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If dev_kcalloc fails to allocate hw_dev->groups then the current exit path is a direct return, causing a leak of resources such as hwdev and ida is not removed. Fix this by exiting via the free_hwmon exit path that performs the necessary resource cleanup. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
When report count is more than one and report size is not 4 bytes, then we need some packing into result buffer from the caller of function sensor_hub_get_feature. By default the value extracted from a field is 4 bytes from hid core (using hid_hw_request(hsdev->hdev, report, HID_REQ_GET_REPORT)), even if report size if less than 4 byte. So when we copy data to user buffer in sensor_hub_get_feature, we need to only copy report size bytes even when report count is more than 1. This is not an issue for most of the sensor hub fields as report count will be 1 where we already copy only report size bytes, but some string fields like description, it is a problem as the report count will be more than 1. For example: Field(6) Physical(Sensor.OtherCustom) Application(Sensor.Sensor) Usage(11) Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Sensor.0306 Report Size(16) Report Count(11) Here since the report size is 2 bytes, we will have 2 additional bytes of 0s copied into user buffer, if we directly copy to user buffer from report->field[]->value This change will copy report size bytes into the buffer of caller for each usage report->field[]->value. So for example without this change, the data displayed for a custom sensor field "sensor-model": 76 00 101 00 110 00 111 00 118 00 111 (truncated to report count of 11) With change 76 101 110 111 118 111 32 89 111 103 97 ("Lenovo Yoga" in ASCII ) Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Fix drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ipc/pci-ish.c:247:12: warning: ‘ish_suspend’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function] static int ish_suspend(struct device *device) ^ drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ipc/pci-ish.c:282:12: warning: ‘ish_resume’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function] static int ish_resume(struct device *device) ^ by sticking them in the CONFIG_PM range too. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Like many similar devices it needs a quirk to work. Issuing the request gets the device into an irrecoverable state. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Same operations are done in ish_hw_start() and _ish_hw_reset() to wakeup ISH device. Consolidate them by introducing a new function ish_wakeup() and move the code there. Signed-off-by: Even Xu <even.xu@intel.com> Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Add a new function ish_disable_dma() and move DMA disable operations here, so that this functionality can be reused. Signed-off-by: Even Xu <even.xu@intel.com> Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
When built as a module, modprobe followed by rmmod can fail because DMA was still active. So to fix this, DMA needs to be disabled during module exit. This change disables DMA during modules exit and change the ISH PCI device status to D3. Signed-off-by: Even Xu <even.xu@intel.com> Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
On some platforms ISH interrupt is shared, which causes request_irq to fail. This requires IRQF_SHARED irq flag. But IRQF_NO_SUSPEND and IRQF_SHARED should not be used together, so removed IRQF_NO_SUSPEND flag. Anyway this driver doesn't require IRQF_NO_SUSPEND, as this interrupt is not required during "noirq" phases of suspending and resuming devices as well as during the time when nonboot CPUs are taken offline and brought back online. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
User is unable to access to input-X-yyy and feature-X-yyy where X is a hex value and more than 9 (e.g. input-a-yyy, feature-b-yyy) in HID sensor custom sysfs interface. This is because when creating the attribute, the attribute index is written to using %x (hex). However, when reading and writing values into the attribute, the attribute index is scanned using %d (decimal). Hence, user is unable to access to attributes with index in hex values (e.g. 'a', 'b', 'c') but able to access to attributes with index in decimal values (e.g. 1, 2, 3,..). This fix will change input-%d-%x-%s and feature-%d-%x-%s to input-%x-%x-%s and feature-%x-%x-%s in show_values() and store_values() accordingly. Signed-off-by: Ooi, Joyce <joyce.ooi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Commit efd9e03 ("arm64: Use static keys for CPU features") introduced support for static keys in asm/cpufeature.h, including linux/jump_label.h. When CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO is not defined, this causes a circular dependency via linux/atomic.h, asm/lse.h and asm/cpufeature.h. This patch moves the capability macros out out of asm/cpufeature.h into a separate asm/cpucaps.h and modifies some of the #includes accordingly. Fixes: efd9e03 ("arm64: Use static keys for CPU features") Reported-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> Tested-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
openrisc qemu tests fail with the following crash. Unable to handle kernel access at virtual address 0xc0300c34 Oops#: 0001 CPU #: 0 PC: c016c710 SR: 0000ae67 SP: c1017e04 GPR00: 00000000 GPR01: c1017e04 GPR02: c0300c34 GPR03: c0300c34 GPR04: 00000000 GPR05: c0300cb0 GPR06: c0300c34 GPR07: 000000ff GPR08: c107f074 GPR09: c0199ef4 GPR10: c1016000 GPR11: 00000000 GPR12: 00000000 GPR13: c107f044 GPR14: c0473774 GPR15: 07ce0000 GPR16: 00000000 GPR17: c107ed8a GPR18: 00009600 GPR19: c107f044 GPR20: c107ee74 GPR21: 00000003 GPR22: c0473770 GPR23: 00000033 GPR24: 000000bf GPR25: 00000019 GPR26: c046400c GPR27: 00000001 GPR28: c0464028 GPR29: c1018000 GPR30: 00000006 GPR31: ccf37483 RES: 00000000 oGPR11: ffffffff Process swapper (pid: 1, stackpage=c1001960) Stack: Stack dump [0xc1017cf8]: sp + 00: 0xc1017e04 sp + 04: 0xc0300c34 sp + 08: 0xc0300c34 sp + 12: 0x00000000 ... Bisect points to commit d2ec3f7 ("pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init"). Fix by defining __ro_after_init for the openrisc architecture, similar to parisc. Fixes: d2ec3f7 ("pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init") Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
…/git/jikos/hid Pull HID fixes from Jiri Kosina: - modprobe-after-rmmod load failure bugfix for intel-ish, from Even Xu - IRQ probing bugfix for intel-ish, from Srinivas Pandruvada - attribute parsing fix in hid-sensor, from Ooi, Joyce - other small misc fixes / quirky device additions * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/hid: HID: sensor: fix attributes in HID sensor interface HID: intel-ish-hid: request_irq failure HID: intel-ish-hid: Fix driver reinit failure HID: intel-ish-hid: Move DMA disable code to new function HID: intel-ish-hid: consolidate ish wake up operation HID: usbhid: add ATEN CS962 to list of quirky devices HID: intel-ish-hid: Fix !CONFIG_PM build warning HID: sensor-hub: Fix packing of result buffer for feature report
…linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging Pull hwmon fix from Guenter Roeck: "Fix resource leak on devm_kcalloc failure" * tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.9-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging: hwmon: (core) fix resource leak on devm_kcalloc failure
…cm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging Pull openrisc fix from Guenter Roeck: "Fix openrisc crash caused by ro_init changes" * tag 'openrisc-for-linus-v4.9-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging: openrisc: Define __ro_after_init to avoid crash
…git/arm64/linux Pull arm64 fix from Will Deacon: "It's been pretty quiet on the fixes side of things for us, but Artem reported a build failure introduced during the merge window that appears with older GCCs that do not support asm goto. The fix is bigger than I'd like, but it's a mechnical move of some constants to break an include dependency between atomic.h and jump_label.h when !HAVE_JUMP_LABEL. Summary: - Fix build failure on compilers without asm goto" * tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: arm64: Fix circular include of asm/lse.h through linux/jump_label.h
The 32-bit ARM DMA configuration code predates the IOMMU core's default domain functionality, and instead relies on allocating its own domains and attaching any devices using the generic IOMMU binding to them. Unfortunately, it does this relatively early on in the creation of the device, before we've seen our add_device callback, which leads us to attempt to operate on a half-configured master. To avoid a crash, check for this situation on attach, but refuse to play, as there's nothing we can do. This at least allows VFIO to keep working for people who update their 32-bit DTs to the generic binding, albeit with a few (innocuous) warnings from the DMA layer on boot. Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
We now delay installing our per-bus iommu_ops until we know an SMMU has successfully probed, as they don't serve much purpose beforehand, and doing so also avoids fights between multiple IOMMU drivers in a single kernel. However, the upshot of passing the return value of bus_set_iommu() back from our probe function is that if there happens to be more than one SMMUv3 device in a system, the second and subsequent probes will wind up returning -EBUSY to the driver core and getting torn down again. Avoid re-setting ops if ours are already installed, so that any genuine failures stand out. Fixes: 08d4ca2 ("iommu/arm-smmu: Support non-PCI devices with SMMUv3") CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> CC: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
We seem to have forgotten to check that iommu_fwspecs actually belong to us before we go ahead and dereference their private data. Oops. Fixes: 021bb84 ("iommu/arm-smmu: Wire up generic configuration support") Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When we iterate a master's config entries, what we generally care about is the entry's stream map index, rather than the entry index itself, so it's nice to have the iterator automatically assign the former from the latter. Unfortunately, booting with KASAN reveals the oversight that using a simple comma operator results in the entry index being dereferenced before being checked for validity, so we always access one element past the end of the fwspec array. Flip things around so that the check always happens before the index may be dereferenced. Fixes: adfec2e ("iommu/arm-smmu: Convert to iommu_fwspec") Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
It turns out that the disable_dmar_iommu() code-path tried to get the device_domain_lock recursivly, which will dead-lock when this code runs on dmar removal. Fix both code-paths that could lead to the dead-lock. Fixes: 55d9404 ('iommu/vt-d: Get rid of domain->iommu_lock') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
…x/kernel/git/joro/iommu Pull IOMMU fixes from Joerg Roedel: - Four patches from Robin Murphy fix several issues with the recently merged generic DT-bindings support for arm-smmu drivers - A fix for a dead-lock issue in the VT-d driver, which shows up on iommu hotplug * tag 'iommu-fixes-v4.9-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu: iommu/vt-d: Fix dead-locks in disable_dmar_iommu() path iommu/arm-smmu: Fix out-of-bounds dereference iommu/arm-smmu: Check that iommu_fwspecs are ours iommu/arm-smmu: Don't inadvertently reject multiple SMMUv3s iommu/arm-smmu: Work around ARM DMA configuration
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A recent commit removed locking from netlink_diag_dump() but forgot one error case. ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] 4.9.0-rc3+ torvalds#336 Not tainted ------------------------------------- syz-executor/4018 is trying to release lock ([ 36.220068] nl_table_lock ) at: [<ffffffff82dc8683>] netlink_diag_dump+0x1a3/0x250 net/netlink/diag.c:182 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 3 locks held by syz-executor/4018: #0: [ 36.220068] ( sock_diag_mutex[ 36.220068] ){+.+.+.} , at: [ 36.220068] [<ffffffff82c3873b>] sock_diag_rcv+0x1b/0x40 #1: [ 36.220068] ( sock_diag_table_mutex[ 36.220068] ){+.+.+.} , at: [ 36.220068] [<ffffffff82c38e00>] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x140/0x3a0 #2: [ 36.220068] ( nlk->cb_mutex[ 36.220068] ){+.+.+.} , at: [ 36.220068] [<ffffffff82db6600>] netlink_dump+0x50/0xac0 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 4018 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc3+ torvalds#336 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 ffff8800645df688 ffffffff81b46934 ffffffff84eb3e78 ffff88006ad85800 ffffffff82dc8683 ffffffff84eb3e78 ffff8800645df6b8 ffffffff812043ca dffffc0000000000 ffff88006ad85ff8 ffff88006ad85fd0 00000000ffffffff Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffff81b46934>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10f lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff812043ca>] print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x17a/0x1a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3388 [< inline >] __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3512 [<ffffffff8120cfd8>] lock_release+0x8e8/0xc60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3765 [< inline >] __raw_read_unlock ./include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [<ffffffff83fc001a>] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 [<ffffffff82dc8683>] netlink_diag_dump+0x1a3/0x250 net/netlink/diag.c:182 [<ffffffff82db6947>] netlink_dump+0x397/0xac0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2110 Fixes: ad20207 ("netlink: Use rhashtable walk interface in diag dump") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The following panic was caught when run ocfs2 disconfig single test (block size 512 and cluster size 8192). ocfs2_journal_dirty() return -ENOSPC, that means credits were used up. The total credit should include 3 times of "num_dx_leaves" from ocfs2_dx_dir_rebalance(), because 2 times will be consumed in ocfs2_dx_dir_transfer_leaf() and 1 time will be consumed in ocfs2_dx_dir_new_cluster() -> __ocfs2_dx_dir_new_cluster() -> ocfs2_dx_dir_format_cluster(). But only two times is included in ocfs2_dx_dir_rebalance_credits(), fix it. This can cause read-only fs(v4.1+) or panic for mainline linux depending on mount option. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/journal.c:775! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ocfs2 nfsd lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrpc autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sd_mod sg ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ppdev xen_kbdfront xen_netfront fb_sys_fops sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea parport_pc parport acpi_cpufreq i2c_piix4 i2c_core pcspkr ext4 jbd2 mbcache xen_blkfront floppy pata_acpi ata_generic ata_piix dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod CPU: 2 PID: 10601 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.1.12-71.el6uek.bug24939243.x86_64 #2 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.4.4OVM 02/11/2016 task: ffff8800b6de6200 ti: ffff8800a7d48000 task.ti: ffff8800a7d48000 RIP: ocfs2_journal_dirty+0xa7/0xb0 [ocfs2] RSP: 0018:ffff8800a7d4b6d8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 00000000ffffffe4 RBX: 00000000814d0a9c RCX: 00000000000004f9 RDX: ffffffffa008e990 RSI: ffffffffa008f1ee RDI: ffff8800622b6460 RBP: ffff8800a7d4b6f8 R08: ffffffffa008f288 R09: ffff8800622b6460 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000002c8421e R13: ffff88006d0cad00 R14: ffff880092beef60 R15: 0000000000000070 FS: 00007f9b83e92700(0000) GS:ffff8800be880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb2c0d1a000 CR3: 0000000008f80000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 Call Trace: ocfs2_dx_dir_transfer_leaf+0x159/0x1a0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_dx_dir_rebalance+0xd9b/0xea0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_find_dir_space_dx+0xd3/0x300 [ocfs2] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert+0x219/0x450 [ocfs2] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x1d6/0x580 [ocfs2] ocfs2_mknod+0x5a2/0x1400 [ocfs2] ocfs2_create+0x73/0x180 [ocfs2] vfs_create+0xd8/0x100 lookup_open+0x185/0x1c0 do_last+0x36d/0x780 path_openat+0x92/0x470 do_filp_open+0x4a/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x11a/0x230 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 1d 3f 29 09 00 48 85 db 74 1f 48 8b 03 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 4c 89 e6 ff d0 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 eb eb 90 <0f> 0b eb fe 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 RIP ocfs2_journal_dirty+0xa7/0xb0 [ocfs2] ---[ end trace 91ac5312a6ee1288 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabled Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478248135-31963-1-git-send-email-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Missing initialization of udp_tunnel_sock_cfg causes to following kernel panic, while kernel tries to execute gro_receive(). While being there, we converted udp_port_cfg to use the same initialization scheme as udp_tunnel_sock_cfg. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffa0588c50 IP: [<ffffffffa0588c50>] __this_module+0x50/0xffffffffffff8400 [ib_rxe] PGD 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD bb394067 PTE 80000000ad5e8163 Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ib_rxe ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3+ #2 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff880235e4e680 ti: ffff880235e68000 task.ti: ffff880235e68000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0588c50>] [<ffffffffa0588c50>] __this_module+0x50/0xffffffffffff8400 [ib_rxe] RSP: 0018:ffff880237343c80 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000dffe482d RBX: ffff8800ae330900 RCX: 000000002001b712 RDX: ffff8800ae330900 RSI: ffff8800ae102578 RDI: ffff880235589c00 RBP: ffff880237343cb0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800ae33e262 R13: ffff880235589c00 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: ffff8800ae102578 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880237340000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffa0588c50 CR3: 0000000001c06000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff8160860e ffff8800ae330900 ffff8800ae102578 0000000000000014 000000000000004e ffff8800ae102578 ffff880237343ce0 ffffffff816088fb 0000000000000000 ffff8800ae330900 0000000000000000 00000000ffad0000 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8160860e>] ? udp_gro_receive+0xde/0x130 [<ffffffff816088fb>] udp4_gro_receive+0x10b/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81611373>] inet_gro_receive+0x1d3/0x270 [<ffffffff81594e29>] dev_gro_receive+0x269/0x3b0 [<ffffffff81595188>] napi_gro_receive+0x38/0x120 [<ffffffffa011caee>] mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe+0x27e/0x340 [mlx5_core] [<ffffffffa011d076>] mlx5e_poll_rx_cq+0x66/0x6d0 [mlx5_core] [<ffffffffa011d7ae>] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x8e/0x400 [mlx5_core] [<ffffffff815949a0>] net_rx_action+0x160/0x380 [<ffffffff816a9197>] __do_softirq+0xd7/0x2c5 [<ffffffff81085c35>] irq_exit+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff816a8f16>] do_IRQ+0x56/0xd0 [<ffffffff816a6dcc>] common_interrupt+0x8c/0x8c <EOI> [<ffffffff81061f96>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 [<ffffffff81037ade>] default_idle+0x1e/0xd0 [<ffffffff8103828f>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20 [<ffffffff810c37dc>] default_idle_call+0x3c/0x50 [<ffffffff810c3b13>] cpu_startup_entry+0x323/0x3c0 [<ffffffff81050d8c>] start_secondary+0x15c/0x1a0 RIP [<ffffffffa0588c50>] __this_module+0x50/0xffffffffffff8400 [ib_rxe] RSP <ffff880237343c80> CR2: ffffffffa0588c50 ---[ end trace 489ee31fa7614ac5 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: disabled ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fixes: 8700e3e ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Yonatan Cohen <yonatanc@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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Tushar Dave says: ==================== sparc: Enable sun4v hypervisor PCI IOMMU v2 APIs and ATU ATU (Address Translation Unit) is a new IOMMU in SPARC supported with sun4v hypervisor PCI IOMMU v2 APIs. Current SPARC IOMMU supports only 32bit address ranges and one TSB per PCIe root complex that has a 2GB per root complex DVMA space limit. The limit has become a scalability bottleneck nowadays that a typical 10G/40G NIC can consume 500MB DVMA space per instance. When DVMA resource is exhausted, devices will not be usable since the driver can't allocate DVMA. For example, we recently experienced legacy IOMMU limitation while using i40e driver in system with large number of CPUs (e.g. 128). Four ports of i40e, each request 128 QP (Queue Pairs). Each queue has 512 (default) descriptors. So considering only RX queues (because RX premap DMA buffers), i40e takes 4*128*512 number of DMA entries in IOMMU table. Legacy IOMMU can have at max (2G/8K)- 1 entries available in table. So bringing up four instance of i40e alone saturate existing IOMMU resource. ATU removes bottleneck by allowing guest os to create IOTSB of size 32G (or more) with 64bit address ranges available in ATU HW. 32G is more than enough DVMA space to be shared by all PCIe devices under root complex contrast to 2G space provided by legacy IOMMU. ATU allows PCIe devices to use 64bit DMA addressing. Devices which choose to use 32bit DMA mask will continue to work with the existing legacy IOMMU. The patch set is tested on sun4v (T1000, T2000, T3, T4, T5, T7, S7) and sun4u SPARC. Thanks. -Tushar v2->v3: - Patch #5 addresses comment by Joe Perches. -- use %s, __func__ instead of embedding the function name. v1->v2: - Patch #2 addresses comments by Dave M. -- use page allocator to allocate IOTSB. -- use true/false with boolean variables. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When SCSI EH invokes zFCP's callbacks for eh_device_reset_handler() and eh_target_reset_handler(), it expects us to relent the ownership over the given scsi_cmnd and all other scsi_cmnds within the same scope - LUN or target - when returning with SUCCESS from the callback ('release' them). SCSI EH can then reuse those commands. We did not follow this rule to release commands upon SUCCESS; and if later a reply arrived for one of those supposed to be released commands, we would still make use of the scsi_cmnd in our ingress tasklet. This will at least result in undefined behavior or a kernel panic because of a wrong kernel pointer dereference. To fix this, we NULLify all pointers to scsi_cmnds (struct zfcp_fsf_req *)->data in the matching scope if a TMF was successful. This is done under the locks (struct zfcp_adapter *)->abort_lock and (struct zfcp_reqlist *)->lock to prevent the requests from being removed from the request-hashtable, and the ingress tasklet from making use of the scsi_cmnd-pointer in zfcp_fsf_fcp_cmnd_handler(). For cases where a reply arrives during SCSI EH, but before we get a chance to NULLify the pointer - but before we return from the callback -, we assume that the code is protected from races via the CAS operation in blk_complete_request() that is called in scsi_done(). The following stacktrace shows an example for a crash resulting from the previous behavior: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address fffffee17a672000 Oops: 0038 [#1] SMP CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted task: 00000003f7ff5be0 ti: 00000003f3d38000 task.ti: 00000003f3d38000 Krnl PSW : 0404d00180000000 00000000001156b0 (smp_vcpu_scheduled+0x18/0x40) R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000000200000007e 0000000000000000 fffffee17a671fd8 0000000300000015 ffffffff80000000 00000000005dfde8 07000003f7f80e00 000000004fa4e800 000000036ce8d8f8 000000036ce8d9c0 00000003ece8fe00 ffffffff969c9e93 00000003fffffffd 000000036ce8da10 00000000003bf134 00000003f3b07918 Krnl Code: 00000000001156a2: a7190000 lghi %r1,0 00000000001156a6: a7380015 lhi %r3,21 #00000000001156aa: e32050000008 ag %r2,0(%r5) >00000000001156b0: 482022b0 lh %r2,688(%r2) 00000000001156b4: ae123000 sigp %r1,%r2,0(%r3) 00000000001156b8: b2220020 ipm %r2 00000000001156bc: 8820001c srl %r2,28 00000000001156c0: c02700000001 xilf %r2,1 Call Trace: ([<0000000000000000>] 0x0) [<000003ff807bdb8e>] zfcp_fsf_fcp_cmnd_handler+0x3de/0x490 [zfcp] [<000003ff807be30a>] zfcp_fsf_req_complete+0x252/0x800 [zfcp] [<000003ff807c0a48>] zfcp_fsf_reqid_check+0xe8/0x190 [zfcp] [<000003ff807c194e>] zfcp_qdio_int_resp+0x66/0x188 [zfcp] [<000003ff80440c64>] qdio_kick_handler+0xdc/0x310 [qdio] [<000003ff804463d0>] __tiqdio_inbound_processing+0xf8/0xcd8 [qdio] [<0000000000141fd4>] tasklet_action+0x9c/0x170 [<0000000000141550>] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x258 [<000000000010ce0a>] do_softirq+0xba/0xc0 [<000000000014187c>] irq_exit+0xc4/0xe8 [<000000000046b526>] do_IRQ+0x146/0x1d8 [<00000000005d6a3c>] io_return+0x0/0x8 [<00000000005d6422>] vtime_stop_cpu+0x4a/0xa0 ([<0000000000000000>] 0x0) [<0000000000103d8a>] arch_cpu_idle+0xa2/0xb0 [<0000000000197f94>] cpu_startup_entry+0x13c/0x1f8 [<0000000000114782>] smp_start_secondary+0xda/0xe8 [<00000000005d6efe>] restart_int_handler+0x56/0x6c [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<00000000003bf12e>] arch_spin_lock_wait+0x56/0xb0 Suggested-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: ea127f9 ("[PATCH] s390 (7/7): zfcp host adapter.") (tglx/history.git) Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #2.6.32+ Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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…t level Since quite a while, Linux issues enough SCSI commands per scsi_device which successfully return with FCP_RESID_UNDER, FSF_FCP_RSP_AVAILABLE, and SAM_STAT_GOOD. This floods the HBA trace area and we cannot see other and important HBA trace records long enough. Therefore, do not trace HBA response errors for pure benign residual under counts at the default trace level. This excludes benign residual under count combined with other validity bits set in FCP_RSP_IU, such as FCP_SNS_LEN_VAL. For all those other cases, we still do want to see both the HBA record and the corresponding SCSI record by default. Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: a54ca0f ("[SCSI] zfcp: Redesign of the debug tracing for HBA records.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #2.6.37+ Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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It is unavoidable that zfcp_scsi_queuecommand() has to finish requests with DID_IMM_RETRY (like fc_remote_port_chkready()) during the time window when zfcp detected an unavailable rport but fc_remote_port_delete(), which is asynchronous via zfcp_scsi_schedule_rport_block(), has not yet blocked the rport. However, for the case when the rport becomes available again, we should prevent unblocking the rport too early. In contrast to other FCP LLDDs, zfcp has to open each LUN with the FCP channel hardware before it can send I/O to a LUN. So if a port already has LUNs attached and we unblock the rport just after port recovery, recoveries of LUNs behind this port can still be pending which in turn force zfcp_scsi_queuecommand() to unnecessarily finish requests with DID_IMM_RETRY. This also opens a time window with unblocked rport (until the followup LUN reopen recovery has finished). If a scsi_cmnd timeout occurs during this time window fc_timed_out() cannot work as desired and such command would indeed time out and trigger scsi_eh. This prevents a clean and timely path failover. This should not happen if the path issue can be recovered on FC transport layer such as path issues involving RSCNs. Fix this by only calling zfcp_scsi_schedule_rport_register(), to asynchronously trigger fc_remote_port_add(), after all LUN recoveries as children of the rport have finished and no new recoveries of equal or higher order were triggered meanwhile. Finished intentionally includes any recovery result no matter if successful or failed (still unblock rport so other successful LUNs work). For simplicity, we check after each finished LUN recovery if there is another LUN recovery pending on the same port and then do nothing. We handle the special case of a successful recovery of a port without LUN children the same way without changing this case's semantics. For debugging we introduce 2 new trace records written if the rport unblock attempt was aborted due to still unfinished or freshly triggered recovery. The records are only written above the default trace level. Benjamin noticed the important special case of new recovery that can be triggered between having given up the erp_lock and before calling zfcp_erp_action_cleanup() within zfcp_erp_strategy(). We must avoid the following sequence: ERP thread rport_work other context ------------------------- -------------- -------------------------------- port is unblocked, rport still blocked, due to pending/running ERP action, so ((port->status & ...UNBLOCK) != 0) and (port->rport == NULL) unlock ERP zfcp_erp_action_cleanup() case ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_LUN: zfcp_erp_try_rport_unblock() ((status & ...UNBLOCK) != 0) [OLD!] zfcp_erp_port_reopen() lock ERP zfcp_erp_port_block() port->status clear ...UNBLOCK unlock ERP zfcp_scsi_schedule_rport_block() port->rport_task = RPORT_DEL queue_work(rport_work) zfcp_scsi_rport_work() (port->rport_task != RPORT_ADD) port->rport_task = RPORT_NONE zfcp_scsi_rport_block() if (!port->rport) return zfcp_scsi_schedule_rport_register() port->rport_task = RPORT_ADD queue_work(rport_work) zfcp_scsi_rport_work() (port->rport_task == RPORT_ADD) port->rport_task = RPORT_NONE zfcp_scsi_rport_register() (port->rport == NULL) rport = fc_remote_port_add() port->rport = rport; Now the rport was erroneously unblocked while the zfcp_port is blocked. This is another situation we want to avoid due to scsi_eh potential. This state would at least remain until the new recovery from the other context finished successfully, or potentially forever if it failed. In order to close this race, we take the erp_lock inside zfcp_erp_try_rport_unblock() when checking the status of zfcp_port or LUN. With that, the possible corresponding rport state sequences would be: (unblock[ERP thread],block[other context]) if the ERP thread gets erp_lock first and still sees ((port->status & ...UNBLOCK) != 0), (block[other context],NOP[ERP thread]) if the ERP thread gets erp_lock after the other context has already cleard ...UNBLOCK from port->status. Since checking fields of struct erp_action is unsafe because they could have been overwritten (re-used for new recovery) meanwhile, we only check status of zfcp_port and LUN since these are only changed under erp_lock elsewhere. Regarding the check of the proper status flags (port or port_forced are similar to the shown adapter recovery): [zfcp_erp_adapter_shutdown()] zfcp_erp_adapter_reopen() zfcp_erp_adapter_block() * clear UNBLOCK ---------------------------------------+ zfcp_scsi_schedule_rports_block() | write_lock_irqsave(&adapter->erp_lock, flags);-------+ | zfcp_erp_action_enqueue() | | zfcp_erp_setup_act() | | * set ERP_INUSE -----------------------------------|--|--+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->erp_lock, flags);--+ | | .context-switch. | | zfcp_erp_thread() | | zfcp_erp_strategy() | | write_lock_irqsave(&adapter->erp_lock, flags);------+ | | ... | | | zfcp_erp_strategy_check_target() | | | zfcp_erp_strategy_check_adapter() | | | zfcp_erp_adapter_unblock() | | | * set UNBLOCK -----------------------------------|--+ | zfcp_erp_action_dequeue() | | * clear ERP_INUSE ---------------------------------|-----+ ... | write_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->erp_lock, flags);-+ Hence, we should check for both UNBLOCK and ERP_INUSE because they are interleaved. Also we need to explicitly check ERP_FAILED for the link down case which currently does not clear the UNBLOCK flag in zfcp_fsf_link_down_info_eval(). Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: 8830271 ("[SCSI] zfcp: Dont fail SCSI commands when transitioning to blocked fc_rport") Fixes: a2fa0ae ("[SCSI] zfcp: Block FC transport rports early on errors") Fixes: 5f852be ("[SCSI] zfcp: Fix deadlock between zfcp ERP and SCSI") Fixes: 338151e ("[SCSI] zfcp: make use of fc_remote_port_delete when target port is unavailable") Fixes: 3859f6a ("[PATCH] zfcp: add rports to enable scsi_add_device to work again") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #2.6.32+ Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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…s enabled Nils Holland and Klaus Ethgen have reported unexpected OOM killer invocations with 32b kernel starting with 4.8 kernels kworker/u4:5 invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x2400840(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOFAIL), nodemask=0, order=0, oom_score_adj=0 kworker/u4:5 cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0 CPU: 1 PID: 2603 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 4.9.0-gentoo #2 [...] Mem-Info: active_anon:58685 inactive_anon:90 isolated_anon:0 active_file:274324 inactive_file:281962 isolated_file:0 unevictable:0 dirty:649 writeback:0 unstable:0 slab_reclaimable:40662 slab_unreclaimable:17754 mapped:7382 shmem:202 pagetables:351 bounce:0 free:206736 free_pcp:332 free_cma:0 Node 0 active_anon:234740kB inactive_anon:360kB active_file:1097296kB inactive_file:1127848kB unevictable:0kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB mapped:29528kB dirty:2596kB writeback:0kB shmem:0kB shmem_thp: 0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 184320kB anon_thp: 808kB writeback_tmp:0kB unstable:0kB pages_scanned:0 all_unreclaimable? no DMA free:3952kB min:788kB low:984kB high:1180kB active_anon:0kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:7316kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB writepending:96kB present:15992kB managed:15916kB mlocked:0kB slab_reclaimable:3200kB slab_unreclaimable:1408kB kernel_stack:0kB pagetables:0kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:0kB local_pcp:0kB free_cma:0kB lowmem_reserve[]: 0 813 3474 3474 Normal free:41332kB min:41368kB low:51708kB high:62048kB active_anon:0kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:532748kB inactive_file:44kB unevictable:0kB writepending:24kB present:897016kB managed:836248kB mlocked:0kB slab_reclaimable:159448kB slab_unreclaimable:69608kB kernel_stack:1112kB pagetables:1404kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:528kB local_pcp:340kB free_cma:0kB lowmem_reserve[]: 0 0 21292 21292 HighMem free:781660kB min:512kB low:34356kB high:68200kB active_anon:234740kB inactive_anon:360kB active_file:557232kB inactive_file:1127804kB unevictable:0kB writepending:2592kB present:2725384kB managed:2725384kB mlocked:0kB slab_reclaimable:0kB slab_unreclaimable:0kB kernel_stack:0kB pagetables:0kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:800kB local_pcp:608kB free_cma:0kB the oom killer is clearly pre-mature because there there is still a lot of page cache in the zone Normal which should satisfy this lowmem request. Further debugging has shown that the reclaim cannot make any forward progress because the page cache is hidden in the active list which doesn't get rotated because inactive_list_is_low is not memcg aware. The code simply subtracts per-zone highmem counters from the respective memcg's lru sizes which doesn't make any sense. We can simply end up always seeing the resulting active and inactive counts 0 and return false. This issue is not limited to 32b kernels but in practice the effect on systems without CONFIG_HIGHMEM would be much harder to notice because we do not invoke the OOM killer for allocations requests targeting < ZONE_NORMAL. Fix the issue by tracking per zone lru page counts in mem_cgroup_per_node and subtract per-memcg highmem counts when memcg is enabled. Introduce helper lruvec_zone_lru_size which redirects to either zone counters or mem_cgroup_get_zone_lru_size when appropriate. We are losing empty LRU but non-zero lru size detection introduced by ca70723 ("mm: update_lru_size warn and reset bad lru_size") because of the inherent zone vs. node discrepancy. Fixes: f8d1a31 ("mm: consider whether to decivate based on eligible zones inactive ratio") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170104100825.3729-1-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reported-by: Nils Holland <nholland@tisys.org> Tested-by: Nils Holland <nholland@tisys.org> Reported-by: Klaus Ethgen <Klaus@Ethgen.de> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
aanisov
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Mathieu reported that the LTTNG modules are broken as of 4.10-rc1 due to the removal of the cpu hotplug notifiers. Usually I don't care much about out of tree modules, but LTTNG is widely used in distros. There are two ways to solve that: 1) Reserve a hotplug state for LTTNG 2) Add a dynamic range for the prepare states. While #1 is the simplest solution, #2 is the proper one as we can convert in tree users, which do not care about ordering, to the dynamic range as well. Add a dynamic range which allows LTTNG to request states in the prepare stage. Reported-and-tested-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701101353010.3401@nanos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Syzkaller fuzzer managed to trigger this: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/shmem.c:852 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 529, name: khugepaged 3 locks held by khugepaged/529: #0: (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff818d7ef1>] shrink_slab.part.59+0x121/0xd30 mm/vmscan.c:451 #1: (&type->s_umount_key#29){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81a63630>] trylock_super+0x20/0x100 fs/super.c:392 #2: (&(&sbinfo->shrinklist_lock)->rlock){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffff818fd83e>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:302 [inline] #2: (&(&sbinfo->shrinklist_lock)->rlock){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffff818fd83e>] shmem_unused_huge_shrink+0x28e/0x1490 mm/shmem.c:427 CPU: 2 PID: 529 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 4.10.0-rc5+ torvalds#201 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: shmem_undo_range+0xb20/0x2710 mm/shmem.c:852 shmem_truncate_range+0x27/0xa0 mm/shmem.c:939 shmem_evict_inode+0x35f/0xca0 mm/shmem.c:1030 evict+0x46e/0x980 fs/inode.c:553 iput_final fs/inode.c:1515 [inline] iput+0x589/0xb20 fs/inode.c:1542 shmem_unused_huge_shrink+0xbad/0x1490 mm/shmem.c:446 shmem_unused_huge_scan+0x10c/0x170 mm/shmem.c:512 super_cache_scan+0x376/0x450 fs/super.c:106 do_shrink_slab mm/vmscan.c:378 [inline] shrink_slab.part.59+0x543/0xd30 mm/vmscan.c:481 shrink_slab mm/vmscan.c:2592 [inline] shrink_node+0x2c7/0x870 mm/vmscan.c:2592 shrink_zones mm/vmscan.c:2734 [inline] do_try_to_free_pages+0x369/0xc80 mm/vmscan.c:2776 try_to_free_pages+0x3c6/0x900 mm/vmscan.c:2982 __perform_reclaim mm/page_alloc.c:3301 [inline] __alloc_pages_direct_reclaim mm/page_alloc.c:3322 [inline] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xa24/0x1c30 mm/page_alloc.c:3683 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x544/0xae0 mm/page_alloc.c:3848 __alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:426 [inline] __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:439 [inline] khugepaged_alloc_page+0xc2/0x1b0 mm/khugepaged.c:750 collapse_huge_page+0x182/0x1fe0 mm/khugepaged.c:955 khugepaged_scan_pmd+0xfdf/0x12a0 mm/khugepaged.c:1208 khugepaged_scan_mm_slot mm/khugepaged.c:1727 [inline] khugepaged_do_scan mm/khugepaged.c:1808 [inline] khugepaged+0xe9b/0x1590 mm/khugepaged.c:1853 kthread+0x326/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:227 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:430 The iput() from atomic context was a bad idea: if after igrab() somebody else calls iput() and we left with the last inode reference, our iput() would lead to inode eviction and therefore sleeping. This patch should fix the situation. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170131093141.GA15899@node.shutemov.name Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
iartemenko
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Feb 20, 2018
rcar_dmac_sleep_suspend uses the spin_lock/spin_unlock functions to acquire lock by commit 9d867d5 ("dmaengine: rcar-dmac: Support S2RAM"), the same lock is also acquired in rcar_dmac_isr_channel of the interrupt handler. But, rcar_dmac_sleep_suspend is called with the interrupt enabled from the suspend callback of the power manager interface, If an interrupt occurs while suspend is acquiring a lock, it may cause a deadlock. ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.9.0-yocto-standard #1 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. sh/2967 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&rchan->lock)->rlock){?.....}, at: [<ffff0000084cf1c0>] rcar_dmac_sleep_suspend+0x50/0x120 state was registered at: [<ffff000008109014>] mark_lock+0x1c4/0x6c8 [<ffff00000810a638>] __lock_acquire+0xba0/0x1728 [<ffff00000810b51c>] lock_acquire+0x4c/0x68 [<ffff0000089e67e8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x58 [<ffff0000084cf530>] rcar_dmac_isr_channel+0x20/0x1e8 [<ffff000008115e74>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x9c/0x128 [<ffff000008115f1c>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1c/0x58 [<ffff000008115fa0>] handle_irq_event+0x48/0x78 [<ffff0000081198d8>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb8/0x1b0 [<ffff000008114f14>] generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x38 [<ffff0000081155dc>] __handle_domain_irq+0x5c/0xb8 [<ffff000008081588>] gic_handle_irq+0x58/0xb0 [<ffff0000080827b4>] el1_irq+0xb4/0x12c [<ffff00000882b5f0>] cpuidle_enter_state+0x158/0x228 [<ffff00000882b6f8>] cpuidle_enter+0x18/0x20 [<ffff000008102948>] call_cpuidle+0x18/0x38 [<ffff000008102b84>] cpu_startup_entry+0x13c/0x1e0 [<ffff0000089dfea0>] rest_init+0x148/0x158 [<ffff000008e50b54>] start_kernel+0x38c/0x3a0 [<ffff000008e501d8>] __primary_switched+0x5c/0x64 irq event stamp: 41905 hardirqs last enabled at (41905): [<ffff0000089e2fac>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2ec/0x390 hardirqs last disabled at (41904): [<ffff0000089e2d38>] mutex_lock_nested+0x78/0x390 softirqs last enabled at (41496): [<ffff0000080c41c0>] __do_softirq+0x218/0x288 softirqs last disabled at (41489): [<ffff0000080c4594>] irq_exit+0xbc/0xf0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&rchan->lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&rchan->lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by sh/2967: #0: (sb_writers#4){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffff000008204400>] vfs_write+0x168/0x1b8 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffff000008287600>] kernfs_fop_write+0x88/0x1e8 #2: (s_active#88){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffff000008287608>] kernfs_fop_write+0x90/0x1e8 #3: (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffff000008110e34>] pm_suspend+0x54/0x268 #4: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<ffff0000085d8e84>] __device_suspend+0xcc/0x298 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 2967 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.9.0-yocto-standard-00002-g658096e81b08 #1 Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a7795 es2.0 (DT) Call trace: [<ffff000008088938>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a8 [<ffff000008088af4>] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [<ffff0000083bc54c>] dump_stack+0xb4/0xf0 [<ffff000008187538>] print_usage_bug.part.24+0x264/0x27c [<ffff000008108fa0>] mark_lock+0x150/0x6c8 [<ffff00000810a100>] __lock_acquire+0x668/0x1728 [<ffff00000810b51c>] lock_acquire+0x4c/0x68 [<ffff0000089e67e8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x58 [<ffff0000084cf1c0>] rcar_dmac_sleep_suspend+0x50/0x120 [<ffff0000085d8440>] dpm_run_callback.isra.7+0x20/0x68 [<ffff0000085d8ec8>] __device_suspend+0x110/0x298 [<ffff0000085da13c>] dpm_suspend+0x114/0x248 [<ffff0000085da568>] dpm_suspend_start+0x70/0x80 [<ffff000008110a28>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xb8/0x470 [<ffff000008110fd4>] pm_suspend+0x1f4/0x268 [<ffff00000810fbe0>] state_store+0x80/0x100 [<ffff0000083bec0c>] kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x28 [<ffff0000082884e0>] sysfs_kf_write+0x60/0x70 [<ffff000008287630>] kernfs_fop_write+0xb8/0x1e8 [<ffff000008203524>] __vfs_write+0x1c/0x110 [<ffff000008204338>] vfs_write+0xa0/0x1b8 [<ffff00000820572c>] SyS_write+0x44/0xa0 [<ffff000008082f4c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 This patch replaces spin_lock/spin_unlock with spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore. Fixes: 9d867d5 ("dmaengine: rcar-dmac: Support S2RAM") Signed-off-by: Takeshi Kihara <takeshi.kihara.df@renesas.com>
otyshchenko1
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May 7, 2019
…-xhci0-usb3 to v4.9/rcar-ctc * commit 'd92cf210d86995efa9fa176aa893702411e68596': Activate XHCI (USB3.0) controller on r8a usb: host: xhci-plat: add firmware for the R-Car M3-W xHCI controllers usb: host: xhci-plat: add support for the R-Car H3 xHCI controllers xhci-rcar: add firmware for R-Car H2/M2 USB 3.0 host controller (cherry picked from commit 980bba68f4409bb131913c09e3ab374a570fd81d) (cherry picked from commit b904874e9ce5fb99bff74447a4a341045f431c3f)
otyshchenko1
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May 7, 2019
During system reboot or halt, with lockdep enabled: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 4.18.0-rc1-salvator-x-00002-g9203dbec90a68103 #41 Tainted: G W -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. reboot/2779 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: 0000000098ae4ad3 (&(&rchan->lock)->rlock){?.-.}, at: rcar_dmac_shutdown+0x58/0x6c {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x208/0x238 _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x54 rcar_dmac_isr_channel+0x28/0x200 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1c0/0x3c8 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x34/0x88 handle_irq_event+0x48/0x78 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x12c generic_handle_irq+0x18/0x2c __handle_domain_irq+0xa8/0xac gic_handle_irq+0x78/0xbc el1_irq+0xec/0x1c0 arch_cpu_idle+0xe8/0x1bc default_idle_call+0x2c/0x30 do_idle+0x144/0x234 cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24 rest_init+0x27c/0x290 start_kernel+0x430/0x45c irq event stamp: 12177 hardirqs last enabled at (12177): [<ffffff800881d804>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x4c hardirqs last disabled at (12176): [<ffffff800881d638>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x1c/0x60 softirqs last enabled at (11948): [<ffffff8008081da8>] __do_softirq+0x160/0x4ec softirqs last disabled at (11935): [<ffffff80080ec948>] irq_exit+0xa0/0xfc other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&rchan->lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&rchan->lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by reboot/2779: #0: 00000000bfabfa74 (reboot_mutex){+.+.}, at: sys_reboot+0xdc/0x208 #1: 00000000c75d8c3a (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_shutdown+0xc8/0x1c4 #2: 00000000ebec58ec (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_shutdown+0xd8/0x1c4 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: reboot Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc1-salvator-x-00002-g9203dbec90a68103 #41 Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148 show_stack+0x14/0x1c dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0 print_usage_bug.part.26+0x1c4/0x27c mark_lock+0x38c/0x610 __lock_acquire+0x3fc/0x14d4 lock_acquire+0x208/0x238 _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x54 rcar_dmac_shutdown+0x58/0x6c platform_drv_shutdown+0x20/0x2c device_shutdown+0x160/0x1c4 kernel_restart_prepare+0x34/0x3c kernel_restart+0x14/0x5c sys_reboot+0x160/0x208 el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 rcar_dmac_stop_all_chan() takes the channel lock while stopping a channel, but does not disable interrupts, leading to a deadlock when a DMAC interrupt comes in. Before, the same code block was called from an interrupt handler, hence taking the spinlock was sufficient. Fix this by disabling local interrupts while taking the spinlock. Fixes: 9203dbe ("dmaengine: rcar-dmac: don't use DMAC error interrupt") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 45c9a60) Signed-off-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx@renesas.com>
arminn
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Nov 28, 2019
Sqlite user Background GC - move_data_block : move page #1 - f2fs_is_atomic_file - f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - commit_inmem_pages : commit page #1 & set node #2 dirty - f2fs_submit_page_write - f2fs_update_data_blkaddr - set_page_dirty : set node #2 dirty - f2fs_do_sync_file - fsync_node_pages : commit node #1 & node #2, then sudden power-cut In a race case, we may check FI_ATOMIC_FILE flag before starting atomic write flow, then we will commit meta data before data with reversed order, after a sudden pow-cut, database transaction will be inconsistent. So we'd better to exclude gc/atomic_write to each other by using lock instead of flag checking. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
arminn
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Nov 28, 2019
syzbot has tested the proposed patch but the reproducer still triggered crash: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:LINE! F2FS-fs (loop1): invalid crc value F2FS-fs (loop5): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0) F2FS-fs (loop5): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock F2FS-fs (loop5): invalid crc value ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:238! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4886 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:do_read_inode fs/f2fs/inode.c:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:f2fs_iget+0x3307/0x3ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:313 RSP: 0018:ffff8801c44a70e8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801ce208040 RBX: ffff8801b3621080 RCX: ffffffff82eace18 F2FS-fs (loop2): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0) RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82eaf047 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: ffff8801c44a7410 R08: ffff8801ce208040 R09: ffffed0039ee4176 R10: ffffed0039ee4176 R11: ffff8801cf720bb7 R12: ffff8801c0efa000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f753aa9d700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:238! CR2: 0000000001b03018 CR3: 00000001c8b74000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: f2fs_fill_super+0x4377/0x7bf0 fs/f2fs/super.c:2842 mount_bdev+0x30c/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1165 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:3020 mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1268 vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037 vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline] do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2517 [inline] do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2847 ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3063 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3077 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3074 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3074 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457daa RSP: 002b:00007f753aa9cba8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000000 RCX: 0000000000457daa RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f753aa9cbf0 RBP: 0000000000000064 R08: 0000000020016a00 R09: 0000000020000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000064 R14: 00000000006fcb80 R15: 0000000000000000 RIP: do_read_inode fs/f2fs/inode.c:238 [inline] RSP: ffff8801c44a70e8 RIP: f2fs_iget+0x3307/0x3ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:313 RSP: ffff8801c44a70e8 invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP KASAN ---[ end trace 1cbcbec2156680bc ]--- Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+41a1b341571f0952badb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
iusyk
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Feb 7, 2021
…adlock This patch fixes deadlock warning in removing/rescanning through sysfs when CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled. The issue can be reproduced by these steps: 1. Enable CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING via defconfig or menuconfig 2. Insert Ethernet card into PCIe CH0 and start up. After kernel starting up, execute the following command. echo 1 > /sys/class/pci_bus/0000\:00/device/0000\:00\:00.0/remove 3. Rescan PCI device by this command echo 1 > /sys/class/pci_bus/0000\:00/rescan The deadlock warnings will occur. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.14.70-ltsi-yocto-standard #27 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- sh/3402 is trying to acquire lock: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x50/0xa8 but task is already holding lock: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0xe0/0x130 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(kn->count#78); lock(kn->count#78); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by sh/3402: #0: (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x198/0x1b0 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x108/0x210 #2: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0xe0/0x130 #3: (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x1c/0x28 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 3402 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.14.70-ltsi-yocto-standard #27 Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a7795 ES3.0+ with 8GiB (4 x 2 GiB) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3d8 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xbc/0xf4 __lock_acquire+0x930/0x18a8 lock_acquire+0x48/0x68 __kernfs_remove+0x280/0x2f8 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x50/0xa8 remove_files.isra.0+0x38/0x78 sysfs_remove_group+0x4c/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x38/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0x54/0x78 device_del+0x1ac/0x308 pci_remove_bus_device+0x78/0xf8 pci_remove_bus_device+0x34/0xf8 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x38 remove_store+0x6c/0x78 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x28 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x78 kernfs_fop_write+0x138/0x210 __vfs_write+0x18/0x118 vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b0 SyS_write+0x48/0xb0 This warning occurs due to a self-deletion attribute using in the sysfs PCI device directory. This kind of attribute is really tricky, it does not allow pci framework drop this attribute until all active .show() and .store() callbacks have finished unless sysfs_break_active_protection() is called. Hence this patch avoids writing into this attribute triggers a deadlock. Referrence commit 5b55b24 ("scsi: core: Avoid that SCSI device removal through sysfs triggers a deadlock") of scsi driver Signed-off-by: Tho Vu <tho.vu.wh@rvc.renesas.com>
varder
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Jun 8, 2021
Prarit reported that depending on the affinity setting the ' irq $N: Affinity broken due to vector space exhaustion.' message is showing up in dmesg, but the vector space on the CPUs in the affinity mask is definitely not exhausted. Shung-Hsi provided traces and analysis which pinpoints the problem: The ordering of trying to assign an interrupt vector in assign_irq_vector_any_locked() is simply wrong if the interrupt data has a valid node assigned. It does: 1) Try the intersection of affinity mask and node mask 2) Try the node mask 3) Try the full affinity mask 4) Try the full online mask Obviously xen-troops#2 and xen-troops#3 are in the wrong order as the requested affinity mask has to take precedence. In the observed cases xen-troops#1 failed because the affinity mask did not contain CPUs from node 0. That made it allocate a vector from node 0, thereby breaking affinity and emitting the misleading message. Revert the order of xen-troops#2 and xen-troops#3 so the full affinity mask without the node intersection is tried before actually affinity is broken. If no node is assigned then only the full affinity mask and if that fails the full online mask is tried. Fixes: d6ffc6a ("x86/vector: Respect affinity mask in irq descriptor") Reported-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Reported-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ft4djtyp.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
arminn
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Aug 9, 2021
commit 510b80a upstream. When user space brings PKRU into init state, then the kernel handling is broken: T1 user space xsave(state) state.header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU; xrstor(state) T1 -> kernel schedule() XSAVE(S) -> T1->xsave.header.xfeatures[PKRU] == 0 T1->flags |= TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD; wrpkru(); schedule() ... pk = get_xsave_addr(&T1->fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU); if (pk) wrpkru(pk->pkru); else wrpkru(DEFAULT_PKRU); Because the xfeatures bit is 0 and therefore the value in the xsave storage is not valid, get_xsave_addr() returns NULL and switch_to() writes the default PKRU. -> FAIL xen-troops#1! So that wrecks any copy_to/from_user() on the way back to user space which hits memory which is protected by the default PKRU value. Assumed that this does not fail (pure luck) then T1 goes back to user space and because TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set it ends up in switch_fpu_return() __fpregs_load_activate() if (!fpregs_state_valid()) { load_XSTATE_from_task(); } But if nothing touched the FPU between T1 scheduling out and back in, then the fpregs_state is still valid which means switch_fpu_return() does nothing and just clears TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD. Back to user space with DEFAULT_PKRU loaded. -> FAIL xen-troops#2! The fix is simple: if get_xsave_addr() returns NULL then set the PKRU value to 0 instead of the restrictive default PKRU value in init_pkru_value. [ bp: Massage in minor nitpicks from folks. ] Fixes: 0cecca9 ("x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144346.045616965@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arminn
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Aug 9, 2021
commit f9dfb5e upstream. The XSAVE init code initializes all enabled and supported components with XRSTOR(S) to init state. Then it XSAVEs the state of the components back into init_fpstate which is used in several places to fill in the init state of components. This works correctly with XSAVE, but not with XSAVEOPT and XSAVES because those use the init optimization and skip writing state of components which are in init state. So init_fpstate.xsave still contains all zeroes after this operation. There are two ways to solve that: 1) Use XSAVE unconditionally, but that requires to reshuffle the buffer when XSAVES is enabled because XSAVES uses compacted format. 2) Save the components which are known to have a non-zero init state by other means. Looking deeper, xen-troops#2 is the right thing to do because all components the kernel supports have all-zeroes init state except the legacy features (FP, SSE). Those cannot be hard coded because the states are not identical on all CPUs, but they can be saved with FXSAVE which avoids all conditionals. Use FXSAVE to save the legacy FP/SSE components in init_fpstate along with a BUILD_BUG_ON() which reminds developers to validate that a newly added component has all zeroes init state. As a bonus remove the now unused copy_xregs_to_kernel_booting() crutch. The XSAVE and reshuffle method can still be implemented in the unlikely case that components are added which have a non-zero init state and no other means to save them. For now, FXSAVE is just simple and good enough. [ bp: Fix a typo or two in the text. ] Fixes: 6bad06b ("x86, xsave: Use xsaveopt in context-switch path when supported") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210618143444.587311343@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arminn
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Aug 9, 2021
commit f54b3ca upstream. This reverts commit 1815d9c. Unfortunately this inverts the locking hierarchy, so back to the drawing board. Full lockdep splat below: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.13.0-rc7-CI-CI_DRM_10254+ xen-troops#1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kms_frontbuffer/1087 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810dcd01a8 (&dev->master_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_is_current_master+0x1b/0x40 but task is already holding lock: ffff88810dcd0488 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_mode_getconnector+0x1c6/0x4a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> xen-troops#2 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xab/0x970 drm_client_modeset_probe+0x22e/0xca0 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x42/0x540 intel_fbdev_initial_config+0xf/0x20 [i915] async_run_entry_fn+0x28/0x130 process_one_work+0x26d/0x5c0 worker_thread+0x37/0x380 kthread+0x144/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> xen-troops#1 (&client->modeset_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xab/0x970 drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x1c/0x180 drm_client_modeset_commit+0x1c/0x40 __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x88/0xb0 drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x34/0x40 intel_fbdev_set_par+0x11/0x40 [i915] fbcon_init+0x270/0x4f0 visual_init+0xc6/0x130 do_bind_con_driver+0x1e5/0x2d0 do_take_over_console+0x10e/0x180 do_fbcon_takeover+0x53/0xb0 register_framebuffer+0x22d/0x310 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x36c/0x540 intel_fbdev_initial_config+0xf/0x20 [i915] async_run_entry_fn+0x28/0x130 process_one_work+0x26d/0x5c0 worker_thread+0x37/0x380 kthread+0x144/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (&dev->master_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x151e/0x2590 lock_acquire+0xd1/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0xab/0x970 drm_is_current_master+0x1b/0x40 drm_mode_getconnector+0x37e/0x4a0 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa8/0xf0 drm_ioctl+0x1e8/0x390 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6a/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &dev->master_mutex --> &client->modeset_mutex --> &dev->mode_config.mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&client->modeset_mutex); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&dev->master_mutex);
arminn
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Aug 9, 2021
[ Upstream commit 85e8b03 ] syzbot complained in neigh_reduce(), because rcu_read_lock_bh() is treated differently than rcu_read_lock() WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/net/addrconf.h:313 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by kworker/0:0/5: #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic64_set include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:856 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:617 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:644 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x871/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2247 xen-troops#1: ffffc90000ca7da8 ((work_completion)(&port->wq)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8a5/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2251 xen-troops#2: ffffffff8bf795c0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1da/0x3130 net/core/dev.c:4180 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events ipvlan_process_multicast Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 __in6_dev_get include/net/addrconf.h:313 [inline] __in6_dev_get include/net/addrconf.h:311 [inline] neigh_reduce drivers/net/vxlan.c:2167 [inline] vxlan_xmit+0x34d5/0x4c30 drivers/net/vxlan.c:2919 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4944 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4958 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3654 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1eb/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3670 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2133/0x3130 net/core/dev.c:4246 ipvlan_process_multicast+0xa99/0xd70 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:287 process_one_work+0x98d/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2276 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2422 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294 Fixes: f564f45 ("vxlan: add ipv6 proxy support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arminn
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Aug 9, 2021
[ Upstream commit d676598 ] Patch was based on wrong presumption that be_poll can be called only from bh context. It reintroducing old regression (also reverted) and causing deadlock when we use netconsole with benet in bonding. Old revert: commit 072a9c4 ("netpoll: revert 6bdb7fe and fix be_poll() instead") [ 331.269715] bond0: (slave enp0s7f0): Releasing backup interface [ 331.270121] CPU: 4 PID: 1479 Comm: ifenslave Not tainted 5.13.0-rc7+ xen-troops#2 [ 331.270122] Call Trace: [ 331.270122] [c00000001789f200] [c0000000008c505c] dump_stack+0x100/0x174 (unreliable) [ 331.270124] [c00000001789f240] [c008000001238b9c] be_poll+0x64/0xe90 [be2net] [ 331.270125] [c00000001789f330] [c000000000d1e6e4] netpoll_poll_dev+0x174/0x3d0 [ 331.270127] [c00000001789f400] [c008000001bc167c] bond_poll_controller+0xb4/0x130 [bonding] [ 331.270128] [c00000001789f450] [c000000000d1e624] netpoll_poll_dev+0xb4/0x3d0 [ 331.270129] [c00000001789f520] [c000000000d1ed88] netpoll_send_skb+0x448/0x470 [ 331.270130] [c00000001789f5d0] [c0080000011f14f8] write_msg+0x180/0x1b0 [netconsole] [ 331.270131] [c00000001789f640] [c000000000230c0c] console_unlock+0x54c/0x790 [ 331.270132] [c00000001789f7b0] [c000000000233098] vprintk_emit+0x2d8/0x450 [ 331.270133] [c00000001789f810] [c000000000234758] vprintk+0xc8/0x270 [ 331.270134] [c00000001789f850] [c000000000233c28] printk+0x40/0x54 [ 331.270135] [c00000001789f870] [c000000000ccf908] __netdev_printk+0x150/0x198 [ 331.270136] [c00000001789f910] [c000000000ccfdb4] netdev_info+0x68/0x94 [ 331.270137] [c00000001789f950] [c008000001bcbd70] __bond_release_one+0x188/0x6b0 [bonding] [ 331.270138] [c00000001789faa0] [c008000001bcc6f4] bond_do_ioctl+0x42c/0x490 [bonding] [ 331.270139] [c00000001789fb60] [c000000000d0d17c] dev_ifsioc+0x17c/0x400 [ 331.270140] [c00000001789fbc0] [c000000000d0db70] dev_ioctl+0x390/0x890 [ 331.270141] [c00000001789fc10] [c000000000c7c76c] sock_do_ioctl+0xac/0x1b0 [ 331.270142] [c00000001789fc90] [c000000000c7ffac] sock_ioctl+0x31c/0x6e0 [ 331.270143] [c00000001789fd60] [c0000000005b9728] sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x150 [ 331.270145] [c00000001789fdb0] [c0000000000336c0] system_call_exception+0x160/0x2f0 [ 331.270146] [c00000001789fe10] [c00000000000d35c] system_call_common+0xec/0x278 [ 331.270147] --- interrupt: c00 at 0x7fffa6c6ec00 [ 331.270147] NIP: 00007fffa6c6ec00 LR: 0000000105c4185c CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 331.270148] REGS: c00000001789fe80 TRAP: 0c00 Not tainted (5.13.0-rc7+) [ 331.270148] MSR: 800000000280f033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28000428 XER: 00000000 [ 331.270155] IRQMASK: 0 [ 331.270156] GPR00: 0000000000000036 00007fffd494d5b0 00007fffa6d57100 0000000000000003 [ 331.270158] GPR04: 0000000000008991 00007fffd494d6d0 0000000000000008 00007fffd494f28c [ 331.270161] GPR08: 0000000000000003 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 331.270164] GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fffa6dfa220 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 331.270167] GPR16: 0000000105c44880 0000000000000000 0000000105c60088 0000000105c60318 [ 331.270170] GPR20: 0000000105c602c0 0000000105c44560 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 331.270172] GPR24: 00007fffd494dc50 00007fffd494d6a8 0000000105c60008 00007fffd494d6d0 [ 331.270175] GPR28: 00007fffd494f27e 0000000105c6026c 00007fffd494f284 0000000000000000 [ 331.270178] NIP [00007fffa6c6ec00] 0x7fffa6c6ec00 [ 331.270178] LR [0000000105c4185c] 0x105c4185c [ 331.270179] --- interrupt: c00 This reverts commit d0d006a. Fixes: d0d006a ("be2net: disable bh with spin_lock in be_process_mcc") Signed-off-by: Petr Oros <poros@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
lorc
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May 26, 2022
…adlock This patch fixes deadlock warning in removing/rescanning through sysfs when CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled. The issue can be reproduced by these steps: 1. Enable CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING via defconfig or menuconfig 2. Insert Ethernet card into PCIe CH0 and start up. After kernel starting up, execute the following command. echo 1 > /sys/class/pci_bus/0000\:00/device/0000\:00\:00.0/remove 3. Rescan PCI device by this command echo 1 > /sys/class/pci_bus/0000\:00/bus_rescan The deadlock warnings will occur. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.14.70-ltsi-yocto-standard #27 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- sh/3402 is trying to acquire lock: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x50/0xa8 but task is already holding lock: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0xe0/0x130 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(kn->count#78); lock(kn->count#78); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by sh/3402: #0: (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x198/0x1b0 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x108/0x210 #2: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0xe0/0x130 #3: (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x1c/0x28 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 3402 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.14.70-ltsi-yocto-standard #27 Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a7795 ES3.0+ with 8GiB (4 x 2 GiB) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3d8 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xbc/0xf4 __lock_acquire+0x930/0x18a8 lock_acquire+0x48/0x68 __kernfs_remove+0x280/0x2f8 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x50/0xa8 remove_files.isra.0+0x38/0x78 sysfs_remove_group+0x4c/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x38/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0x54/0x78 device_del+0x1ac/0x308 pci_remove_bus_device+0x78/0xf8 pci_remove_bus_device+0x34/0xf8 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x38 remove_store+0x6c/0x78 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x28 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x78 kernfs_fop_write+0x138/0x210 __vfs_write+0x18/0x118 vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b0 SyS_write+0x48/0xb0 This warning occurs due to a self-deletion attribute using in the sysfs PCI device directory. This kind of attribute is really tricky, it does not allow pci framework drop this attribute until all active .show() and .store() callbacks have finished unless sysfs_break_active_protection() is called. Hence this patch avoids writing into this attribute triggers a deadlock. Referrence commit 5b55b24 ("scsi: core: Avoid that SCSI device removal through sysfs triggers a deadlock") of scsi driver Signed-off-by: Tho Vu <tho.vu.wh@renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Hoang Vo <hoang.vo.eb@renesas.com>
lorc
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Jul 16, 2024
…adlock This patch fixes deadlock warning in removing/rescanning through sysfs when CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled. The issue can be reproduced by these steps: 1. Enable CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING via defconfig or menuconfig 2. Insert Ethernet card into PCIe CH0 and start up. After kernel starting up, execute the following command. echo 1 > /sys/class/pci_bus/0000\:00/device/0000\:00\:00.0/remove 3. Rescan PCI device by this command echo 1 > /sys/class/pci_bus/0000\:00/bus_rescan The deadlock warnings will occur. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.14.70-ltsi-yocto-standard #27 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- sh/3402 is trying to acquire lock: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x50/0xa8 but task is already holding lock: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0xe0/0x130 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(kn->count#78); lock(kn->count#78); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by sh/3402: #0: (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x198/0x1b0 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x108/0x210 #2: (kn->count#78){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0xe0/0x130 #3: (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x1c/0x28 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 3402 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.14.70-ltsi-yocto-standard #27 Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a7795 ES3.0+ with 8GiB (4 x 2 GiB) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3d8 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xbc/0xf4 __lock_acquire+0x930/0x18a8 lock_acquire+0x48/0x68 __kernfs_remove+0x280/0x2f8 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x50/0xa8 remove_files.isra.0+0x38/0x78 sysfs_remove_group+0x4c/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x38/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0x54/0x78 device_del+0x1ac/0x308 pci_remove_bus_device+0x78/0xf8 pci_remove_bus_device+0x34/0xf8 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x38 remove_store+0x6c/0x78 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x28 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x78 kernfs_fop_write+0x138/0x210 __vfs_write+0x18/0x118 vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b0 SyS_write+0x48/0xb0 This warning occurs due to a self-deletion attribute using in the sysfs PCI device directory. This kind of attribute is really tricky, it does not allow pci framework drop this attribute until all active .show() and .store() callbacks have finished unless sysfs_break_active_protection() is called. Hence this patch avoids writing into this attribute triggers a deadlock. Referrence commit 5b55b24 ("scsi: core: Avoid that SCSI device removal through sysfs triggers a deadlock") of scsi driver Signed-off-by: Tho Vu <tho.vu.wh@renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Hoang Vo <hoang.vo.eb@renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Tin Tran <tin.tran.xk@renesas.com>
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