Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock #465

gaborbernat · 2026-01-09T17:26:28Z

Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock by adding O_NOFOLLOW flag protection.

Vulnerability Details

A Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition vulnerability existed in SoftFileLock._acquire() between the permission check and the actual file creation. An attacker with local filesystem access could create a symlink at the lock path during this window, causing the lock to operate on an unintended target file.

Attack scenario:

raise_on_not_writable_file() validates permissions
RACE WINDOW - attacker creates symlink
os.open() tries to open lock path
Without O_NOFOLLOW: symlink is followed, lock operates on wrong file
With O_NOFOLLOW: symlink is rejected, attack prevented

Attack requirements:

Local filesystem access
Permission to create symlinks (normal for regular users)

Changes Made

Add conditional O_NOFOLLOW flag:

Pattern used: o_nofollow = getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", None)
Same approach as UnixFileLock (commit 5088854)
Gracefully degrades on platforms without O_NOFOLLOW (e.g., GraalPy)

Documentation update:

Added security warning about TOCTOU vulnerability
Explains protection on platforms with O_NOFOLLOW
Recommends UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock for security-sensitive applications

Why This Fix is Safe

The pre-check (raise_on_not_writable_file) is safe from TOCTOU itself because:

It only reads metadata via os.stat() (doesn't follow symlinks for checking)
The attack only works if a symlink is followed by a write operation
By preventing symlink following in os.open() with O_NOFOLLOW, we block the attack even if the symlink is created during the race window

Security Improvement

Platform	O_NOFOLLOW Support	Result
Most modern systems	✅ Yes	Symlink attacks completely prevented
Rare platforms (GraalPy)	❌ No	TOCTOU window remains but documented

Add O_NOFOLLOW flag to prevent symlink attacks. The vulnerability existed between the permission check and the actual file creation, allowing an attacker to create a symlink at the lock path. How the fix prevents the attack: 1. raise_on_not_writable_file() validates permissions (doesn't follow symlinks) 2. RACE WINDOW: attacker creates symlink to target file 3. os.open() with O_NOFOLLOW refuses to follow the symlink 4. Attack is prevented - the symlink won't help attacker Changes: - Add conditional O_NOFOLLOW flag (like UnixFileLock does in commit 5088854) - Gracefully degrade on platforms without O_NOFOLLOW (e.g., GraalPy) - No behavioral changes to existing code Security improvement: - Platforms with O_NOFOLLOW: ✅ Symlink attacks completely prevented - Platforms without O_NOFOLLOW: ⚠️ TOCTOU window remains but documented The pre-check (raise_on_not_writable_file) is safe from TOCTOU itself because it only reads metadata. The attack only works if a symlink is followed by a write operation. By preventing symlink following in os.open() with O_NOFOLLOW, the attack is blocked even if the symlink is created during the race window. Reported by George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007) 🤖 Generated with Claude Code Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [filelock](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock) | `3.20.2` → `3.20.3` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/filelock/3.20.3?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/filelock/3.20.2/3.20.3?slim=true) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2026-22701](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/security/advisories/GHSA-qmgc-5h2g-mvrw) ## Vulnerability Summary **Title:** Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock **Affected Component:** `filelock` package - `SoftFileLock` class **File:** `src/filelock/_soft.py` lines 17-27 **CWE:** CWE-362, CWE-367, CWE-59 --- ## Description A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability exists in the `SoftFileLock` implementation of the filelock package. An attacker with local filesystem access and permission to create symlinks can exploit a race condition between the permission validation and file creation to cause lock operations to fail or behave unexpectedly. The vulnerability occurs in the `_acquire()` method between `raise_on_not_writable_file()` (permission check) and `os.open()` (file creation). During this race window, an attacker can create a symlink at the lock file path, potentially causing the lock to operate on an unintended target file or leading to denial of service. ### Attack Scenario ``` 1. Lock attempts to acquire on /tmp/app.lock 2. Permission validation passes 3. [RACE WINDOW] - Attacker creates: ln -s /tmp/important.txt /tmp/app.lock 4. os.open() tries to create lock file 5. Lock operates on attacker-controlled target file or fails ``` --- ## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ This is a **Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition vulnerability** affecting any application using `SoftFileLock` for inter-process synchronization. **Affected Users:** - Applications using `filelock.SoftFileLock` directly - Applications using the fallback `FileLock` on systems without `fcntl` support (e.g., GraalPy) **Consequences:** - **Silent lock acquisition failure** - applications may not detect that exclusive resource access is not guaranteed - **Denial of Service** - attacker can prevent lock file creation by maintaining symlink - **Resource serialization failures** - multiple processes may acquire "locks" simultaneously - **Unintended file operations** - lock could operate on attacker-controlled files **CVSS v4.0 Score:** 5.6 (Medium) **Vector:** CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AT:L/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N **Attack Requirements:** - Local filesystem access to the directory containing lock files - Permission to create symlinks (standard for regular unprivileged users on Unix/Linux) - Ability to time the symlink creation during the narrow race window --- ## Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Yes, the vulnerability has been patched by adding the `O_NOFOLLOW` flag to prevent symlink following during lock file creation. **Patched Version:** Next release (commit: 255ed068bc85d1ef406e50a135e1459170dd1bf0) **Mitigation Details:** - The `O_NOFOLLOW` flag is added conditionally and gracefully degrades on platforms without support - On platforms with `O_NOFOLLOW` support (most modern systems): symlink attacks are completely prevented - On platforms without `O_NOFOLLOW` (e.g., GraalPy): TOCTOU window remains but is documented **Users should:** - Upgrade to the patched version when available - For critical deployments, consider using `UnixFileLock` or `WindowsFileLock` instead of the fallback `SoftFileLock` --- ## Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ For users unable to update immediately: 1. **Avoid `SoftFileLock` in security-sensitive contexts** - use `UnixFileLock` or `WindowsFileLock` when available (these were already patched for CVE-2025-68146) 2. **Restrict filesystem permissions** - prevent untrusted users from creating symlinks in lock file directories: ```bash chmod 700 /path/to/lock/directory ``` 3. **Use process isolation** - isolate untrusted code from lock file paths to prevent symlink creation 4. **Monitor lock operations** - implement application-level checks to verify lock acquisitions are successful before proceeding with critical operations --- ## References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ - **Similar Vulnerability:** CVE-2025-68146 (TOCTOU vulnerability in UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock) - **CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html - **CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html - **CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html - **O_NOFOLLOW documentation:** https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html - **GitHub Repository:** https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock --- **Reported by:** George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007) --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>tox-dev/py-filelock (filelock)</summary> ### [`v3.20.3`](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/3.20.3) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock/compare/3.20.2...3.20.3)  #### What's Changed - Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock by [@gaborbernat](https://redirect.github.com/gaborbernat) in [tox-dev/filelock#465](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/465) **Full Changelog**: <tox-dev/filelock@3.20.2...3.20.3> </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/cognitedata/toolkit).  Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [filelock](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock) | `3.20.0` → `3.20.3` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/filelock/3.20.3?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/filelock/3.20.0/3.20.3?slim=true) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2025-68146](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/security/advisories/GHSA-w853-jp5j-5j7f) ### Impact A Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition allows local attackers to corrupt or truncate arbitrary user files through symlink attacks. The vulnerability exists in both Unix and Windows lock file creation where filelock checks if a file exists before opening it with O_TRUNC. An attacker can create a symlink pointing to a victim file in the time gap between the check and open, causing os.open() to follow the symlink and truncate the target file. **Who is impacted:** All users of filelock on Unix, Linux, macOS, and Windows systems. The vulnerability cascades to dependent libraries: - **virtualenv users**: Configuration files can be overwritten with virtualenv metadata, leaking sensitive paths - **PyTorch users**: CPU ISA cache or model checkpoints can be corrupted, causing crashes or ML pipeline failures - **poetry/tox users**: through using virtualenv or filelock on their own. Attack requires local filesystem access and ability to create symlinks (standard user permissions on Unix; Developer Mode on Windows 10+). Exploitation succeeds within 1-3 attempts when lock file paths are predictable. ### Patches Fixed in version **3.20.1**. **Unix/Linux/macOS fix:** Added O_NOFOLLOW flag to os.open() in UnixFileLock.\_acquire() to prevent symlink following. **Windows fix:** Added GetFileAttributesW API check to detect reparse points (symlinks/junctions) before opening files in WindowsFileLock.\_acquire(). **Users should upgrade to filelock 3.20.1 or later immediately.** ### Workarounds If immediate upgrade is not possible: 1. Use SoftFileLock instead of UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock (note: different locking semantics, may not be suitable for all use cases) 2. Ensure lock file directories have restrictive permissions (chmod 0700) to prevent untrusted users from creating symlinks 3. Monitor lock file directories for suspicious symlinks before running trusted applications **Warning:** These workarounds provide only partial mitigation. The race condition remains exploitable. Upgrading to version 3.20.1 is strongly recommended. ______________________________________________________________________ ## Technical Details: How the Exploit Works ### The Vulnerable Code Pattern **Unix/Linux/macOS** (`src/filelock/_unix.py:39-44`): ```python def _acquire(self) -> None: ensure_directory_exists(self.lock_file) open_flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_TRUNC # (1) Prepare to truncate if not Path(self.lock_file).exists(): # (2) CHECK: Does file exist? open_flags |= os.O_CREAT fd = os.open(self.lock_file, open_flags, ...) # (3) USE: Open and truncate ``` **Windows** (`src/filelock/_windows.py:19-28`): ```python def _acquire(self) -> None: raise_on_not_writable_file(self.lock_file) # (1) Check writability ensure_directory_exists(self.lock_file) flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC # (2) Prepare to truncate fd = os.open(self.lock_file, flags, ...) # (3) Open and truncate ``` ### The Race Window The vulnerability exists in the gap between operations: **Unix variant:** ``` Time Victim Thread Attacker Thread ---- ------------- --------------- T0 Check: lock_file exists? → False T1 ↓ RACE WINDOW T2 Create symlink: lock → victim_file T3 Open lock_file with O_TRUNC → Follows symlink → Opens victim_file → Truncates victim_file to 0 bytes! ☠️ ``` **Windows variant:** ``` Time Victim Thread Attacker Thread ---- ------------- --------------- T0 Check: lock_file writable? T1 ↓ RACE WINDOW T2 Create symlink: lock → victim_file T3 Open lock_file with O_TRUNC → Follows symlink/junction → Opens victim_file → Truncates victim_file to 0 bytes! ☠️ ``` ### Step-by-Step Attack Flow **1. Attacker Setup:** ```python # Attacker identifies target application using filelock lock_path = "/tmp/myapp.lock" # Predictable lock path victim_file = "/home/victim/.ssh/config" # High-value target ``` **2. Attacker Creates Race Condition:** ```python import os import threading def attacker_thread(): # Remove any existing lock file try: os.unlink(lock_path) except FileNotFoundError: pass # Create symlink pointing to victim file os.symlink(victim_file, lock_path) print(f"[Attacker] Created: {lock_path} → {victim_file}") # Launch attack threading.Thread(target=attacker_thread).start() ``` **3. Victim Application Runs:** ```python from filelock import UnixFileLock # Normal application code lock = UnixFileLock("/tmp/myapp.lock") lock.acquire() # ← VULNERABILITY TRIGGERED HERE # At this point, /home/victim/.ssh/config is now 0 bytes! ``` **4. What Happens Inside os.open():** On Unix systems, when `os.open()` is called: ```c // Linux kernel behavior (simplified) int open(const char *pathname, int flags) { struct file *f = path_lookup(pathname); // Resolves symlinks by default! if (flags & O_TRUNC) { truncate_file(f); // ← Truncates the TARGET of the symlink } return file_descriptor; } ``` Without `O_NOFOLLOW` flag, the kernel follows the symlink and truncates the target file. ### Why the Attack Succeeds Reliably **Timing Characteristics:** - **Check operation** (Path.exists()): ~100-500 nanoseconds - **Symlink creation** (os.symlink()): ~1-10 microseconds - **Race window**: ~1-5 microseconds (very small but exploitable) - **Thread scheduling quantum**: ~1-10 milliseconds **Success factors:** 1. **Tight loop**: Running attack in a loop hits the race window within 1-3 attempts 2. **CPU scheduling**: Modern OS thread schedulers frequently context-switch during I/O operations 3. **No synchronization**: No atomic file creation prevents the race 4. **Symlink speed**: Creating symlinks is extremely fast (metadata-only operation) ### Real-World Attack Scenarios **Scenario 1: virtualenv Exploitation** ```python # Victim runs: python -m venv /tmp/myenv # Attacker racing to create: os.symlink("/home/victim/.bashrc", "/tmp/myenv/pyvenv.cfg") # Result: /home/victim/.bashrc overwritten with: # home = /usr/bin/python3 # include-system-site-packages = false # version = 3.11.2 # ← Original .bashrc contents LOST + virtualenv metadata LEAKED to attacker ``` **Scenario 2: PyTorch Cache Poisoning** ```python # Victim runs: import torch # PyTorch checks CPU capabilities, uses filelock on cache # Attacker racing to create: os.symlink("/home/victim/.torch/compiled_model.pt", "/home/victim/.cache/torch/cpu_isa_check.lock") # Result: Trained ML model checkpoint truncated to 0 bytes # Impact: Weeks of training lost, ML pipeline DoS ``` ### Why Standard Defenses Don't Help **File permissions don't prevent this:** - Attacker doesn't need write access to victim_file - os.open() with O_TRUNC follows symlinks using the *victim's* permissions - The victim process truncates its own file **Directory permissions help but aren't always feasible:** - Lock files often created in shared /tmp directory (mode 1777) - Applications may not control lock file location - Many apps use predictable paths in user-writable directories **File locking doesn't prevent this:** - The truncation happens *during* the open() call, before any lock is acquired - fcntl.flock() only prevents concurrent lock acquisition, not symlink attacks ### Exploitation Proof-of-Concept Results From empirical testing with the provided PoCs: **Simple Direct Attack** (`filelock_simple_poc.py`): - Success rate: 33% per attempt (1 in 3 tries) - Average attempts to success: 2.1 - Target file reduced to 0 bytes in \<100ms **virtualenv Attack** (`weaponized_virtualenv.py`): - Success rate: ~90% on first attempt (deterministic timing) - Information leaked: File paths, Python version, system configuration - Data corruption: Complete loss of original file contents **PyTorch Attack** (`weaponized_pytorch.py`): - Success rate: 25-40% per attempt - Impact: Application crashes, model loading failures - Recovery: Requires cache rebuild or model retraining **Discovered and reported by:** George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007) #### [CVE-2026-22701](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/security/advisories/GHSA-qmgc-5h2g-mvrw) ## Vulnerability Summary **Title:** Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock **Affected Component:** `filelock` package - `SoftFileLock` class **File:** `src/filelock/_soft.py` lines 17-27 **CWE:** CWE-362, CWE-367, CWE-59 --- ## Description A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability exists in the `SoftFileLock` implementation of the filelock package. An attacker with local filesystem access and permission to create symlinks can exploit a race condition between the permission validation and file creation to cause lock operations to fail or behave unexpectedly. The vulnerability occurs in the `_acquire()` method between `raise_on_not_writable_file()` (permission check) and `os.open()` (file creation). During this race window, an attacker can create a symlink at the lock file path, potentially causing the lock to operate on an unintended target file or leading to denial of service. ### Attack Scenario ``` 1. Lock attempts to acquire on /tmp/app.lock 2. Permission validation passes 3. [RACE WINDOW] - Attacker creates: ln -s /tmp/important.txt /tmp/app.lock 4. os.open() tries to create lock file 5. Lock operates on attacker-controlled target file or fails ``` --- ## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ This is a **Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition vulnerability** affecting any application using `SoftFileLock` for inter-process synchronization. **Affected Users:** - Applications using `filelock.SoftFileLock` directly - Applications using the fallback `FileLock` on systems without `fcntl` support (e.g., GraalPy) **Consequences:** - **Silent lock acquisition failure** - applications may not detect that exclusive resource access is not guaranteed - **Denial of Service** - attacker can prevent lock file creation by maintaining symlink - **Resource serialization failures** - multiple processes may acquire "locks" simultaneously - **Unintended file operations** - lock could operate on attacker-controlled files **CVSS v4.0 Score:** 5.6 (Medium) **Vector:** CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AT:L/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N **Attack Requirements:** - Local filesystem access to the directory containing lock files - Permission to create symlinks (standard for regular unprivileged users on Unix/Linux) - Ability to time the symlink creation during the narrow race window --- ## Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Yes, the vulnerability has been patched by adding the `O_NOFOLLOW` flag to prevent symlink following during lock file creation. **Patched Version:** Next release (commit: 255ed068bc85d1ef406e50a135e1459170dd1bf0) **Mitigation Details:** - The `O_NOFOLLOW` flag is added conditionally and gracefully degrades on platforms without support - On platforms with `O_NOFOLLOW` support (most modern systems): symlink attacks are completely prevented - On platforms without `O_NOFOLLOW` (e.g., GraalPy): TOCTOU window remains but is documented **Users should:** - Upgrade to the patched version when available - For critical deployments, consider using `UnixFileLock` or `WindowsFileLock` instead of the fallback `SoftFileLock` --- ## Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ For users unable to update immediately: 1. **Avoid `SoftFileLock` in security-sensitive contexts** - use `UnixFileLock` or `WindowsFileLock` when available (these were already patched for CVE-2025-68146) 2. **Restrict filesystem permissions** - prevent untrusted users from creating symlinks in lock file directories: ```bash chmod 700 /path/to/lock/directory ``` 3. **Use process isolation** - isolate untrusted code from lock file paths to prevent symlink creation 4. **Monitor lock operations** - implement application-level checks to verify lock acquisitions are successful before proceeding with critical operations --- ## References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ - **Similar Vulnerability:** CVE-2025-68146 (TOCTOU vulnerability in UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock) - **CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html - **CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html - **CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html - **O_NOFOLLOW documentation:** https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html - **GitHub Repository:** https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock --- **Reported by:** George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007) --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>tox-dev/py-filelock (filelock)</summary> ### [`v3.20.3`](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/3.20.3) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock/compare/3.20.2...3.20.3)  #### What's Changed - Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock by [@gaborbernat](https://redirect.github.com/gaborbernat) in [tox-dev/filelock#465](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/465) **Full Changelog**: <tox-dev/filelock@3.20.2...3.20.3> ### [`v3.20.2`](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/3.20.2) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock/compare/3.20.1...3.20.2)  ##### What's Changed - Support Unix systems without O\_NOFOLLOW by [@mwilliamson](https://redirect.github.com/mwilliamson) in [tox-dev/filelock#463](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/463) - \[pre-commit.ci] pre-commit autoupdate by [@pre-commit-ci](https://redirect.github.com/pre-commit-ci)\[bot] in [tox-dev/filelock#464](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/464) ##### New Contributors - [@mwilliamson](https://redirect.github.com/mwilliamson) made their first contribution in [tox-dev/filelock#463](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/463) **Full Changelog**: <tox-dev/filelock@3.20.1...3.20.2> ### [`v3.20.1`](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/3.20.1) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock/compare/3.20.0...3.20.1)  #### What's Changed - CVE-2025-68146: Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in lock file creation by [@gaborbernat](https://redirect.github.com/gaborbernat) in [tox-dev/filelock#461](https://redirect.github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/461) **Full Changelog**: <tox-dev/filelock@3.20.0...3.20.1> </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/vortex-data/vortex).  Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

gaborbernat force-pushed the sof branch from 675db8a to 255ed06 Compare January 9, 2026 17:40

gaborbernat merged commit 41b42dd into tox-dev:main Jan 9, 2026
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rtibblesbot mentioned this pull request Feb 11, 2026

chore(deps): bump filelock from 3.20.1 to 3.20.3 learningequality/studio#5640

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Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock #465

Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock #465

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Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock #465

Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in SoftFileLock #465

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