tag function's
-callers since it's in a local scope.  This assumes that TT's [first-come-first-serve name restrictions][TT-block] solve
-provisioning, letting only authorized callers access the sensitive
-operation.
+Here's an example of how `isTemplateObject` lets a tag function wisely use a sensitive operation, namely *[Create a Trusted Type][]*.
+The sensitive operation is not directly accessible to the tag function's callers since it's in a local scope.
+This assumes that TT's [first-come-first-serve name restrictions][TT-block] solve provisioning, letting only authorized callers access the sensitive operation.
 
 ```js
 const { Array, TypeError } = globalThis;
@@ -147,37 +139,32 @@ console.log(`f(${ JSON.stringify(payload) }) = ${ f(payload) }`);
 ```
 
 The threat model here involves three actors:
-*  A team of *first-party developers* (in conjunction with security
-   specialists) decides to trust the tag function.
+*  A team of *first-party developers* (in conjunction with security specialists) decides to trust the tag function.
 *  A malicious *attacker* controls a string in the variable `payload`.
-*  Non-malicious but confusable third-party library tries to provide a
-   higher level of service by forging a template object.
-   It assumes its clients are comfortable with trusting
-   `dodgyMarkdownToHTMLConverter` to produce HTML for the current origin.
+*  Non-malicious but confusable third-party library tries to provide a higher level of service by forging a template object.
+   It assumes its clients are comfortable with trusting `dodgyMarkdownToHTMLConverter` to produce HTML for the current origin.
 
-We've addressed this threat model when the first-party developers can
-be less tolerant of risk than the most risk tolerant third party
-dependency w.r.t. HTML injection.
+We've addressed this threat model when the first-party developers can be less tolerant of risk than the most risk tolerant third party dependency w.r.t. HTML injection.
 
 This simple implementation doesn't deal with interpolations.
 A more thorough implementation could do [contextual autoescaping][].
 
 ## What this is not
 
 This is not an attempt to determine whether the current function was called as a template literal.
-See the linked issue as to why that is untenable.  Especially the discussion around threat models,
-`eval` and tail-call optimizations that weighed against alternate approaches.
+See the linked issue as to why that is untenable.  Especially the discussion around threat models, `eval`, and tail-call optimizations that weighed against alternate approaches.
 
 ## Possible Spec Language
 
-You can browse the [ecmarkup output](https://tc39.es/proposal-array-is-template-object/)
-or browse the [source](https://github.com/tc39/proposal-array-is-template-object/blob/master/spec.emu).
+You can browse the [ecmarkup output](https://tc39.es/proposal-array-is-template-object/) or browse the [source](https://github.com/tc39/proposal-array-is-template-object/blob/master/spec.emu).
 
+<!--
 ## Polyfill
 
 An es-shim API compatible polyfill available at [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/is-template-object.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/is-template-object).
 
 A polyfill is available in the [core-js](https://github.com/zloirock/core-js) library. You can find it in the [ECMAScript proposals section](https://github.com/zloirock/core-js#arrayistemplateobject).
+-->
 
 ## Tests
 
@@ -188,8 +175,7 @@ which would be added under
 
 ## Related Work
 
-If the [literals proposal](https://github.com/mikewest/tc39-proposal-literals) were to advance,
-this proposal would be unnecessary since they both cover the use cases from this document.
+If the [literals proposal](https://github.com/mikewest/tc39-proposal-literals) were to advance, this proposal would be unnecessary since they both cover the use cases from this document.
 
 [contextual autoescaping]: https://rawgit.com/mikesamuel/sanitized-jquery-templates/trunk/safetemplate.html
 [TT-block]: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-trusted-types/dist/spec/#abstract-opdef-should-trusted-type-policy-creation-be-blocked-by-content-security-policy