update

.codespell-whitelist

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+uint
+ith
+mitre
+readded
+crate
+developper
+ist

.travis-ci.sh

@@ -24,4 +24,6 @@ elif [[ $TASK = 'eip-validator' ]]; then
 
   FILES="$(ls EIPS/*.md | egrep "eip-[0-9]+.md")"
   bundle exec eip_validator $FILES
+elif [[ $TASK = 'codespell' ]]; then
+  codespell -q4 -I .codespell-whitelist eip-X.md EIPS/
 fi

.travis.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cache:
   - bundler
   - directories:
     - $TRAVIS_BUILD_DIR/tmp/.htmlproofer #https://github.com/gjtorikian/html-proofer/issues/381
-
+    - /usr/local/lib/python3.3/dist-packages/pip/
 
 # Assume bundler is being used, therefore
 # the `install` step will run `bundle install` by default.
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ matrix:
       env: TASK='htmlproofer-external'
     - rvm: 2.2.5
       env: TASK='eip-validator'
+    - python: 3.3
+      env: TASK='codespell'
+      before_script: "sudo pip install urllib3[secure] && sudo pip install codespell"
   allow_failures:
     - rvm: 2.2.5
       env: TASK='htmlproofer-external'

EIPS/eip-1011.md

@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ def check_and_finalize_new_checkpoint(new_block):
         db.last_finalized_block = finalized_hash
 ```
 
-The new chain scoring rule queries the casper contract to find the highest justified epoch that meets the client's minimum deposit requirement (`NON_REVERT_MIN_DEPOSITS`). The `10**40` multiplier ensures that the justified epoch takes precendence over block mining difficulty. `total_difficulty` only serves as a tie breaker if the two blocks in question have an equivalent `highest_justified_epoch`.
+The new chain scoring rule queries the casper contract to find the highest justified epoch that meets the client's minimum deposit requirement (`NON_REVERT_MIN_DEPOSITS`). The `10**40` multiplier ensures that the justified epoch takes precedence over block mining difficulty. `total_difficulty` only serves as a tie breaker if the two blocks in question have an equivalent `highest_justified_epoch`.
 
 _Note_: If the client has no justified checkpoints, the contract returns `highest_justified_epoch` as `0` essentially reverting the fork choice rule to pure PoW.
 
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ Any call to this method fails prior to the end of the `WARM_UP_PERIOD`. Thus the
 #### Issuance
 A fixed amount of 1.25M ETH was chosen as `CASPER_BALANCE` to fund the casper contract. This gives the contract enough runway to operate for approximately 2 years (assuming ~10M ETH in validator deposits). Acting similarly to the "difficulty bomb", this "funding crunch" forces the network to hardfork in the relative near future to further fund the contract. This future hardfork is an opportunity to upgrade the contract and transition to full PoS.
 
-The PoW block reward is reduced from 3.0 to 0.6 ETH/block over the course of approximately one year because the security of the chain is greatly shifted from PoW difficulty to PoS finality and because rewards are now issued to both validators and miners. Rewards are stepped down by 0.6 ETH/block every 3 months (`REWARD_STEPDOWN_BLOCK_COUNT`) to provide for a conservative transition period from full PoW to hybrid PoS/PoW. This gives validators time to become familiar with the new technology and begin logging on and also provides the network with more leeway in case of any unforseen issues. If any major issues do arise, the Ethereum network will still have substantial PoW security to rely upon while decisions are made and/or patches are deployed. See [here](https://gist.github.com/djrtwo/bc864c0d0a275170183803814b207b9a) for further analysis of the current PoW security and of the effect of PoW block reward reduction in the context of Hybrid Casper FFG.
+The PoW block reward is reduced from 3.0 to 0.6 ETH/block over the course of approximately one year because the security of the chain is greatly shifted from PoW difficulty to PoS finality and because rewards are now issued to both validators and miners. Rewards are stepped down by 0.6 ETH/block every 3 months (`REWARD_STEPDOWN_BLOCK_COUNT`) to provide for a conservative transition period from full PoW to hybrid PoS/PoW. This gives validators time to become familiar with the new technology and begin logging on and also provides the network with more leeway in case of any unforeseen issues. If any major issues do arise, the Ethereum network will still have substantial PoW security to rely upon while decisions are made and/or patches are deployed. See [here](https://gist.github.com/djrtwo/bc864c0d0a275170183803814b207b9a) for further analysis of the current PoW security and of the effect of PoW block reward reduction in the context of Hybrid Casper FFG.
 
 In addition to block rewards, miners now receive an issuance reward for including successful `vote` transactions into the block on time. This reward is equal to 1/8th that of the reward the validator receives for a successful `vote` transaction. Under optimal FFG conditions after group validator reward adjustments are made, miners receive approximately 1/5th of the total ETH issued by the Casper contract.
 

EIPS/eip-1015.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ created: 2018-04-20
 
 ## Simple Summary
 
-This EIP changes the block reward step by instead of setting it to be hard coded on the clients and to be given to the miner/validator etherbase, it should instead go to an address decided by an on-chain contract, with hard limits on how it would be issued (six month lock-in; issuance can only decrease or be mantained, but not increase;). A decision method is suggested but not essential to the notion of this EIP. This would **not be a generic governance solution**, which is a much broader and harder topic, would **not** affect technical upgrade decisions or other hard forks, but seen as *a forum to attempt to prevent contentious hard forks* that can be solved with the issuance.
+This EIP changes the block reward step by instead of setting it to be hard coded on the clients and to be given to the miner/validator etherbase, it should instead go to an address decided by an on-chain contract, with hard limits on how it would be issued (six month lock-in; issuance can only decrease or be maintained, but not increase;). A decision method is suggested but not essential to the notion of this EIP. This would **not be a generic governance solution**, which is a much broader and harder topic, would **not** affect technical upgrade decisions or other hard forks, but seen as *a forum to attempt to prevent contentious hard forks* that can be solved with the issuance.
 
 ## Summary
 ### Thesis: many controversial issues boil down to resources
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Moving to PoS has been on the roadmap since day 0 for ethereum, along with a red
 
 #### Issuance Cap at 120 Million
 
-[EIP 960](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/960), Vitalik's not so jokey april's fool has been taken seriously. It proposes the issuance to be slowly reduced until it reaches 120 million ether. One of the main counterpoints by Vlad can be simplified by [we don't know enough to know what that ether can be used for](https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/against-vitaliks-fixed-supply-eip-eip-960-18e182a7e5bd) and Vitalik's counterpoint is that [reducing emissions can be a way to reduce future abuse of these funds by finding a schelling point at 0](https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/to-be-clear-im-not-necessarily-wedded-to-a-finite-supply-cap-a7aa48ab880c). Issuance has already been reduced once, from 5 ether to the current 3 ether per block. The main point of a hard cap is that a lot of people consider *not issuing* as having a positive contribution, that can outweight other actions. Burning ether is also a valid issuance decision.
+[EIP 960](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/960), Vitalik's not so jokey april's fool has been taken seriously. It proposes the issuance to be slowly reduced until it reaches 120 million ether. One of the main counterpoints by Vlad can be simplified by [we don't know enough to know what that ether can be used for](https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/against-vitaliks-fixed-supply-eip-eip-960-18e182a7e5bd) and Vitalik's counterpoint is that [reducing emissions can be a way to reduce future abuse of these funds by finding a schelling point at 0](https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/to-be-clear-im-not-necessarily-wedded-to-a-finite-supply-cap-a7aa48ab880c). Issuance has already been reduced once, from 5 ether to the current 3 ether per block. The main point of a hard cap is that a lot of people consider *not issuing* as having a positive contribution, that can outweigh other actions. Burning ether is also a valid issuance decision.
 
 #### Asics and advantadges of PoW
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ It's not meant to be a general governance contract. The contract **should NOT be
 
 ##### It cannot only decrease issuance, and once decreased it cannot be increased again
 
-In order to reduce future abuse and uncertainity, **once issuance is reduced, it cannot be increased**. To prevent a single action reducing it to 0, the reduction is limited up to a percentage per time, so if the **decision assembly** is agressively to reduce issuance to zero, it would take a known number of years.
+In order to reduce future abuse and uncertainty, **once issuance is reduced, it cannot be increased**. To prevent a single action reducing it to 0, the reduction is limited up to a percentage per time, so if the **decision assembly** is aggressively to reduce issuance to zero, it would take a known number of years.
 
 ##### Results are locked for six months
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ A lot of things are suggested in this EIP, so I would like to propose these ques
 
 1. Do we want to have dynamically changing block rewards, instead of having them be hard coded in the protocol?
 2. If the answer above is yes, then what would be the best governance process to decide it, and what sorts of limits would we want that governance contract to have?
-3. If the answer is a multi-signalling contract, then what sorts of signals would we want, what sort of relative weight should they have and what would be the proccess to add and remove them?
+3. If the answer is a multi-signalling contract, then what sorts of signals would we want, what sort of relative weight should they have and what would be the process to add and remove them?
 
 
 

EIPS/eip-1057.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ A new Proof-of-Work algorithm to replace Ethash that utilizes almost all parts o
 
 ## Abstract
 
-ProgPoW is a proof-of-work algorithm designed to close the efficency gap available to specialized ASICs. It utilizes almost all parts of commodity hardware (GPUs), and comes pre-tuned for the most common hardware utilized in the Ethereum network. 
+ProgPoW is a proof-of-work algorithm designed to close the efficiency gap available to specialized ASICs. It utilizes almost all parts of commodity hardware (GPUs), and comes pre-tuned for the most common hardware utilized in the Ethereum network. 
 
 ## Motivation
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ With the growth of large mining pools, the control of hashing power has been del
 
 While the goal of “ASIC resistance” is valuable, the entire concept of “ASIC resistance” is a bit of a fallacy.  CPUs and GPUs are themselves ASICs.  Any algorithm that can run on a commodity ASIC (a CPU or GPU) by definition can have a customized ASIC created for it with slightly less functionality. Some algorithms are intentionally made to be  “ASIC friendly” - where an ASIC implementation is drastically more efficient than the same algorithm running on general purpose hardware. The protection that this offers when the coin is unknown also makes it an attractive target for a dedicate mining ASIC company as soon as it becomes useful.
 
-Therefore, ASIC resistance is: the efficiency difference of specilized hardware versus hardware that has a wider adoption and applicability.  A smaller efficiency difference between custom vs general hardware mean higher resistance and a better algorithm. This efficiency difference is the proper metric to use when comparing the quality of PoW algorithms.  Efficiency could mean absolute performance, performance per watt, or performance per dollar - they are all highly correlated.  If a single entity creates and controls an ASIC that is drastically more efficient, they can gain 51% of the network hashrate and possibly stage an attack.
+Therefore, ASIC resistance is: the efficiency difference of specialized hardware versus hardware that has a wider adoption and applicability.  A smaller efficiency difference between custom vs general hardware mean higher resistance and a better algorithm. This efficiency difference is the proper metric to use when comparing the quality of PoW algorithms.  Efficiency could mean absolute performance, performance per watt, or performance per dollar - they are all highly correlated.  If a single entity creates and controls an ASIC that is drastically more efficient, they can gain 51% of the network hashrate and possibly stage an attack.
 
 ### Review of Existing PoW Algorithms
 
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ The random program changes every `PROGPOW_PERIOD` blocks  to ensure the hardware
 
 Sample code is written in C++, this should be kept in mind when evaluating the code in the specification.
 
-All numerics are computed using unsinged 32 bit integers.  Any overflows are trimmed off before proceeding to the next computation.  Languages that use numerics not fixed to bit lenghts (such as Python and JavaScript) or that only use signed integers (such as Java) will need to keep their languages' quirks in mind.  The extensive use of 32 bit data values aligns with modern GPUs internal data architectures.
+All numerics are computed using unsigned 32 bit integers.  Any overflows are trimmed off before proceeding to the next computation.  Languages that use numerics not fixed to bit lengths (such as Python and JavaScript) or that only use signed integers (such as Java) will need to keep their languages' quirks in mind.  The extensive use of 32 bit data values aligns with modern GPUs internal data architectures.
 
 ProgPoW uses a 32-bit variant of **FNV1a** for merging data. The existing Ethash uses a similar vaiant of FNV1 for merging, but FNV1a provides better distribution properties.