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Lineage 17.1 update #7

Merged
merged 130 commits into from
Jul 14, 2021
Merged

Lineage 17.1 update #7

merged 130 commits into from
Jul 14, 2021

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tititiou36 and others added 30 commits May 26, 2021 11:27
[ Upstream commit c019d92457826bb7b2091c86f36adb5de08405f9 ]

'setup_find_cpu_node()' take a reference on the node it returns.
This reference must be decremented when not needed anymore, or there will
be a leak.

Add the missing 'of_node_put(cpu)'.

Note that 'setup_cpuinfo()' that also calls this function already has a
correct 'of_node_put(cpu)' at its end.

Fixes: 9d02a42 ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5cb289bf2d7c34ca1abd794ce116c4f19185a1d4 ]

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case instead of
0 as done elsewhere in this function.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210514090952.6715-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
Fixes: a908301 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add ISP82XX support.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dbb5afad100a828c97e012c6106566d99f041db6 ]

Suppose we have 2 threads, the group-leader L and a sub-theread T,
both parked in ptrace_stop(). Debugger tries to resume both threads
and does

	ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, T);
	ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, L);

If the sub-thread T execs in between, the 2nd PTRACE_CONT doesn not
resume the old leader L, it resumes the post-exec thread T which was
actually now stopped in PTHREAD_EVENT_EXEC. In this case the
PTHREAD_EVENT_EXEC event is lost, and the tracer can't know that the
tracee changed its pid.

This patch makes ptrace() fail in this case until debugger does wait()
and consumes PTHREAD_EVENT_EXEC which reports old_pid. This affects all
ptrace requests except the "asynchronous" PTRACE_INTERRUPT/KILL.

The patch doesn't add the new PTRACE_ option to not complicate the API,
and I _hope_ this won't cause any noticeable regression:

	- If debugger uses PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC and the thread did an exec
	  and the tracer does a ptrace request without having consumed
	  the exec event, it's 100% sure that the thread the ptracer
	  thinks it is targeting does not exist anymore, or isn't the
	  same as the one it thinks it is targeting.

	- To some degree this patch adds nothing new. In the scenario
	  above ptrace(L) can fail with -ESRCH if it is called after the
	  execing sub-thread wakes the leader up and before it "steals"
	  the leader's pid.

Test-case:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <signal.h>
	#include <sys/ptrace.h>
	#include <sys/wait.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <pthread.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	void *tf(void *arg)
	{
		execve("/usr/bin/true", NULL, NULL);
		assert(0);

		return NULL;
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		int leader = fork();
		if (!leader) {
			kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);

			pthread_t th;
			pthread_create(&th, NULL, tf, NULL);
			for (;;)
				pause();

			return 0;
		}

		waitpid(leader, NULL, WSTOPPED);

		ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, leader, 0,
				PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE | PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC);
		waitpid(leader, NULL, 0);

		ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, leader, 0,0);
		waitpid(leader, NULL, 0);

		int status, thread = waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
		assert(thread > 0 && thread != leader);
		assert(status == 0x80137f);

		ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, thread, 0,0);
		/*
		 * waitid() because waitpid(leader, &status, WNOWAIT) does not
		 * report status. Why ????
		 *
		 * Why WEXITED? because we have another kernel problem connected
		 * to mt-exec.
		 */
		siginfo_t info;
		assert(waitid(P_PID, leader, &info, WSTOPPED|WEXITED|WNOWAIT) == 0);
		assert(info.si_pid == leader && info.si_status == 0x0405);

		/* OK, it sleeps in ptrace(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC == 0x04) */
		assert(ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, leader, 0,0) == -1);
		assert(errno == ESRCH);

		assert(leader == waitpid(leader, &status, WNOHANG));
		assert(status == 0x04057f);

		assert(ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, leader, 0,0) == 0);

		return 0;
	}

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Simon Marchi <simon.marchi@efficios.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Simon Marchi <simon.marchi@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d201d7631ca170b038e7f8921120d05eec70d7c5 upstream.

When using smb2_copychunk_range() for large ranges we will
run through several iterations of a loop calling SMB2_ioctl()
but never actually free the returned buffer except for the final
iteration.
This leads to memory leaks everytime a large copychunk is requested.

Fixes: 9bf0c9c ("CIFS: Fix SMB2/SMB3 Copy offload support (refcopy) for large files")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e84749a78dc82bc545f12ce009e3dbcc2c5a8a91 upstream.

snd_usbmidi_get_ms_info() may access beyond the border when a
malformed descriptor is passed.  This patch adds the sanity checks of
the given MS endpoint descriptors, and skips invalid ones.

Reported-by: syzbot+6bb23a5d5548b93c94aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210510150659.17710-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0edabdfe89581669609eaac5f6a8d0ae6fe95e7f upstream.

Mackie d.2 has an extension card for IEEE 1394 communication, which uses
BridgeCo DM1000 ASIC. On the other hand, Mackie d.4 Pro has built-in
function for IEEE 1394 communication by Oxford Semiconductor OXFW971,
according to schematic diagram available in Mackie website. Although I
misunderstood that Mackie d.2 Pro would be also a model with OXFW971,
it's wrong. Mackie d.2 Pro is a model which includes the extension card
as factory settings.

This commit fixes entries in Kconfig and comment in ALSA OXFW driver.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: fd6f4b0 ("ALSA: bebob: Add skelton for BeBoB based devices")
Fixes: ec4dba5 ("ALSA: oxfw: Add support for Behringer/Mackie devices")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513125652.110249-3-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94f88309f201821073f57ae6005caefa61bf7b7e upstream.

This reverts commit dcd0fea.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

The original commit message for this change was incorrect as the code
path can never result in a NULL dereference, alluding to the fact that
whatever tool was used to "find this" is broken.  It's just an optional
resource reservation, so removing this check is fine.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Fixes: dcd0fea ("ALSA: sb8: add a check for request_region")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-35-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c81d3d24602540f65256f98831d0a25599ea6b87 upstream.

When multiple PCI devices get assigned to a guest right at boot, libxl
incrementally populates the backend tree. The writes for the first of
the devices trigger the backend watch. In turn xen_pcibk_setup_backend()
will set the XenBus state to Initialised, at which point no further
reconfigures would happen unless a device got hotplugged. Arrange for
reconfigure to also get triggered from the backend watch handler.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2337cbd6-94b9-4187-9862-c03ea12e0c61@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c699a0db2d62e3bbb7f0bf35c87edbc8d23e3062 upstream.

The following commands will crash the kernel:

modprobe brd rd_size=1048576
dmsetup create o --table "0 `blockdev --getsize /dev/ram0` snapshot-origin /dev/ram0"
dmsetup create s --table "0 `blockdev --getsize /dev/ram0` snapshot /dev/ram0 /dev/ram1 N 0"

The reason is that when we test for zero chunk size, we jump to the label
bad_read_metadata without setting the "r" variable. The function
snapshot_ctr destroys all the structures and then exits with "r == 0". The
kernel then crashes because it falsely believes that snapshot_ctr
succeeded.

In order to fix the bug, we set the variable "r" to -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 58c0cc2d90f1e37c4eb63ae7f164c83830833f78 upstream.

This reverts commit ec7f6aa.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

This patch "looks" correct, but the driver keeps on running and will
fail horribly right afterward if this error condition ever trips.

So points for trying to resolve an issue, but a huge NEGATIVE value for
providing a "fake" fix for the problem as nothing actually got resolved
at all.  I'll go fix this up properly...

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Cc: Ferenc Bakonyi <fero@drama.obuda.kando.hu>
Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Fixes: ec7f6aa ("video: hgafb: fix potential NULL pointer dereference")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-39-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bee1b0511844c8c79fccf1f2b13472393b6b91f7 upstream.

This reverts commit f86a3b8.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

The original commit causes a memory leak when it is trying to claim it
is properly handling errors.  Revert this change and fix it up properly
in a follow-on commit.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes: f86a3b8 ("net: stmicro: fix a missing check of clk_prepare")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-21-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…ead"

commit 8d1beda5f11953ffe135a5213287f0b25b4da41b upstream.

This reverts commit 248b570.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

The original commit does not properly unwind if there is an error
condition so it needs to be reverted at this point in time.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 248b570 ("leds: lp5523: fix a missing check of return value of lp55xx_read")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-9-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 99ae3417672a6d4a3bf68d4fc43d7c6ca074d477 upstream.

This reverts commit 9aa3aa1.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, it was determined that this commit is not needed at all so
just revert it.  Also, the call to lm80_init_client() was not properly
handled, so if error handling is needed in the lm80_probe() function,
then it should be done properly, not half-baked like the commit being
reverted here did.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Fixes: 9aa3aa1 ("hwmon: (lm80) fix a missing check of bus read in lm80 probe")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-5-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed04fe8a0e87d7b5ea17d47f4ac9ec962b24814a upstream.

This reverts commit 1d84353.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

The original commit here, while technically correct, did not fully
handle all of the reported issues that the commit stated it was fixing,
so revert it until it can be "fixed" fully.

Note, ioremap() probably will never fail for old hardware like this, and
if anyone actually used this hardware (a PowerMac era PCI display card),
they would not be using fbdev anymore.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Cc: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 1d84353 ("video: imsttfb: fix potential NULL pointer dereferences")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-67-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e1436df2f2550bc89d832ffd456373fdf5d5b5d7 upstream.

This reverts commit 2c2a755.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

The original commit log for this change was incorrect, no "error
handling code" was added, things will blow up just as badly as before if
any of these cases ever were true.  As this BUG_ON() never fired, and
most of these checks are "obviously" never going to be true, let's just
revert to the original code for now until this gets unwound to be done
correctly in the future.

Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Fixes: 2c2a755 ("ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-49-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 257343d3ed557f11d580d0b7c515dc154f64a42b upstream.

This reverts commit 093c482.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

Because of this, all submissions from this group must be reverted from
the kernel tree and will need to be re-reviewed again to determine if
they actually are a valid fix.  Until that work is complete, remove this
change to ensure that no problems are being introduced into the
codebase.

Cc: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Cc: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Fixes: 093c482 ("gdrom: fix a memory leak bug")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-27-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d03d1021da6fe7f46efe9f2a7335564e7c9db5ab upstream.

The fields, "toc" and "cd_info", of "struct gdrom_unit gd" are allocated
in "probe_gdrom()". Prevent a memory leak by making sure "gd.cd_info" is
deallocated in the "remove_gdrom()" function.

Also prevent double free of the field "gd.toc" by moving it from the
module's exit function to "remove_gdrom()". This is because, in
"probe_gdrom()", the function makes sure to deallocate "gd.toc" in case
of any errors, so the exit function invoked later would again free
"gd.toc".

The patch also maintains consistency by deallocating the above mentioned
fields in "remove_gdrom()" along with another memory allocated field
"gd.disk".

Suggested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Atul Gopinathan <atulgopinathan@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-28-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9183f01b5e6e32eb3f17b5f3f8d5ad5ac9786c49 upstream.

As Peter points out, if we were to disconnect and then reconnect this
driver from a device, the "global" state of the device would contain odd
values and could cause problems.  Fix this up by just initializing the
whole thing to 0 at probe() time.

Ideally this would be a per-device variable, but given the age and the
total lack of users of it, that would require a lot of s/./->/g changes
for really no good reason.

Reported-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YJP2j6AU82MqEY2M@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68c5634c4a7278672a3bed00eb5646884257c413 upstream.

This reverts commit 7659762.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

This commit is not correct, it should not have used unlikely() and is
not propagating the error properly to the calling function, so it should
be reverted at this point in time.  Also, if the check failed, the
work queue was still assumed to be allocated, so further accesses would
have continued to fail, meaning this patch does nothing to solve the
root issues at all.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Bryan Brattlof <hello@bryanbrattlof.com>
Fixes: 7659762 ("rtlwifi: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-13-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b95b57dfe7a142bf2446548eb7f49340fd73e78b upstream.

This reverts commit 5bf7295.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

This commit does not properly detect if an error happens because the
logic after this loop will not detect that there was a failed
allocation.

Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes: 5bf7295 ("qlcnic: Avoid potential NULL pointer dereference")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-25-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7930742d6a0ff091c85b92ef4e076432d8d8cb79 upstream.

This reverts commit 26fd962.

Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.

Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted.  It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.

The change here was incorrect.  While it is nice to check if
niu_pci_eeprom_read() succeeded or not when using the data, any error
that might have happened was not propagated upwards properly, causing
the kernel to assume that these reads were successful, which results in
invalid data in the buffer that was to contain the successfully read
data.

Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Shannon Nelson <shannon.lee.nelson@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes: 26fd962 ("niu: fix missing checks of niu_pci_eeprom_read")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-23-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e6e337708c22f80824b82d4af645f20715730ad0 upstream.

niu_pci_eeprom_read() may fail, so add checks to its return value and
propagate the error up the callstack.

An examination of the callstack up to niu_pci_eeprom_read shows that:

niu_pci_eeprom_read() // returns int
    niu_pci_vpd_scan_props() // returns int
        niu_pci_vpd_fetch() // returns *void*
            niu_get_invariants() // returns int

since niu_pci_vpd_fetch() returns void which breaks the bubbling up,
change its return type to int so that error is propagated upwards.

Signed-off-by: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Cc: Shannon Nelson <shannon.lee.nelson@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-24-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0c32a96d000f260b5ebfabb4145a86ae1cd71847 upstream.

In case clk_prepare() fails, capture and propagate the error code up the
stack. If regulator_enable() was called earlier, properly unwind it by
calling regulator_disable().

Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam <mail@anirudhrb.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-22-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30b0e0ee9d02b97b68705c46b41444786effc40c upstream.

If alloc_workqueue() fails, properly catch this and propagate the error
to the calling functions, so that the devuce initialization will
properly error out.

Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Bryan Brattlof <hello@bryanbrattlof.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-14-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6647f7a06eb030a2384ec71f0bb2e78854afabfe upstream.

Check return value of lp5xx_read and if non-zero, jump to code at end of
the function, causing lp5523_stop_all_engines to be executed before
returning the error value up the call chain. This fixes the original
commit (248b570) which was reverted due to the University of Minnesota
problems.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-10-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 84460f01cba382553199bc1361f69a872d5abed4 upstream.

The function qlcnic_dl_lb_test() currently calls netdev_alloc_skb()
without checking afterwards that the allocation succeeded. Fix this by
checking if the skb is NULL and returning an error in such a case.
Breaking out of the loop if the skb is NULL is not correct as no error
would be reported to the caller and no message would be printed for the
user.

Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Seewald <tseewald@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-26-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc13cac4862cc68ec74348a80b6942532b7735fa upstream.

The return of ioremap if not checked, and can lead to a NULL to be
assigned to hga_vram. Potentially leading to a NULL pointer
dereference.

The fix adds code to deal with this case in the error label and
changes how the hgafb_probe handles the return of hga_card_detect.

Cc: Ferenc Bakonyi <fero@drama.obuda.kando.hu>
Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Igor Matheus Andrade Torrente <igormtorrente@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-40-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4d0ad57b3865795c4cde2fb5094c594c2e8f469 upstream.

Fix an issue with VGA console font size changes made after the initial
video text mode has been changed with a user tool like `svgatextmode'
calling the VT_RESIZEX ioctl.  As it stands in that case the original
screen geometry continues being used to validate further VT resizing.

Consequently when the video adapter is firstly reprogrammed from the
original say 80x25 text mode using a 9x16 character cell (720x400 pixel
resolution) to say 80x37 text mode and the same character cell (720x592
pixel resolution), and secondly the CRTC character cell updated to 9x8
(by loading a suitable font with the KD_FONT_OP_SET request of the
KDFONTOP ioctl), the VT geometry does not get further updated from 80x37
and only upper half of the screen is used for the VT, with the lower
half showing rubbish corresponding to whatever happens to be there in
the video memory that maps to that part of the screen.  Of course the
proportions change according to text mode geometries and font sizes
chosen.

Address the problem then, by updating the text mode geometry defaults
rather than checking against them whenever the VT is resized via a user
ioctl.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: e400b6e ("vt/vgacon: Check if screen resize request comes from userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.24+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 860dafa902595fb5f1d23bbcce1215188c3341e6 upstream.

Restore the original intent of the VT_RESIZEX ioctl's `v_clin' parameter
which is the number of pixel rows per character (cell) rather than the
height of the font used.

For framebuffer devices the two values are always the same, because the
former is inferred from the latter one.  For VGA used as a true text
mode device these two parameters are independent from each other: the
number of pixel rows per character is set in the CRT controller, while
font height is in fact hardwired to 32 pixel rows and fonts of heights
below that value are handled by padding their data with blanks when
loaded to hardware for use by the character generator.  One can change
the setting in the CRT controller and it will update the screen contents
accordingly regardless of the font loaded.

The `v_clin' parameter is used by the `vgacon' driver to set the height
of the character cell and then the cursor position within.  Make the
parameter explicit then, by defining a new `vc_cell_height' struct
member of `vc_data', set it instead of `vc_font.height' from `v_clin' in
the VT_RESIZEX ioctl, and then use it throughout the `vgacon' driver
except where actual font data is accessed which as noted above is
independent from the CRTC setting.

This way the framebuffer console driver is free to ignore the `v_clin'
parameter as irrelevant, as it always should have, avoiding any issues
attempts to give the parameter a meaning there could have caused, such
as one that has led to commit 988d076 ("vt_ioctl: make VT_RESIZEX
behave like VT_RESIZE"):

 "syzbot is reporting UAF/OOB read at bit_putcs()/soft_cursor() [1][2],
  for vt_resizex() from ioctl(VT_RESIZEX) allows setting font height
  larger than actual font height calculated by con_font_set() from
  ioctl(PIO_FONT). Since fbcon_set_font() from con_font_set() allocates
  minimal amount of memory based on actual font height calculated by
  con_font_set(), use of vt_resizex() can cause UAF/OOB read for font
  data."

The problem first appeared around Linux 2.5.66 which predates our repo
history, but the origin could be identified with the old MIPS/Linux repo
also at: <git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ralf/linux.git>
as commit 9736a3546de7 ("Merge with Linux 2.5.66."), where VT_RESIZEX
code in `vt_ioctl' was updated as follows:

 		if (clin)
-			video_font_height = clin;
+			vc->vc_font.height = clin;

making the parameter apply to framebuffer devices as well, perhaps due
to the use of "font" in the name of the original `video_font_height'
variable.  Use "cell" in the new struct member then to avoid ambiguity.

References:

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=32577e96d88447ded2d3b76d71254fb855245837
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=6b8355d27b2b94fb5cedf4655e3a59162d9e48e3

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ffb324e6f874121f7dce5bdae5e05d02baae7269 upstream.

syzbot is reporting OOB write at vga16fb_imageblit() [1], for
resize_screen() from ioctl(VT_RESIZE) returns 0 without checking whether
requested rows/columns fit the amount of memory reserved for the graphical
screen if current mode is KD_GRAPHICS.

----------
  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <sys/stat.h>
  #include <fcntl.h>
  #include <sys/ioctl.h>
  #include <linux/kd.h>
  #include <linux/vt.h>

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        const int fd = open("/dev/char/4:1", O_RDWR);
        struct vt_sizes vt = { 0x4100, 2 };

        ioctl(fd, KDSETMODE, KD_GRAPHICS);
        ioctl(fd, VT_RESIZE, &vt);
        ioctl(fd, KDSETMODE, KD_TEXT);
        return 0;
  }
----------

Allow framebuffer drivers to return -EINVAL, by moving vc->vc_mode !=
KD_GRAPHICS check from resize_screen() to fbcon_resize().

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1f29e126cf461c4de3b3 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+1f29e126cf461c4de3b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+1f29e126cf461c4de3b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiwai and others added 15 commits June 10, 2021 12:41
commit 9c1fe96bded935369f8340c2ac2e9e189f697d5d upstream.

snd_timer_notify1() calls the notification to each slave for a master
event, but it passes a wrong event number.  It should be +10 offset,
corresponding to SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MXXX, but it's incorrectly with
+100 offset.  Casually this was spotted by UBSAN check via syzkaller.

Reported-by: syzbot+d102fa5b35335a7e544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000e5560e05c3bd1d63@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210602113823.23777-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac98fec68 upstream.

We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553]  ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975]  ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368]  ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759]  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179]  ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567]  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995]  ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359]  generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767]  generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152]  ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556]  __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851]  vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110]  ksys_read+0x74/0xf0

This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable).  Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0711f0d7050b9e07c44bc159bbc64ac0a1022c7f upstream.

During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid.  Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid().  As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early.  As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g.  when delivering signals).

This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec5209 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.

Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.

Full KASAN splat below.

   ==================================================================
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
   Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273

   CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
   Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
   Call trace:
    ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
    task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
    do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
    exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
    do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
    do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
    get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
    do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
    do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
    work_pending+0xc/0x2dc

   Allocated by task 0:
    slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
    slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
    alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
    copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
    kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
    kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
    rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
    arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
    start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
    0x0

   Freed by task 270:
    slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
    slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
    slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
    kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
    put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
    put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
    proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
    proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
    proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
    new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
    vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
    ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
    __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
    __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
    __arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
    __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
    invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
    el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
    do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
    el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
    el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
    el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701

   The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
    which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
   The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
    224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0)
   The buggy address belongs to the page:
   page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0
   head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0
   flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head)
   raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080
   raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
   page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

   Memory state around the buggy address:
    ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   >ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                      ^
    ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ==================================================================

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210524172230.38715-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Fixes: 9ec5209 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.

When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped.  That will cause file corruption.  Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.

Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.

    qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
             -O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv

The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.

    fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
    fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…nect

commit 4ac06a1e013cf5fdd963317ffd3b968560f33bba upstream.

It's possible to trigger NULL pointer dereference by local unprivileged
user, when calling getsockname() after failed bind() (e.g. the bind
fails because LLCP_SAP_MAX used as SAP):

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  CPU: 1 PID: 426 Comm: llcp_sock_getna Not tainted 5.13.0-rc2-next-20210521+ #9
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   llcp_sock_getname+0xb1/0xe0
   __sys_getpeername+0x95/0xc0
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd5/0x180
   ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x40
   __x64_sys_getpeername+0x11/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x36/0x70
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

This can be reproduced with Syzkaller C repro (bind followed by
getpeername):
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14def446e00000

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: d646960 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Reported-by: syzbot+80fb126e7f7d8b1a5914@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210531072138.5219-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.

This function has the following pattern

	while (1) {
		ret = whatever();
		if (ret)
			goto out;
	}
	ret = 0
out:
	return ret;

However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.

Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the

	ret = 0;
out:

bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0884335a2e653b8a045083aa1d57ce74269ac81d upstream.

Drop bits 63:32 on loads/stores to/from DRs and CRs when the vCPU is not
in 64-bit mode.  The APM states bits 63:32 are dropped for both DRs and
CRs:

  In 64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 64 bits without the need
  for a REX prefix. In non-64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 32
  bits and the upper 32 bits of the destination are forced to 0.

Fixes: 7ff76d5 ("KVM: SVM: enhance MOV CR intercept handler")
Fixes: cae3797 ("KVM: SVM: enhance mov DR intercept handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422022128.3464144-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: manual backport to old file]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1962682 upstream.

Stop printing a (ratelimited) kernel message for each instance of an
unimplemented syscall being called. Userland making an unimplemented
syscall is not necessarily misbehaviour and to be expected with a
current userland running on an older kernel. Also, the current message
looks scary to users but does not actually indicate a real problem nor
help them narrow down the cause. Just rely on sys_ni_syscall() to return
-ENOSYS.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The commit referenced below was incomplete: It merely affected what
would get written to the vdev-<N> xenstore node. The guest would still
find the function at the original function number as long as
__xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev() wouldn't be in sync. The same goes for AER wrt
__xen_pcibk_get_pcifront_dev().

Undo overriding the function to zero and instead make sure that VFs at
function zero remain alone in their slot. This has the added benefit of
improving overall capacity, considering that there's only a total of 32
slots available right now (PCI segment and bus can both only ever be
zero at present).

This is upstream commit 4ba50e7c423c29639878c00573288869aa627068.

Fixes: 8a5248f ("xen PV passthru: assign SR-IOV virtual functions to 
separate virtual slots")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8def783b-404c-3452-196d-3f3fd4d72c9e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210608175926.524658689@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jason Self <jason@bluehome.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Changes in 4.4.272: (24 commits)
        efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location()
        vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init()
        vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow
        ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service
        HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init()
        netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches
        ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface()
        ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams()
        Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order
        Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object
        net: caif: added cfserl_release function
        net: caif: add proper error handling
        net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify
        net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify
        ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification
        ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed
        pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid`
        ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate
        nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect
        btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts
        KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode
        arm64: Remove unimplemented syscall log message
        xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology
        Linux 4.4.272
sdfat version 2.4.5 introduced wbc_to_write_flags() as a compat
function for legacy kernels. Unfortunately, as the legacy
__sdfat_submit_bio_write() path was adapted to take advantage of
wbc_to_write_flags(), it used the return value direcly as the
rw paramater to submit_bio(), and the default return value is 0
(READ). This becomes a problem later when write paths assert that
bio_data_dir() is WRITE (i.e., write bit of bio->bi_rw is set).

Pass a bitwise-or of WRITE and the return value of wbc_to_write_flags()
to submit_bio() on this legacy path. This logically unifies the
approach with the newer path here and directly with the legacy path of
__sdfat_submit_bio_write2() in mpage.c.

Fixes: afd489c6a8c8 ("fs: sdfat: Update to version 2.4.5")
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: Ic7b937a467e9e116c3390c6ac0e009a59229b93c
@Flamefire Flamefire merged commit a7aa648 into lineage-17.1 Jul 14, 2021
@Flamefire Flamefire deleted the lineage-17.1-update branch July 14, 2021 16:23
bananafunction pushed a commit to bananafunction/android_kernel_sony_msm8998-1 that referenced this pull request May 25, 2022
[ Upstream commit f63d24baff787e13b723d86fe036f84bdbc35045 ]

This fixes the following trace caused by receiving
HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without
first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is
do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm:

 ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
    Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142

    CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted
    5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a Flamefire#7
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
    rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
     kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
     hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
     l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0
     l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0
     l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0
     sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110
     sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370
     do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690
     do_iter_write+0x132/0x640
     vfs_writev+0x198/0x570
     do_writev+0x202/0x280
     do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
    RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
    Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3
    0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05
    <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
    RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77
    R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580
    RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
    </TASK>
    R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0

    Allocated by task 45:
        kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
        __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
        hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0
        l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0
        l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000
        le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0
        hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0
        hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450
        hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90
        hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
        process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
        worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
        kthread+0x29d/0x340
        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

    Freed by task 45:
        kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
        kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
        kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
        __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130
        kfree+0xac/0x350
        hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0
        hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0
        hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120
        hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90
        hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
        process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
        worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
        kthread+0x29d/0x340
        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500
    The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
    which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
    The buggy address belongs to the page:
    128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580)
    flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
    page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0
    mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0
    raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff
    0000000000000000
    raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004
    ffff8880078418c0
    page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
    ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
    Memory state around the buggy address:
    >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                ^
    ==================================================================
    ffff88800c0f0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Reported-by: Sönke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Tested-by: Sönke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bananafunction pushed a commit to bananafunction/android_kernel_sony_msm8998-1 that referenced this pull request May 25, 2022
[ Upstream commit af68656d66eda219b7f55ce8313a1da0312c79e1 ]

While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.

System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload

Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
     213      2  11  c000000004c89e00  UN   0.0       0      0  [eehd]
     215      2   0  c000000004c80000  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/0:2]
    2196      1  28  c000000004504f00  UN   0.1   15936  11136  wickedd
    4287      1   9  c00000020d076800  UN   0.0    4032   3008  agetty
    4289      1  20  c00000020d056680  UN   0.0    7232   3840  agetty
   32423      2  26  c00000020038c580  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/26:3]
   32871   4241  27  c0000002609ddd00  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd
   32920  10130  16  c00000027284a100  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33092  32987   0  c000000205218b00  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33154   4567  16  c000000260e51780  UN   0.1   48832  12864  pickup
   33209   4241  36  c000000270cb6500  UN   0.1   18624  11712  sshd
   33473  33283   0  c000000205211480  UN   0.1   48512  12672  sendmail
   33531   4241  37  c00000023c902780  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd

EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213    TASK: c000000004c89e00  CPU: 11  COMMAND: "eehd"
  #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
  Flamefire#1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
  Flamefire#2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
  Flamefire#3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
  Flamefire#4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  Flamefire#5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
  Flamefire#6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
  Flamefire#7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
  Flamefire#8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
  Flamefire#9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64

And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702

   6697  {
   6698          might_sleep();
   6699          set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6700
   6701          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702                  msleep(1);
   6703          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
   6704                  msleep(1);
   6705
   6706          hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
   6707
   6708          clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6709  }

EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:

bnx2x_io_error_detected()
  +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
       +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
            +-> __netif_napi_del()

bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
  +-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
       +-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
            +->napi_disable()

Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.

Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 26, 2022
commit 38c9c22a85aeed28d0831f230136e9cf6fa2ed44 upstream.

Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as follows:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880751acee8 by task a.out/879

CPU: 7 PID: 879 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220630-00001-gcc5218c8bd2c-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1c0/0x2b0
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x484
 print_report.cold+0x55/0x232
 kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0
 ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130
 ntfs_are_names_equal.cold+0x2b/0x41
 ntfs_attr_find+0x43b/0xb90
 ntfs_attr_lookup+0x16d/0x1e0
 ntfs_read_locked_attr_inode+0x4aa/0x2360
 ntfs_attr_iget+0x1af/0x220
 ntfs_read_locked_inode+0x246c/0x5120
 ntfs_iget+0x132/0x180
 load_system_files+0x1cc6/0x3480
 ntfs_fill_super+0xa66/0x1cf0
 mount_bdev+0x38d/0x460
 legacy_get_tree+0x10d/0x220
 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300
 do_new_mount+0x2da/0x6d0
 path_mount+0x496/0x19d0
 __x64_sys_mount+0x284/0x300
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f2118d9ea
Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc269deac8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3f2118d9ea
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffc269dec00
RBP: 00007ffc269dec80 R08: 00007ffc269deb00 R09: 00007ffc269dec44
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f81ab1d220
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000085430378 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x555c6a81d pfn:0x751ac
memcg:ffff888101f7e180
anon flags: 0xfffffc00a0014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 000fffffc00a0014 ffffea0001bf2988 ffffea0001de2448 ffff88801712e201
raw: 0000000555c6a81d 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff888101f7e180
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8880751acd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8880751ace00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8880751ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                          ^
 ffff8880751acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8880751acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

The reason is that struct ATTR_RECORD->name_offset is 6485, end address of
name string is out of bounds.

Fix this by adding sanity check on end address of attribute name string.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
[chenxiaosong2@huawei.com: cleanup suggested by Hawkins Jiawei]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220709064511.3304299-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707105329.4020708-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
Cc: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
Cc: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 26, 2022
…loc()

commit d29f59051d3a07b81281b2df2b8c9dfe4716067f upstream.

The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the
array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc()
accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around.

This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough
index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64).
The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur.

This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced
by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels:
aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40
index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G        W IOE      6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ #7
Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002    07/22/2010
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1]
snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm]
snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm]
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170
snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Signed-off-by: Tasos Sahanidis <tasos@tasossah.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3707dcab-320a-62ff-63c0-73fc201ef756@tasossah.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 21, 2023
…g the sock

[ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ]

There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device
during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is
released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in
later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got
NULL pointer dereference. e.g.

   #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757
   #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d
   #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48
   #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b
   #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb
   #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542
   #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62
      [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]
      RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b  RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000008  RBX: ffff8aa000888000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000000e  RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e  RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700
      RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e   R8: 0000000000700000   R9: 00000000000010ae
      R10: ffff8a9fcb748980  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8a9fd1168700
      R13: ffff8aa000888000  R14: 00000000002a0000  R15: 00000000000010ae
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]
   #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507
   #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45
  #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807
  #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951
  #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde
  #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b
  #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139
  #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a
  #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3
  #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca
  #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3

Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh

Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before
releasing the sock.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 24, 2023
[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ]

Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid
but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to
__gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL
since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined.

When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are
ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the
first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the
correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for.
Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet.

We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs
are executed in parallel.  The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9
kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/
elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7.

PID: 71258  TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000  CPU: 36  COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
 #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f
 #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9
 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss]
 #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc
[sunrpc]
 #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss]
 #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc]
 #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc]
 #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc]
 #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc]
 #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc]

The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for
services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe.

When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to
service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in
gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked
because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for
B in pipe->in_downcall.  And the process waiting for the msg
corresponding to service A will be woken up.

Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the
next msg.  In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A).
The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and
gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in
gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that.

This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not
sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon
receiving a downcall.

Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com>
Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[uli: backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 24, 2023
[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03bd890566d873e3593b32d034bf2f5a087 ]

During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3
driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding
reset tasks:

crash> foreach UN bt
...
PID: 159    TASK: c0000000067c6000  CPU: 8   COMMAND: "eehd"
...
 #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18
 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3]
 #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c
...

PID: 290    TASK: c000000036e5f800  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
 #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 296    TASK: c000000037a65800  CPU: 21  COMMAND: "kworker/21:1"
...
 #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 655    TASK: c000000036f49000  CPU: 16  COMMAND: "kworker/16:2"
...:1

 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and
tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of
their code blocks.  If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between
the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and
tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur.

Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior
to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another
deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER
tg3_io_error_detected() has executed:

crash> foreach UN bt
PID: 159    TASK: c0000000067d2000  CPU: 9   COMMAND: "eehd"
...
 #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3]
 #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88
...
PID: 363    TASK: c000000037564000  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
 #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c
 #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848
 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3]
 #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error
recovery is already in progress.

Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize")
Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 25, 2023
commit 60eed1e3d45045623e46944ebc7c42c30a4350f0 upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 25, 2023
[ Upstream commit 250870824c1cf199b032b1ef889c8e8d69d9123a ]

GCC warns about the pattern sizeof(void*)/sizeof(void), as it looks like
the abuse of a pattern to calculate the array size. This pattern appears
in the unevaluated part of the ternary operator in _INTC_ARRAY if the
parameter is NULL.

The replacement uses an alternate approach to return 0 in case of NULL
which does not generate the pattern sizeof(void*)/sizeof(void), but still
emits the warning if _INTC_ARRAY is called with a nonarray parameter.

This patch is required for successful compilation with -Werror enabled.

The idea to use _Generic for type distinction is taken from Comment #7
in https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=108483 by Jakub Jelinek

Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/619fa552-c988-35e5-b1d7-fe256c46a272@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de
Signed-off-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 10, 2023
commit 675751bb20634f981498c7d66161584080cc061e upstream.

If something was written to the buffer just before destruction,
it may be possible (maybe not in a real system, but it did
happen in ARCH=um with time-travel) to destroy the ringbuffer
before the IRQ work ran, leading this KASAN report (or a crash
without KASAN):

    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a
    Read of size 8 at addr 000000006d640a48 by task swapper/0

    CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G        W  O       6.3.0-rc1 #7
    Stack:
     60c4f20f 0c203d48 41b58ab3 60f224fc
     600477fa 60f35687 60c4f20f 601273dd
     00000008 6101eb00 6101eab0 615be548
    Call Trace:
     [<60047a58>] show_stack+0x25e/0x282
     [<60c609e0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x96/0xfd
     [<60c50d4c>] print_report+0x1a7/0x5a8
     [<603078d3>] kasan_report+0xc1/0xe9
     [<60308950>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1b/0x1d
     [<60232844>] irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a
     [<602328b4>] irq_work_tick+0x24/0x34
     [<6017f9dc>] update_process_times+0x162/0x196
     [<6019f335>] tick_sched_handle+0x1a4/0x1c3
     [<6019fd9e>] tick_sched_timer+0x79/0x10c
     [<601812b9>] __hrtimer_run_queues.constprop.0+0x425/0x695
     [<60182913>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x16c/0x2c4
     [<600486a3>] um_timer+0x164/0x183
     [...]

    Allocated by task 411:
     save_stack_trace+0x99/0xb5
     stack_trace_save+0x81/0x9b
     kasan_save_stack+0x2d/0x54
     kasan_set_track+0x34/0x3e
     kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x28
     ____kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x97
     __kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x12
     __kmalloc+0xb2/0xe8
     load_elf_phdrs+0xee/0x182
     [...]

    The buggy address belongs to the object at 000000006d640800
     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
    The buggy address is located 584 bytes inside of
     freed 1024-byte region [000000006d640800, 000000006d640c00)

Add the appropriate irq_work_sync() so the work finishes before
the buffers are destroyed.

Prior to the commit in the Fixes tag below, there was only a
single global IRQ work, so this issue didn't exist.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230427175920.a76159263122.I8295e405c44362a86c995e9c2c37e3e03810aa56@changeid

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 1569345 ("tracing/ring-buffer: Move poll wake ups into ring buffer code")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 05bb0167c80b8f93c6a4e0451b7da9b96db990c2 ]

ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e

Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia:

  #0    0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302
  #1.2  0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f
  #1.1  0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f
  #1    0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f
  #2    0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d
  #3    0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d
  #4    0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302
  #5    0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369
  #6    0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac
  #7    0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2
  #8    0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052
  #9    0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8
  #10   0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98
  #11   0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac
  #12   0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d
  #13   0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603

Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but
otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA
20221020, but the same code exists on master.

Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2024
…ock()

commit 1a3e1f4 upstream.

NOTE: This is a partial backport since we only need the refcnt between
memcg and stock to fix the problem stated below, and in this way
multiple versions use the same code and align with each other.

There was a kernel panic happened on an in-house environment running
3.10, and the same problem was reproduced on 4.19:

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 2085 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Tainted: G             L    4.19.90+ #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010 drain_all_stock+0xad/0x140
Code: 00 00 4d 85 ff 74 2c 45 85 c9 74 27 4d 39 fc 74 42 41 80 bc 24 28 04 00 00 00 74 17 49 8b 04 24 49 8b 17 48 8b 88 90 02 00 00 <48> 39 8a 90 02 00 00 74 02 eb 86 48 63 88 3c 01 00 00 39 8a 3c 01
RSP: 0018:ffffa7efc5813d70 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff8cb185548800 RBX: ffff8cb89f420160 RCX: ffff8cb1867b6000
RDX: babababababababa RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000231876
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000415 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8cb186f89040
R13: 0000000000020160 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8cb186b27040
FS:  00007f4a308d3740(0000) GS:ffff8cb89f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe4d634a68 CR3: 000000010b022000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 mem_cgroup_force_empty_write+0x31/0xb0
 cgroup_file_write+0x60/0x140
 ? __check_object_size+0x136/0x147
 kernfs_fop_write+0x10e/0x190
 __vfs_write+0x37/0x1b0
 ? selinux_file_permission+0xe8/0x130
 ? security_file_permission+0x2e/0xb0
 vfs_write+0xb6/0x1a0
 ksys_write+0x57/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x250
 ? async_page_fault+0x8/0x30
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
Modules linked in: ...

It is found that in case of stock->nr_pages == 0, the memcg on
stock->cached could be freed due to its refcnt decreased to 0, which
made stock->cached become a dangling pointer. It could cause a UAF
problem in drain_all_stock() in the following concurrent scenario. Note
that drain_all_stock() doesn't disable irq but only preemption.

CPU1                             CPU2
==============================================================================
stock->cached = memcgA (freed)
                                 drain_all_stock(memcgB)
                                  rcu_read_lock()
                                  memcg = CPU1's stock->cached (memcgA)
                                  (interrupted)
refill_stock(memcgC)
 drain_stock(memcgA)
 stock->cached = memcgC
 stock->nr_pages += xxx (> 0)
                                  stock->nr_pages > 0
                                  mem_cgroup_is_descendant(memcgA, memcgB) [UAF]
                                  rcu_read_unlock()

This problem is, unintentionally, fixed at 5.9, where commit
1a3e1f4 ("mm: memcontrol: decouple reference counting from page
accounting") adds memcg refcnt for stock. Therefore affected LTS
versions include 4.19 and 5.4.

For 4.19, memcg's css offline process doesn't call drain_all_stock(). so
it's easier for the released memcg to be left on the stock. For 5.4,
although mem_cgroup_css_offline() does call drain_all_stock(), but the
flushing could be skipped when stock->nr_pages happens to be 0, and
besides the async draining could be delayed and take place after the UAF
problem has happened.

Fix this problem by adding (and decreasing) memcg's refcnt when memcg is
put onto (and removed from) stock, just like how commit 1a3e1f4
("mm: memcontrol: decouple reference counting from page accounting")
does. After all, "being on the stock" is a kind of reference with
regards to memcg. As such, it's guaranteed that a css on stock would not
be freed.

It's good to mention that refill_stock() is executed in an irq-disabled
context, so the drain_stock() patched with css_put() would not actually
free memcgA until the end of refill_stock(), since css_put() is an RCU
free and it's still in grace period. For CPU2, the access to CPU1's
stock->cached is protected by rcu_read_lock(), so in this case it gets
either NULL from stock->cached or a memcgA that is still good.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org      # 4.19 5.4
Fixes: cdec2e4 ("memcg: coalesce charging via percpu storage")
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
Flamefire pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07ac535593139c875ffa19af924b1084540 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[uli: backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
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