forked from torvalds/linux
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 30
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
CPU stepping not working #1
Comments
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 6, 2016
In commit 3d83811 ("iio: pressure: bmp280: add power management") For some reason the code in the runtime suspend/resume hooks got wrong (I suspect in the ambition to cut down boilerplate) and it seems it was tested without CONFIG_PM and crashes like so for me: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000c pgd = c0204000 [0000000c] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [tobetter#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.7.0-03348-g90dc3680458a-dirty torvalds#99 Hardware name: Generic DT based system Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work task: df3c6300 ti: dec8a000 task.ti: dec8a000 PC is at regulator_disable+0x0/0x6c LR is at bmp280_runtime_suspend+0x3c/0xa4 Dereferencing the BMP280 state container properly fixes the problem, sorry for screwing up. Fixes: 3d83811 ("iio: pressure: bmp280: add power management") Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 6, 2016
This patch leverages 'struct pci_host_bridge' from the PCI subsystem in order to free the pci_controller only after the last reference to its devices is dropped (avoiding an oops in pcibios_release_device() if the last reference is dropped after pcibios_free_controller()). The patch relies on pci_host_bridge.release_fn() (and .release_data), which is called automatically by the PCI subsystem when the root bus is released (i.e., the last reference is dropped). Those fields are set via pci_set_host_bridge_release() (e.g. in the platform-specific implementation of pcibios_root_bridge_prepare()). It introduces the 'pcibios_free_controller_deferred()' .release_fn() and it expects .release_data to hold a pointer to the pci_controller. The function implictly calls 'pcibios_free_controller()', so an user must *NOT* explicitly call it if using the new _deferred() callback. The functionality is enabled for pseries (although it isn't platform specific, and may be used by cxl). Details on not-so-elegant design choices: - Use 'pci_host_bridge.release_data' field as pointer to associated 'struct pci_controller' so *not* to 'pci_bus_to_host(bridge->bus)' in pcibios_free_controller_deferred(). That's because pci_remove_root_bus() sets 'host_bridge->bus = NULL' (so, if the last reference is released after pci_remove_root_bus() runs, which eventually reaches pcibios_free_controller_deferred(), that would hit a null pointer dereference). The cxl/vphb.c code calls pci_remove_root_bus(), and the cxl folks are interested in this fix. Test-case tobetter#1 (hold references) # ls -ld /sys/block/sd* | grep -m1 0021:01:00.0 <...> /sys/block/sdaa -> ../devices/pci0021:01/0021:01:00.0/<...> # ls -ld /sys/block/sd* | grep -m1 0021:01:00.1 <...> /sys/block/sdab -> ../devices/pci0021:01/0021:01:00.1/<...> # cat >/dev/sdaa & pid1=$! # cat >/dev/sdab & pid2=$! # drmgr -w 5 -d 1 -c phb -s 'PHB 33' -r Validating PHB DLPAR capability...yes. [ 594.306719] pci_hp_remove_devices: PCI: Removing devices on bus 0021:01 [ 594.306738] pci_hp_remove_devices: Removing 0021:01:00.0... ... [ 598.236381] pci_hp_remove_devices: Removing 0021:01:00.1... ... [ 611.972077] pci_bus 0021:01: busn_res: [bus 01-ff] is released [ 611.972140] rpadlpar_io: slot PHB 33 removed # kill -9 $pid1 # kill -9 $pid2 [ 632.918088] pcibios_free_controller_deferred: domain 33, dynamic 1 Test-case tobetter#2 (don't hold references) # drmgr -w 5 -d 1 -c phb -s 'PHB 33' -r Validating PHB DLPAR capability...yes. [ 916.357363] pci_hp_remove_devices: PCI: Removing devices on bus 0021:01 [ 916.357386] pci_hp_remove_devices: Removing 0021:01:00.0... ... [ 920.566527] pci_hp_remove_devices: Removing 0021:01:00.1... ... [ 933.955873] pci_bus 0021:01: busn_res: [bus 01-ff] is released [ 933.955977] pcibios_free_controller_deferred: domain 33, dynamic 1 [ 933.955999] rpadlpar_io: slot PHB 33 removed Suggested-By: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> # cxl Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 6, 2016
We observed a kernel oops when running a PPC guest with config NR_CPUS=4 and qemu option "-smp cores=1,threads=8": [ 30.634781] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xc00000014192eb17 [ 30.636173] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000003e5cc [ 30.637069] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [tobetter#1] [ 30.637877] SMP NR_CPUS=4 NUMA pSeries [ 30.638471] Modules linked in: [ 30.638949] CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: migration/3 Not tainted 4.7.0-07963-g9714b26 tobetter#1 [ 30.640059] task: c00000001e29c600 task.stack: c00000001e2a8000 [ 30.640956] NIP: c00000000003e5cc LR: c00000000003e550 CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 30.642001] REGS: c00000001e2ab8e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.7.0-07963-g9714b26) [ 30.643139] MSR: 8000000102803033 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[E]> CR: 22004084 XER: 00000000 [ 30.644583] CFAR: c000000000009e98 DAR: c00000014192eb17 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: c00000000140a6b8 c00000001e2abb60 c0000000016dd300 0000000000000003 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 c0000000016e5920 0000000000000008 GPR08: 0000000000000004 c00000014192eb17 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 GPR12: c00000000140a6c0 c00000000ffffc00 c0000000000d3ea8 c00000001e005680 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 c00000001e6b3a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 GPR24: c00000001ff85138 c00000001ff85130 000000001eb6f000 0000000000000001 GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000000017014e0 0000000000000000 0000000000000018 [ 30.653882] NIP [c00000000003e5cc] __cpu_disable+0xcc/0x190 [ 30.654713] LR [c00000000003e550] __cpu_disable+0x50/0x190 [ 30.655528] Call Trace: [ 30.655893] [c00000001e2abb60] [c00000000003e550] __cpu_disable+0x50/0x190 (unreliable) [ 30.657280] [c00000001e2abbb0] [c0000000000aca0c] take_cpu_down+0x5c/0x100 [ 30.658365] [c00000001e2abc10] [c000000000163918] multi_cpu_stop+0x1a8/0x1e0 [ 30.659617] [c00000001e2abc60] [c000000000163cc0] cpu_stopper_thread+0xf0/0x1d0 [ 30.660737] [c00000001e2abd20] [c0000000000d8d70] smpboot_thread_fn+0x290/0x2a0 [ 30.661879] [c00000001e2abd80] [c0000000000d3fa8] kthread+0x108/0x130 [ 30.662876] [c00000001e2abe30] [c000000000009968] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74 [ 30.664017] Instruction dump: [ 30.664477] 7bde1f24 38a00000 787f1f24 3b600001 39890008 7d204b78 7d05e214 7d0b07b4 [ 30.665642] 796b1f24 7d26582a 7d204a14 7d29f214 <7d4048a8> 7d4a3878 7d4049ad 40c2fff4 [ 30.666854] ---[ end trace 32643b7195717741 ]--- The reason of this is that in __cpu_disable(), when we try to set the cpu_sibling_mask or cpu_core_mask of the sibling CPUs of the disabled one, we don't check whether the current configuration employs those sibling CPUs(hw threads). And if a CPU is not employed by a configuration, the percpu structures cpu_{sibling,core}_mask are not allocated, therefore accessing those cpumasks will result in problems as above. This patch fixes this problem by adding an addition check on whether the id is no less than nr_cpu_ids in the sibling CPU iteration code. Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 6, 2016
of_mm_gpiochip_add_data() calls mm_gc->save_regs() before setting the data. Therefore ->save_regs() cannot use gpiochip_get_data() [ 0.275940] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000130 [ 0.283120] Faulting instruction address: 0xc01b44cc [ 0.288175] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [tobetter#1] [ 0.293343] PREEMPT CMPC885 [ 0.296141] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.7.0-g65124df-dirty torvalds#68 [ 0.304131] task: c6074000 ti: c6080000 task.ti: c6080000 [ 0.309459] NIP: c01b44cc LR: c0011720 CTR: c0011708 [ 0.314372] REGS: c6081d90 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.7.0-g65124df-dirty) [ 0.322267] MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24000028 XER: 20000000 [ 0.328813] DAR: 00000130 DSISR: c0000000 GPR00: c01b6d0c c6081e40 c6074000 c6017000 c9028000 c601d028 c6081dd8 00000000 GPR08: c601d028 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 24000044 00000000 c0002790 00000000 GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 c05643b0 00000083 GPR24: c04a1a6c c0560000 c04a8308 c04c6480 c0012498 c6017000 c7ffcc78 c6017000 [ 0.360806] NIP [c01b44cc] gpiochip_get_data+0x4/0xc [ 0.365684] LR [c0011720] cpm1_gpio16_save_regs+0x18/0x44 [ 0.370972] Call Trace: [ 0.373451] [c6081e50] [c01b6d0c] of_mm_gpiochip_add_data+0x70/0xdc [ 0.379624] [c6081e70] [c00124c0] cpm_init_par_io+0x28/0x118 [ 0.385238] [c6081e80] [c04a8ac0] do_one_initcall+0xb0/0x17c [ 0.390819] [c6081ef0] [c04a8cbc] kernel_init_freeable+0x130/0x1dc [ 0.396924] [c6081f30] [c00027a4] kernel_init+0x14/0x110 [ 0.402177] [c6081f40] [c000b424] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 [ 0.408233] Instruction dump: [ 0.411168] 4182fafc 3f80c040 48234c6d 3bc0fff0 3b9c5ed0 4bfffaf4 81290020 712a0004 [ 0.418825] 4182fb34 48234c51 4bfffb2c 81230004 <80690130> 4e800020 7c0802a6 9421ffe0 [ 0.426763] ---[ end trace fe4113ee21d72ffa ]--- fixes: e65078f ("powerpc: sysdev: cpm1: use gpiochip data pointer") fixes: a14a2d4 ("powerpc: cpm_common: use gpiochip data pointer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 6, 2016
Userspace can begin and suspend a transaction within the signal handler which means they might enter sys_rt_sigreturn() with the processor in suspended state. sys_rt_sigreturn() wants to restore process context (which may have been in a transaction before signal delivery). To do this it must restore TM SPRS. To achieve this, any transaction initiated within the signal frame must be discarded in order to be able to restore TM SPRs as TM SPRs can only be manipulated non-transactionally.. >From the PowerPC ISA: TM Bad Thing Exception [Category: Transactional Memory] An attempt is made to execute a mtspr targeting a TM register in other than Non-transactional state. Not doing so results in a TM Bad Thing: [12045.221359] Kernel BUG at c000000000050a40 [verbose debug info unavailable] [12045.221470] Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000050a40 (msr 0x201033) [12045.221540] Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [tobetter#1] [12045.221586] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV [12045.221634] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_tcpudp bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables kvm_hv kvm uio_pdrv_genirq ipmi_powernv uio powernv_rng ipmi_msghandler autofs4 ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas bnx2x ipr mdio libcrc32c [12045.222167] CPU: 68 PID: 6178 Comm: sigreturnpanic Not tainted 4.7.0 tobetter#34 [12045.222224] task: c0000000fce38600 ti: c0000000fceb4000 task.ti: c0000000fceb4000 [12045.222293] NIP: c000000000050a40 LR: c0000000000163bc CTR: 0000000000000000 [12045.222361] REGS: c0000000fceb7ac0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (4.7.0) [12045.222418] MSR: 9000000300201033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 28444280 XER: 20000000 [12045.222625] CFAR: c0000000000163b8 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 900000014280f033 GPR00: 01100000b8000001 c0000000fceb7d40 c00000000139c100 c0000000fce390d0 GPR04: 900000034280f033 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR08: 0000000000000000 b000000000001033 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000000002926400 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00003ffff98cadd0 00003ffff98cb470 0000000000000000 GPR28: 900000034280f033 c0000000fceb7ea0 0000000000000001 c0000000fce390d0 [12045.223535] NIP [c000000000050a40] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c [12045.223584] LR [c0000000000163bc] tm_recheckpoint+0x5c/0xa0 [12045.223630] Call Trace: [12045.223655] [c0000000fceb7d80] [c000000000026e74] sys_rt_sigreturn+0x494/0x6c0 [12045.223738] [c0000000fceb7e30] [c0000000000092e0] system_call+0x38/0x108 [12045.223806] Instruction dump: [12045.223841] 7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8 [12045.223955] 4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020 [12045.224074] ---[ end trace cb8002ee240bae76 ]--- It isn't clear exactly if there is really a use case for userspace returning with a suspended transaction, however, doing so doesn't (on its own) constitute a bad frame. As such, this patch simply discards the transactional state of the context calling the sigreturn and continues. Reported-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Tested-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Simon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 6, 2016
There are three usercopy warnings which are currently being silenced for gcc 4.6 and newer: 1) "copy_from_user() buffer size is too small" compile warning/error This is a static warning which happens when object size and copy size are both const, and copy size > object size. I didn't see any false positives for this one. So the function warning attribute seems to be working fine here. Note this scenario is always a bug and so I think it should be changed to *always* be an error, regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS. 2) "copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct" compile warning This is another static warning which happens when I enable __compiletime_object_size() for new compilers (and CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS). It happens when object size is const, but copy size is *not*. In this case there's no way to compare the two at build time, so it gives the warning. (Note the warning is a byproduct of the fact that gcc has no way of knowing whether the overflow function will be called, so the call isn't dead code and the warning attribute is activated.) So this warning seems to only indicate "this is an unusual pattern, maybe you should check it out" rather than "this is a bug". I get 102(!) of these warnings with allyesconfig and the __compiletime_object_size() gcc check removed. I don't know if there are any real bugs hiding in there, but from looking at a small sample, I didn't see any. According to Kees, it does sometimes find real bugs. But the false positive rate seems high. 3) "Buffer overflow detected" runtime warning This is a runtime warning where object size is const, and copy size > object size. All three warnings (both static and runtime) were completely disabled for gcc 4.6 with the following commit: 2fb0815 ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+") That commit mistakenly assumed that the false positives were caused by a gcc bug in __compiletime_object_size(). But in fact, __compiletime_object_size() seems to be working fine. The false positives were instead triggered by tobetter#2 above. (Though I don't have an explanation for why the warnings supposedly only started showing up in gcc 4.6.) So remove warning tobetter#2 to get rid of all the false positives, and re-enable warnings tobetter#1 and tobetter#3 by reverting the above commit. Furthermore, since tobetter#1 is a real bug which is detected at compile time, upgrade it to always be an error. Having done all that, CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
pxa_timer wants to be able to call clk_enable() etc on this clock, but our clk_enable() implementation expects non-NULL enable/disable operations. Provide these dummy implementations. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = c0204000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [tobetter#1] ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ torvalds#887 Hardware name: Intel-Assabet task: c0644590 task.stack: c0640000 PC is at 0x0 LR is at clk_enable+0x40/0x58 pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<c021b178>] psr: 600000d3 sp : c0641f60 ip : c0641f4c fp : c0641f74 r10: c1ffc7a0 r9 : 6901b118 r8 : 00000001 r7 : c0639a34 r6 : 0000001b r5 : a00000d3 r4 : c0645d70 r3 : c0645d78 r2 : 00000001 r1 : c0641ef0 r0 : c0645d70 Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: c020717f Table: c020717f DAC: 00000053 Process swapper (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xc0640188) Stack: (0xc0641f60 to 0xc0642000) 1f60: 00384000 c08762e4 c0641f98 c0641f78 c063308c c021b144 00000000 00000000 1f80: 00000000 c0660b20 ffffffff c0641fa8 c0641f9c c06220ec c0633058 c0641fb8 1fa0: c0641fac c061f114 c06220dc c0641ff4 c0641fbc c061bb68 c061f0fc ffffffff 1fc0: ffffffff 00000000 c061b6cc c0639a34 c0660cd4 c0642038 c0639a30 c0645434 1fe0: c0204000 c06380f8 00000000 c0641ff8 c0208048 c061b954 00000000 00000000 Backtrace: [<c021b138>] (clk_enable) from [<c063308c>] (pxa_timer_nodt_init+0x40/0x120) r5:c08762e4 r4:00384000 [<c063304c>] (pxa_timer_nodt_init) from [<c06220ec>] (sa1100_timer_init+0x1c/0x20) r6:ffffffff r5:c0660b20 r4:00000000 [<c06220d0>] (sa1100_timer_init) from [<c061f114>] (time_init+0x24/0x2c) [<c061f0f0>] (time_init) from [<c061bb68>] (start_kernel+0x220/0x42c) [<c061b948>] (start_kernel) from [<c0208048>] (0xc0208048) r10:c06380f8 r8:c0204000 r7:c0645434 r6:c0639a30 r5:c0642038 r4:c0660cd4 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! Fixes: ee3a402 ("ARM: 8250/1: sa1100: provide OSTIMER0 clock for pxa_timer") Acked-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
I got this: divide error: 0000 [tobetter#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ torvalds#189 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 task: ffff8801120a9580 task.stack: ffff8801120b0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0 RSP: 0018:ffff88011aa87da8 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000004f76 RBX: ffff880112655e88 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880112655ea0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88011aa87e00 R08: ffff88013fff905c R09: ffff88013fff9048 R10: ffff88013fff9050 R11: 00000001050a7b8c R12: ffff880114778a00 R13: ffff880114778ab4 R14: ffff880114778b30 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f071647c700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 0000000112021000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffff880114778ab8 ffff880112655ea0 0000000000004f76 ffff880112655ec8 ffff880112655e80 ffff880112655e88 ffff88011aa98fc0 00000000b97ccf2b dffffc0000000000 ffff88011aa98fc0 ffff88011aa87ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff813abce7>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x347/0xa00 [<ffffffff82c8bbc0>] ? snd_hrtimer_close+0x130/0x130 [<ffffffff813ab9a0>] ? retrigger_next_event+0x1b0/0x1b0 [<ffffffff813ae1a6>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x136/0x4b0 [<ffffffff813ae220>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x1b0/0x4b0 [<ffffffff8120f91e>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0xf0 [<ffffffff81227ad3>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x13/0xc0 [<ffffffff83c35086>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 [<ffffffff83c3416c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 <EOI> [<ffffffff83c3239c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x60 [<ffffffff82c8185d>] snd_timer_start1+0xdd/0x670 [<ffffffff82c87015>] snd_timer_continue+0x45/0x80 [<ffffffff82c88100>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x1030/0x2830 [<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90 [<ffffffff815aa4f8>] ? handle_mm_fault+0xbc8/0x27f0 [<ffffffff815a9930>] ? __pmd_alloc+0x370/0x370 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050 [<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200 [<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0 [<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190 [<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0 [<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 [<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050 [<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0 [<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: e8 fc 42 7b fe 8b 0d 06 8a 50 03 49 0f af cf 48 85 c9 0f 88 7c 01 00 00 48 89 4d a8 e8 e0 42 7b fe 48 8b 45 c0 48 8b 4d a8 48 99 <48> f7 f9 49 01 c7 e8 cb 42 7b fe 48 8b 55 d0 48 b8 00 00 00 00 RIP [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0 RSP <ffff88011aa87da8> ---[ end trace 6aa380f756a21074 ]--- The problem happens when you call ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE) on a completely new/unused timer -- it will have ->sticks == 0, which causes a divide by 0 in snd_hrtimer_callback(). Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
I hit this with syzkaller: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [tobetter#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ torvalds#190 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 task: ffff88011278d600 task.stack: ffff8801120c0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8ba07>] [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100 RSP: 0018:ffff8801120c7a60 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 1ffff10023483091 RDI: 0000000000000048 RBP: ffff8801120c7a78 R08: ffff88011a5cf768 R09: ffff88011a5ba790 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffed00234b9ef1 R12: ffff880114843980 R13: ffffffff84213c00 R14: ffff880114843ab0 R15: 0000000000000286 FS: 00007f72958f3700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 00000001126ab000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff880114843980 ffff880111eb2dc0 ffff880114843a34 ffff8801120c7ad0 ffffffff82c81ab1 0000000000000000 ffffffff842138e0 0000000100000000 ffff880111eb2dd0 ffff880111eb2dc0 0000000000000001 ffff880111eb2dc0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82c81ab1>] snd_timer_start1+0x331/0x670 [<ffffffff82c85bfd>] snd_timer_start+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff82c8795e>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x88e/0x2830 [<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90 [<ffffffff8132762f>] ? put_prev_entity+0x108f/0x21a0 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050 [<ffffffff813510af>] ? cpuacct_account_field+0x12f/0x1a0 [<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200 [<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0 [<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190 [<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0 [<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 [<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050 [<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0 [<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: c7 c7 c4 b9 c8 82 48 89 d9 4c 89 ee e8 63 88 7f fe e8 7e 46 7b fe 48 8d 7b 48 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 04 84 c0 7e 65 80 7b 48 00 74 0e e8 52 46 RIP [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100 RSP <ffff8801120c7a60> ---[ end trace 5955b08db7f2b029 ]--- This can happen if snd_hrtimer_open() fails to allocate memory and returns an error, which is currently not checked by snd_timer_open(): ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT) - snd_timer_user_tselect() - snd_timer_close() - snd_hrtimer_close() - (struct snd_timer *) t->private_data = NULL - snd_timer_open() - snd_hrtimer_open() - kzalloc() fails; t->private_data is still NULL ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START) - snd_timer_user_start() - snd_timer_start() - snd_timer_start1() - snd_hrtimer_start() - t->private_data == NULL // boom Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
If we hit the error path, we have never called drm_encoder_init() and so have nothing to cleanup. Doing so hits a null dereference: [ 10.066261] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000104 [ 10.066273] IP: [<c16054b4>] mutex_lock+0xa/0x15 [ 10.066287] *pde = 00000000 [ 10.066295] Oops: 0002 [tobetter#1] [ 10.066302] Modules linked in: i915(+) video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ppdev evdev snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus psmouse snd_pcm snd_timer snd pcspkr uhci_hcd ehci_pci soundcore sr_mod ehci_hcd serio_raw i2c_i801 usbcore i2c_smbus cdrom lpc_ich mfd_core rng_core e100 mii floppy parport_pc parport acpi_cpufreq button processor usb_common eeprom lm85 hwmon_vid autofs4 [ 10.066378] CPU: 0 PID: 132 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3-00013-gef0e1ea tobetter#34 [ 10.066389] Hardware name: MicroLink /D865GLC , BIOS BF86510A.86A.0077.P25.0508040031 08/04/2005 [ 10.066401] task: f62db800 task.stack: f5970000 [ 10.066409] EIP: 0060:[<c16054b4>] EFLAGS: 00010286 CPU: 0 [ 10.066417] EIP is at mutex_lock+0xa/0x15 [ 10.066424] EAX: 00000104 EBX: 00000104 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 80000000 [ 10.066432] ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000104 EBP: f5be8000 ESP: f5971b58 [ 10.066439] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 10.066446] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000104 CR3: 35945000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 10.066453] Stack: [ 10.066459] f503d740 f824dddf 00000000 f61170c0 f61170c0 f82371ae f850f40e 00000001 [ 10.066476] f61170c0 f5971bcc f5be8000 f9c2d401 00000001 f8236fcc 00000001 00000000 [ 10.066491] f5144014 f5be8104 00000008 f9c5267c 00000007 f61170c0 f5144400 f9c4ff00 [ 10.066507] Call Trace: [ 10.066526] [<f824dddf>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all+0x27/0xb3 [drm] [ 10.066545] [<f82371ae>] ? drm_encoder_cleanup+0x1a/0x132 [drm] [ 10.066559] [<f850f40e>] ? drm_atomic_helper_connector_reset+0x3f/0x5c [drm_kms_helper] [ 10.066644] [<f9c2d401>] ? intel_dvo_init+0x569/0x788 [i915] [ 10.066663] [<f8236fcc>] ? drm_encoder_init+0x43/0x20b [drm] [ 10.066734] [<f9bf1fce>] ? intel_modeset_init+0x1436/0x17dd [i915] [ 10.066791] [<f9b37636>] ? i915_driver_load+0x85a/0x15d3 [i915] [ 10.066846] [<f9b3603d>] ? i915_driver_open+0x5/0x5 [i915] [ 10.066857] [<c14af4d0>] ? firmware_map_add_entry.part.2+0xc/0xc [ 10.066868] [<c1343daf>] ? pci_device_probe+0x8e/0x11c [ 10.066878] [<c140cec8>] ? driver_probe_device+0x1db/0x62e [ 10.066888] [<c120c010>] ? kernfs_new_node+0x29/0x9c [ 10.066897] [<c13438e0>] ? pci_match_device+0xd9/0x161 [ 10.066905] [<c120c48b>] ? kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x42/0x88 [ 10.066914] [<c140d401>] ? __driver_attach+0xe6/0x11b [ 10.066924] [<c1303b13>] ? kobject_add_internal+0x1bb/0x44f [ 10.066933] [<c140d31b>] ? driver_probe_device+0x62e/0x62e [ 10.066941] [<c140a2d2>] ? bus_for_each_dev+0x46/0x7f [ 10.066950] [<c140c502>] ? driver_attach+0x1a/0x34 [ 10.066958] [<c140d31b>] ? driver_probe_device+0x62e/0x62e [ 10.066966] [<c140b758>] ? bus_add_driver+0x217/0x32a [ 10.066975] [<f8403000>] ? 0xf8403000 [ 10.066982] [<c140de27>] ? driver_register+0x5f/0x108 [ 10.066991] [<c1000493>] ? do_one_initcall+0x49/0x1f6 [ 10.067000] [<c1082299>] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x14b/0x2a3 [ 10.067008] [<c1603c8d>] ? __schedule+0x15c/0x4fe [ 10.067016] [<c1604104>] ? preempt_schedule_common+0x19/0x3c [ 10.067027] [<c11051de>] ? do_init_module+0x17/0x230 [ 10.067035] [<c1604139>] ? _cond_resched+0x12/0x1a [ 10.067044] [<c116f9aa>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x8f/0x11f [ 10.067052] [<c11051de>] ? do_init_module+0x17/0x230 [ 10.067060] [<c11703dd>] ? kfree+0x137/0x203 [ 10.067068] [<c110523d>] ? do_init_module+0x76/0x230 [ 10.067078] [<c10cadf3>] ? load_module+0x2a39/0x333f [ 10.067087] [<c10cb8b2>] ? SyS_finit_module+0x96/0xd5 [ 10.067096] [<c1132231>] ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0x79/0xa0 [ 10.067105] [<c1001e96>] ? do_fast_syscall_32+0xb5/0x1b0 [ 10.067114] [<c16086a6>] ? sysenter_past_esp+0x47/0x75 [ 10.067121] Code: c8 f7 76 c1 e8 8e cc d2 ff e9 45 fe ff ff 66 90 66 90 66 90 66 90 90 ff 00 7f 05 e8 4e 0c 00 00 c3 53 89 c3 e8 75 ec ff ff 89 d8 <ff> 08 79 05 e8 fa 0a 00 00 5b c3 53 89 c3 85 c0 74 1b 8b 03 83 [ 10.067180] EIP: [<c16054b4>] mutex_lock+0xa/0x15 SS:ESP 0068:f5971b58 [ 10.067190] CR2: 0000000000000104 [ 10.067222] ---[ end trace 049f1f09da45a856 ]--- Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Fixes: 580d8ed ("drm/i915: Give encoders useful names") Reviewed-by: David Weinehall <david.weinehall@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: drm-intel-fixes@lists.freedesktop.org Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20160823092558.14931-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk (cherry picked from commit 8f76aa0)
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
On handling amsdu on rx path, get the rx_status from htt context. Without this fix, we are seeing warnings when running DBDC traffic like this. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/mac80211/rx.c:4105 ieee80211_rx_napi+0x88/0x7d8 [mac80211]() [ 1715.878248] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.18.21 tobetter#1 [ 1715.878273] [<c001d3f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c001a4b0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 1715.878293] [<c001a4b0>] (show_stack) from [<c01bee64>] (dump_stack+0x70/0xbc) [ 1715.878315] [<c01bee64>] (dump_stack) from [<c002a61c>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) [ 1715.878339] [<c002a61c>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c002a6d0>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20) [ 1715.878395] [<c002a6d0>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<bf4caa98>] (ieee80211_rx_napi+0x88/0x7d8 [mac80211]) [ 1715.878474] [<bf4caa98>] (ieee80211_rx_napi [mac80211]) from [<bf568658>] (ath10k_htt_t2h_msg_handler+0xb48/0xbfc [ath10k_core]) [ 1715.878535] [<bf568658>] (ath10k_htt_t2h_msg_handler [ath10k_core]) from [<bf568708>] (ath10k_htt_t2h_msg_handler+0xbf8/0xbfc [ath10k_core]) [ 1715.878597] [<bf568708>] (ath10k_htt_t2h_msg_handler [ath10k_core]) from [<bf569160>] (ath10k_htt_txrx_compl_task+0xa54/0x1170 [ath10k_core]) [ 1715.878639] [<bf569160>] (ath10k_htt_txrx_compl_task [ath10k_core]) from [<c002db14>] (tasklet_action+0xb4/0x130) [ 1715.878659] [<c002db14>] (tasklet_action) from [<c002d110>] (__do_softirq+0xe0/0x210) [ 1715.878678] [<c002d110>] (__do_softirq) from [<c002d4b4>] (irq_exit+0x84/0xe0) [ 1715.878700] [<c002d4b4>] (irq_exit) from [<c005a544>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x98/0xd0) [ 1715.878722] [<c005a544>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c00085f4>] (gic_handle_irq+0x38/0x5c) [ 1715.878741] [<c00085f4>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0009680>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x74) [ 1715.878753] Exception stack(0xc05f9f50 to 0xc05f9f98) [ 1715.878767] 9f40: ffffffed 00000000 00399e1e c000a220 [ 1715.878786] 9f60: 00000000 c05f6780 c05f8000 00000000 c05f5db8 ffffffed c05f8000 c04d1980 [ 1715.878802] 9f80: 00000000 c05f9f98 c0018110 c0018114 60000013 ffffffff [ 1715.878822] [<c0009680>] (__irq_svc) from [<c0018114>] (arch_cpu_idle+0x2c/0x50) [ 1715.878844] [<c0018114>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c00530d4>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x108/0x234) [ 1715.878866] [<c00530d4>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c05c7be0>] (start_kernel+0x33c/0x3b8) [ 1715.878879] ---[ end trace 6d5e1cc0fef8ed6a ]--- [ 1715.878899] ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fixes: 1823566 ("ath10k: cleanup amsdu processing for rx indication") Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj Nagarajan <arnagara@qti.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
The warning was seen on AR5416 chip, which invoke ath9k_hw_gio_get() before the GPIO initialized correctly. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1159 at ~/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hw.c:2776 ath9k_hw_gpio_get+0x148/0x1a0 [ath9k_hw] ... CPU: 1 PID: 1159 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7-aptosid-amd64 tobetter#1 aptosid 4.7~rc7-1~git92.slh.3 Hardware name: /DH67CL, BIOS BLH6710H.86A.0160.2012.1204.1156 12/04/2012 0000000000000286 00000000f912d633 ffffffff81290fd3 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff81063fd4 ffff88040c6dc018 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000100 ffff88040c6dc018 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81290fd3>] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x79 [<ffffffff81063fd4>] ? __warn+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffffa0668fb8>] ? ath9k_hw_gpio_get+0x148/0x1a0 [ath9k_hw] Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan <miaoqing@codeaurora.org> Reported-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
According to the CI test machines, SNB also uses the GEN7_PCODE_MIN_FREQ_TABLE_GT_RATIO_OUT_OF_RANGE value to report a bad GEN6_PCODE_MIN_FREQ_TABLE request. [ 157.744641] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 9238 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:7760 sandybridge_pcode_write+0x141/0x200 [i915] [ 157.744642] Missing switch case (16) in gen6_check_mailbox_status [ 157.744642] Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel i915 ax88179_178a usbnet mii x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core mei_me lpc_ich snd_pcm mei broadcom bcm_phy_lib tg3 ptp pps_core [last unloaded: vgem] [ 157.744658] CPU: 5 PID: 9238 Comm: drv_hangman Tainted: G U W 4.8.0-rc3-CI-CI_DRM_1589+ tobetter#1 [ 157.744658] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 8300 /0Y2MRG, BIOS A06 10/17/2011 [ 157.744659] 0000000000000000 ffff88011f093a98 ffffffff81426415 ffff88011f093ae8 [ 157.744662] 0000000000000000 ffff88011f093ad8 ffffffff8107d2a6 00001e50810d3c9f [ 157.744663] ffff880128680000 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 ffff88012868a650 [ 157.744665] Call Trace: [ 157.744669] [<ffffffff81426415>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92 [ 157.744672] [<ffffffff8107d2a6>] __warn+0xc6/0xe0 [ 157.744673] [<ffffffff8107d30a>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4a/0x50 [ 157.744685] [<ffffffffa0029831>] sandybridge_pcode_write+0x141/0x200 [i915] [ 157.744697] [<ffffffffa002a88a>] intel_enable_gt_powersave+0x64a/0x1330 [i915] [ 157.744712] [<ffffffffa006b4cb>] ? i9xx_emit_request+0x1b/0x80 [i915] [ 157.744725] [<ffffffffa0055ed3>] __i915_add_request+0x1e3/0x370 [i915] [ 157.744738] [<ffffffffa00428bd>] i915_gem_do_execbuffer.isra.16+0xced/0x1b80 [i915] [ 157.744740] [<ffffffff811a232e>] ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 [ 157.744752] [<ffffffffa0043b72>] i915_gem_execbuffer2+0xc2/0x2a0 [i915] [ 157.744753] [<ffffffff815485b7>] drm_ioctl+0x207/0x4c0 [ 157.744765] [<ffffffffa0043ab0>] ? i915_gem_execbuffer+0x360/0x360 [i915] [ 157.744767] [<ffffffff810ea4ad>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x1d/0x20 [ 157.744769] [<ffffffff811fe09e>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x8e/0x680 [ 157.744770] [<ffffffff811a2377>] ? __might_fault+0x87/0x90 [ 157.744771] [<ffffffff811a232e>] ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 [ 157.744773] [<ffffffff810d3df2>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x122/0x1b0 [ 157.744774] [<ffffffff811fe6cc>] SyS_ioctl+0x3c/0x70 [ 157.744776] [<ffffffff8180fe69>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1c/0xac Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97491 Fixes: 8766050 ("drm/i915/gen6+: Interpret mailbox error flags") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Lyude <cpaul@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20160826105926.3413-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Acked-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 7850d1c) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
When a user timer instance is continued without the explicit start beforehand, the system gets eventually zero-division error like: divide error: 0000 [tobetter#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 27320 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3-next-20160825+ tobetter#8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003c9b2280 task.stack: ffff880027280000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [< inline >] ktime_divns include/linux/ktime.h:195 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [<ffffffff858e1a6c>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1bc/0x3c0 sound/core/hrtimer.c:62 Call Trace: <IRQ> [< inline >] __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1238 [<ffffffff81504335>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x325/0xe70 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1302 [<ffffffff81506ceb>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x18b/0x420 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1336 [<ffffffff8126d8df>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:933 [<ffffffff86e13056>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:957 [<ffffffff86e1210c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:487 <EOI> ..... Although a similar issue was spotted and a fix patch was merged in commit [6b760bb: ALSA: timer: fix division by zero after SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE], it seems covering only a part of iceberg. In this patch, we fix the issue a bit more drastically. Basically the continue of an uninitialized timer is supposed to be a fresh start, so we do it for user timers. For the direct snd_timer_continue() call, there is no way to pass the initial tick value, so we kick out for the uninitialized case. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
When a seq-virmidi driver is initialized, it registers a rawmidi instance with its callback to create an associated seq kernel client. Currently it's done throughly in rawmidi's register_mutex context. Recently it was found that this may lead to a deadlock another rawmidi device that is being attached with the sequencer is accessed, as both open with the same register_mutex. This was actually triggered by syzkaller, as Dmitry Vyukov reported: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.8.0-rc1+ tobetter#11 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor/7154 is trying to acquire lock: (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 but task is already holding lock: (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff850138bb>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x5b/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:495 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> tobetter#1 (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}: [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [<ffffffff863f6199>] down_read+0x49/0xc0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:22 [< inline >] deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:681 [<ffffffff85005c5e>] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x35e/0x890 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:822 [<ffffffff85006e96>] > snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0x126/0x170 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2418 [<ffffffff85012c52>] snd_seq_system_broadcast+0xb2/0xf0 sound/core/seq/seq_system.c:101 [<ffffffff84fff70a>] snd_seq_create_kernel_client+0x24a/0x330 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2297 [< inline >] snd_virmidi_dev_attach_seq sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:383 [<ffffffff8502d29f>] snd_virmidi_dev_register+0x29f/0x750 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:450 [<ffffffff84fd208c>] snd_rawmidi_dev_register+0x30c/0xd40 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1645 [<ffffffff84f816d3>] __snd_device_register.part.0+0x63/0xc0 sound/core/device.c:164 [< inline >] __snd_device_register sound/core/device.c:162 [<ffffffff84f8235d>] snd_device_register_all+0xad/0x110 sound/core/device.c:212 [<ffffffff84f7546f>] snd_card_register+0xef/0x6c0 sound/core/init.c:749 [<ffffffff85040b7f>] snd_virmidi_probe+0x3ef/0x590 sound/drivers/virmidi.c:123 [<ffffffff833ebf7b>] platform_drv_probe+0x8b/0x170 drivers/base/platform.c:564 ...... -> #0 (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}: [< inline >] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1829 [< inline >] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1939 [< inline >] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2266 [<ffffffff814791f4>] __lock_acquire+0x4d44/0x4d80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3335 [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [< inline >] __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:521 [<ffffffff863f0ef1>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb1/0xa20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:621 [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 [<ffffffff8502e7c7>] midisynth_subscribe+0xf7/0x350 sound/core/seq/seq_midi.c:188 [< inline >] subscribe_port sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:427 [<ffffffff85013cc7>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x467/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:510 [<ffffffff85015da9>] snd_seq_port_connect+0x2c9/0x500 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:579 [<ffffffff850079b8>] snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port+0x1d8/0x2b0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:1480 [<ffffffff84ffe9e4>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x184/0x1e0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2225 [<ffffffff84ffeae8>] snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl+0xa8/0x110 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2440 [<ffffffff85027664>] snd_seq_oss_midi_open+0x3b4/0x610 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:375 [<ffffffff85023d67>] snd_seq_oss_synth_setup_midi+0x107/0x4c0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:281 [<ffffffff8501b0a8>] snd_seq_oss_open+0x748/0x8d0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c:274 [<ffffffff85019d8a>] odev_open+0x6a/0x90 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c:138 [<ffffffff84f7040f>] soundcore_open+0x30f/0x640 sound/sound_core.c:639 ...... other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The fix is to simply move the registration parts in snd_rawmidi_dev_register() to the outside of the register_mutex lock. The lock is needed only to manage the linked list, and it's not necessarily to cover the whole initialization process. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
The resent conversion of the cpu hotplug support in the uncore driver introduced a regression due to the way the callbacks are invoked at initialization time. The old code called the prepare/starting/online function on each online cpu as a block. The new code registers the hotplug callbacks in the core for each state. The core invokes the callbacks at each registration on all online cpus. The code implicitely relied on the prepare/starting/online callbacks being called as combo on a particular cpu, which was not obvious and completely undocumented. The resulting subtle wreckage happens due to the way how the uncore code manages shared data structures for cpus which share an uncore resource in hardware. The sharing is determined in the cpu starting callback, but the prepare callback allocates per cpu data for the upcoming cpu because potential sharing is unknown at this point. If the starting callback finds a online cpu which shares the hardware resource it takes a refcount on the percpu data of that cpu and puts the own data structure into a 'free_at_online' pointer of that shared data structure. The online callback frees that. With the old model this worked because in a starting callback only one non unused structure (the one of the starting cpu) was available. The new code allocates the data structures for all cpus when the prepare callback is registered. Now the starting function iterates through all online cpus and looks for a data structure (skipping its own) which has a matching hardware id. The id member of the data structure is initialized to 0, but the hardware id can be 0 as well. The resulting wreckage is: CPU0 finds a matching id on CPU1, takes a refcount on CPU1 data and puts its own data structure into CPU1s data structure to be freed. CPU1 skips CPU0 because the data structure is its allegedly unsued own. It finds a matching id on CPU2, takes a refcount on CPU1 data and puts its own data structure into CPU2s data structure to be freed. .... Now the online callbacks are invoked. CPU0 has a pointer to CPU1s data and frees the original CPU0 data. So far so good. CPU1 has a pointer to CPU2s data and frees the original CPU1 data, which is still referenced by CPU0 ---> Booom So there are two issues to be solved here: 1) The id field must be initialized at allocation time to a value which cannot be a valid hardware id, i.e. -1 This prevents the above scenario, but now CPU1 and CPU2 both stick their own data structure into the free_at_online pointer of CPU0. So we leak CPU1s data structure. 2) Fix the memory leak described in tobetter#1 Instead of having a single pointer, use a hlist to enqueue the superflous data structures which are then freed by the first cpu invoking the online callback. Ideally we should know the sharing _before_ invoking the prepare callback, but that's way beyond the scope of this bug fix. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Fixes: 96b2bd3 ("perf/x86/amd/uncore: Convert to hotplug state machine") Reported-and-tested-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160909160822.lowgmkdwms2dheyv@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
On lubbock board, the probe of the driver crashes by dereferencing very early a platform_data structure which is not set, in pxa2xx_configure_sockets(). The stack fixed is : [ 0.244353] SA1111 Microprocessor Companion Chip: silicon revision 1, metal revision 1 [ 0.256321] sa1111 sa1111: Providing IRQ336-390 [ 0.340899] clocksource: Switched to clocksource oscr0 [ 0.472263] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004 [ 0.480469] pgd = c0004000 [ 0.483432] [00000004] *pgd=00000000 [ 0.487105] Internal error: Oops: f5 [tobetter#1] ARM [ 0.491497] Modules linked in: [ 0.494650] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3-00080-g1aaa68426f0c-dirty #2068 [ 0.503229] Hardware name: Intel DBPXA250 Development Platform (aka Lubbock) [ 0.510344] task: c3e42000 task.stack: c3e44000 [ 0.514984] PC is at pxa2xx_configure_sockets+0x4/0x24 (drivers/pcmcia/pxa2xx_base.c:227) [ 0.520193] LR is at pcmcia_lubbock_init+0x1c/0x38 [ 0.525079] pc : [<c0247c30>] lr : [<c02479b0>] psr: a0000053 [ 0.525079] sp : c3e45e70 ip : 100019ff fp : 00000000 [ 0.536651] r10: c0828900 r9 : c0434838 r8 : 00000000 [ 0.541953] r7 : c0820700 r6 : c0857b30 r5 : c3ec1400 r4 : c0820758 [ 0.548549] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 0000000c r1 : c3c09c40 r0 : c3ec1400 [ 0.555154] Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 0.562450] Control: 0000397f Table: a0004000 DAC: 00000053 [ 0.568257] Process swapper (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xc3e44190) [ 0.574154] Stack: (0xc3e45e70 to 0xc3e46000) [ 0.578610] 5e60: c4849800 00000000 c3ec1400 c024769c [ 0.586928] 5e80: 00000000 c3ec140c c3c0ee0c c3ec1400 c3ec1434 c020c410 c3ec1400 c3ec1434 [ 0.595244] 5ea0: c0820700 c080b408 c0828900 c020c5f8 00000000 c0820700 c020c578 c020ac5c [ 0.603560] 5ec0: c3e687cc c3e71e10 c0820700 00000000 c3c02de0 c020bae4 c03c62f7 c03c62f7 [ 0.611872] 5ee0: c3e68780 c0820700 c042e034 00000000 c043c440 c020cdec c080b408 00000005 [ 0.620188] 5f00: c042e034 c00096c0 c0034440 c01c730c 20000053 ffffffff 00000000 00000000 [ 0.628502] 5f20: 00000000 c3ffcb87 c3ffcb90 c00346ac c3e66ba0 c03f7914 00000092 00000005 [ 0.636811] 5f40: 00000005 c03f847c 00000091 c03f847c 00000000 00000005 c0434828 00000005 [ 0.645125] 5f60: c043482c 00000092 c043c440 c0828900 c0434838 c0418d2c 00000005 00000005 [ 0.653430] 5f80: 00000000 c041858c 00000000 c032e9f0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.661729] 5fa0: 00000000 c032e9f8 00000000 c000f0f0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.670020] 5fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.678311] 5fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.686673] (pxa2xx_configure_sockets) from pcmcia_lubbock_init (/drivers/pcmcia/sa1111_lubbock.c:161) [ 0.696026] (pcmcia_lubbock_init) from pcmcia_probe (/drivers/pcmcia/sa1111_generic.c:213) [ 0.704358] (pcmcia_probe) from driver_probe_device (/drivers/base/dd.c:378 /drivers/base/dd.c:499) [ 0.712848] (driver_probe_device) from __driver_attach (/./include/linux/device.h:983 /drivers/base/dd.c:733) [ 0.721414] (__driver_attach) from bus_for_each_dev (/drivers/base/bus.c:313) [ 0.729723] (bus_for_each_dev) from bus_add_driver (/drivers/base/bus.c:708) [ 0.738036] (bus_add_driver) from driver_register (/drivers/base/driver.c:169) [ 0.746185] (driver_register) from do_one_initcall (/init/main.c:778) [ 0.754561] (do_one_initcall) from kernel_init_freeable (/init/main.c:843 /init/main.c:851 /init/main.c:869 /init/main.c:1016) [ 0.763409] (kernel_init_freeable) from kernel_init (/init/main.c:944) [ 0.771660] (kernel_init) from ret_from_fork (/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S:119) [ 0.779347] Code: c03c6305 c03c631e c03c632e e5903048 (e993000c) All code ======== 0: c03c6305 eorsgt r6, ip, r5, lsl tobetter#6 4: c03c631e eorsgt r6, ip, lr, lsl r3 8: c03c632e eorsgt r6, ip, lr, lsr tobetter#6 c: e5903048 ldr r3, [r0, torvalds#72] ; 0x48 10:* e993000c ldmib r3, {r2, r3} <-- trapping instruction Signed-off-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
rsc_lookup steals the passed-in memory to avoid doing an allocation of its own, so we can't just pass in a pointer to memory that someone else is using. If we really want to avoid allocation there then maybe we should preallocate somwhere, or reference count these handles. For now we should revert. On occasion I see this on my server: kernel: kernel BUG at /home/cel/src/linux/linux-2.6/mm/slub.c:3851! kernel: invalid opcode: 0000 [tobetter#1] SMP kernel: Modules linked in: cts rpcsec_gss_krb5 sb_edac edac_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd btrfs xor iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support raid6_pq pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_smbus lpc_ich mfd_core mei_me sg mei shpchp wmi ioatdma ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad acpi_power_meter rpcrdma ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm nfsd nfs_acl lockd grace auth_rpcgss sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c mlx4_ib mlx4_en ib_core sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ast drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm crc32c_intel igb mlx4_core ahci libahci libata ptp pps_core dca i2c_algo_bit i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod kernel: CPU: 7 PID: 145 Comm: kworker/7:2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc4-00006-g9d06b0b tobetter#15 kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 1.0c 09/09/2015 kernel: Workqueue: events do_cache_clean [sunrpc] kernel: task: ffff8808541d8000 task.stack: ffff880854344000 kernel: RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811e7075>] [<ffffffff811e7075>] kfree+0x155/0x180 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff880854347d70 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: RAX: ffffea0020fe7660 RBX: ffff88083f9db064 RCX: 146ff0f9d5ec5600 kernel: RDX: 000077ff80000000 RSI: ffff880853f01500 RDI: ffff88083f9db064 kernel: RBP: ffff880854347d88 R08: ffff8808594ee000 R09: ffff88087fdd8780 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffea0020fe76c0 R12: ffff880853f01500 kernel: R13: ffffffffa013cf76 R14: ffffffffa013cff0 R15: ffffffffa04253a0 kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88087fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel: CR2: 00007fed60b020c3 CR3: 0000000001c06000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 kernel: Stack: kernel: ffff8808589f2f00 ffff880853f01500 0000000000000001 ffff880854347da0 kernel: ffffffffa013cf76 ffff8808589f2f00 ffff880854347db8 ffffffffa013d006 kernel: ffff8808589f2f20 ffff880854347e00 ffffffffa0406f60 0000000057c7044f kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffffa013cf76>] rsc_free+0x16/0x90 [auth_rpcgss] kernel: [<ffffffffa013d006>] rsc_put+0x16/0x30 [auth_rpcgss] kernel: [<ffffffffa0406f60>] cache_clean+0x2e0/0x300 [sunrpc] kernel: [<ffffffffa04073ee>] do_cache_clean+0xe/0x70 [sunrpc] kernel: [<ffffffff8109a70f>] process_one_work+0x1ff/0x3b0 kernel: [<ffffffff8109b15c>] worker_thread+0x2bc/0x4a0 kernel: [<ffffffff8109aea0>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3a0/0x3a0 kernel: [<ffffffff810a0ba4>] kthread+0xe4/0xf0 kernel: [<ffffffff8169c47f>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 kernel: [<ffffffff810a0ac0>] ? kthread_stop+0x110/0x110 kernel: Code: f7 ff ff eb 3b 65 8b 05 da 30 e2 7e 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 a0 38 b8 00 0f 92 c0 84 c0 0f 85 d1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 e9 f5 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 03 31 f6 f6 c4 40 0f 85 62 ff ff ff e9 61 ff ff ff kernel: RIP [<ffffffff811e7075>] kfree+0x155/0x180 kernel: RSP <ffff880854347d70> kernel: ---[ end trace 3fdec044969def26 ]--- It seems to be most common after a server reboot where a client has been using a Kerberos mount, and reconnects to continue its workload. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
af_iucv socket programs with HiperSockets as transport make use of the qdio completion queue. Running such an af_iucv socket program may result in a crash: [90341.677709] Oops: 0038 ilc:2 [tobetter#1] SMP [90341.677743] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.6.0-20160720.0.0e86ec7.5e62689.fc23.s390xperformance tobetter#1 [90341.677744] Hardware name: IBM 2964 N96 703 (LPAR) [90341.677746] task: 00000000edb79f00 ti: 00000000edb84000 task.ti: 00000000edb84000 [90341.677748] Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000075bc50 (qeth_qdio_input_handler+0x258/0x4e0) [90341.677756] R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000003d10391e900 0000000000000001 00000000e61e6000 0000000000000005 [90341.677759] 0000000000a9e6ec 5420040001a77400 0000000000000001 000000000000006f [90341.677761] 00000000e0d83f00 0000000000000003 0000000000000010 5420040001a77400 [90341.677784] 000000007ba8b000 0000000000943fd0 000000000075bc4e 00000000ed3b3c10 [90341.677793] Krnl Code: 000000000075bc42: e320cc180004 lg %r2,3096(%r12) 000000000075bc48: c0e5ffffc5cc brasl %r14,7547e0 #000000000075bc4e: 1816 lr %r1,%r6 >000000000075bc50: ba19b008 cs %r1,%r9,8(%r11) 000000000075bc54: ec180041017e cij %r1,1,8,75bcd6 000000000075bc5a: 5810b008 l %r1,8(%r11) 000000000075bc5e: ec16005c027e cij %r1,2,6,75bd16 000000000075bc64: 5090b008 st %r9,8(%r11) [90341.677807] Call Trace: [90341.677810] ([<000000000075bbc0>] qeth_qdio_input_handler+0x1c8/0x4e0) [90341.677812] ([<000000000070efbc>] qdio_kick_handler+0x124/0x2a8) [90341.677814] ([<0000000000713570>] __tiqdio_inbound_processing+0xf0/0xcd0) [90341.677818] ([<0000000000143312>] tasklet_action+0x92/0x120) [90341.677823] ([<00000000008b6e72>] __do_softirq+0x112/0x308) [90341.677824] ([<0000000000142bce>] irq_exit+0xd6/0xf8) [90341.677829] ([<000000000010b1d2>] do_IRQ+0x6a/0x88) [90341.677830] ([<00000000008b6322>] io_int_handler+0x112/0x220) [90341.677832] ([<0000000000102b2e>] enabled_wait+0x56/0xa8) [90341.677833] ([<0000000000000000>] (null)) [90341.677835] ([<0000000000102e32>] arch_cpu_idle+0x32/0x48) [90341.677838] ([<000000000018a126>] cpu_startup_entry+0x266/0x2b0) [90341.677841] ([<0000000000113b38>] smp_start_secondary+0x100/0x110) [90341.677843] ([<00000000008b68a6>] restart_int_handler+0x62/0x78) [90341.677845] ([<00000000008b6588>] psw_idle+0x3c/0x40) [90341.677846] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [90341.677848] [<00000000007547ec>] qeth_dbf_longtext+0xc/0xc0 [90341.677849] [90341.677850] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt qeth_qdio_cq_handler() analyzes SBALs on this completion queue, but does not observe the limit of 16 SBAL elements per SBAL. This patch adds the additional check to process not more than 16 SBAL elements. Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
Disable creation of a UDP socket for ipv6 when CONFIG_IPV6 is not enabeld. Since udp_sock_create6() returns 0 when CONFIG_IPV6 is not set [ 46.888632] IP: [<c220705a>] setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x6/0x4f [ 46.891355] *pdpt = 0000000000000000 *pde = f000ff53f000ff53 [ 46.893918] Oops: 0002 [tobetter#1] PREEMPT [ 46.896014] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.7.0-rc4-00001-g8700e3e tobetter#1 [ 46.900280] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 46.904905] task: cf06c040 ti: cf05e000 task.ti: cf05e000 [ 46.907854] EIP: 0060:[<c220705a>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0 [ 46.911137] EIP is at setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x6/0x4f [ 46.914070] EAX: 00000044 EBX: 00000001 ECX: cf05fef0 EDX: ca8142e0 [ 46.917236] ESI: c2c4505b EDI: cf05fef0 EBP: cf05fed0 ESP: cf05fed0 [ 46.919836] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 46.922046] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000001fc CR3: 02cec000 CR4: 000006b0 [ 46.924550] Stack: [ 46.926014] cf05ff10 c1fd4657 ca8142e0 0000000a 00000000 00000000 0000b712 00000008 [ 46.931274] 00000000 6bb5bd01 c1fd48de 00000000 00000000 cf05ff1c 00000000 00000000 [ 46.936122] cf05ff1c c1fd4bdf 00000000 cf05ff28 c2c4507b ffffffff cf05ff88 c2bf1c74 [ 46.942350] Call Trace: [ 46.944403] [<c1fd4657>] rxe_setup_udp_tunnel+0x8f/0x99 [ 46.947689] [<c1fd48de>] ? net_to_rxe+0x4e/0x4e [ 46.950567] [<c1fd4bdf>] rxe_net_init+0xe/0xa4 [ 46.953147] [<c2c4507b>] rxe_module_init+0x20/0x4c [ 46.955448] [<c2bf1c74>] do_one_initcall+0x89/0x113 [ 46.957797] [<c2bf15eb>] ? set_debug_rodata+0xf/0xf [ 46.959966] [<c2bf1dbc>] ? kernel_init_freeable+0xbe/0x15b [ 46.962262] [<c2bf1ddc>] kernel_init_freeable+0xde/0x15b [ 46.964418] [<c232eb54>] kernel_init+0x8/0xd0 [ 46.966618] [<c2333122>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xe/0x24 [ 46.969592] [<c232eb4c>] ? rest_init+0x6f/0x6f Fixes: 8700e3e ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Yonatan Cohen <yonatanc@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
Since commit 4d4c474 ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix BTS PMI detection") my box goes boom on boot: | .... node #0, CPUs: tobetter#1 tobetter#2 tobetter#3 tobetter#4 tobetter#5 tobetter#6 tobetter#7 | BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 | IP: [<ffffffff8100c463>] intel_bts_interrupt+0x43/0x130 | Call Trace: | <NMI> d [<ffffffff8100b341>] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x51/0x4b0 | [<ffffffff81004d47>] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x27/0x40 This happens because the code introduced in this commit dereferences the debug store pointer unconditionally. The debug store is not guaranteed to be available, so a NULL pointer check as on other places is required. Fixes: 4d4c474 ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix BTS PMI detection") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: vince@deater.net Cc: eranian@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160920131220.xg5pbdjtznszuyzb@breakpoint.cc Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
While running a compile on arm64, I hit a memory exposure usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from fffffc0000f3b1a8 (buffer_head) (1 bytes) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [tobetter#1] SMP Modules linked in: ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_nat ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables vfat fat xgene_edac xgene_enet edac_core i2c_xgene_slimpro i2c_core at803x realtek xgene_dma mdio_xgene gpio_dwapb gpio_xgene_sb xgene_rng mailbox_xgene_slimpro nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sdhci_of_arasan sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core xhci_plat_hcd gpio_keys CPU: 0 PID: 19744 Comm: updatedb Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc3-threadinfo+ tobetter#1 Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016 task: fffffe03df944c00 task.stack: fffffe00d128c000 PC is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0 LR is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0 ... [<fffffc00082b4280>] __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0 [<fffffc00082cdc30>] filldir64+0x158/0x1a0 [<fffffc0000f327e8>] __fat_readdir+0x4a0/0x558 [fat] [<fffffc0000f328d4>] fat_readdir+0x34/0x40 [fat] [<fffffc00082cd8f8>] iterate_dir+0x190/0x1e0 [<fffffc00082cde58>] SyS_getdents64+0x88/0x120 [<fffffc0008082c70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 fffffc0000f3b1a8 is a module address. Modules may have compiled in strings which could get copied to userspace. In this instance, it looks like "." which matches with a size of 1 byte. Extend the is_vmalloc_addr check to be is_vmalloc_or_module_addr to cover all possible cases. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
mhaehnel
pushed a commit
to mhaehnel/linux
that referenced
this issue
Sep 26, 2016
The wq_numa_init() function makes a private CPU to node map by calling cpu_to_node() early in the boot process, before the non-boot CPUs are brought online. Since the default implementation of cpu_to_node() returns zero for CPUs that have never been brought online, the workqueue system's view is that *all* CPUs are on node zero. When the unbound workqueue for a non-zero node is created, the tsk_cpus_allowed() for the worker threads is the empty set because there are, in the view of the workqueue system, no CPUs on non-zero nodes. The code in try_to_wake_up() using this empty cpumask ends up using the cpumask empty set value of NR_CPUS as an index into the per-CPU area pointer array, and gets garbage as it is one past the end of the array. This results in: [ 0.881970] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffb1008b926a4 [ 1.970095] pgd = fffffc00094b0000 [ 1.973530] [fffffb1008b926a4] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000, *pmd=0000000000000000 [ 1.982610] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [tobetter#1] SMP [ 1.987541] Modules linked in: [ 1.990631] CPU: 48 PID: 295 Comm: cpuhp/48 Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc6-preempt-vol+ tobetter#9 [ 1.999435] Hardware name: Cavium ThunderX CN88XX board (DT) [ 2.005159] task: fffffe0fe89cc300 task.stack: fffffe0fe8b8c000 [ 2.011158] PC is at try_to_wake_up+0x194/0x34c [ 2.015737] LR is at try_to_wake_up+0x150/0x34c [ 2.020318] pc : [<fffffc00080e7468>] lr : [<fffffc00080e7424>] pstate: 600000c5 [ 2.027803] sp : fffffe0fe8b8fb10 [ 2.031149] x29: fffffe0fe8b8fb10 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 2.036522] x27: fffffc0008c63bc8 x26: 0000000000001000 [ 2.041896] x25: fffffc0008c63c80 x24: fffffc0008bfb200 [ 2.047270] x23: 00000000000000c0 x22: 0000000000000004 [ 2.052642] x21: fffffe0fe89d25bc x20: 0000000000001000 [ 2.058014] x19: fffffe0fe89d1d00 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2.063386] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 2.068760] x15: 0000000000000018 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 2.074133] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 2.079505] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 [ 2.084879] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 2.090251] x7 : 0000000000000040 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 2.095621] x5 : ffffffffffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 2.100991] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 2.106364] x1 : fffffc0008be4c24 x0 : ffffff0ffffada80 [ 2.111737] [ 2.113236] Process cpuhp/48 (pid: 295, stack limit = 0xfffffe0fe8b8c020) [ 2.120102] Stack: (0xfffffe0fe8b8fb10 to 0xfffffe0fe8b90000) [ 2.125914] fb00: fffffe0fe8b8fb80 fffffc00080e7648 . . . [ 2.442859] Call trace: [ 2.445327] Exception stack(0xfffffe0fe8b8f940 to 0xfffffe0fe8b8fa70) [ 2.451843] f940: fffffe0fe89d1d00 0000040000000000 fffffe0fe8b8fb10 fffffc00080e7468 [ 2.459767] f960: fffffe0fe8b8f980 fffffc00080e4958 ffffff0ff91ab200 fffffc00080e4b64 [ 2.467690] f980: fffffe0fe8b8f9d0 fffffc00080e515c fffffe0fe8b8fa80 0000000000000000 [ 2.475614] f9a0: fffffe0fe8b8f9d0 fffffc00080e58e4 fffffe0fe8b8fa80 0000000000000000 [ 2.483540] f9c0: fffffe0fe8d10000 0000000000000040 fffffe0fe8b8fa50 fffffc00080e5ac4 [ 2.491465] f9e0: ffffff0ffffada80 fffffc0008be4c24 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 2.499387] fa00: 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000040 [ 2.507309] fa20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 2.515233] fa40: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000018 [ 2.523156] fa60: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 2.528089] [<fffffc00080e7468>] try_to_wake_up+0x194/0x34c [ 2.533723] [<fffffc00080e7648>] wake_up_process+0x28/0x34 [ 2.539275] [<fffffc00080d3764>] create_worker+0x110/0x19c [ 2.544824] [<fffffc00080d69dc>] alloc_unbound_pwq+0x3cc/0x4b0 [ 2.550724] [<fffffc00080d6bcc>] wq_update_unbound_numa+0x10c/0x1e4 [ 2.557066] [<fffffc00080d7d78>] workqueue_online_cpu+0x220/0x28c [ 2.563234] [<fffffc00080bd288>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x6c/0x168 [ 2.569398] [<fffffc00080bdf74>] cpuhp_up_callbacks+0x44/0xe4 [ 2.575210] [<fffffc00080be194>] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x13c/0x148 [ 2.581027] [<fffffc00080dfbac>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x19c/0x1a8 [ 2.586929] [<fffffc00080dbd64>] kthread+0xdc/0xf0 [ 2.591776] [<fffffc0008083380>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 [ 2.597147] Code: b00057e 91304021 91005021 b8626822 (b8606821) [ 2.603464] ---[ end trace 58c0cd36b88802bc ]--- [ 2.608138] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Fix by moving call to numa_store_cpu_info() for all CPUs into smp_prepare_cpus(), which happens before wq_numa_init(). Since smp_store_cpu_info() now contains only a single function call, simplify by removing the function and out-lining its contents. Suggested-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org> Fixes: 1a2db30 ("arm64, numa: Add NUMA support for arm64 platforms.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.7.x- Signed-off-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Tested-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 6, 2016
A discrepancy between cpu_online_mask and cpuset's effective_cpus mask is inevitable during hotplug since cpuset defers updating of effective_cpus mask using a workqueue, during which time nothing prevents the system from more hotplug operations. For that reason guarantee_online_cpus() walks up the cpuset hierarchy until it finds an intersection under the assumption that top cpuset's effective_cpus mask intersects with cpu_online_mask even with such a race occurring. However a sequence of CPU hotplugs can open a time window, during which none of the effective CPUs in the top cpuset intersect with cpu_online_mask. For example when there are 4 possible CPUs 0-3 and only CPU0 is online: ======================== =========================== cpu_online_mask top_cpuset.effective_cpus ======================== =========================== echo 1 > cpu2/online. CPU hotplug notifier woke up hotplug work but not yet scheduled. [0,2] [0] echo 0 > cpu0/online. The workqueue is still runnable. [2] [0] ======================== =========================== Now there is no intersection between cpu_online_mask and top_cpuset.effective_cpus. Thus invoking sys_sched_setaffinity() at this moment can cause following: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000d0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ Kernel BUG at ffffffc0001389b0 [verbose debug info unavailable] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 1420 Comm: taskset Tainted: G W 4.4.8+ torvalds#98 task: ffffffc06a5c4880 ti: ffffffc06e124000 task.ti: ffffffc06e124000 PC is at guarantee_online_cpus+0x2c/0x58 LR is at cpuset_cpus_allowed+0x4c/0x6c <snip> Process taskset (pid: 1420, stack limit = 0xffffffc06e124020) Call trace: [<ffffffc0001389b0>] guarantee_online_cpus+0x2c/0x58 [<ffffffc00013b208>] cpuset_cpus_allowed+0x4c/0x6c [<ffffffc0000d61f0>] sched_setaffinity+0xc0/0x1ac [<ffffffc0000d6374>] SyS_sched_setaffinity+0x98/0xac [<ffffffc000085cb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 The top cpuset's effective_cpus are guaranteed to be identical to cpu_online_mask eventually. Hence fall back to cpu_online_mask when there is no intersection between top cpuset's effective_cpus and cpu_online_mask. Signed-off-by: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.17+ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 6, 2016
…_route Since the commit below the ipmr/ip6mr rtnl_unicast() code uses the portid instead of the previous dst_pid which was copied from in_skb's portid. Since the skb is new the portid is 0 at that point so the packets are sent to the kernel and we get scheduling while atomic or a deadlock (depending on where it happens) by trying to acquire rtnl two times. Also since this is RTM_GETROUTE, it can be triggered by a normal user. Here's the sleeping while atomic trace: [ 7858.212557] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620 [ 7858.212748] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0 [ 7858.212881] 2 locks held by swapper/0/0: [ 7858.213013] #0: (((&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350 [ 7858.213422] #1: (mfc_unres_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8161e005>] ipmr_expire_process+0x25/0x130 [ 7858.213807] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc7+ torvalds#179 [ 7858.213934] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014 [ 7858.214108] 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403c50 ffffffff813a7804 0000000000000000 [ 7858.214412] ffffffff81a1338e ffff88005b403c78 ffffffff810a4a72 ffffffff81a1338e [ 7858.214716] 000000000000026c 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403ca8 ffffffff810a4b9f [ 7858.215251] Call Trace: [ 7858.215412] <IRQ> [<ffffffff813a7804>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc1 [ 7858.215662] [<ffffffff810a4a72>] ___might_sleep+0x192/0x250 [ 7858.215868] [<ffffffff810a4b9f>] __might_sleep+0x6f/0x100 [ 7858.216072] [<ffffffff8165bea3>] mutex_lock_nested+0x33/0x4d0 [ 7858.216279] [<ffffffff815a7a5f>] ? netlink_lookup+0x25f/0x460 [ 7858.216487] [<ffffffff8157474b>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1b/0x40 [ 7858.216687] [<ffffffff815a9a0c>] netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x260 [ 7858.216900] [<ffffffff81573c70>] rtnl_unicast+0x20/0x30 [ 7858.217128] [<ffffffff8161cd39>] ipmr_destroy_unres+0xa9/0xf0 [ 7858.217351] [<ffffffff8161e06f>] ipmr_expire_process+0x8f/0x130 [ 7858.217581] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180 [ 7858.217785] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180 [ 7858.217990] [<ffffffff810fbc95>] call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x350 [ 7858.218192] [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350 [ 7858.218415] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180 [ 7858.218656] [<ffffffff810fde10>] run_timer_softirq+0x260/0x640 [ 7858.218865] [<ffffffff8166379b>] ? __do_softirq+0xbb/0x54f [ 7858.219068] [<ffffffff816637c8>] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x54f [ 7858.219269] [<ffffffff8107a948>] irq_exit+0xb8/0xc0 [ 7858.219463] [<ffffffff81663452>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x50 [ 7858.219678] [<ffffffff816625bc>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 [ 7858.219897] <EOI> [<ffffffff81055f16>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 [ 7858.220165] [<ffffffff810d64dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 7858.220373] [<ffffffff810298e3>] default_idle+0x23/0x190 [ 7858.220574] [<ffffffff8102a20f>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20 [ 7858.220790] [<ffffffff810c9f8c>] default_idle_call+0x4c/0x60 [ 7858.221016] [<ffffffff810ca33b>] cpu_startup_entry+0x39b/0x4d0 [ 7858.221257] [<ffffffff8164f995>] rest_init+0x135/0x140 [ 7858.221469] [<ffffffff81f83014>] start_kernel+0x50e/0x51b [ 7858.221670] [<ffffffff81f82120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120 [ 7858.221894] [<ffffffff81f8243f>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [ 7858.222113] [<ffffffff81f8257c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x13b/0x14a Fixes: 2942e90 ("[RTNETLINK]: Use rtnl_unicast() for rtnetlink unicasts") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 6, 2016
While the driver is probing the adapter, an error may occur before the netdev structure is allocated and attached to pci_dev. In this case, not only netdev isn't available, but the tg3 private structure is also not available as it is just math from the NULL pointer, so dereferences must be skipped. The following trace is seen when the error is triggered: [1.402247] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00001a99 [1.402410] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000007e33f8 [1.402450] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [1.402481] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV [1.402513] Modules linked in: [1.402545] CPU: 0 PID: 651 Comm: eehd Not tainted 4.4.0-36-generic torvalds#55-Ubuntu [1.402591] task: c000001fe4e42a20 ti: c000001fe4e88000 task.ti: c000001fe4e88000 [1.402742] NIP: c0000000007e33f8 LR: c0000000007e3164 CTR: c000000000595ea0 [1.402787] REGS: c000001fe4e8b790 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.4.0-36-generic) [1.402832] MSR: 9000000100009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28000422 XER: 20000000 [1.403058] CFAR: c000000000008468 DAR: 0000000000001a99 DSISR: 42000000 SOFTE: 1 GPR00: c0000000007e3164 c000001fe4e8ba10 c0000000015c5e00 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000039 0000000000000299 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 c000001fe4e88000 0000000000000006 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c00000000fb40000 c0000000000e6558 c000003ca1bffd00 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000000d52768 GPR24: c000000000d52740 0000000000000100 c000003ca1b52000 0000000000000002 GPR28: 0000000000000900 0000000000000000 c00000000152a0c0 c000003ca1b52000 [1.404226] NIP [c0000000007e33f8] tg3_io_error_detected+0x308/0x340 [1.404265] LR [c0000000007e3164] tg3_io_error_detected+0x74/0x340 This patch avoids the NULL pointer dereference by moving the access after the netdev NULL pointer check on tg3_io_error_detected(). Also, we add a check for netdev being NULL on tg3_io_resume() [suggested by Michael Chan]. Fixes: 0486a06 ("tg3: prevent ifup/ifdown during PCI error recovery") Fixes: dfc8f37 ("net/tg3: Release IRQs on permanent error") Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Milton Miller <miltonm@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 6, 2016
…age_cache_page() Antonio reports the following crash when using fuse under memory pressure: kernel BUG at /build/linux-a2WvEb/linux-4.4.0/mm/workingset.c:346! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: all of them CPU: 2 PID: 63 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 4.4.0-36-generic torvalds#55-Ubuntu Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8H67-M PRO, BIOS 3904 04/27/2013 task: ffff88040cae6040 ti: ffff880407488000 task.ti: ffff880407488000 RIP: shadow_lru_isolate+0x181/0x190 Call Trace: __list_lru_walk_one.isra.3+0x8f/0x130 list_lru_walk_one+0x23/0x30 scan_shadow_nodes+0x34/0x50 shrink_slab.part.40+0x1ed/0x3d0 shrink_zone+0x2ca/0x2e0 kswapd+0x51e/0x990 kthread+0xd8/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 which corresponds to the following sanity check in the shadow node tracking: BUG_ON(node->count & RADIX_TREE_COUNT_MASK); The workingset code tracks radix tree nodes that exclusively contain shadow entries of evicted pages in them, and this (somewhat obscure) line checks whether there are real pages left that would interfere with reclaim of the radix tree node under memory pressure. While discussing ways how fuse might sneak pages into the radix tree past the workingset code, Miklos pointed to replace_page_cache_page(), and indeed there is a problem there: it properly accounts for the old page being removed - __delete_from_page_cache() does that - but then does a raw raw radix_tree_insert(), not accounting for the replacement page. Eventually the page count bits in node->count underflow while leaving the node incorrectly linked to the shadow node LRU. To address this, make sure replace_page_cache_page() uses the tracked page insertion code, page_cache_tree_insert(). This fixes the page accounting and makes sure page-containing nodes are properly unlinked from the shadow node LRU again. Also, make the sanity checks a bit less obscure by using the helpers for checking the number of pages and shadows in a radix tree node. Fixes: 449dd69 ("mm: keep page cache radix tree nodes in check") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160919155822.29498-1-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reported-by: Antonio SJ Musumeci <trapexit@spawn.link> Debugged-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.15+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
bkrepo
pushed a commit
to bkrepo/linux
that referenced
this issue
Oct 28, 2016
[ Upstream commit d3e6952 ] I ran into this: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [tobetter#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ tobetter#19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>] [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710 RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048 RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220 ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232 ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190 [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0 [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410 [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74 RIP [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710 RSP <ffff880111747bb8> ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]--- The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL, and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
bkrepo
pushed a commit
to bkrepo/linux
that referenced
this issue
Oct 28, 2016
commit bd975d1 upstream. The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) tobetter#1 mount.cifs(8) tobetter#2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 8, 2024
[ Upstream commit 8ee81ed ] There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com> Acked-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 8, 2024
[ Upstream commit 348a198 ] Luis has been reporting an assert failure when freeing an inode cluster during inode inactivation for a while. The assert looks like: XFS: Assertion failed: bp->b_flags & XBF_DONE, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 241 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/loop5 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs] RIP: 0010:assfail (fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102) xfs RSP: 0018:ffff88810188f7f0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88816e748250 RCX: 1ffffffff844b0e7 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff88810188f558 RDI: ffffffffc2431fa0 RBP: 1ffff11020311f01 R08: 0000000042431f9f R09: ffffed1020311e9b R10: ffff88810188f4df R11: ffffffffac725d70 R12: ffff88817a3f4000 R13: ffff88812182f000 R14: ffff88810188f998 R15: ffffffffc2423f80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881c8400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055fe9d0f109c CR3: 000000014426c002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_trans_read_buf_map (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:241 (discriminator 1)) xfs xfs_imap_to_bp (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h:210 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_inode_buf.c:138) xfs xfs_inode_item_precommit (fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c:145) xfs xfs_trans_run_precommits (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:931) xfs __xfs_trans_commit (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:966) xfs xfs_inactive_ifree (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:1811) xfs xfs_inactive (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:2013) xfs xfs_inodegc_worker (fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1841 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1886) xfs process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 (discriminator 2) kernel/workqueue.c:3393 (discriminator 2)) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) </TASK> And occurs when the the inode precommit handlers is attempt to look up the inode cluster buffer to attach the inode for writeback. The trail of logic that I can reconstruct is as follows. 1. the inode is clean when inodegc runs, so it is not attached to a cluster buffer when precommit runs. 2. #1 implies the inode cluster buffer may be clean and not pinned by dirty inodes when inodegc runs. 3. #2 implies that the inode cluster buffer can be reclaimed by memory pressure at any time. 4. The assert failure implies that the cluster buffer was attached to the transaction, but not marked done. It had been accessed earlier in the transaction, but not marked done. 5. #4 implies the cluster buffer has been invalidated (i.e. marked stale). 6. #5 implies that the inode cluster buffer was instantiated uninitialised in the transaction in xfs_ifree_cluster(), which only instantiates the buffers to invalidate them and never marks them as done. Given factors 1-3, this issue is highly dependent on timing and environmental factors. Hence the issue can be very difficult to reproduce in some situations, but highly reliable in others. Luis has an environment where it can be reproduced easily by g/531 but, OTOH, I've reproduced it only once in ~2000 cycles of g/531. I think the fix is to have xfs_ifree_cluster() set the XBF_DONE flag on the cluster buffers, even though they may not be initialised. The reasons why I think this is safe are: 1. A buffer cache lookup hit on a XBF_STALE buffer will clear the XBF_DONE flag. Hence all future users of the buffer know they have to re-initialise the contents before use and mark it done themselves. 2. xfs_trans_binval() sets the XFS_BLI_STALE flag, which means the buffer remains locked until the journal commit completes and the buffer is unpinned. Hence once marked XBF_STALE/XFS_BLI_STALE by xfs_ifree_cluster(), the only context that can access the freed buffer is the currently running transaction. 3. #2 implies that future buffer lookups in the currently running transaction will hit the transaction match code and not the buffer cache. Hence XBF_STALE and XFS_BLI_STALE will not be cleared unless the transaction initialises and logs the buffer with valid contents again. At which point, the buffer will be marked marked XBF_DONE again, so having XBF_DONE already set on the stale buffer is a moot point. 4. #2 also implies that any concurrent access to that cluster buffer will block waiting on the buffer lock until the inode cluster has been fully freed and is no longer an active inode cluster buffer. 5. #4 + #1 means that any future user of the disk range of that buffer will always see the range of disk blocks covered by the cluster buffer as not done, and hence must initialise the contents themselves. 6. Setting XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster() then means the unlinked inode precommit code will see a XBF_DONE buffer from the transaction match as it expects. It can then attach the stale but newly dirtied inode to the stale but newly dirtied cluster buffer without unexpected failures. The stale buffer will then sail through the journal and do the right thing with the attached stale inode during unpin. Hence the fix is just one line of extra code. The explanation of why we have to set XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster, OTOH, is long and complex.... Fixes: 82842fe ("xfs: fix AGF vs inode cluster buffer deadlock") Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Tested-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com> Acked-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 56f4526 ] This timer HW supports 8, 16 and 32-bit timer widths. This driver currently uses a u32 to store the max possible value of the timer. However, statements perform addition of 2 in xilinx_pwm_apply() when calculating the period_cycles and duty_cycles values. Since priv->max is a u32, this will result in an overflow to 1 which will not only be incorrect but fail on range comparison. This results in making it impossible to set the PWM in this timer mode. There are two obvious solutions to the current problem: 1. Cast each instance where overflow occurs to u64. 2. Change priv->max from a u32 to a u64. Solution #1 requires more code modifications, and leaves opportunity to introduce similar overflows if other math statements are added in the future. These may also go undetected if running in non 32-bit timer modes. Solution #2 is the much smaller and cleaner approach and thus the chosen method in this patch. This was tested on a Zynq UltraScale+ with multiple instances of the PWM IP. Signed-off-by: Ken Sloat <ksloat@designlinxhs.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/SJ0P222MB0107490C5371B848EF04351CA1E19@SJ0P222MB0107.NAMP222.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 78c5a6f upstream. Steve French reported null pointer dereference error from sha256 lib. cifs.ko can send session setup requests on reused connection. If reused connection is used for binding session, conn->binding can still remain true and generate_preauth_hash() will not set sess->Preauth_HashValue and it will be NULL. It is used as a material to create an encryption key in ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey. ->Preauth_HashValue cause null pointer dereference error from crypto_shash_update(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 8 PID: 429254 Comm: kworker/8:39 Hardware name: LENOVO 20MAS08500/20MAS08500, BIOS N2CET69W (1.52 ) Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd] RIP: 0010:lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? __die+0x24/0x80 ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] _sha256_update+0x77/0xa0 [sha256_ssse3] sha256_avx2_update+0x15/0x30 [sha256_ssse3] crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 hmac_update+0x12/0x20 crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 generate_key+0x234/0x380 [ksmbd] generate_smb3encryptionkey+0x40/0x1c0 [ksmbd] ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey+0x72/0xa0 [ksmbd] ntlm_authenticate.isra.0+0x423/0x5d0 [ksmbd] smb2_sess_setup+0x952/0xaa0 [ksmbd] __process_request+0xa3/0x1d0 [ksmbd] __handle_ksmbd_work+0x1c4/0x2f0 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x2d/0xa0 [ksmbd] process_one_work+0x16c/0x350 worker_thread+0x306/0x440 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xef/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: f5a544e ("ksmbd: add support for SMB3 multichannel") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 3e3de79 upstream. Commit 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") extended the 'vmap_block' structure to contain a 'cpu' field which is set at allocation time to the id of the initialising CPU. When a new 'vmap_block' is being instantiated by new_vmap_block(), the partially initialised structure is added to the local 'vmap_block_queue' xarray before the 'cpu' field has been initialised. If another CPU is concurrently walking the xarray (e.g. via vm_unmap_aliases()), then it may perform an out-of-bounds access to the remote queue thanks to an uninitialised index. This has been observed as UBSAN errors in Android: | Internal error: UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | | Call trace: | purge_fragmented_block+0x204/0x21c | _vm_unmap_aliases+0x170/0x378 | vm_unmap_aliases+0x1c/0x28 | change_memory_common+0x1dc/0x26c | set_memory_ro+0x18/0x24 | module_enable_ro+0x98/0x238 | do_init_module+0x1b0/0x310 Move the initialisation of 'vb->cpu' in new_vmap_block() ahead of the addition to the xarray. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240812171606.17486-1-will@kernel.org Fixes: 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Zhaoyang Huang <zhaoyang.huang@unisoc.com> Cc: Hailong.Liu <hailong.liu@oppo.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 177e1cc upstream. The start_kthread() and stop_thread() code was not always called with the interface_lock held. This means that the kthread variable could be unexpectedly changed causing the kthread_stop() to be called on it when it should not have been, leading to: while true; do rtla timerlat top -u -q & PID=$!; sleep 5; kill -INT $PID; sleep 0.001; kill -TERM $PID; wait $PID; done Causing the following OOPS: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 885 Comm: timerlatu/5 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-test-00002-gbc754cc76d1b-dirty torvalds#125 a533010b71dab205ad2f507188ce8c82203b0254 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 Code: 48 c1 ee 03 41 54 48 01 d1 48 01 d6 55 53 48 83 ec 20 80 39 00 0f 85 30 02 00 00 49 8b 6f 30 4c 8d 75 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 3c 10 4c 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 40 38 f8 7c 09 40 84 ff 0f RSP: 0018:ffff88811d97f940 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88823c6b5b28 RCX: ffffed10478d6b6b RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffed10478d6b6c RDI: ffff88823c6b5b28 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88823c6b5b58 R09: ffff88823c6b5b60 R10: ffff88811d97f957 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 00000000000a801d R13: ffff88810d8b35d8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88823c6b5b28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561858ad7258 CR3: 000000007729e001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x154/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_locks_remove_file+0x10/0x10 hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x40 timerlat_fd_release+0x8e/0x1f0 ? security_file_release+0x43/0x80 __fput+0x372/0xb10 task_work_run+0x11e/0x1f0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170 ? do_exit+0x7a0/0x24b0 do_exit+0x7bd/0x24b0 ? __pfx_migrate_enable+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x64/0x140 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x86/0xe0 do_group_exit+0xb0/0x220 get_signal+0x17ba/0x1b50 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? timerlat_fd_read+0x30b/0x9d0 ? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_timerlat_fd_read+0x10/0x10 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8c/0x570 ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? ksys_read+0xfe/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbc/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x116/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7ff0070eca9c Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff0070eca72. RSP: 002b:00007ff006dff8c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007ff0070eca9c RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007ff006dff9a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff006dffde0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ff000000ba0 R10: 00007ff007004b08 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00007ff006dff9a0 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000008 </TASK> Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is because it would mistakenly call kthread_stop() on a user space thread making it "exit" before it actually exits. Since kthreads are created based on global behavior, use a cpumask to know when kthreads are running and that they need to be shutdown before proceeding to do new work. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240820130001.124768-1-tglozar@redhat.com/ This was debugged by using the persistent ring buffer: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240823013902.135036960@goodmis.org/ Note, locking was originally used to fix this, but that proved to cause too many deadlocks to work around: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240823102816.5e55753b@gandalf.local.home/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240904103428.08efdf4c@gandalf.local.home Fixes: e88ed22 ("tracing/timerlat: Add user-space interface") Reported-by: Tomas Glozar <tglozar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 72a6e22 upstream. The fscache_cookie_lru_timer is initialized when the fscache module is inserted, but is not deleted when the fscache module is removed. If timer_reduce() is called before removing the fscache module, the fscache_cookie_lru_timer will be added to the timer list of the current cpu. Afterwards, a use-after-free will be triggered in the softIRQ after removing the fscache module, as follows: ================================================================== BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff803c9e9 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 21ffea067 P4D 21ffea067 PUD 21ffe6067 PMD 110a7c067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3 torvalds#855 Tainted: [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__run_timer_base.part.0+0x254/0x8a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x627/0x810 __walk_groups.isra.0+0x47/0x140 tmigr_handle_remote+0x1fa/0x2f0 handle_softirqs+0x180/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20 default_idle_call+0x38/0x60 do_idle+0x2b5/0x300 cpu_startup_entry+0x54/0x60 start_secondary+0x20d/0x280 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 </TASK> Modules linked in: [last unloaded: netfs] ================================================================== Therefore delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when removing the fscahe module. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826112056.2458299-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit d260327 upstream. Chi Zhiling reported: We found a null pointer accessing in tracefs[1], the reason is that the variable 'ei_child' is set to LIST_POISON1, that means the list was removed in eventfs_remove_rec. so when access the ei_child->is_freed, the panic triggered. by the way, the following script can reproduce this panic loop1 (){ while true do echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events echo "" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events done } loop2 (){ while true do tree /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/ done } loop1 & loop2 [1]: [ 1147.959632][T17331] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000150 [ 1147.968239][T17331] Mem abort info: [ 1147.971739][T17331] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 1147.976172][T17331] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1147.982171][T17331] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1147.985906][T17331] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1147.989734][T17331] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1147.995292][T17331] Data abort info: [ 1147.998858][T17331] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 1148.005023][T17331] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 1148.010759][T17331] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 1148.016752][T17331] [dead000000000150] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 1148.024571][T17331] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 1148.030825][T17331] Modules linked in: team_mode_loadbalance team nlmon act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding tls macvlan dummy ib_core bridge stp llc veth amdgpu amdxcp mfd_core gpu_sched drm_exec drm_buddy radeon crct10dif_ce video drm_suballoc_helper ghash_ce drm_ttm_helper sha2_ce ttm sha256_arm64 i2c_algo_bit sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt cp210x drm_display_helper cec sr_mod cdrom drm_kms_helper binfmt_misc sg loop fuse drm dm_mod nfnetlink ip_tables autofs4 [last unloaded: tls] [ 1148.072808][T17331] CPU: 3 PID: 17331 Comm: ls Tainted: G W ------- ---- 6.6.43 #2 [ 1148.081751][T17331] Source Version: 21b3b386e948bedd29369af66f3e98ab01b1c650 [ 1148.088783][T17331] Hardware name: Greatwall GW-001M1A-FTF/GW-001M1A-FTF, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 07/16/2020 [ 1148.098419][T17331] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1148.106060][T17331] pc : eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398 [ 1148.111017][T17331] lr : eventfs_iterate+0x2fc/0x398 [ 1148.115969][T17331] sp : ffff80008d56bbd0 [ 1148.119964][T17331] x29: ffff80008d56bbf0 x28: ffff001ff5be2600 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.127781][T17331] x26: ffff001ff52ca4e0 x25: 0000000000009977 x24: dead000000000100 [ 1148.135598][T17331] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000000b x21: ffff800082645f10 [ 1148.143415][T17331] x20: ffff001fddf87c70 x19: ffff80008d56bc90 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.151231][T17331] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff001ff52ca4e0 [ 1148.159048][T17331] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.166864][T17331] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff8000804391d0 [ 1148.174680][T17331] x8 : 0000000180000000 x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : 0000aaab04b92862 [ 1148.182498][T17331] x5 : 0000aaab04b92862 x4 : 0000000080000000 x3 : 0000000000000068 [ 1148.190314][T17331] x2 : 000000000000000f x1 : 0000000000007ea8 x0 : 0000000000000001 [ 1148.198131][T17331] Call trace: [ 1148.201259][T17331] eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398 [ 1148.205864][T17331] iterate_dir+0x98/0x188 [ 1148.210036][T17331] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x160 [ 1148.215161][T17331] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108 [ 1148.219593][T17331] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0 [ 1148.224977][T17331] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 1148.228974][T17331] el0_svc+0x40/0x168 [ 1148.232798][T17331] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 [ 1148.237836][T17331] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 [ 1148.242182][T17331] Code: 54ffff6c f9400676 910006d6 f900067 (b9405300) [ 1148.248955][T17331] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The issue is that list_del() is used on an SRCU protected list variable before the synchronization occurs. This can poison the list pointers while there is a reader iterating the list. This is simply fixed by using list_del_rcu() that is specifically made for this purpose. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240829085025.3600021-1-chizhiling@163.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240904131605.640d42b1@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 43aa6f9 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts") Reported-by: Chi Zhiling <chizhiling@kylinos.cn> Tested-by: Chi Zhiling <chizhiling@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit fe1910f upstream. When we cork messages in psock->cork, the last message triggers the flushing will result in sending a sk_msg larger than the current message size. In this case, in tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), 'copied' becomes negative at least in the following case: 468 case __SK_DROP: 469 default: 470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend); 471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend); 472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); // <==== HERE 473 return -EACCES; Therefore, it could lead to the following BUG with a proper value of 'copied' (thanks to syzbot). We should not use negative 'copied' as a return value here. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/socket.c:733! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3265 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-gd07b43284ab3 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:728 [inline] pc : __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 lr : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] lr : __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 net/socket.c:745 sp : ffff800088ea3b30 x29: ffff800088ea3b30 x28: fbf00000062bc900 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff800088ea3bc0 x25: ffff800088ea3bc0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: f9f00000048dc000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800088ea3d90 x20: f9f00000048dc000 x19: ffff800088ea3d90 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002002ffaf x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000815849c0 x9 : ffff8000815b49c0 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 000000000000003f x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 00000000000007e0 x4 : fff07ffffd239000 x3 : fbf00000062bc900 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000fffffdef Call trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x274/0x2ac net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100 net/socket.c:2651 __sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:2687 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x34/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: f9404463 d63f0060 3108441f 54fffe81 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4f738ad ("bpf: create tcp_bpf_ulp allowing BPF to monitor socket TX/RX data") Reported-by: syzbot+58c03971700330ce14d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240821030744.320934-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit d11a676 ] Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <igor.bagnucki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <dawid.osuchowski@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 2504b84 ] The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler. XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following sections: * ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked * ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected * ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the one below: [ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14 [ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18 [Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms [ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001 [ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14 [ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1 [ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [...] [ +0.000013] Call Trace: [ +0.000016] <TASK> [ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0 [ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice] [ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice] [ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0 [ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0 [ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice] [ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0 [ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000604] </TASK> The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable, particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds with removal anyway. There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock(). Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp(). Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that have to be considered: 1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild 2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case, we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new configuration for us in a managed fashion. Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to indicate that ice_xdp() can just hot-swap the program. Also, as ice_vsi_rebuild() flow is touched in this patch, make it more consistent by deconfiguring VSI when coalesce allocation fails. Fixes: 2d4238f ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Fixes: efc2214 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7e41969 ] We observed a null-ptr-deref in fou_gro_receive() while shutting down a host. [0] The NULL pointer is sk->sk_user_data, and the offset 8 is of protocol in struct fou. When fou_release() is called due to netns dismantle or explicit tunnel teardown, udp_tunnel_sock_release() sets NULL to sk->sk_user_data. Then, the tunnel socket is destroyed after a single RCU grace period. So, in-flight udp4_gro_receive() could find the socket and execute the FOU GRO handler, where sk->sk_user_data could be NULL. Let's use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in fou_from_sock() and add NULL checks in FOU GRO handlers. [0]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 80000001032f4067 P4D 80000001032f4067 PUD 103240067 PMD 0 SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.216-204.855.amzn2.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5.large/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] Code: 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc e8 e7 2e 69 f4 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f8 41 54 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 49 8b 80 88 02 00 00 <0f> b6 48 08 0f b7 42 4a 66 25 fd fd 80 cc 02 66 89 42 4a 0f b6 42 RSP: 0018:ffffa330c0003d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RSI: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RDI: ffff93dac2e24d08 RBP: ffff93d9e3a6b900 R08: ffff93dacbce6400 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffb5f369b0 R12: ffff93dacbce6400 R13: ffff93dac2e24d08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffb4edd1c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93daee800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000102140001 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? no_context (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:752) ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1435 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1483) ? asm_exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:571) ? fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] udp_gro_receive (include/linux/netdevice.h:2552 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:559) udp4_gro_receive (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:604) inet_gro_receive (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1549 (discriminator 7)) dev_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6035 (discriminator 4)) napi_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6170) ena_clean_rx_irq (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1558) [ena] ena_io_poll (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1742) [ena] napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6847) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6917) __do_softirq (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:25 include/linux/jump_label.h:200 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:299) asm_call_irq_on_stack (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:809) </IRQ> do_softirq_own_stack (arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:27 arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:393 kernel/softirq.c:423 kernel/softirq.c:435) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:239) asm_common_interrupt (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:626) RIP: 0010:acpi_idle_do_entry (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:114 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:575) Code: 8b 15 d1 3c c4 02 ed c3 cc cc cc cc 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ef 01 00 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 eb 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d d5 09 55 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc e9 be fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffffffb5603e58 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ffff93dac0929c00 RCX: ffff93daee833900 RDX: ffff93daee800000 RSI: ffff93daee87dc00 RDI: ffff93daee87dc64 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffb5e7b6c0 R09: 0000000000000044 R10: ffff93daee831b04 R11: 00000000000001cd R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffb5e7b740 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 ? sched_clock_cpu (kernel/sched/clock.c:371) acpi_idle_enter (drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:712 (discriminator 3)) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:237) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:353) cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:158 kernel/sched/idle.c:239) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:302) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:395 (discriminator 1)) start_kernel (init/main.c:1048) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:310) Modules linked in: udp_diag tcp_diag inet_diag nft_nat ipip tunnel4 dummy fou ip_tunnel nft_masq nft_chain_nat nf_nat wireguard nft_ct curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic nf_conntrack libchacha20poly1305 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nft_objref chacha_x86_64 nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink poly1305_x86_64 ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel libchacha crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper mousedev psmouse button ena ptp pps_core crc32c_intel CR2: 0000000000000008 Fixes: d92283e ("fou: change to use UDP socket GRO") Reported-by: Alphonse Kurian <alkurian@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240902173927.62706-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit c145eea ] mwifiex_get_priv_by_id() returns the priv pointer corresponding to the bss_num and bss_type, but without checking if the priv is actually currently in use. Unused priv pointers do not have a wiphy attached to them which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences further down the callstack. Fix this by returning only used priv pointers which have priv->bss_mode set to something else than NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED. Said NULL pointer dereference happened when an Accesspoint was started with wpa_supplicant -i mlan0 with this config: network={ ssid="somessid" mode=2 frequency=2412 key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 proto=RSN group=CCMP pairwise=CCMP psk="12345678" } When waiting for the AP to be established, interrupting wpa_supplicant with <ctrl-c> and starting it again this happens: | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000140 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x0000000096000004 | EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 | CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 | GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 | user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046d96000 | [0000000000000140] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: caam_jr caamhash_desc spidev caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes mwifiex_sdio +mwifiex crct10dif_ce cdc_acm onboard_usb_hub fsl_imx8_ddr_perf imx8m_ddrc rtc_ds1307 lm75 rtc_snvs +imx_sdma caam imx8mm_thermal spi_imx error imx_cpufreq_dt fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 | CPU: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-00007-g937242013fce-dirty #18 | Hardware name: somemachine (DT) | Workqueue: events sdio_irq_work | pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex] | lr : mwifiex_get_cfp+0x34/0x15c [mwifiex] | sp : ffff8000818b3a70 | x29: ffff8000818b3a70 x28: ffff000006bfd8a5 x27: 0000000000000004 | x26: 000000000000002c x25: 0000000000001511 x24: 0000000002e86bc9 | x23: ffff000006bfd996 x22: 0000000000000004 x21: ffff000007bec000 | x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 00500072b5503510 x15: ccc283740681e517 | x14: 0201000101006d15 x13: 0000000002e8ff43 x12: 002c01000000ffb1 | x11: 0100000000000000 x10: 02e8ff43002c0100 x9 : 0000ffb100100157 | x8 : ffff000003d20000 x7 : 00000000000002f1 x6 : 00000000ffffe124 | x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0001000000011001 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex] | mwifiex_parse_single_response_buf+0x1d0/0x504 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_handle_event_ext_scan_report+0x19c/0x2f8 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_process_sta_event+0x298/0xf0c [mwifiex] | mwifiex_process_event+0x110/0x238 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_main_process+0x428/0xa44 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_sdio_interrupt+0x64/0x12c [mwifiex_sdio] | process_sdio_pending_irqs+0x64/0x1b8 | sdio_irq_work+0x4c/0x7c | process_one_work+0x148/0x2a0 | worker_thread+0x2fc/0x40c | kthread+0x110/0x114 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: a94153f3 a8c37bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (f940a000) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703072409.556618-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit c68bbf5 ] This adds a check before freeing the rx->skb in flush and close functions to handle the kernel crash seen while removing driver after FW download fails or before FW download completes. dmesg log: [ 54.634586] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000080 [ 54.643398] Mem abort info: [ 54.646204] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 54.649964] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 54.655286] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 54.658348] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 54.661498] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 54.666391] Data abort info: [ 54.669273] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 54.674768] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 54.674771] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 54.674775] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000048860000 [ 54.674780] [0000000000000080] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 54.703880] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 54.710152] Modules linked in: btnxpuart(-) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma gpio_ir_recv rc_core sch_fq_codel fuse [ 54.744357] CPU: 3 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.6.3-otbr-g128004619037 #2 [ 54.744364] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT) [ 54.744368] Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [ 54.757244] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 54.757249] pc : kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0 [ 54.772299] lr : btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart] [ 54.782921] sp : ffff8000805ebca0 [ 54.782923] x29: ffff8000805ebca0 x28: ffffa5c6cf1869c0 x27: ffffa5c6cf186000 [ 54.782931] x26: ffff377b84852400 x25: ffff377b848523c0 x24: ffff377b845e7230 [ 54.782938] x23: ffffa5c6ce8dbe08 x22: ffffa5c6ceb65410 x21: 00000000ffffff92 [ 54.782945] x20: ffffa5c6ce8dbe98 x19: ffffffffffffffac x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 54.807651] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa5c6ce2824ec x15: ffff8001005eb857 [ 54.821917] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffa5c6cf1a02e0 x12: 0000000000000642 [ 54.821924] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffffa5c6cf19d690 x9 : ffffa5c6cf19d688 [ 54.821931] x8 : ffff377b86000028 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 54.821938] x5 : ffff377b86000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 54.843331] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffffffffffac [ 54.857599] Call trace: [ 54.857601] kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0 [ 54.863878] btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart] [ 54.863888] hci_dev_open_sync+0x3a8/0xa04 [ 54.872773] hci_power_on+0x54/0x2e4 [ 54.881832] process_one_work+0x138/0x260 [ 54.881842] worker_thread+0x32c/0x438 [ 54.881847] kthread+0x118/0x11c [ 54.881853] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 54.896406] Code: a9be7bfd 910003fd f9000bf3 aa0003f3 (b940d400) [ 54.896410] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <neeraj.sanjaykale@nxp.com> Tested-by: Guillaume Legoupil <guillaume.legoupil@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit c3a5e3e ] When using cachefiles, lockdep may emit something similar to the circular locking dependency notice below. The problem appears to stem from the following: (1) Cachefiles manipulates xattrs on the files in its cache when called from ->writepages(). (2) The setxattr() and removexattr() system call handlers get the name (and value) from userspace after taking the sb_writers lock, putting accesses of the vma->vm_lock and mm->mmap_lock inside of that. (3) The afs filesystem uses a per-inode lock to prevent multiple revalidation RPCs and in writeback vs truncate to prevent parallel operations from deadlocking against the server on one side and local page locks on the other. Fix this by moving the getting of the name and value in {get,remove}xattr() outside of the sb_writers lock. This also has the minor benefits that we don't need to reget these in the event of a retry and we never try to take the sb_writers lock in the event we can't pull the name and value into the kernel. Alternative approaches that might fix this include moving the dispatch of a write to the cache off to a workqueue or trying to do without the validation lock in afs. Note that this might also affect other filesystems that use netfslib and/or cachefiles. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-build2+ torvalds#956 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ fsstress/6050 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888138fd82f0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}, at: filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 down_write+0x3b/0x50 vma_start_write+0x6b/0xa0 vma_link+0xcc/0x140 insert_vm_struct+0xb7/0xf0 alloc_bprm+0x2c1/0x390 kernel_execve+0x65/0x1a0 call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x14d/0x190 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb0 strncpy_from_user+0x25/0x160 removexattr+0x7f/0x100 __do_sys_fremovexattr+0x7e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 percpu_down_read+0x3c/0x90 vfs_iocb_iter_write+0xe9/0x1d0 __cachefiles_write+0x367/0x430 cachefiles_issue_write+0x299/0x2f0 netfs_advance_write+0x117/0x140 netfs_write_folio.isra.0+0x5ca/0x6e0 netfs_writepages+0x230/0x2f0 afs_writepages+0x4d/0x70 do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa8/0xf0 file_write_and_wait_range+0x59/0x90 afs_release+0x10f/0x270 __fput+0x25f/0x3d0 __do_sys_close+0x43/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&vnode->validate_lock){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 down_read+0x95/0x200 afs_writepages+0x37/0x70 do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0 filemap_invalidate_inode+0x167/0x1e0 netfs_unbuffered_write_iter+0x1bd/0x2d0 vfs_write+0x22e/0x320 ksys_write+0xbc/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}: check_noncircular+0x119/0x160 check_prev_add+0x195/0x430 __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 down_read+0x95/0x200 filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0 __do_fault+0x57/0xd0 do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320 __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320 handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260 do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500 exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90 asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: mapping.invalidate_lock#3 --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &vma->vm_lock->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(&vma->vm_lock->lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&vma->vm_lock->lock); rlock(mapping.invalidate_lock#3); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by fsstress/6050: #0: ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 6050 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.10.0-build2+ torvalds#956 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80 check_noncircular+0x119/0x160 ? queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4be/0x510 ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 ? mark_lock+0x47/0x160 ? init_chain_block+0x9c/0xc0 ? add_chain_block+0x84/0xf0 check_prev_add+0x195/0x430 __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13b/0x230 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0 ? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x120 down_read+0x95/0x200 ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0 ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? __filemap_get_folio+0x25/0x1a0 filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0 ? __pfx_filemap_fault+0x10/0x10 ? find_held_lock+0x7c/0x90 ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pte_offset_map+0x99/0x110 __do_fault+0x57/0xd0 do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320 __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320 ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10 handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260 do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500 exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90 asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2136178.1721725194@warthog.procyon.org.uk cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org [brauner: fix minor issues] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 9715502 ] HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several callbacks. I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output: [ 13.050438] ================================================================== [ 13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh] [ 13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3 [ 13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479 [ 13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0 [ 13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024 [ 13.067860] Call Trace: [ 13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8 [ 13.071486] <TASK> [ 13.071492] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 13.078296] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.082199] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 13.085776] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.089367] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.093255] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.097464] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 13.101461] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.105802] amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.110303] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.114879] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.119450] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082] [ 13.124097] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.127404] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.131925] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.136455] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0 [ 13.140197] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.143602] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b] [ 13.147234] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.150446] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0 [ 13.155061] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.158581] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.161814] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150 [ 13.165029] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0 [ 13.168243] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370 [ 13.171500] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120 [ 13.175000] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0 [ 13.178521] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 13.181771] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180 [ 13.185033] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.188229] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10 [ 13.191446] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.194382] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0 [ 13.197328] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360 [ 13.200283] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.203362] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380 [ 13.206432] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 [ 13.210175] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.213211] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70 [ 13.216688] do_init_module+0x238/0x750 [ 13.219696] load_module+0x5011/0x6af0 [ 13.223096] ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.226743] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.230080] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.233323] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.236778] ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.239703] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.243070] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.245924] ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150 [ 13.248745] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.251503] ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.254198] init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.256826] ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 [ 13.259428] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.261959] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.264471] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.267026] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.269494] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.271949] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.274324] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 [ 13.276671] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.278963] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0 [ 13.281193] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650 [ 13.283420] ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.285619] ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10 [ 13.287714] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.289828] ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420 [ 13.291870] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.293880] ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0 [ 13.295820] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130 [ 13.297874] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 [ 13.299898] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.301905] ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0 [ 13.303877] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.305753] ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130 [ 13.307577] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.309489] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 13.311371] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d [ 13.313234] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 13.317051] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 13.319024] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d [ 13.321100] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 13.323314] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0 [ 13.325505] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 13.327637] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530 [ 13.329737] </TASK> [ 13.333945] Allocated by task 139: [ 13.336111] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.336121] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.336125] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 [ 13.336129] amdtp_hid_probe+0xb1/0x440 [amd_sfh] [ 13.336138] amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0xb8a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh] [ 13.336144] sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh] [ 13.336150] process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0 [ 13.336155] worker_thread+0x795/0x1250 [ 13.336160] kthread+0x290/0x350 [ 13.336164] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 [ 13.336169] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 13.338175] Freed by task 139: [ 13.340064] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.340072] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.340076] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.340081] poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.340085] __kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50 [ 13.340089] kfree+0xe5/0x310 [ 13.340094] amdtp_hid_remove+0xb2/0x160 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340102] amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit+0x324/0x640 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340107] amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0x94a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340113] sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340118] process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0 [ 13.340123] worker_thread+0x795/0x1250 [ 13.340127] kthread+0x290/0x350 [ 13.340132] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 [ 13.340136] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 13.342482] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813152f400 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 [ 13.347357] The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of freed 64-byte region [ffff88813152f400, ffff88813152f440) [ 13.347367] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 13.355409] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13152f [ 13.355416] anon flags: 0x2ffff8000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 13.355423] page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) [ 13.355429] raw: 02ffff8000000000 ffff8881000428c0 ffffea0004c43a00 0000000000000005 [ 13.355435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 [ 13.355439] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 13.357295] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 13.357299] ffff88813152f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357303] ffff88813152f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357306] >ffff88813152f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357309] ^ [ 13.357311] ffff88813152f480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357315] ffff88813152f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357318] ================================================================== [ 13.357405] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 13.383534] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0a1bc4140000013: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 13.383544] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x050e020a00000098-0x050e020a0000009f] [ 13.383551] CPU: 3 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G B 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0 [ 13.383561] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024 [ 13.383565] RIP: 0010:amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh] [ 13.383580] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 78 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 63 08 49 8d 7c 24 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1a 03 00 00 45 8b 74 24 10 45 [ 13.383585] RSP: 0018:ffff8881261f7388 EFLAGS: 00010212 [ 13.383592] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88813152f400 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 13.383597] RDX: 00a1c04140000013 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 050e020a0000009b [ 13.383600] RBP: ffff88814d010000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: fffffbfff3ddb8c0 [ 13.383604] R10: ffffffff9eedc607 R11: ffff88810ce98000 R12: 050e020a0000008b [ 13.383607] R13: ffff88814d010000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 13.383611] FS: 00007a21f94d0880(0000) GS:ffff8887e7d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 13.383615] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 13.383618] CR2: 00007e0014c438f0 CR3: 000000012614c000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 [ 13.383622] PKRU: 55555554 [ 13.383625] Call Trace: [ 13.383629] <TASK> [ 13.383632] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 [ 13.383644] ? die_addr+0x46/0x70 [ 13.383652] ? exc_general_protection+0x150/0x240 [ 13.383664] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ 13.383674] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.383686] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.383697] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.383706] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383713] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082] [ 13.383727] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.383739] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383745] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.383753] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0 [ 13.383762] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383768] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b] [ 13.383790] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383795] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0 [ 13.383806] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.383818] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383826] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150 [ 13.383832] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0 [ 13.383838] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370 [ 13.383844] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120 [ 13.383851] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0 [ 13.383857] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383863] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180 [ 13.383868] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383874] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383880] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383887] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0 [ 13.383895] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360 [ 13.383902] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.383910] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380 [ 13.383919] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383927] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383933] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70 [ 13.383943] do_init_module+0x238/0x750 [ 13.383955] load_module+0x5011/0x6af0 [ 13.383962] ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.383968] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.383973] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.383980] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.383993] ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384007] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.384012] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384018] ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150 [ 13.384025] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384032] ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.384037] init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.384044] ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384050] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.384055] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384060] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.384066] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.384071] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384080] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384085] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 [ 13.384091] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384096] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0 [ 13.384106] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650 [ 13.384114] ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384120] ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384129] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384135] ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420 [ 13.384142] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384147] ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0 [ 13.384157] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130 [ 13.384164] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 [ 13.384174] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384179] ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0 [ 13.384188] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384193] ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130 [ 13.384201] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384206] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 13.384212] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d [ 13.384263] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 13.384267] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 13.384273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d [ 13.384277] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 13.384280] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0 [ 13.384284] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 13.384288] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530 [ 13.384297] </TASK> [ 13.384299] Modules linked in: soundwire_amd(+) hid_sensor_gyro_3d(+) hid_sensor_magn_3d hid_sensor_accel_3d soundwire_generic_allocation amdxcp hid_sensor_trigger drm_exec industrialio_triggered_buffer soundwire_bus gpu_sched kvm_amd kfifo_buf qmi_helpers joydev drm_buddy hid_sensor_iio_common mousedev snd_soc_core industrialio i2c_algo_bit mac80211 snd_compress drm_suballoc_helper kvm snd_hda_intel drm_ttm_helper ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_intel_dspcfg ttm thinkpad_acpi(+) snd_intel_sdw_acpi hid_sensor_hub snd_rpl_pci_acp6x drm_display_helper snd_hda_codec hid_multitouch libarc4 snd_acp_pci platform_profile think_lmi(+) hid_generic firmware_attributes_class wmi_bmof cec snd_acp_legacy_common sparse_keymap rapl snd_hda_core psmouse cfg80211 pcspkr snd_pci_acp6x snd_hwdep video snd_pcm snd_pci_acp5x snd_timer snd_rn_pci_acp3x ucsi_acpi snd_acp_config snd sp5100_tco rfkill snd_soc_acpi typec_ucsi thunderbolt amd_sfh k10temp mhi soundcore i2c_piix4 snd_pci_acp3x typec i2c_hid_acpi roles i2c_hid wmi acpi_tad amd_pmc [ 13.384454] mac_hid i2c_dev crypto_user loop nfnetlink zram ip_tables x_tables dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee dm_mod crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic gf128mul ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw sha512_ssse3 atkbd sha256_ssse3 libps2 sha1_ssse3 vivaldi_fmap nvme aesni_intel crypto_simd nvme_core cryptd ccp xhci_pci i8042 nvme_auth xhci_pci_renesas serio vfat fat btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq [ 13.384552] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- KASAN reports a use-after-free of hid->driver_data in function amd_sfh_get_report(). The backtrace indicates that the function is called by amdtp_hid_request() which is one of the callbacks of hid device. The current make sure that driver_data is freed only once hid_destroy_device() returned. Note that I observed the crash both on v6.9.9 and v6.10.0. The code seems to be as it was from the early days of the driver. Signed-off-by: Olivier Sobrie <olivier@sobrie.be> Acked-by: Basavaraj Natikar <Basavaraj.Natikar@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit b739dff ] When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table (dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"): OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0 OF: parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2 OF: intspec=4 OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2 OF: -> addrsize=3 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764 CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G O 6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1 Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84 print_report+0x150/0x448 kasan_report+0x98/0x140 __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0 of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270 parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120 of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0 fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0 device_add+0xb38/0xc30 of_device_add+0x64/0x90 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170 of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600 of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0 __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230 __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4 of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94 ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4 head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2) raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== OF: -> got it ! Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a buffer of sufficient size. Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <stefan.wiehler@nokia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812100652.3800963-1-stefan.wiehler@nokia.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 4df1536 upstream. Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted. Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743 CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434 binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Allocated by task 743: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270 binder_new_node+0x50/0x700 binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8 binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Freed by task 745: kfree+0xbc/0x208 binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4 binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c [...] ================================================================== To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the boundaries of the data section. Fixes: 6d98eb9 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn") Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822182353.2129600-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit cd9253c upstream. If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict result. This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by two users in the Link tags below. Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information through a special value stored in current->journal_info. This is safe because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not holding a transaction handle, so current->journal_info is NULL. The following C program triggers the issue: $ cat repro.c /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <pthread.h> static int fd; static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) { while (count > 0) { ssize_t ret; ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset); if (ret < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return ret; } count -= ret; buf += ret; } return 0; } static void *fsync_loop(void *arg) { while (1) { int ret; ret = fsync(fd); if (ret != 0) { perror("Fsync failed"); exit(6); } } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long pagesize; void *write_buf; pthread_t fsyncer; int ret; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <file path>\n", argv[0]); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666); if (fd == -1) { perror("Failed to open/create file"); return 1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); if (pagesize == -1) { perror("Failed to get page size"); return 2; } ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, pagesize); if (ret) { perror("Failed to allocate buffer"); return 3; } ret = pthread_create(&fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret); return 4; } while (1) { ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0); if (ret != 0) { perror("Write failed"); exit(5); } } return 0; } $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Reported-by: Paulo Dias <paulo.miguel.dias@gmail.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187 Reported-by: Andreas Jahn <jahn-andi@web.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199 Reported-by: syzbot+4704b3cc972bd76024f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000044ff540620d7dee2@google.com/ Fixes: 939b656 ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 4f9a714 upstream. Buffer 'card->dai_link' is reallocated in 'meson_card_reallocate_links()', so move 'pad' pointer initialization after this function when memory is already reallocated. Kasan bug report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in axg_card_add_link+0x76c/0x9bc Read of size 8 at addr ffff000000e8b260 by task modprobe/356 CPU: 0 PID: 356 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O 6.9.12-sdkernel #1 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 print_report+0xfc/0x5c0 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 axg_card_add_link+0x76c/0x9bc [snd_soc_meson_axg_sound_card] meson_card_probe+0x344/0x3b8 [snd_soc_meson_card_utils] platform_probe+0x8c/0xf4 really_probe+0x110/0x39c __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x18c driver_probe_device+0x108/0x1d8 __driver_attach+0xd0/0x25c bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x154 driver_attach+0x34/0x44 bus_add_driver+0x134/0x294 driver_register+0xa8/0x1e8 __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x54 axg_card_pdrv_init+0x20/0x1000 [snd_soc_meson_axg_sound_card] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x25c do_init_module+0x10c/0x334 load_module+0x24c4/0x26cc init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1f4/0x41c invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x13c do_el0_svc+0x30/0x40 el0_svc+0x38/0x78 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Fixes: 7864a79 ("ASoC: meson: add axg sound card support") Cc: Stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <avkrasnov@salutedevices.com> Reviewed-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911142425.598631-1-avkrasnov@salutedevices.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 89a906d ] Floating point instructions in userspace can crash some arm kernels built with clang/LLD 17.0.6: BUG: unsupported FP instruction in kernel mode FPEXC == 0xc0000780 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#1] ARM CPU: 0 PID: 196 Comm: vfp-reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0 #1 Hardware name: BCM2835 PC is at vfp_support_entry+0xc8/0x2cc LR is at do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250 pc : [<c0101d50>] lr : [<c010a80c>] psr: a0000013 sp : dc8d1f68 ip : 60000013 fp : bedea19c r10: ec532b17 r9 : 00000010 r8 : 0044766c r7 : c0000780 r6 : ec532b17 r5 : c1c13800 r4 : dc8d1fb0 r3 : c10072c4 r2 : c0101c88 r1 : ec532b17 r0 : 0044766c Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 00c5387d Table: 0251c008 DAC: 00000051 Register r0 information: non-paged memory Register r1 information: vmalloc memory Register r2 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory Register r3 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory Register r4 information: 2-page vmalloc region Register r5 information: slab kmalloc-cg-2k Register r6 information: vmalloc memory Register r7 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory Register r8 information: non-paged memory Register r9 information: zero-size pointer Register r10 information: vmalloc memory Register r11 information: non-paged memory Register r12 information: non-paged memory Process vfp-reproducer (pid: 196, stack limit = 0x61aaaf8b) Stack: (0xdc8d1f68 to 0xdc8d2000) 1f60: 0000081f b6f69300 0000000f c10073f4 c10072c4 dc8d1fb0 1f80: ec532b17 0c532b17 0044766c b6f9ccd8 00000000 c010a80c 00447670 60000010 1fa0: ffffffff c1c13800 00c5387d c0100f10 b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188 1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c 1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff 00000000 00000000 Call trace: [<c0101d50>] (vfp_support_entry) from [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250) [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr) from [<c0100f10>] (__und_usr+0x70/0x80) Exception stack(0xdc8d1fb0 to 0xdc8d1ff8) 1fa0: b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188 1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c 1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff Code: 0a000061 e3877202 e594003c e3a09010 (eef16a10) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- This is a minimal userspace reproducer on a Raspberry Pi Zero W: #include <stdio.h> #include <math.h> int main(void) { double v = 1.0; printf("%fn", NAN + *(volatile double *)&v); return 0; } Another way to consistently trigger the oops is: calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ python -c "import json" The bug reproduces only when the kernel is built with DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n, because the pr_debug() calls act as barriers even when not activated. This is the output from the same kernel source built with the same compiler and DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y, where the userspace reproducer works as expected: VFP: bounce: trigger ec532b17 fpexc c0000780 VFP: emulate: INST=0xee377b06 SCR=0x00000000 VFP: bounce: trigger eef1fa10 fpexc c0000780 VFP: emulate: INST=0xeeb40b40 SCR=0x00000000 VFP: raising exceptions 30000000 calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ ./vfp-reproducer nan Crudely grepping for vmsr/vmrs instructions in the otherwise nearly idential text for vfp_support_entry() makes the problem obvious: vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cb8] <+48>: vmrs r7, fpexc vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cd8] <+80>: vmsr fpexc, r0 vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d20] <+152>: vmsr fpexc, r7 vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d38] <+176>: vmrs r4, fpexc vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d6c] <+228>: vmrs r0, fpscr vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101dc4] <+316>: vmsr fpexc, r0 vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101dc8] <+320>: vmrs r0, fpsid vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101dcc] <+324>: vmrs r6, fpscr vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101e10] <+392>: vmrs r10, fpinst vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101eb8] <+560>: vmrs r10, fpinst2 vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101cb8] <+48>: vmrs r7, fpexc vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101cd8] <+80>: vmsr fpexc, r0 vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101d20] <+152>: vmsr fpexc, r7 vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101d30] <+168>: vmrs r0, fpscr vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101d50] <+200>: vmrs r6, fpscr <== BOOM! vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101d6c] <+228>: vmsr fpexc, r0 vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101d70] <+232>: vmrs r0, fpsid vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101da4] <+284>: vmrs r10, fpinst vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101df8] <+368>: vmrs r4, fpexc vmlinux.llvm.bad [0xc0101e5c] <+468>: vmrs r10, fpinst2 I think LLVM's reordering is valid as the code is currently written: the compiler doesn't know the instructions have side effects in hardware. Fix by using "asm volatile" in fmxr() and fmrx(), so they cannot be reordered with respect to each other. The original compiler now produces working kernels on my hardware with DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n. This is the relevant piece of the diff of the vfp_support_entry() text, from the original oopsing kernel to a working kernel with this patch: vmrs r0, fpscr tst r0, #4096 bne 0xc0101d48 tst r0, #458752 beq 0xc0101ecc orr r7, r7, #536870912 ldr r0, [r4, #0x3c] mov r9, #16 -vmrs r6, fpscr orr r9, r9, #251658240 add r0, r0, #4 str r0, [r4, #0x3c] mvn r0, torvalds#159 sub r0, r0, #-1207959552 and r0, r7, r0 vmsr fpexc, r0 vmrs r0, fpsid +vmrs r6, fpscr and r0, r0, #983040 cmp r0, #65536 bne 0xc0101d88 Fixes: 4708fb0 ("ARM: vfp: Reimplement VFP exception entry in C code") Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvin@wbinvd.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 862bf7c ] mt7915_band_config() sets band_idx = 1 on the main phy for mt7986 with MT7975_ONE_ADIE or MT7976_ONE_ADIE. Commit 0335c03 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to checking tx queue fill status") introduced a dereference of the phys array indirectly indexed by band_idx via wcid->phy_idx in mt76_wcid_cleanup(). This caused the following Oops on affected mt7986 devices: Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000024 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000042545000 [0000000000000024] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ... mt7915e mt76_connac_lib mt76 mac80211 cfg80211 ... CPU: 2 PID: 1631 Comm: hostapd Not tainted 5.15.150 #0 Hardware name: ZyXEL EX5700 (Telenor) (DT) pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76] lr : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x64/0x22c [mt76] sp : ffffffc00a803700 x29: ffffffc00a803700 x28: ffffff80008f7300 x27: ffffff80003f3c00 x26: ffffff80000a7880 x25: ffffffc008c26e00 x24: 0000000000000001 x23: ffffffc000a68114 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff8004172cc8 x20: ffffffc00a803748 x19: ffffff8004152020 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 00000000000017c0 x16: ffffffc008ef5000 x15: 0000000000000be0 x14: ffffff8004172e28 x13: ffffff8004172e28 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffff8004172e30 x9 : ffffff8004172e28 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffff8004156020 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000031 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffff80008f7300 x0 : 0000000000000024 Call trace: mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76] __mt76_sta_remove+0x70/0xbc [mt76] mt76_sta_state+0x8c/0x1a4 [mt76] mt7915_eeprom_get_power_delta+0x11e4/0x23a0 [mt7915e] drv_sta_state+0x144/0x274 [mac80211] sta_info_move_state+0x1cc/0x2a4 [mac80211] sta_set_sinfo+0xaf8/0xc24 [mac80211] sta_info_destroy_addr_bss+0x4c/0x6c [mac80211] ieee80211_color_change_finish+0x1c08/0x1e70 [mac80211] cfg80211_check_station_change+0x1360/0x4710 [cfg80211] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xb4/0x110 genl_rcv_msg+0xd0/0x1bc netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x120 genl_rcv+0x34/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x2ec netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3d0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x210 ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0 __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0xa0 __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x40/0xd0 el0_svc+0x14/0x4c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x110 el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160 Code: d2800002 910092c0 52800023 f9800011 (885f7c01) ---[ end trace 7e42dd9a39ed2281 ]--- Fix by using mt76_dev_phy() which will map band_idx to the correct phy for all hardware combinations. Fixes: 0335c03 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to checking tx queue fill status") Link: openwrt/openwrt#14548 Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240713130010.516037-1-bjorn@mork.no Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 04ccecf ] Blamed commit accidentally removed a check for rt->rt6i_idev being NULL, as spotted by syzbot: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10998 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00208-g625403177711 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline] RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914 Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06 RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0 RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18 R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> addrconf_ifdown+0x15d/0x1bd0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3856 addrconf_notify+0x3cb/0x1020 notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xd81/0x1c40 net/core/dev.c:11352 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11414 [inline] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x303/0x370 net/core/dev.c:11289 unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:3129 [inline] __tun_detach+0x6b9/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:685 tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:701 [inline] tun_chr_close+0x108/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3510 __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:882 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1031 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1042 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1040 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1040 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1acc77def9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f1acc77decf. RSP: 002b:00007ffeb26fa738 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1acc77def9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000043 RBP: 00007f1acc7dd508 R08: 00007ffeb26f84d7 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007ffeb26fa8e0 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline] RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914 Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06 RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0 RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18 R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: e332bc6 ("ipv6: Don't call with rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240913083147.3095442-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a0bd28 ] Case #1: SQLite App GC Thread Kworker Shrinker - f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_commit_atomic_write - filemap_write_and_wait_range : write atomic_file's data to cow_inode echo 3 > drop_caches to drop atomic_file's cache. - f2fs_gc - gc_data_segment - move_data_page - set_page_dirty - writepages - f2fs_do_write_data_page : overwrite atomic_file's data to cow_inode - f2fs_down_write(&fi->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]) - __f2fs_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_up_write(&fi->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]) Case #2: SQLite App GC Thread Kworker - f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write - __writeback_single_inode - do_writepages - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page : write atomic_file's data to cow_inode - f2fs_gc - gc_data_segment - move_data_page - set_page_dirty - writepages - f2fs_do_write_data_page : overwrite atomic_file's data to cow_inode - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write In above cases racing in between atomic_write and GC, previous data in atomic_file may be overwrited to cow_file, result in data corruption. This patch introduces PAGE_PRIVATE_ATOMIC_WRITE bit flag in page.private, and use it to indicate that there is last dirty data in atomic file, and the data should be writebacked into cow_file, if the flag is not tagged in page, we should never write data across files. Fixes: 3db1de0 ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way") Cc: Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@google.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit 18ec12c ] Inject fault while probing of-fpga-region, if kasprintf() fails in module_add_driver(), the second sysfs_remove_link() in exit path will cause null-ptr-deref as below because kernfs_name_hash() will call strlen() with NULL driver_name. Fix it by releasing resources based on the exit path sequence. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [dfffffc000000000] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: of_fpga_region(+) fpga_region fpga_bridge cfg80211 rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc ipv6 [last unloaded: of_fpga_region] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2036 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-g6a0e38264012 torvalds#295 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : strlen+0x24/0xb0 lr : kernfs_name_hash+0x1c/0xc4 sp : ffffffc081f97380 x29: ffffffc081f97380 x28: ffffffc081f97b90 x27: ffffff80c821c2a0 x26: ffffffedac0be418 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff80c09d2000 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000001840 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 1ffffff8103f2e42 x14: 00000000f1f1f1f1 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffb01812d61d x11: 1ffffff01812d61c x10: ffffffb01812d61c x9 : dfffffc000000000 x8 : 0000004fe7ed29e4 x7 : ffffff80c096b0e7 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffffff80c096b0e0 x4 : 1ffffffdb990efa2 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: strlen+0x24/0xb0 kernfs_name_hash+0x1c/0xc4 kernfs_find_ns+0x118/0x2e8 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x80/0x100 sysfs_remove_link+0x74/0xa8 module_add_driver+0x278/0x394 bus_add_driver+0x1f0/0x43c driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 of_fpga_region_init+0x20/0x1000 [of_fpga_region] do_one_initcall+0x110/0x788 do_init_module+0x1dc/0x5c8 load_module+0x3c38/0x4cac init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128 idempotent_init_module+0x2cc/0x528 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100 invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c el0_svc+0x48/0xb8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: f2fbffe1 a90157f4 12000802 aa0003f5 (38e16861) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception Fixes: 85d2b0a ("module: don't ignore sysfs_create_link() failures") Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812080658.2791982-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
[ Upstream commit c8770db ] We have some machines running stock Ubuntu 20.04.6 which is their 5.4.0-174-generic kernel that are running ceph and recently hit a null ptr dereference in tcp_rearm_rto(). Initially hitting it from the TLP path, but then later we also saw it getting hit from the RACK case as well. Here are examples of the oops messages we saw in each of those cases: Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.780353] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.787572] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.792971] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.798362] PGD 0 P4D 0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.801164] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.805091] CPU: 0 PID: 9180 Comm: msgr-worker-1 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic torvalds#193-Ubuntu Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.814996] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.825952] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.830656] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.849665] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.855149] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.862542] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.869933] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.877318] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.884710] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.892095] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.900438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.906435] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.913822] PKRU: 55555554 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.916786] Call Trace: Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.919488] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.921765] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.925859] ? __die+0x90/0xd9 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.929169] ? no_context+0x196/0x380 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.933088] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.938216] ? ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.943000] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.947873] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.952486] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.957104] ? ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.961279] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.965458] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.969465] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.973217] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.977313] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.981408] tcp_send_loss_probe+0x10b/0x220 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.985937] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.990809] tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.994814] ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.999866] call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.003782] __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.008309] ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.012841] ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.017718] ? lapic_next_event+0x21/0x30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.021984] ? clockevents_program_event+0x8f/0xe0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.027035] run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.031212] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.035044] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.039480] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.041840] do_softirq.part.0+0x46/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.046022] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.050460] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1e/0x20 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.054817] nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x29e/0xbe0 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.060994] ? get_l4proto+0xe7/0x190 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.066220] nf_conntrack_in+0xe9/0x670 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.071618] ipv6_conntrack_local+0x14/0x20 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.077356] nf_hook_slow+0x45/0xb0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.081098] ip6_xmit+0x3f0/0x5d0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.084670] ? ipv6_anycast_cleanup+0x50/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.089282] ? __sk_dst_check+0x38/0x70 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.093381] ? inet6_csk_route_socket+0x13b/0x200 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.098346] inet6_csk_xmit+0xa7/0xf0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.102263] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x550/0xb30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.106701] tcp_write_xmit+0x3c6/0xc20 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.110792] ? __alloc_skb+0x98/0x1d0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.114708] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x37/0x100 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.119667] tcp_push+0xfd/0x100 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.123150] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xc70/0xdd0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.127588] tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.131245] inet6_sendmsg+0x43/0x70 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.135075] __sock_sendmsg+0x48/0x70 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.138994] ____sys_sendmsg+0x212/0x280 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.143172] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.147098] ? __seccomp_filter+0x7e/0x6b0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.151446] ? __switch_to+0x39c/0x460 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.155453] ? __switch_to_asm+0x42/0x80 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.159636] ? __switch_to_asm+0x5a/0x80 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.163816] __sys_sendmsg+0x5c/0xa0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.167647] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.171832] do_syscall_64+0x57/0x190 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.175748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.181055] RIP: 0033:0x7f1ef692618d Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.184893] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 ca ee ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 2f 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 fe ee ff ff 48 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.203889] RSP: 002b:00007f1ef4a26aa0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.211708] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000084b RCX: 00007f1ef692618d Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.219091] RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007f1ef4a26b10 RDI: 0000000000000275 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.226475] RBP: 0000000000004000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000020 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.233859] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000084b Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.241243] R13: 00007f1ef4a26b10 R14: 0000000000000275 R15: 000055592030f1e8 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.248628] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler nft_ct sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 mlx5_core hid_generic pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul tls usbhid ahci mlxfw bnxt_en libahci hid nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.324334] CR2: 0000000000000020 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.327944] ---[ end trace 68a2b679d1cfb4f1 ]--- Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.433435] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.438137] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.457144] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.462629] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.470012] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.477396] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.484779] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.492164] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.499547] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.507886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.513884] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.521267] PKRU: 55555554 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.524230] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.530885] Kernel Offset: 0x1b200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Jul 26 15:05:03 rx [11061396.660181] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- After we hit this we disabled TLP by setting tcp_early_retrans to 0 and then hit the crash in the RACK case: Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.265582] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.272719] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.278030] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.283343] PGD 0 P4D 0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.286057] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.289896] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic torvalds#193-Ubuntu Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.299107] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.309970] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.314584] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.333499] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600a50960 EFLAGS: 00010246 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.338895] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.346193] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff92d687ed8160 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.353489] RBP: ffffb42600a50978 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000cd896dcc Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.360786] R10: ffff92dc3404f400 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff92d687ed8000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.368084] R13: ffff92d687ed8160 R14: 00000000cd896dcc R15: 00000000cd8fca81 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.375381] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93158ad40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.383632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.389544] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e775ce006 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.396839] PKRU: 55555554 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.399717] Call Trace: Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.402335] Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.404525] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.408532] ? __die+0x90/0xd9 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.411760] ? no_context+0x196/0x380 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.415599] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.420392] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1e/0x30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.424401] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.428927] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.433450] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.437542] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.441470] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.445134] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.449145] tcp_ack+0xa32/0xb30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.452542] tcp_rcv_established+0x13c/0x670 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.456981] ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0x48/0x220 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.461419] tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdb/0x450 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.465257] tcp_v6_rcv+0xc2b/0xd10 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.468918] ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd3/0x4e0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.473706] ip6_input_finish+0x15/0x20 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.477710] ip6_input+0xa2/0xb0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.481109] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.486151] ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.490679] ip6_sublist_rcv+0x1aa/0x250 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.494779] ? ip6_rcv_finish_core.isra.0+0xa0/0xa0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.499828] ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.503748] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1a4/0x250 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.509057] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1a1/0x2b0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.514538] gro_normal_list.part.0+0x1e/0x40 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.519068] napi_complete_done+0x91/0x130 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.523352] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x18e/0x610 [mlx5_core] Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.528481] net_rx_action+0x142/0x390 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.532398] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.536142] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.539452] do_IRQ+0x5a/0xf0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.542590] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.546421] Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.548695] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.553399] Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.572309] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600177e70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffc2 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.580040] RAX: ffffffff8ed08b20 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000001 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.587337] RDX: 00000000f48eeca2 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.594635] RBP: ffffb42600177e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000020f Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.601931] R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.609229] R13: ffff93157deb5f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.616530] ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.620886] ? default_idle+0x20/0x140 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.624804] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.628545] default_idle_call+0x23/0x30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.632640] do_idle+0x1fb/0x270 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.636035] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.640126] start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.644218] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.648568] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet ast mii drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 hid_generic mlx5_core pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul usbhid ahci tls mlxfw bnxt_en hid libahci nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi [last unloaded: cpuid] Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.726180] CR2: 0000000000000020 Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.729718] ---[ end trace e0e2e37e4e612984 ]--- Prior to seeing the first crash and on other machines we also see the warning in tcp_send_loss_probe() where packets_out is non-zero, but both transmit and retrans queues are empty so we know the box is seeing some accounting issue in this area: Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: invalid inflight: 2 state 1 cwnd 68 mss 8988 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 16 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2605 tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif joydev input_leds rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_he> Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CPU: 16 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Not tainted 5.4.0-174-generic torvalds#193-Ubuntu Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 08 26 01 00 75 e2 41 0f b6 54 24 12 41 8b 8c 24 c0 06 00 00 45 89 f0 48 c7 c7 e0 b4 20 a7 c6 05 8d 08 26 01 01 e8 4a c0 0f 00 <0f> 0b eb ba 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb7838088ce00 EFLAGS: 00010286 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b84b5630430 RCX: 0000000000000006 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff9b8e4621c8c0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb7838088ce18 R08: 0000000000000927 R09: 0000000000000004 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9b84b5630000 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000231c R15: ffff9b84b5630430 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9b8e46200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CR2: 000056238cec2380 CR3: 0000003e49ede005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: PKRU: 55555554 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Call Trace: Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: <IRQ> Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __warn+0x98/0xe0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? report_bug+0xd1/0x100 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? ktime_get+0x3e/0xa0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0x140 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: </IRQ> Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb783801cfe70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: ffffffffa6908b20 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000001 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 000000006fc0c97e RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb783801cfe90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000225 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: ffff9b8e390b0000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? default_idle+0x20/0x140 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: default_idle_call+0x23/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: do_idle+0x1fb/0x270 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ---[ end trace e7ac822987e33be1 ]--- The NULL ptr deref is coming from tcp_rto_delta_us() attempting to pull an skb off the head of the retransmit queue and then dereferencing that skb to get the skb_mstamp_ns value via tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb). The crash is the same one that was reported a # of years ago here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/86c0f836-9a7c-438b-d81a-839be45f1f58@gmail.com/T/#t and the kernel we're running has the fix which was added to resolve this issue. Unfortunately we've been unsuccessful so far in reproducing this problem in the lab and do not have the luxury of pushing out a new kernel to try and test if newer kernels resolve this issue at the moment. I realize this is a report against both an Ubuntu kernel and also an older 5.4 kernel. I have reported this issue to Ubuntu here: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2077657 however I feel like since this issue has possibly cropped up again it makes sense to build in some protection in this path (even on the latest kernel versions) since the code in question just blindly assumes there's a valid skb without testing if it's NULL b/f it looks at the timestamp. Given we have seen crashes in this path before and now this case it seems like we should protect ourselves for when packets_out accounting is incorrect. While we should fix that root cause we should also just make sure the skb is not NULL before dereferencing it. Also add a warn once here to capture some information if/when the problem case is hit again. Fixes: e1a10ef ("tcp: introduce tcp_rto_delta_us() helper for xmit timer fix") Signed-off-by: Josh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 44d1745 upstream. Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the fairness of r/w semaphores). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 2 lock(&vcpu->mutex); 3 lock(&kvm->srcu); 4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 5 lock(kvm_lock); 6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 8 sync(&kvm->srcu); Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(): cpuhp_cpufreq_online() | -> cpufreq_online() | -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits() | -> __cpufreq_driver_target() | -> __target_index() | -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin() | -> cpufreq_notify_transition() | -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier() But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual. The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock. For now, settle for fixing the most blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip torvalds#330 Tainted: G S O ------------------------------------------------------ tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock: ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0 static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30 kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel] __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0 synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30 kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30 lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260 __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] param_attr_store+0x93/0x100 module_attr_store+0x22/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x28d/0x380 ksys_write+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-ID: <20240830043600.127750-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit 8151a6c upstream. [why] Encounter NULL pointer dereference uner mst + dsc setup. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 #1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2 Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022 RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper] Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8> RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224 RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280 RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850 R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224 FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? plist_add+0xbe/0x100 ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026] ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026] compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] ? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0 [how] dsc recompute should be skipped if no mode change detected on the new request. If detected, keep checking whether the stream is already on current state or not. Cc: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <rodrigo.siqueira@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Fangzhi Zuo <Jerry.Zuo@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <wayne.lin@amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit f0b94c1 upstream. With the current bandwidth allocation we end up reserving too much for the USB 3.x and PCIe tunnels that leads to reduced capabilities for the second DisplayPort tunnel. Fix this by decreasing the USB 3.x allocation to 900 Mb/s which then allows both tunnels to get the maximum HBR2 bandwidth. This way, the reserved bandwidth for USB 3.x and PCIe, would be 1350 Mb/s (taking weights of USB 3.x and PCIe into account). So bandwidth allocations on a link are: USB 3.x + PCIe tunnels => 1350 Mb/s DisplayPort tunnel #1 => 17280 Mb/s DisplayPort tunnel #2 => 17280 Mb/s Total consumed bandwidth is 35910 Mb/s. So that all the above can be tunneled on a Gen 3 link (which allows maximum of 36000 Mb/s). Fixes: 582e70b ("thunderbolt: Change bandwidth reservations to comply USB4 v2") Signed-off-by: Gil Fine <gil.fine@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tobetter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 10, 2024
commit d3d17e2 upstream. Olliver reported that his system crashes when plugging in Thunderbolt 1 device: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:tb_port_do_update_credits+0x1b/0x130 [thunderbolt] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? tb_port_do_update_credits+0x1b/0x130 ? tb_switch_update_link_attributes+0x83/0xd0 tb_switch_add+0x7a2/0xfe0 tb_scan_port+0x236/0x6f0 tb_handle_hotplug+0x6db/0x900 process_one_work+0x171/0x340 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe5/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> This is due the fact that some Thunderbolt 1 devices only have one lane adapter. Fix this by checking for the lane 1 before we read its credits. Reported-by: Olliver Schinagl <oliver@schinagl.nl> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/c24c7882-6254-4e68-8f22-f3e8f65dc84f@schinagl.nl/ Fixes: 81af295 ("thunderbolt: Add support for asymmetric link") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Gil Fine <gil.fine@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Unlike in branch odroidxu3-3.10.y the CPU stepping is not working. This means, that the thermal_core shuts down the machine, instead of throttling the frequencies to lower values. In branch odroidxu3-3.10.y this is working correctly.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: