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[lineage-17.1] Update #1

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merged 131 commits into from
Aug 1, 2020

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@derfelot derfelot commented Aug 1, 2020

  • Merged LA.UM.8.4.r1-05800-8x98.0 CAF tag
  • Merged Linux 4.4.231 kernel
  • Merged Linux 4.4.232 kernel
  • Updated WireGuard to 1.0.20200729 snapshot

Al Viro and others added 30 commits June 12, 2020 12:46
may_create_in_sticky() call is done when we already have dropped the
reference to dir.

Fixes: 30aba66 (namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Change-Id: I395c97ab9d7aedbe3262e30068f22a0a3e11922f
Git-repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Git-commit: d0cb501
Signed-off-by: Alam Md Danish <amddan@codeaurora.org>
commit 0dde10b upstream.

There is no need for the extra pair of parentheses, remove it. This
fixes the following warning when building with clang:

fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3694:10: warning: equality comparison with extraneous
  parentheses [-Wparentheses-equality]
                if ((i == (nr - 1)))
                     ~~^~~~~~~~~~~

Also remove the unnecessary parentheses around the substraction.

Change-Id: I4a060e767a2da8b9ef74a83e2919e64a437fe714
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Git-repo: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4
Git-commit: e7f42b0
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
[ Upstream commit a4af892 ]

The function dsi_get_cmd_fmt returns enum dsi_cmd_dst_format,
use the correct enum value also for MIPI_DSI_FMT_RGB666/_PACKED.

This has been discovered using clang:
  drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c:743:35: warning: implicit conversion
        from enumeration type 'enum dsi_vid_dst_format' to different
        enumeration type 'enum dsi_cmd_dst_format' [-Wenum-conversion]
          case MIPI_DSI_FMT_RGB666:       return VID_DST_FORMAT_RGB666;
                                          ~~~~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

Change-Id: I0dddb33add814e8815dac10dbf6ae6b50bcc6418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Reviewed-by: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Git-repo: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4
Git-commit: 5151a0c8d730509cc92ac2d1a2697dd0fe48be59
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
The array fields in struct wmi_start_scan_arg that are checked here are
fixed size arrays so they can never be NULL.

Change-Id: I5c80a9758328df2eff1fa7c4bb433d0370f67143
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1260031
Cc: Arend Van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Git-repo: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4
Git-commit: 8c1f208
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
Add check to restrict index underflow.This is to avoid
that it does not access invalid index.

Change-Id: Ib971033c5820ca4dab38ace3b106c7b1b42529e4
Acked-by: Gururaj Chalger <gchalger@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mohammed Nayeem Ur Rahman <mohara@codeaurora.org>
Section name should be placed in String table.
Currently, we used static version for string table
index to update subsequent section names.

Due to this string table index keeps on increasing
during every new dump(subsystem restart) request.
This ultimately will result in buffer overflow,
leading to Redzone overwritten.

Hence, as a fix, now reset, this string table
index once dump capture is complete.

Change-Id: Ibc2446ae4011db5291044eacdc1a1119597d862a
Signed-off-by: Jitendra Sharma <shajit@codeaurora.org>
When syzkaller tests, there is a UAF:
  BUG: KASan: use after free in vgacon_invert_region+0x9d/0x110 at addr
    ffff880000100000
  Read of size 2 by task syz-executor.1/16489
  page:ffffea0000004000 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping:          (null)
  index:0x0
  page flags: 0xfffff00000000()
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
  CPU: 1 PID: 16489 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
  rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
    [<ffffffffb119f309>] dump_stack+0x1e/0x20
    [<ffffffffb04af957>] kasan_report+0x577/0x950
    [<ffffffffb04ae652>] __asan_load2+0x62/0x80
    [<ffffffffb090f26d>] vgacon_invert_region+0x9d/0x110
    [<ffffffffb0a39d95>] invert_screen+0xe5/0x470
    [<ffffffffb0a21dcb>] set_selection+0x44b/0x12f0
    [<ffffffffb0a3bfae>] tioclinux+0xee/0x490
    [<ffffffffb0a1d114>] vt_ioctl+0xff4/0x2670
    [<ffffffffb0a0089a>] tty_ioctl+0x46a/0x1a10
    [<ffffffffb052db3d>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5bd/0xc40
    [<ffffffffb052e2f2>] SyS_ioctl+0x132/0x170
    [<ffffffffb11c9b1b>] system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27
    Memory state around the buggy address:
     ffff8800000fff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00
     ffff8800000fff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00
    >ffff880000100000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
     ff ff ff

It can be reproduce in the linux mainline by the program:
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <fcntl.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <sys/stat.h>
  #include <sys/ioctl.h>
  #include <linux/vt.h>

  struct tiocl_selection {
    unsigned short xs;      /* X start */
    unsigned short ys;      /* Y start */
    unsigned short xe;      /* X end */
    unsigned short ye;      /* Y end */
    unsigned short sel_mode; /* selection mode */
  };

  #define TIOCL_SETSEL    2
  struct tiocl {
    unsigned char type;
    unsigned char pad;
    struct tiocl_selection sel;
  };

  int main()
  {
    int fd = 0;
    const char *dev = "/dev/char/4:1";

    struct vt_consize v = {0};
    struct tiocl tioc = {0};

    fd = open(dev, O_RDWR, 0);

    v.v_rows = 3346;
    ioctl(fd, VT_RESIZEX, &v);

    tioc.type = TIOCL_SETSEL;
    ioctl(fd, TIOCLINUX, &tioc);

    return 0;
  }

When resize the screen, update the 'vc->vc_size_row' to the new_row_size,
but when 'set_origin' in 'vgacon_set_origin', vgacon use 'vga_vram_base'
for 'vc_origin' and 'vc_visible_origin', not 'vc_screenbuf'. It maybe
smaller than 'vc_screenbuf'. When TIOCLINUX, use the new_row_size to calc
the offset, it maybe larger than the vga_vram_size in vgacon driver, then
bad access.
Also, if set an larger screenbuf firstly, then set an more larger
screenbuf, when copy old_origin to new_origin, a bad access may happen.

So, If the screen size larger than vga_vram, resize screen should be
failed. This alse fix CVE-2020-8649 and CVE-2020-8647.

Linus pointed out that overflow checking seems absent. We're saved by
the existing bounds checks in vc_do_resize() with rather strict
limits:

	if (cols > VC_RESIZE_MAXCOL || lines > VC_RESIZE_MAXROW)
		return -EINVAL;

Fixes: 0aec486 ("[PATCH] SVGATextMode fix")
Reference: CVE-2020-8647 and CVE-2020-8649
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
[danvet: augment commit message to point out overflow safety]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200304022429.37738-1-zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com
Change-Id: I755aa00002d0b9c885d42b1cc93f3233d4d714b7
Git-repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Git-commit: 513dc79
Signed-off-by: Alam Md Danish <amddan@codeaurora.org>
Auto configs are not supported on this
baseline so remove the support.

Change-Id: If21e6dfa54d42a7e10120b401551f1b81a88395b
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
Change-Id: I9fda178d681ebe8c869c5e335316348e78808b32
[ Upstream commit 7749112 ]

The current number of KVM_IRQCHIP_NUM_PINS results in an order 3
allocation (32kb) for each guest start/restart. This can result in OOM
killer activity even with free swap when the memory is fragmented
enough:

kernel: qemu-system-s39 invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x440dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), order=3, oom_score_adj=0
kernel: CPU: 1 PID: 357274 Comm: qemu-system-s39 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.4.0-29-generic whatawurst#33-Ubuntu
kernel: Hardware name: IBM 8562 T02 Z06 (LPAR)
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: ([<00000001f848fe2a>] show_stack+0x7a/0xc0)
kernel:  [<00000001f8d3437a>] dump_stack+0x8a/0xc0
kernel:  [<00000001f8687032>] dump_header+0x62/0x258
kernel:  [<00000001f8686122>] oom_kill_process+0x172/0x180
kernel:  [<00000001f8686abe>] out_of_memory+0xee/0x580
kernel:  [<00000001f86e66b8>] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xd18/0xe90
kernel:  [<00000001f86e6ad4>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2a4/0x320
kernel:  [<00000001f86b1ab4>] kmalloc_order+0x34/0xb0
kernel:  [<00000001f86b1b62>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x32/0xe0
kernel:  [<00000001f84bb806>] kvm_set_irq_routing+0xa6/0x2e0
kernel:  [<00000001f84c99a4>] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x544/0x9e0
kernel:  [<00000001f84b8936>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x396/0x760
kernel:  [<00000001f875df66>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x376/0x690
kernel:  [<00000001f875e304>] ksys_ioctl+0x84/0xb0
kernel:  [<00000001f875e39a>] __s390x_sys_ioctl+0x2a/0x40
kernel:  [<00000001f8d55424>] system_call+0xd8/0x2c8

As far as I can tell s390x does not use the iopins as we bail our for
anything other than KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_S390_ADAPTER and the chip/pin is
only used for KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP. So let us use a small number to
reduce the memory footprint.

Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617083620.5409-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit abd4278 ]

Imagine below scene, spidev is referenced after it's freed.

spidev_release()                spidev_remove()
...
                                spin_lock_irq(&spidev->spi_lock);
                                    spidev->spi = NULL;
                                spin_unlock_irq(&spidev->spi_lock);
mutex_lock(&device_list_lock);
dofree = (spidev->spi == NULL);
if (dofree)
    kfree(spidev);
mutex_unlock(&device_list_lock);
                                mutex_lock(&device_list_lock);
                                list_del(&spidev->device_entry);
                                device_destroy(spidev_class, spidev->devt);
                                clear_bit(MINOR(spidev->devt), minors);
                                if (spidev->users == 0)
                                    kfree(spidev);
                                mutex_unlock(&device_list_lock);

Fix it by resetting spidev->spi in device_list_lock's protection.

Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200618032125.4650-1-zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 06096cc ]

If an spi device is unbounded from the driver before the release
process, there will be an NULL pointer reference when it's
referenced in spi_slave_abort().

Fix it by checking it's already freed before reference.

Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200618032125.4650-2-zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit afe89f1 ]

The sense data buffer in sense_buf_pool is allocated with size of
MPT_SENSE_BUFFER_ALLOC(64) (multiplied by req_depth) while SNS_LEN(sc)(96)
is used when reading the data.  That may lead to a read from unallocated
area, sometimes from another (unallocated) page.  To fix this, limit the
read size to MPT_SENSE_BUFFER_ALLOC.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616150446.4840-1-thenzl@redhat.com
Co-developed-by: Stanislav Saner <ssaner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Saner <ssaner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8a259e6 ]

t4_prep_fw goto bye tag with positive return value when something
bad happened and which can not free resource in adap_init0.
so fix it to return negative value.

Fixes: 16e4762 ("cxgb4: Add new scheme to update T4/T5 firmware")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Heng <liheng40@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7c8b1e8 ]

The return value of the function smsc95xx_reset() must be checked
to avoid returning false success from the function smsc95xx_bind().

Fixes: 2f7ca80 ("net: Add SMSC LAN9500 USB2.0 10/100 ethernet adapter driver")
Signed-off-by: Andre Edich <andre.edich@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Parthiban Veerasooran <Parthiban.Veerasooran@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3ed58f9 ]

In a case where the ID_REV register read is failed, the memory for a
private data structure has to be freed before returning error from the
function smsc95xx_bind.

Fixes: bbd9f9e ("smsc95xx: add wol support for more frame types")
Signed-off-by: Andre Edich <andre.edich@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Parthiban Veerasooran <Parthiban.Veerasooran@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f79a732 ]

On partial_drain completion we should be in SNDRV_PCM_STATE_RUNNING
state, so set that for partially draining streams in
snd_compr_drain_notify() and use a flag for partially draining streams

While at it, add locks for stream state change in
snd_compr_drain_notify() as well.

Fixes: f44f2a5 ("ALSA: compress: fix drain calls blocking other compress functions (v6)")
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Tested-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200629134737.105993-4-vkoul@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8523c00 ]

After entering kdb due to breakpoint, when we execute 'ss' or 'go' (will
delay installing breakpoints, do single-step first), it won't work
correctly, and it will enter kdb due to oops.

It's because the reason gotten in kdb_stub() is not as expected, and it
seems that the ex_vector for single-step should be 0, like what arch
powerpc/sh/parisc has implemented.

Before the patch:
Entering kdb (current=0xffff8000119e2dc0, pid 0) on processor 0 due to Keyboard Entry
[0]kdb> bp printk
Instruction(i) BP #0 at 0xffff8000101486cc (printk)
    is enabled   addr at ffff8000101486cc, hardtype=0 installed=0

[0]kdb> g

/ # echo h > /proc/sysrq-trigger

Entering kdb (current=0xffff0000fa878040, pid 266) on processor 3 due to Breakpoint @ 0xffff8000101486cc
[3]kdb> ss

Entering kdb (current=0xffff0000fa878040, pid 266) on processor 3 Oops: (null)
due to oops @ 0xffff800010082ab8
CPU: 3 PID: 266 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-13839-gf0e5ad491718 whatawurst#6
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 00000085 (nzcv daIf -PAN -UAO)
pc : el1_irq+0x78/0x180
lr : __handle_sysrq+0x80/0x190
sp : ffff800015003bf0
x29: ffff800015003d20 x28: ffff0000fa878040
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff80001126b1f0
x25: ffff800011b6a0d8 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 0000000080200005 x22: ffff8000101486cc
x21: ffff800015003d30 x20: 0000ffffffffffff
x19: ffff8000119f2000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff800015003e50
x7 : 0000000000000002 x6 : 00000000380b9990
x5 : ffff8000106e99e8 x4 : ffff0000fadd83c0
x3 : 0000ffffffffffff x2 : ffff800011b6a0d8
x1 : ffff800011b6a000 x0 : ffff80001130c9d8
Call trace:
 el1_irq+0x78/0x180
 printk+0x0/0x84
 write_sysrq_trigger+0xb0/0x118
 proc_reg_write+0xb4/0xe0
 __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
 vfs_write+0xb0/0x1b8
 ksys_write+0x64/0xf0
 __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
 el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0xb0/0x168
 do_el0_svc+0x20/0x98
 el0_sync_handler+0xec/0x1a8
 el0_sync+0x140/0x180

[3]kdb>

After the patch:
Entering kdb (current=0xffff8000119e2dc0, pid 0) on processor 0 due to Keyboard Entry
[0]kdb> bp printk
Instruction(i) BP #0 at 0xffff8000101486cc (printk)
    is enabled   addr at ffff8000101486cc, hardtype=0 installed=0

[0]kdb> g

/ # echo h > /proc/sysrq-trigger

Entering kdb (current=0xffff0000fa852bc0, pid 268) on processor 0 due to Breakpoint @ 0xffff8000101486cc
[0]kdb> g

Entering kdb (current=0xffff0000fa852bc0, pid 268) on processor 0 due to Breakpoint @ 0xffff8000101486cc
[0]kdb> ss

Entering kdb (current=0xffff0000fa852bc0, pid 268) on processor 0 due to SS trap @ 0xffff800010082ab8
[0]kdb>

Fixes: 44679a4 ("arm64: KGDB: Add step debugging support")
Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200509214159.19680-2-liwei391@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ad15571 upstream.

The stack object “info” in snd_opl3_ioctl() has a leaking problem.
It has 2 padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked via
“copy_to_user”.

Signed-off-by: xidongwang <wangxidong_97@163.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1594006058-30362-1-git-send-email-wangxidong_97@163.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6a6ca78 upstream.

We have a Dell AIO, there is neither internal speaker nor internal
mic, only a multi-function audio jack on it.

Users reported that after freshly installing the OS and plug
a headset to the audio jack, the headset can't output sound. I
reproduced this bug, at that moment, the Input Source is as below:
Simple mixer control 'Input Source',0
  Capabilities: cenum
  Items: 'Headphone Mic' 'Headset Mic'
  Item0: 'Headphone Mic'

That is because the patch_realtek will set this audio jack as mic_in
mode if Input Source's value is hp_mic.

If it is not fresh installing, this issue will not happen since the
systemd will run alsactl restore -f /var/lib/alsa/asound.state, this
will set the 'Input Source' according to history value.

If there is internal speaker or internal mic, this issue will not
happen since there is valid sink/source in the pulseaudio, the PA will
set the 'Input Source' according to active_port.

To fix this issue, change the parser function to let the hs_mic be
stored ahead of hp_mic.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200625083833.11264-1-hui.wang@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e337bf1 upstream.

These devices claim to be 96kHz mono, but actually are 48kHz stereo with
swapped channels and unaligned transfers.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702071433.237843-1-marcan@marcan.st
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5ecad24 upstream.

Bit 8 would be the "global" bit, which does not quite make sense for non-leaf
page table entries.  Intel ignores it; AMD ignores it in PDEs and PDPEs, but
reserves it in PML4Es.

Probably, earlier versions of the AMD manual documented it as reserved in PDPEs
as well, and that behavior made it into KVM as well as kvm-unit-tests; fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Fixes: a0c0feb ("KVM: x86: reserve bit 8 of non-leaf PDPEs and PML4Es in 64-bit mode on AMD", 2014-09-03)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 90ecba9 which is
commit 2bbcaae upstream.

It is being reverted upstream, just hasn't made it there yet and is
causing lots of problems.

Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6bf9cd2 upstream.

Under somewhat convoluted conditions, it is possible to attempt to
release an extent_buffer that is under io, which triggers a BUG_ON in
btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages.

This relies on a few different factors. First, extent_buffer reads done
as readahead for searching use WAIT_NONE, so they free the local extent
buffer reference while the io is outstanding. However, they should still
be protected by TREE_REF. However, if the system is doing signficant
reclaim, and simultaneously heavily accessing the extent_buffers, it is
possible for releasepage to race with two concurrent readahead attempts
in a way that leaves TREE_REF unset when the readahead extent buffer is
released.

Essentially, if two tasks race to allocate a new extent_buffer, but the
winner who attempts the first io is rebuffed by a page being locked
(likely by the reclaim itself) then the loser will still go ahead with
issuing the readahead. The loser's call to find_extent_buffer must also
race with the reclaim task reading the extent_buffer's refcount as 1 in
a way that allows the reclaim to re-clear the TREE_REF checked by
find_extent_buffer.

The following represents an example execution demonstrating the race:

            CPU0                                                         CPU1                                           CPU2
reada_for_search                                            reada_for_search
  readahead_tree_block                                        readahead_tree_block
    find_create_tree_block                                      find_create_tree_block
      alloc_extent_buffer                                         alloc_extent_buffer
                                                                  find_extent_buffer // not found
                                                                  allocates eb
                                                                  lock pages
                                                                  associate pages to eb
                                                                  insert eb into radix tree
                                                                  set TREE_REF, refs == 2
                                                                  unlock pages
                                                              read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE
                                                                not uptodate (brand new eb)
                                                                                                            lock_page
                                                                if !trylock_page
                                                                  goto unlock_exit // not an error
                                                              free_extent_buffer
                                                                release_extent_buffer
                                                                  atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1
        find_extent_buffer // found
                                                                                                            try_release_extent_buffer
                                                                                                              take refs_lock
                                                                                                              reads refs == 1; no io
          atomic_inc_not_zero refs to 2
          mark_buffer_accessed
            check_buffer_tree_ref
              // not STALE, won't take refs_lock
              refs == 2; TREE_REF set // no action
    read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE
                                                                                                              clear TREE_REF
                                                                                                              release_extent_buffer
                                                                                                                atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1
                                                                                                                unlock_page
      still not uptodate (CPU1 read failed on trylock_page)
      locks pages
      set io_pages > 0
      submit io
      return
    free_extent_buffer
      release_extent_buffer
        dec refs to 0
        delete from radix tree
        btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages
          BUG_ON(io_pages > 0)!!!

We observe this at a very low rate in production and were also able to
reproduce it in a test environment by introducing some spurious delays
and by introducing probabilistic trylock_page failures.

To fix it, we apply check_tree_ref at a point where it could not
possibly be unset by a competing task: after io_pages has been
incremented. All the codepaths that clear TREE_REF check for io, so they
would not be able to clear it after this point until the io is done.

Stack trace, for reference:
[1417839.424739] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[1417839.435328] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4841!
[1417839.447024] invalid opcode: 0000 [whatawurst#1] SMP
[1417839.502972] RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0x20/0x1f0
[1417839.517008] Code: ed e9 ...
[1417839.558895] RSP: 0018:ffffc90020bcf798 EFLAGS: 00010202
[1417839.570816] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888102d6def0 RCX: 0000000000000028
[1417839.586962] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8887f0296482 RDI: ffff888102d6def0
[1417839.603108] RBP: ffff88885664a000 R08: 0000000000000046 R09: 0000000000000238
[1417839.619255] R10: 0000000000000028 R11: ffff88885664af68 R12: 0000000000000000
[1417839.635402] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88875f573ad0 R15: ffff888797aafd90
[1417839.651549] FS:  00007f5a844fa700(0000) GS:ffff88885f680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[1417839.669810] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1417839.682887] CR2: 00007f7884541fe0 CR3: 000000049f609002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[1417839.699037] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[1417839.715187] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[1417839.731320] Call Trace:
[1417839.737103]  release_extent_buffer+0x39/0x90
[1417839.746913]  read_block_for_search.isra.38+0x2a3/0x370
[1417839.758645]  btrfs_search_slot+0x260/0x9b0
[1417839.768054]  btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70
[1417839.778427]  btrfs_get_extent+0x15f/0x830
[1417839.787665]  ? submit_extent_page+0xc4/0x1c0
[1417839.797474]  ? __do_readpage+0x299/0x7a0
[1417839.806515]  __do_readpage+0x33b/0x7a0
[1417839.815171]  ? btrfs_releasepage+0x70/0x70
[1417839.824597]  extent_readpages+0x28f/0x400
[1417839.833836]  read_pages+0x6a/0x1c0
[1417839.841729]  ? startup_64+0x2/0x30
[1417839.849624]  __do_page_cache_readahead+0x13c/0x1a0
[1417839.860590]  filemap_fault+0x6c7/0x990
[1417839.869252]  ? xas_load+0x8/0x80
[1417839.876756]  ? xas_find+0x150/0x190
[1417839.884839]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x295/0x3b0
[1417839.894652]  __do_fault+0x32/0x110
[1417839.902540]  __handle_mm_fault+0xacd/0x1000
[1417839.912156]  handle_mm_fault+0xaa/0x1c0
[1417839.921004]  __do_page_fault+0x242/0x4b0
[1417839.930044]  ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
[1417839.937933]  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[1417839.945631] RIP: 0033:0x33c4bae
[1417839.952927] Code: Bad RIP value.
[1417839.960411] RSP: 002b:00007f5a844f7350 EFLAGS: 00010206
[1417839.972331] RAX: 000000000000006e RBX: 1614b3ff6a50398a RCX: 0000000000000000
[1417839.988477] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
[1417840.004626] RBP: 00007f5a844f7420 R08: 000000000000006e R09: 00007f5a94aeccb8
[1417840.020784] R10: 00007f5a844f7350 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5a94aecc79
[1417840.036932] R13: 00007f5a94aecc78 R14: 00007f5a94aecc90 R15: 00007f5a94aecc40

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 41855a8 upstream.

clang static analysis flags this error

drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/ci_dpm.c:5652:9: warning: Use of memory after it is freed [unix.Malloc]
                kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps[i].ps_priv);
                      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/ci_dpm.c:5654:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

problem is reported in ci_dpm_fini, with these code blocks.

	for (i = 0; i < rdev->pm.dpm.num_ps; i++) {
		kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps[i].ps_priv);
	}
	kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps);

The first free happens in ci_parse_power_table where it cleans up locally
on a failure.  ci_dpm_fini also does a cleanup.

	ret = ci_parse_power_table(rdev);
	if (ret) {
		ci_dpm_fini(rdev);
		return ret;
	}

So remove the cleanup in ci_parse_power_table and
move the num_ps calculation to inside the loop so ci_dpm_fini
will know how many array elements to free.

Fixes: cc8dbbb ("drm/radeon: add dpm support for CI dGPUs (v2)")

Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 00fdec9 upstream.

Trap handler for syscall tracing reads EFA (Exception Fault Address),
in case strace wants PC of trap instruction (EFA is not part of pt_regs
as of current code).

However this EFA read is racy as it happens after dropping to pure
kernel mode (re-enabling interrupts). A taken interrupt could
context-switch, trigger a different task's trap, clobbering EFA for this
execution context.

Fix this by reading EFA early, before re-enabling interrupts. A slight
side benefit is de-duplication of FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN in trap handler.
The trap handler is common to both ARCompact and ARCv2 builds too.

This just came out of code rework/review and no real problem was reported
but is clearly a potential problem specially for strace.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit d27e2da94a42655861ca4baea30c8cd65546f25d ]

Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling

During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic
could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The
bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(),
which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload()
SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could
overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using
bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also tries to free SGEs. This race
condition can result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory
locations in bnx2x_free_rx_sge()

799  static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge(struct bnx2x *bp,
800				struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp, u16 index)
801  {
802	struct sw_rx_page *sw_buf = &fp->rx_page_ring[index];
803     struct page *page = sw_buf->page;
....
where sw_buf was set to NULL after the call to dma_unmap_page()
by the preceding thread.

    EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
    PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset()
    bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing...
    bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142)
    bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload
    Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
    BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
    Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc
    Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [whatawurst#1]
    .....
    Call Trace:
    [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable)
    [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0
    [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550
    [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60
    [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170
    [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
    [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64

To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before
freeing.

Fixes: 4cace67 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer element")
Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315205535.1321-1-thinhtr@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2024
This reverts commit 2035c770bfdbcc82bd52e05871a7c82db9529e0f.

This patch lost a unlock loop_ctl_mutex in loop_get_status(...),
which caused syzbot to report a UAF issue.The upstream patch does not
have this issue. Therefore, we revert this patch and directly apply
the upstream patch later on.

Risk use-after-free as reported by syzbot:

[  174.437352] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[  174.437772] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bac49ab8 by task syz-executor.0/13897
[  174.438205]
[  174.438306] CPU: 1 PID: 13897 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.306 whatawurst#1
[  174.438712] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[  174.439236] Call Trace:
[  174.439392]  dump_stack+0x94/0xc7
[  174.439596]  ? __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[  174.439881]  print_address_description+0x60/0x229
[  174.440165]  ? __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[  174.440436]  kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
[  174.440696]  __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[  174.440959]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[  174.441272]  ? mutex_trylock+0xa0/0xa0
[  174.441500]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[  174.441816]  ? kobject_get_unless_zero+0x129/0x1c0
[  174.442106]  ? kset_unregister+0x30/0x30
[  174.442351]  ? find_symbol_in_section+0x310/0x310
[  174.442634]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[  174.442901]  mutex_lock_killable+0xb0/0xf0
[  174.443149]  ? __mutex_lock_killable_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[  174.443465]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[  174.443732]  ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x20
[  174.443966]  ? kobject_get+0x54/0xa0
[  174.444190]  lo_open+0x16/0xc0
[  174.444382]  __blkdev_get+0x273/0x10f0
[  174.444612]  ? lo_fallocate.isra.20+0x150/0x150
[  174.444886]  ? bdev_disk_changed+0x190/0x190
[  174.445146]  ? path_init+0x1030/0x1030
[  174.445371]  ? do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x2d0
[  174.445608]  ? deref_stack_reg+0xab/0xe0
[  174.445852]  blkdev_get+0x97/0x880
[  174.446061]  ? walk_component+0x297/0xdc0
[  174.446303]  ? __blkdev_get+0x10f0/0x10f0
[  174.446547]  ? __fsnotify_inode_delete+0x20/0x20
[  174.446822]  blkdev_open+0x1bd/0x240
[  174.447040]  do_dentry_open+0x448/0xf80
[  174.447274]  ? blkdev_get_by_dev+0x60/0x60
[  174.447522]  ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x1a0/0x1a0
[  174.447775]  ? inode_permission+0x86/0x320
[  174.448022]  path_openat+0xa83/0x3ed0
[  174.448248]  ? path_mountpoint+0xb50/0xb50
[  174.448495]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[  174.448723]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xbc/0x1b0
[  174.448971]  ? getname_flags+0xc4/0x560
[  174.449203]  ? do_sys_open+0x1ce/0x3f0
[  174.449432]  ? do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x2d0
[  174.449706]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[  174.450022]  ? __d_alloc+0x2a/0xa50
[  174.450232]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[  174.450510]  ? should_fail+0x117/0x6c0
[  174.450737]  ? timespec64_trunc+0xc1/0x150
[  174.450986]  ? inode_init_owner+0x2e0/0x2e0
[  174.451237]  ? timespec64_trunc+0xc1/0x150
[  174.451484]  ? inode_init_owner+0x2e0/0x2e0
[  174.451736]  do_filp_open+0x197/0x270
[  174.451959]  ? may_open_dev+0xd0/0xd0
[  174.452182]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[  174.452448]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[  174.452672]  ? __alloc_fd+0x1a3/0x4b0
[  174.452895]  do_sys_open+0x2c7/0x3f0
[  174.453114]  ? filp_open+0x60/0x60
[  174.453320]  do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x2d0
[  174.453541]  ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xf3/0x170
[  174.453832]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[  174.454136] RIP: 0033:0x41edee
[  174.454321] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 48 48 c7 c0 a4 af 0b 01 8b 00 85 c0 75 69 89 f2 b8 01 01 00 00 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 a6 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c5
[  174.455404] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2501fbd0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[  174.455854] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2501fc90 RCX: 000000000041edee
[  174.456273] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007ffd2501fcd0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[  174.456698] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffd2501f9a7
[  174.457116] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
[  174.457535] R13: 0000000000565e48 R14: 00007ffd2501fcd0 R15: 0000000000400510
[  174.457955]
[  174.458052] Allocated by task 945:
[  174.458261]  kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[  174.458478]  kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xb4/0x1d0
[  174.458743]  copy_process.part.57+0x14b0/0x7010
[  174.459017]  _do_fork+0x197/0x980
[  174.459218]  kernel_thread+0x2f/0x40
[  174.459438]  call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0xa8/0x240
[  174.459742]  process_one_work+0x933/0x13b0
[  174.459986]  worker_thread+0x8c/0x1000
[  174.460212]  kthread+0x343/0x410
[  174.460408]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[  174.460621]
[  174.460716] Freed by task 22902:
[  174.460913]  __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170
[  174.461159]  kmem_cache_free+0x6e/0x1b0
[  174.461391]  __put_task_struct+0x1c4/0x440
[  174.461636]  delayed_put_task_struct+0x135/0x170
[  174.461915]  rcu_process_callbacks+0x578/0x15c0
[  174.462184]  __do_softirq+0x175/0x60e
[  174.462403]
[  174.462501] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880bac49a80
[  174.462501]  which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 3264
[  174.463235] The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
[  174.463235]  3264-byte region [ffff8880bac49a80, ffff8880bac4a740)
[  174.463923] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  174.464210] page:ffffea0002eb1200 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888188ca0a00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[  174.464784] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[  174.465079] raw: 0100000000008100 ffffea0002eaa400 0000000400000004 ffff888188ca0a00
[  174.465533] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000090009 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  174.465988] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  174.466321]
[  174.466322] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  174.466325]  ffff8880bac49980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  174.466327]  ffff8880bac49a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.466329] >ffff8880bac49a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  174.466329]                                         ^
[  174.466331]  ffff8880bac49b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  174.466333]  ffff8880bac49b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  174.466333] ==================================================================
[  174.466338] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Reported-by: k2ci <kernel-bot@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Genjian Zhang <zhanggenjian@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
commit d21d40605bca7bd5fc23ef03d4c1ca1f48bc2cae upstream.

syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during
netlink socket destruction.  [1]

From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then
the response was generated.  The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump
for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due
to the fault injection.  [0]

  12:01:34 executing program 3:
  r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0)
  sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...)
  recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8)

Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call
of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3].  syzkaller stopped
receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct()
called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done().

fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it
is still not NULL.  fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by
nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling
itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page.

To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc().

[0]:
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty whatawurst#11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117)
 should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153)
 should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733)
 kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992)
 inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662)
 rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029)
 netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269)
 netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988)
 ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801)
 ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846)
 do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943)
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034)

[1]:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb)
stack guard page: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty whatawurst#11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work
RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570)
Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3
RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358
RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <#DF>
 </#DF>
 <TASK>
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 ...
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
 netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401)
 __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2))
 sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224)
 __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235)
 sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246)
 process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259)
 worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416)
 kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388)
 ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153)
 ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:256)
Modules linked in:

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401211003.25274-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
commit 04c35ab3bdae7fefbd7c7a7355f29fa03a035221 upstream.

PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios.  Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.

Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().

In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.

To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.

We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode.  We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.

For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.

Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():

<--- C reproducer --->
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <liburing.h>

 int main(void)
 {
         struct io_uring_params p = {};
         int ring_fd;
         size_t size;
         char *map;

         ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &p);
         if (ring_fd < 0) {
                 perror("io_uring_setup");
                 return 1;
         }
         size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);

         /* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
         map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
                    ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
         if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
                 perror("mmap");
                 return 1;
         }

         /* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
         *map = 0;
         pause();
         return 0;
 }
<--- C reproducer --->

On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:
 # ./iouring &
 # memhog 16G
 # killall iouring
[  301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g
[  301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 whatawurst#1
[  301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4
[  301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000
[  301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047
[  301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200
[  301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000
[  301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000
[  301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000
[  301.564186] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  301.564773] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  301.565725] PKRU: 55555554
[  301.565944] Call Trace:
[  301.566148]  <TASK>
[  301.566325]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.566618]  ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[  301.566876]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.567163]  ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
[  301.567466]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[  301.567743]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[  301.568038]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[  301.568363]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.568660]  ? untrack_pfn+0x65/0x100
[  301.568947]  unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
[  301.569247]  unmap_vmas+0xb5/0x190
[  301.569532]  exit_mmap+0xec/0x340
[  301.569801]  __mmput+0x3e/0x130
[  301.570051]  do_exit+0x305/0xaf0
...

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240403212131.929421-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227122814.3781907-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: b1a86e1 ("x86, pat: remove the dependency on 'vm_pgoff' in track/untrack pfn vma routines")
Fixes: 5899329 ("x86: PAT: implement track/untrack of pfnmap regions for x86 - v3")
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07ac535593139c875ffa19af924b1084540 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 whatawurst#1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 whatawurst#2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 whatawurst#3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 whatawurst#4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 whatawurst#5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 whatawurst#6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 whatawurst#7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 whatawurst#8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 whatawurst#9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 whatawurst#10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 whatawurst#11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 whatawurst#12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 whatawurst#13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 whatawurst#14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 whatawurst#15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 whatawurst#16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 whatawurst#17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 whatawurst#18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 whatawurst#19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[uli: backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit 54c4ec5f8c471b7c1137a1f769648549c423c026 ]

The uart_handle_cts_change() function in serial_core expects the caller
to hold uport->lock. For example, I have seen the below kernel splat,
when the Bluetooth driver is loaded on an i.MX28 board.

    [   85.119255] ------------[ cut here ]------------
    [   85.124413] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 27 at /drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:3453 uart_handle_cts_change+0xb4/0xec
    [   85.134694] Modules linked in: hci_uart bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc wlcore_sdio configfs
    [   85.143314] CPU: 0 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.6.3-00021-gd62a2f068f92 whatawurst#1
    [   85.151396] Hardware name: Freescale MXS (Device Tree)
    [   85.156679] Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth]
    (...)
    [   85.191765]  uart_handle_cts_change from mxs_auart_irq_handle+0x380/0x3f4
    [   85.198787]  mxs_auart_irq_handle from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x210
    (...)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4d90bb1 ("serial: core: Document and assert lock requirements for irq helpers")
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Kronborg <emil.kronborg@protonmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240320121530.11348-1-emil.kronborg@protonmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[uli: backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit c214ed2a4dda35b308b0b28eed804d7ae66401f9 ]

The session resources are used by FW and driver when session is offloaded,
once session is uploaded these resources are not used. The lock is not
required as these fields won't be used any longer. The offload and upload
calls are sequential, hence lock is not required.

This will suppress following BUG_ON():

[  449.843143] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  449.848302] kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2727!
[  449.853072] invalid opcode: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[  449.858712] CPU: 5 PID: 1996 Comm: kworker/u24:2 Not tainted 5.14.0-118.el9.x86_64 whatawurst#1
Rebooting.
[  449.867454] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0WCJNT, BIOS 2.3.4 11/08/2016
[  449.876966] Workqueue: fc_rport_eq fc_rport_work [libfc]
[  449.882910] RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x2e/0x30
[  449.887098] Code: 00 65 8b 05 14 a2 f0 4a a9 00 ff ff 00 75 1b 55 48 89 fd e8 34 36 79 00 48 85 ed 74 0b 48 89 ef 31 f6 5d e9 14 fc ff ff 5d c3 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 49 89 ce 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 41
[  449.908054] RSP: 0018:ffffb83d878b3d68 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  449.913887] RAX: 0000000080000201 RBX: ffff8f4355133550 RCX: 000000000d400005
[  449.921843] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: ffffb83da53f5000
[  449.929808] RBP: ffff8f4ac6675800 R08: ffffb83d878b3d30 R09: 00000000000efbdf
[  449.937774] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff8f434573e000 R12: 0000000000001000
[  449.945736] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffffb83da53f5000 R15: ffff8f43d4ea3ae0
[  449.953701] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f529fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  449.962732] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  449.969138] CR2: 00007f8cf993e150 CR3: 0000000efbe10003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[  449.977102] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  449.985065] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  449.993028] Call Trace:
[  449.995756]  __iommu_dma_free+0x96/0x100
[  450.000139]  bnx2fc_free_session_resc+0x67/0x240 [bnx2fc]
[  450.006171]  bnx2fc_upload_session+0xce/0x100 [bnx2fc]
[  450.011910]  bnx2fc_rport_event_handler+0x9f/0x240 [bnx2fc]
[  450.018136]  fc_rport_work+0x103/0x5b0 [libfc]
[  450.023103]  process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
[  450.027581]  worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[  450.031669]  ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370
[  450.036143]  kthread+0x149/0x170
[  450.039744]  ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[  450.044411]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  450.048404] Modules linked in: vfat msdos fat xfs nfs_layout_nfsv41_files rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver dm_service_time qedf qed crc8 bnx2fc libfcoe libfc scsi_transport_fc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp dcdbas rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore mei_me pcspkr mei ipmi_ssif lpc_ich ipmi_si fuse zram ext4 mbcache jbd2 loop nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs irdma ice sd_mod t10_pi sg ib_uverbs ib_core 8021q garp mrp stp llc mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt mxm_wmi fb_sys_fops cec crct10dif_pclmul ahci crc32_pclmul bnx2x drm ghash_clmulni_intel libahci rfkill i40e libata megaraid_sas mdio wmi sunrpc lrw dm_crypt dm_round_robin dm_multipath dm_snapshot dm_bufio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_zero dm_mod linear raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_intel raid1 raid0 iscsi_ibft squashfs be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 tls
[  450.048497]  libcxgbi libcxgb qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi edd ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler
[  450.159753] ---[ end trace 712de2c57c64abc8 ]---

Reported-by: Guangwu Zhang <guazhang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Saurav Kashyap <skashyap@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315071427.31842-1-skashyap@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit adf0398cee86643b8eacde95f17d073d022f782c ]

There is a race condition between l2cap_chan_timeout() and
l2cap_chan_del(). When we use l2cap_chan_del() to delete the
channel, the chan->conn will be set to null. But the conn could
be dereferenced again in the mutex_lock() of l2cap_chan_timeout().
As a result the null pointer dereference bug will happen. The
KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below:

[  472.074580] ==================================================================
[  472.075284] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0
[  472.075308] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000158 by task kworker/0:0/7
[  472.075308]
[  472.075308] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b whatawurst#36
[  472.075308] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4
[  472.075308] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
[  472.075308] Call Trace:
[  472.075308]  <TASK>
[  472.075308]  dump_stack_lvl+0x137/0x1a0
[  472.075308]  print_report+0x101/0x250
[  472.075308]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x77/0x160
[  472.075308]  ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0
[  472.075308]  kasan_report+0x139/0x170
[  472.075308]  ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0
[  472.075308]  kasan_check_range+0x2c3/0x2e0
[  472.075308]  mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0
[  472.075308]  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300
[  472.075308]  process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00
[  472.075308]  worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660
[  472.075308]  ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
[  472.075308]  kthread+0x2b7/0x350
[  472.075308]  ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
[  472.075308]  ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
[  472.075308]  ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
[  472.075308]  ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
[  472.075308]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[  472.075308]  </TASK>
[  472.075308] ==================================================================
[  472.094860] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  472.096136] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158
[  472.096136] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  472.096136] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  472.096136] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  472.096136] Oops: 0002 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[  472.096136] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G    B              6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b whatawurst#36
[  472.096136] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4
[  472.096136] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
[  472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0
[  472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88
[  472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246
[  472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865
[  472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78
[  472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f
[  472.096136] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000
[  472.096136] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00
[  472.096136] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  472.096136] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  472.096136] Call Trace:
[  472.096136]  <TASK>
[  472.096136]  ? __die_body+0x8d/0xe0
[  472.096136]  ? page_fault_oops+0x6b8/0x9a0
[  472.096136]  ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x20c/0x2a0
[  472.096136]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1027/0x1340
[  472.096136]  ? _printk+0x7a/0xa0
[  472.096136]  ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0
[  472.096136]  ? add_taint+0x42/0xd0
[  472.096136]  ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x1b0
[  472.096136]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[  472.096136]  ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0
[  472.096136]  ? mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0
[  472.096136]  ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0
[  472.096136]  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300
[  472.096136]  process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00
[  472.096136]  worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660
[  472.096136]  ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
[  472.096136]  kthread+0x2b7/0x350
[  472.096136]  ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
[  472.096136]  ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
[  472.096136]  ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
[  472.096136]  ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
[  472.096136]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[  472.096136]  </TASK>
[  472.096136] Modules linked in:
[  472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158
[  472.096136] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0
[  472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88
[  472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246
[  472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865
[  472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78
[  472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f
[  472.132932] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000
[  472.132932] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00
[  472.132932] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  472.132932] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  472.132932] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  472.132932] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[  472.132932] Kernel Offset: disabled
[  472.132932] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

Add a check to judge whether the conn is null in l2cap_chan_timeout()
in order to mitigate the bug.

Fixes: 3df91ea ("Bluetooth: Revert to mutexes from RCU list")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
commit 080cbb890286cd794f1ee788bbc5463e2deb7c2b upstream.

Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported
a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0
linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034

CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 whatawurst#1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377
 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601
 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026
 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094
 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108
 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144
 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244
 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186
 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324
 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824
 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159
 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390
 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461
 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534
 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648
 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976
 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576
 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645
 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781
 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553
 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454
 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381
 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33
 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378
 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169
 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526
 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540
 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313
 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295
 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303
 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451
 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129
 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492
 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963
 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250
 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850
 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730
 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745
 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191
 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203
 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199
 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52
 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29
Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29
RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its
ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup
code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier.

Fixes: 1149557 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
…nix_gc().

commit 1971d13ffa84a551d29a81fdf5b5ec5be166ac83 upstream.

syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().

One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.

So, the splat is false-positive.

Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.

Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
 -----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> whatawurst#1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
       unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
       unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
       skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
       skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
       __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
       kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
       kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
       manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
       unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
       unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
       do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
       splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
       do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
       __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
       __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
       __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
       __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
       process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
       process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
       worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
       kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
       ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(unix_gc_lock);
                               lock(&u->lock);
                               lock(unix_gc_lock);
  lock(&u->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 whatawurst#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 whatawurst#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 whatawurst#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 whatawurst#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
 </TASK>

Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit 85a6a1aff08ec9f5b929d345d066e2830e8818e5 ]

The 'TAG 66 Packet Format' description is missing the cipher code and
checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,
the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and
write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the
buffer.

Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet
will always fit in the buffer.

This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181

  CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu whatawurst#1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70
   print_report+0xc5/0x610
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   kasan_report+0xc2/0x110
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   __asan_store1+0x62/0x80
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10
   ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540
   ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]
   ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10
   ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0
   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
  RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67
  Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f
  RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67
  RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
  RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040
   </TASK>

  Allocated by task 181:
   kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60
   kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0
   __kmalloc+0x66/0x160
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Fixes: dddfa46 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Brian Kubisiak <brian@kubisiak.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5j2q56p6qkhezva6b2yuqfrsurmvrrqtxxzrnp3wqu7xrz22i7@hoecdztoplbl
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit c6854e5a267c28300ff045480b5a7ee7f6f1d913 ]

Add a check to make sure that the requested xattr node size is no larger
than the eraseblock minus the cleanmarker.

Unlike the usual inode nodes, the xattr nodes aren't split into parts
and spread across multiple eraseblocks, which means that a xattr node
must not occupy more than one eraseblock. If the requested xattr value is
too large, the xattr node can spill onto the next eraseblock, overwriting
the nodes and causing errors such as:

jffs2: argh. node added in wrong place at 0x0000b050(2)
jffs2: nextblock 0x0000a000, expected at 0000b00c
jffs2: error: (823) do_verify_xattr_datum: node CRC failed at 0x01e050,
read=0xfc892c93, calc=0x000000
jffs2: notice: (823) jffs2_get_inode_nodes: Node header CRC failed
at 0x01e00c. {848f,2fc4,0fef511f,59a3d171}
jffs2: Node at 0x0000000c with length 0x00001044 would run over the
end of the erase block
jffs2: Perhaps the file system was created with the wrong erase size?
jffs2: jffs2_scan_eraseblock(): Magic bitmask 0x1985 not found
at 0x00000010: 0x1044 instead

This breaks the filesystem and can lead to KASAN crashes such as:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802c31e914 by task repro/830
CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ whatawurst#1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120
 print_report+0xc4/0x620
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x308/0x5b0
 kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
 ? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
 ? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
 jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
 jffs2_flash_direct_writev+0xa8/0xd0
 jffs2_flash_writev+0x9c9/0xef0
 ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc4/0x160
 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x140
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 [...]

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: aa98d7c ("[JFFS2][XATTR] XATTR support on JFFS2 (version. 5)")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Denisyev <dev@elkcl.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240412155357.237803-1-dev@elkcl.ru
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit e03e7f20ebf7e1611d40d1fdc1bde900fd3335f6 ]

syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]

Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> whatawurst#1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
        nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]
        nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355
        nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683
        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
        nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
        nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
        nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(nr_node_list_lock);
                               lock(&nr_node->node_lock);
                               lock(nr_node_list_lock);
  lock(&nr_node->node_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 5129 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
  check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
  __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
  lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
  __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
  spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
  nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
  nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
  nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
  sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
  sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
  vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
  __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
  __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515142934.3708038-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit d101291b2681e5ab938554e3e323f7a7ee33e3aa ]

syzbot is able to trigger the following crash [1],
caused by unsafe ip6_dst_idev() use.

Indeed ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, and must always be checked.

[1]

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 PID: 31648 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240417-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
 RIP: 0010:__fib6_rule_action net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:237 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_action+0x241/0x7b0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:267
Code: 02 00 00 49 8d 9f d8 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f9 32 bf f7 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 e0 32 bf f7 4c 8b 03 48 89 ef 4c
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fc1f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1a772f98c8186700
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8bcac4e0 RDI: ffffffff8c1f9760
RBP: ffff8880673fb980 R08: ffffffff8fac15ef R09: 1ffffffff1f582bd
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f582be R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: ffff888076509000 R15: ffff88807a029a00
FS:  00007f55e82ca6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b31d23000 CR3: 0000000022b66000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  fib_rules_lookup+0x62c/0xdb0 net/core/fib_rules.c:317
  fib6_rule_lookup+0x1fd/0x790 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:108
  ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2637 [inline]
  ip6_route_output_flags+0x38e/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:2649
  ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline]
  ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x189/0x11a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1120
  ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xb9/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250
  sctp_v6_get_dst+0x792/0x1e20 net/sctp/ipv6.c:326
  sctp_transport_route+0x12c/0x2e0 net/sctp/transport.c:455
  sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x614/0x15c0 net/sctp/associola.c:662
  sctp_connect_new_asoc+0x31d/0x6c0 net/sctp/socket.c:1099
  __sctp_connect+0x66d/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1197
  sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline]
  sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834
  __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline]
  __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065
  __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline]
  __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline]
  __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 5e5f3f0 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Convert ipv6_get_saddr() to ipv6_dev_get_saddr().")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507163145.835254-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[uli: backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2024
…oy_rcu()

[ Upstream commit dc21c6cc3d6986d938efbf95de62473982c98dec ]

syzbot reported that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() :

WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Not tainted

net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:263 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/13427:
  #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa86/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471
  whatawurst#1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
  whatawurst#1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:405 [inline]
  whatawurst#1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: instance_destroy_rcu+0x30/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 13427 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712
  nf_reinject net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:323 [inline]
  nfqnl_reinject+0x6ec/0x1120 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:397
  nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:410 [inline]
  instance_destroy_rcu+0x1ae/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2196 [inline]
  rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471
  handle_softirqs+0x2d6/0x990 kernel/softirq.c:554
  __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
  invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
  __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637
  irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649
  instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline]
  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>

Fixes: 9872bec ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink: use RCU for queue instances hash")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2024
commit 22f00812862564b314784167a89f27b444f82a46 upstream.

The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in
the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate
resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the
dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:

cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71
cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]
CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:
	whatawurst#1:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	whatawurst#2:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	whatawurst#3:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	whatawurst#4:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	whatawurst#5:  98% system,	  1% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 73096
hardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]
hardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551
softirqs last  enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]
softirqs last  enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582
softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588
CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024

Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error
messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding
material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.

In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to
avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is
to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with
dev_err_ratelimited().

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Suggested-by: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5f996b83575ef4058638@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/00000000000073d54b061a6a1c65@google.com/
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1b2abad17596ad03dcff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/000000000000f45085061aa9b37e@google.com/
Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/40dfa45b-5f21-4eef-a8c1-51a2f320e267@rowland.harvard.edu/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/29855215-52f5-4385-b058-91f42c2bee18@rowland.harvard.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2024
commit c0a40097f0bc81deafc15f9195d1fb54595cd6d0 upstream.

Synchronize the dev->driver usage in really_probe() and dev_uevent().
These can run in different threads, what can result in the following
race condition for dev->driver uninitialization:

Thread whatawurst#1:
==========

really_probe() {
...
probe_failed:
...
device_unbind_cleanup(dev) {
    ...
    dev->driver = NULL;   // <= Failed probe sets dev->driver to NULL
    ...
    }
...
}

Thread whatawurst#2:
==========

dev_uevent() {
...
if (dev->driver)
      // If dev->driver is NULLed from really_probe() from here on,
      // after above check, the system crashes
      add_uevent_var(env, "DRIVER=%s", dev->driver->name);
...
}

really_probe() holds the lock, already. So nothing needs to be done
there. dev_uevent() is called with lock held, often, too. But not
always. What implies that we can't add any locking in dev_uevent()
itself. So fix this race by adding the lock to the non-protected
path. This is the path where above race is observed:

 dev_uevent+0x235/0x380
 uevent_show+0x10c/0x1f0  <= Add lock here
 dev_attr_show+0x3a/0xa0
 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x17c/0x250
 kernfs_seq_show+0x7c/0x90
 seq_read_iter+0x2d7/0x940
 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xc6/0x310
 vfs_read+0x5bc/0x6b0
 ksys_read+0xeb/0x1b0
 __x64_sys_read+0x42/0x50
 x64_sys_call+0x27ad/0x2d30
 do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Similar cases are reported by syzkaller in

https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ffa8143439596313a85a

But these are regarding the *initialization* of dev->driver

dev->driver = drv;

As this switches dev->driver to non-NULL these reports can be considered
to be false-positives (which should be "fixed" by this commit, as well,
though).

The same issue was reported and tried to be fixed back in 2015 in

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1421259054-2574-1-git-send-email-a.sangwan@samsung.com/

already.

Fixes: 239378f ("Driver core: add uevent vars for devices of a class")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: syzbot+ffa8143439596313a85a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Ashish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com>
Cc: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@de.bosch.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240513050634.3964461-1-dirk.behme@de.bosch.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2024
commit a4ca369ca221bb7e06c725792ac107f0e48e82e7 upstream.

Destructive writes to a block device on which nilfs2 is mounted can cause
a kernel bug in the folio/page writeback start routine or writeback end
routine (__folio_start_writeback in the log below):

 kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:3070!
 Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
 ...
 RIP: 0010:__folio_start_writeback+0xbaa/0x10e0
 Code: 25 ff 0f 00 00 0f 84 18 01 00 00 e8 40 ca c6 ff e9 17 f6 ff ff
  e8 36 ca c6 ff 4c 89 f7 48 c7 c6 80 c0 12 84 e8 e7 b3 0f 00 90 <0f>
  0b e8 1f ca c6 ff 4c 89 f7 48 c7 c6 a0 c6 12 84 e8 d0 b3 0f 00
 ...
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x4654/0x69d0 [nilfs2]
  nilfs_segctor_construct+0x181/0x6b0 [nilfs2]
  nilfs_segctor_thread+0x548/0x11c0 [nilfs2]
  kthread+0x2f0/0x390
  ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>

This is because when the log writer starts a writeback for segment summary
blocks or a super root block that use the backing device's page cache, it
does not wait for the ongoing folio/page writeback, resulting in an
inconsistent writeback state.

Fix this issue by waiting for ongoing writebacks when putting
folios/pages on the backing device into writeback state.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240530141556.4411-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: 9ff0512 ("nilfs2: segment constructor")
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2024
[ Upstream commit d46401052c2d5614da8efea5788532f0401cb164 ]

ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly.

syzbot reported:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker
 RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64
Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98
RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000
R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline]
  xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline]
  xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541
  xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835
  xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline]
  xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201
  xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline]
  xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309
  ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256
  send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139
  wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178
  wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200
  wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40
  wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51
  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615154231.234442-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2024
[ Upstream commit af9a8730ddb6a4b2edd779ccc0aceb994d616830 ]

During the stress testing of the jffs2 file system,the following
abnormal printouts were found:
[ 2430.649000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0069696969696948
[ 2430.649622] Mem abort info:
[ 2430.649829]   ESR = 0x96000004
[ 2430.650115]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 2430.650564]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 2430.650795]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 2430.651032]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 2430.651446] Data abort info:
[ 2430.651683]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 2430.652001]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 2430.652558] [0069696969696948] address between user and kernel address ranges
[ 2430.653265] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2430.654512] CPU: 2 PID: 20919 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.15.25-g512f31242bf6 whatawurst#33
[ 2430.655008] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 2430.655517] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2430.656142] pc : kfree+0x78/0x348
[ 2430.656630] lr : jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48
[ 2430.657051] sp : ffff800009eebd10
[ 2430.657355] x29: ffff800009eebd10 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 2430.658327] x26: ffff000038f09d80 x25: 0080000000000000 x24: ffff800009d38000
[ 2430.658919] x23: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a x22: ffff000038f09d80 x21: ffff8000084f0d14
[ 2430.659434] x20: ffff0000bf9a6ac0 x19: 0169696969696940 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 2430.659969] x17: ffff8000b6506000 x16: ffff800009eec000 x15: 0000000000004000
[ 2430.660637] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000001000820a1 x12: 00000000000d1b19
[ 2430.661345] x11: 0004000800000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffff8000084f0d14
[ 2430.662025] x8 : ffff0000bf9a6b40 x7 : ffff0000bf9a6b48 x6 : 0000000003470302
[ 2430.662695] x5 : ffff00002e41dcc0 x4 : ffff0000bf9aa3b0 x3 : 0000000003470342
[ 2430.663486] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8000084f0d14 x0 : fffffc0000000000
[ 2430.664217] Call trace:
[ 2430.664528]  kfree+0x78/0x348
[ 2430.664855]  jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48
[ 2430.665233]  i_callback+0x24/0x50
[ 2430.665528]  rcu_do_batch+0x1ac/0x448
[ 2430.665892]  rcu_core+0x28c/0x3c8
[ 2430.666151]  rcu_core_si+0x18/0x28
[ 2430.666473]  __do_softirq+0x138/0x3cc
[ 2430.666781]  irq_exit+0xf0/0x110
[ 2430.667065]  handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0x98
[ 2430.667447]  gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xe8
[ 2430.667739]  call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x54
The parameter passed to kfree was 5a5a5a5a, which corresponds to the target field of
the jffs_inode_info structure. It was found that all variables in the jffs_inode_info
structure were 5a5a5a5a, except for the first member sem. It is suspected that these
variables are not initialized because they were set to 5a5a5a5a during memory testing,
which is meant to detect uninitialized memory.The sem variable is initialized in the
function jffs2_i_init_once, while other members are initialized in
the function jffs2_init_inode_info.

The function jffs2_init_inode_info is called after iget_locked,
but in the iget_locked function, the destroy_inode process is triggered,
which releases the inode and consequently, the target member of the inode
is not initialized.In concurrent high pressure scenarios, iget_locked
may enter the destroy_inode branch as described in the code.

Since the destroy_inode functionality of jffs2 only releases the target,
the fix method is to set target to NULL in jffs2_i_init_once.

Signed-off-by: Wang Yong <wang.yong12@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Lu Zhongjun <lu.zhongjun@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin16@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2024
[ Upstream commit e271ff53807e8f2c628758290f0e499dbe51cb3d ]

In function bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set(), if newval->string is an
empty string, newval->string+1 will point to the byte after the
string, causing an out-of-bound read.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881119c4781 by task syz-executor665/8107
CPU: 1 PID: 8107 Comm: syz-executor665 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7 whatawurst#1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
 print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 mm/kasan/report.c:475
 kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418
 __fortify_strlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:210 [inline]
 in4_pton+0xa3/0x3f0 net/core/utils.c:130
 bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set+0xc2/0x910
drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:1201
 __bond_opt_set+0x2a4/0x1030 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:767
 __bond_opt_set_notify+0x48/0x150 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:792
 bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0xda/0x160 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:817
 bonding_sysfs_store_option+0xa1/0x120 drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c:156
 dev_attr_store+0x54/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2366
 sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x337/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x96a/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:584
 ksys_write+0x122/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
---[ end trace ]---

Fix it by adding a check of string length before using it.

Fixes: f9de11a ("bonding: add ip checks when store ip target")
Signed-off-by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240702-bond-oob-v6-1-2dfdba195c19@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
commit 50ea741def587a64e08879ce6c6a30131f7111e7 upstream.

Syzbot reports a issue as follows:
============================================
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11022e24fe
PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-g55027e689933 #0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 make_indexed_dir+0xdaf/0x13c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2341
 ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2451
 ext4_rename fs/ext4/namei.c:3936 [inline]
 ext4_rename2+0x26e5/0x4370 fs/ext4/namei.c:4214
[...]
============================================

The immediate cause of this problem is that there is only one valid dentry
for the block to be split during do_split, so split==0 results in out of
bounds accesses to the map triggering the issue.

    do_split
      unsigned split
      dx_make_map
       count = 1
      split = count/2 = 0;
      continued = hash2 == map[split - 1].hash;
       ---> map[4294967295]

The maximum length of a filename is 255 and the minimum block size is 1024,
so it is always guaranteed that the number of entries is greater than or
equal to 2 when do_split() is called.

But syzbot's crafted image has no dot and dotdot in dir, and the dentry
distribution in dirblock is as follows:

  bus     dentry1          hole           dentry2           free
|xx--|xx-------------|...............|xx-------------|...............|
0   12 (8+248)=256  268     256     524 (8+256)=264 788     236     1024

So when renaming dentry1 increases its name_len length by 1, neither hole
nor free is sufficient to hold the new dentry, and make_indexed_dir() is
called.

In make_indexed_dir() it is assumed that the first two entries of the
dirblock must be dot and dotdot, so bus and dentry1 are left in dx_root
because they are treated as dot and dotdot, and only dentry2 is moved
to the new leaf block. That's why count is equal to 1.

Therefore add the ext4_check_dx_root() helper function to add more sanity
checks to dot and dotdot before starting the conversion to avoid the above
issue.

Reported-by: syzbot+ae688d469e36fb5138d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ae688d469e36fb5138d0
Fixes: ac27a0e ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240702132349.2600605-2-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit 3e7917c0cdad835a5121520fc5686d954b7a61ab ]

linkwatch_event() grabs possibly very contended RTNL mutex.

system_wq is not suitable for such work.

Inspired by many noisy syzbot reports.

3 locks held by kworker/0:7/5266:
 #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3206 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x90a/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
 whatawurst#1: ffffc90003f6fd00 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3207 [inline]
 , at: process_scheduled_works+0x945/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
 whatawurst#2: ffffffff8fa6f208 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: linkwatch_event+0xe/0x60 net/core/link_watch.c:276

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240805085821.1616528-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit 305a5170dc5cf3d395bb4c4e9239bca6d0b54b49 ]

Currently, mdadm support --revert-reshape to abort the reshape while
reassembling, as the test 07revert-grow. However, following BUG_ON()
can be triggerred by the test:

kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:6278!
invalid opcode: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
irq event stamp: 158985
CPU: 6 PID: 891 Comm: md0_reshape Not tainted 6.9.0-03335-g7592a0b0049a whatawurst#94
RIP: 0010:reshape_request+0x3f1/0xe60
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 raid5_sync_request+0x43d/0x550
 md_do_sync+0xb7a/0x2110
 md_thread+0x294/0x2b0
 kthread+0x147/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x59/0x70
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>

Root cause is that --revert-reshape update the raid_disks from 5 to 4,
while reshape position is still set, and after reassembling the array,
reshape position will be read from super block, then during reshape the
checking of 'writepos' that is caculated by old reshape position will
fail.

Fix this panic the easy way first, by converting the BUG_ON() to
WARN_ON(), and stop the reshape if checkings fail.

Noted that mdadm must fix --revert-shape as well, and probably md/raid
should enhance metadata validation as well, however this means
reassemble will fail and there must be user tools to fix the wrong
metadata.

Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240611132251.1967786-13-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit c145eea2f75ff7949392aebecf7ef0a81c1f6c14 ]

mwifiex_get_priv_by_id() returns the priv pointer corresponding to
the bss_num and bss_type, but without checking if the priv is actually
currently in use.
Unused priv pointers do not have a wiphy attached to them which can
lead to NULL pointer dereferences further down the callstack.  Fix
this by returning only used priv pointers which have priv->bss_mode
set to something else than NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED.

Said NULL pointer dereference happened when an Accesspoint was started
with wpa_supplicant -i mlan0 with this config:

network={
        ssid="somessid"
        mode=2
        frequency=2412
        key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256
        proto=RSN
        group=CCMP
        pairwise=CCMP
        psk="12345678"
}

When waiting for the AP to be established, interrupting wpa_supplicant
with <ctrl-c> and starting it again this happens:

| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000140
| Mem abort info:
|   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
|   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
|   SET = 0, FnV = 0
|   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
|   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
| Data abort info:
|   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
|   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
|   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
| user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046d96000
| [0000000000000140] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
| Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP
| Modules linked in: caam_jr caamhash_desc spidev caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes mwifiex_sdio
+mwifiex crct10dif_ce cdc_acm onboard_usb_hub fsl_imx8_ddr_perf imx8m_ddrc rtc_ds1307 lm75 rtc_snvs
+imx_sdma caam imx8mm_thermal spi_imx error imx_cpufreq_dt fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6
| CPU: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-00007-g937242013fce-dirty whatawurst#18
| Hardware name: somemachine (DT)
| Workqueue: events sdio_irq_work
| pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex]
| lr : mwifiex_get_cfp+0x34/0x15c [mwifiex]
| sp : ffff8000818b3a70
| x29: ffff8000818b3a70 x28: ffff000006bfd8a5 x27: 0000000000000004
| x26: 000000000000002c x25: 0000000000001511 x24: 0000000002e86bc9
| x23: ffff000006bfd996 x22: 0000000000000004 x21: ffff000007bec000
| x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 00500072b5503510 x15: ccc283740681e517
| x14: 0201000101006d15 x13: 0000000002e8ff43 x12: 002c01000000ffb1
| x11: 0100000000000000 x10: 02e8ff43002c0100 x9 : 0000ffb100100157
| x8 : ffff000003d20000 x7 : 00000000000002f1 x6 : 00000000ffffe124
| x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0001000000011001 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
|  mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex]
|  mwifiex_parse_single_response_buf+0x1d0/0x504 [mwifiex]
|  mwifiex_handle_event_ext_scan_report+0x19c/0x2f8 [mwifiex]
|  mwifiex_process_sta_event+0x298/0xf0c [mwifiex]
|  mwifiex_process_event+0x110/0x238 [mwifiex]
|  mwifiex_main_process+0x428/0xa44 [mwifiex]
|  mwifiex_sdio_interrupt+0x64/0x12c [mwifiex_sdio]
|  process_sdio_pending_irqs+0x64/0x1b8
|  sdio_irq_work+0x4c/0x7c
|  process_one_work+0x148/0x2a0
|  worker_thread+0x2fc/0x40c
|  kthread+0x110/0x114
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
| Code: a94153f3 a8c37bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (f940a000)
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703072409.556618-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit b739dffa5d570b411d4bdf4bb9b8dfd6b7d72305 ]

When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than
the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects
the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table
(dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"):

  OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0
  OF:  parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2
  OF:  intspec=4
  OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2
  OF:  -> addrsize=3
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
  Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764

  CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G           O       6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 whatawurst#1
  Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130
   show_stack+0x1c/0x30
   dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84
   print_report+0x150/0x448
   kasan_report+0x98/0x140
   __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0
   of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
   of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270
   parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120
   of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0
   fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0
   device_add+0xb38/0xc30
   of_device_add+0x64/0x90
   of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170
   of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600
   of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254
   blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0
   __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230
   __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4
   of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94
   ...

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
  The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
   128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680)

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4
  head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
  flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2)
  raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                        ^
   ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ==================================================================
  OF:  -> got it !

Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a
buffer of sufficient size.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <stefan.wiehler@nokia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812100652.3800963-1-stefan.wiehler@nokia.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[uli: backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
… error

commit f5cacdc6f2bb2a9bf214469dd7112b43dd2dd68a upstream.

In __jbd2_log_wait_for_space(), we might call jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail()
to recover some journal space. But if an error occurs while executing
jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() (e.g., an EIO), we don't stop waiting for free
space right away, we try other branches, and if j_committing_transaction
is NULL (i.e., the tid is 0), we will get the following complain:

============================================
JBD2: I/O error when updating journal superblock for sdd-8.
__jbd2_log_wait_for_space: needed 256 blocks and only had 217 space available
__jbd2_log_wait_for_space: no way to get more journal space in sdd-8
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 at fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c:109 __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 139804 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.6.0+ whatawurst#1
RIP: 0010:__jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 add_transaction_credits+0x5d1/0x5e0
 start_this_handle+0x1ef/0x6a0
 jbd2__journal_start+0x18b/0x340
 ext4_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xb0
 __mark_inode_dirty+0xe4/0x5d0
 generic_update_time+0x60/0x70
[...]
============================================

So only if jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() returns 1, i.e., there is nothing to
clean up at the moment, continue to try to reclaim free space in other ways.

Note that this fix relies on commit 6f6a6fd ("jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt
when updating journal superblock fails") to make jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail
return the correct error code.

Fixes: 8c3f25d ("jbd2: don't give up looking for space so easily in __jbd2_log_wait_for_space")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240718115336.2554501-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit f9ff7665cd128012868098bbd07e28993e314fdb ]

Fix a kernel panic in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged
traffic via a VxLAN device.
This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit.

It is dependent on:
1) the br_netfilter module being loaded;
2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1;
3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port;
4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded

When forwarding the untagged packet to the VxLAN bridge port, before
the netfilter hooks are called, br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel is called and
changes the skb_dst to the tunnel dst. The tunnel_dst is a metadata type
of dst, i.e., skb_valid_dst(skb) is false, and metadata->dst.dev is NULL.

Then in the br_netfilter hooks, in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit, there's a check
for frames that needs to be fragmented: frames with higher MTU than the
VxLAN device end up calling br_nf_ip_fragment, which in turns call
ip_skb_dst_mtu.

The ip_dst_mtu tries to use the skb_dst(skb) as if it was a valid dst
with valid dst->dev, thus the crash.

This case was never supported in the first place, so drop the packet
instead.

PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data.
[  176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
virtual address 0000000000000110
[  176.292101] Mem abort info:
[  176.292184]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[  176.292322]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[  176.292530]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[  176.292709]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[  176.292862]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[  176.293013] Data abort info:
[  176.293104]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[  176.293488]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[  176.293787]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[  176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000
[  176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000,
p4d=0000000000000000
[  176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth
br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce
[  176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted
6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 whatawurst#2
[  176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[  176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS
BTYPE=--)
[  176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[  176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[  176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630
[  176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27:
ffff6828c49ad9f8
[  176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24:
00000000000003e8
[  176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21:
ffff6828c3b16d28
[  176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18:
0000000000000014
[  176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15:
0000000095744632
[  176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12:
ffffb7e137926a70
[  176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 :
0000000000000000
[  176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 :
f20e0100bebafeca
[  176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 :
0000000000000000
[  176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 :
ffff6828c7f918f0
[  176.300889] Call trace:
[  176.301123]  br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[  176.301411]  br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter]
[  176.301703]  nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[  176.302060]  br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge]
[  176.302371]  br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter]
[  176.302605]  br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter]
[  176.302824]  br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter]
[  176.303136]  br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter]
[  176.303359]  nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[  176.303803]  __br_forward+0xc4/0x194 [bridge]
[  176.304013]  br_flood+0xd4/0x168 [bridge]
[  176.304300]  br_handle_frame_finish+0x1d4/0x5c4 [bridge]
[  176.304536]  br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter]
[  176.304978]  br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x29c/0x494 [br_netfilter]
[  176.305188]  br_nf_pre_routing+0x250/0x524 [br_netfilter]
[  176.305428]  br_handle_frame+0x244/0x3cc [bridge]
[  176.305695]  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x33c/0xecc
[  176.306080]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x40/0x8c
[  176.306197]  __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x64
[  176.306369]  process_backlog+0x80/0x124
[  176.306540]  __napi_poll+0x38/0x17c
[  176.306636]  net_rx_action+0x124/0x26c
[  176.306758]  __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c
[  176.307051]  ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
[  176.307162]  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c
[  176.307289]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c
[  176.307396]  do_softirq+0x54/0x6c
[  176.307485]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0x98
[  176.307637]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x22c/0xd28
[  176.307775]  neigh_resolve_output+0xf4/0x1a0
[  176.308018]  ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628
[  176.308137]  ip_do_fragment+0x5b4/0x658
[  176.308279]  ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x48/0xec
[  176.308420]  __ip_finish_output+0xa4/0x254
[  176.308593]  ip_finish_output+0x34/0x130
[  176.308814]  ip_output+0x6c/0x108
[  176.308929]  ip_send_skb+0x50/0xf0
[  176.309095]  ip_push_pending_frames+0x30/0x54
[  176.309254]  raw_sendmsg+0x758/0xaec
[  176.309568]  inet_sendmsg+0x44/0x70
[  176.309667]  __sys_sendto+0x110/0x178
[  176.309758]  __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x38
[  176.309918]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
[  176.310211]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
[  176.310353]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[  176.310434]  el0_svc+0x34/0xb4
[  176.310551]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
[  176.310690]  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[  176.311066] Code: f9402e61 79402aa2 927ff821 f9400023 (f9408860)
[  176.315743] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  176.316060] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in
interrupt
[  176.316371] Kernel Offset: 0x37e0e3000000 from 0xffff800080000000
[  176.316564] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff97d780000000
[  176.316782] CPU features: 0x0,88000203,3c020000,0100421b
[  176.317210] Memory Limit: none
[  176.317527] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal
Exception in interrupt ]---\

Fixes: 11538d0 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Roulin <aroulin@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241001154400.22787-2-aroulin@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit 330a699ecbfc9c26ec92c6310686da1230b4e7eb ]

Commit 004d25060c78 ("igb: Fix igb_down hung on surprise removal")
changed igb_io_error_detected() to ignore non-fatal pcie errors in order
to avoid hung task that can happen when igb_down() is called multiple
times. This caused an issue when processing transient non-fatal errors.
igb_io_resume(), which is called after igb_io_error_detected(), assumes
that device is brought down by igb_io_error_detected() if the interface
is up. This resulted in panic with stacktrace below.

[ T3256] igb 0000:09:00.0 haeth0: igb: haeth0 NIC Link is Down
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) error received: 0000:09:00.0
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fatal), type=Transaction Layer, (Requester ID)
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0:   device [8086:1537] error status/mask=00004000/00000000
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0:    [14] CmpltTO [  200.105524,009][  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: AER:   TLP Header: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast error_detected message
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: Non-correctable non-fatal error reported.
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast mmio_enabled message
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast resume message
[  T292] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  T292] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6539!
[  T292] invalid opcode: 0000 [whatawurst#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  T292] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292] Call Trace:
[  T292]  <TASK>
[  T292]  ? die+0x33/0x90
[  T292]  ? do_trap+0xdc/0x110
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? do_error_trap+0x70/0xb0
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  igb_up+0x41/0x150
[  T292]  igb_io_resume+0x25/0x70
[  T292]  report_resume+0x54/0x70
[  T292]  ? report_frozen_detected+0x20/0x20
[  T292]  pci_walk_bus+0x6c/0x90
[  T292]  ? aer_print_port_info+0xa0/0xa0
[  T292]  pcie_do_recovery+0x22f/0x380
[  T292]  aer_process_err_devices+0x110/0x160
[  T292]  aer_isr+0x1c1/0x1e0
[  T292]  ? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10
[  T292]  irq_thread_fn+0x1a/0x60
[  T292]  irq_thread+0xe3/0x1a0
[  T292]  ? irq_set_affinity_notifier+0x120/0x120
[  T292]  ? irq_affinity_notify+0x100/0x100
[  T292]  kthread+0xe2/0x110
[  T292]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[  T292]  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[  T292]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[  T292]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[  T292]  </TASK>

To fix this issue igb_io_resume() checks if the interface is running and
the device is not down this means igb_io_error_detected() did not bring
the device down and there is no need to bring it up.

Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella@purestorage.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuanyuan Zhong <yzhong@purestorage.com>
Fixes: 004d25060c78 ("igb: Fix igb_down hung on surprise removal")
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
SteadyQuad pushed a commit to SteadyQuad/android_kernel_sony_msm8998 that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
commit 1dae9f1187189bc09ff6d25ca97ead711f7e26f9 upstream.

The kernel may crash when deleting a genetlink family if there are still
listeners for that family:

Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [whatawurst#1]
  ...
  NIP [c000000000c080bc] netlink_update_socket_mc+0x3c/0xc0
  LR [c000000000c0f764] __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0
  Call Trace:
__netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0
genl_unregister_family+0xd4/0x2d0

Change the unsafe loop on the list to a safe one, because inside the
loop there is an element removal from this list.

Fixes: b827357 ("genetlink: fix netns vs. netlink table locking (2)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anastasia Kovaleva <a.kovaleva@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241003104431.12391-1-a.kovaleva@yadro.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
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