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page table memory protection (part of x86 KERNEXEC) #9

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thestinger opened this issue May 11, 2017 · 1 comment
Closed

page table memory protection (part of x86 KERNEXEC) #9

thestinger opened this issue May 11, 2017 · 1 comment

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@thestinger thestinger changed the title page table memory protection (part of KERNEXEC) page table memory protection (part of x86 KERNEXEC) May 12, 2017
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 12, 2017
commit 4dfce57 upstream.

There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer
dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes,
when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents
on the temporary inode, something like:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
PID: 29439  TASK: ffff880550584fa0  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "xfs_fsr"
    [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10]
 #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs]
#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs]
#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs]
#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs]
#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs]
#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67
#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5
#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8
#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c
#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b
#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e
#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27
#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c
#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d

As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along
with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros
when we tear down the extents during truncate.  When the in-core
inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally
set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents
to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents
generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes
instead.

This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in
xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing
it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent
because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained
what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due
to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations
were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun.

Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number
of extents, not di_nextents.

Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the
root cause.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 12, 2017
[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ]

As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.

We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:

 #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
    [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
 #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8

Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.

It's found the freed dst_entry here:

 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
 225 {↩
 226 ▹       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
 227 ▹       const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
 228 ↩
 229 ▹       return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
 230 ▹       ▹       (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
 231 }↩

But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.

All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:

- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.

- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:

LockDroppedIcmps                  267

A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:

do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release().

Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.

To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.

The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.

As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().

Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
@thestinger thestinger added the PaX label May 15, 2017
@thestinger thestinger reopened this Jun 16, 2017
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 3, 2017
Andrey reported a lockdep warning on non-initialized
spinlock:

 INFO: trying to register non-static key.
 the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
 turning off the locking correctness validator.
 CPU: 1 PID: 4099 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.12.0-rc6+ #9
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
  dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
  register_lock_class+0x717/0x1aa0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:755
  ? 0xffffffffa0000000
  __lock_acquire+0x269/0x3690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3255
  lock_acquire+0x22d/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
  __raw_spin_lock_bh ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135
  _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:175
  spin_lock_bh ./include/linux/spinlock.h:304
  ip_mc_clear_src+0x27/0x1e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2076
  igmpv3_clear_delrec+0xee/0x4f0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1194
  ip_mc_destroy_dev+0x4e/0x190 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1736

We miss a spin_lock_init() in igmpv3_add_delrec(), probably
because previously we never use it on this code path. Since
we already unlink it from the global mc_tomb list, it is
probably safe not to acquire this spinlock here. It does not
harm to have it although, to avoid conditional locking.

Fixes: c38b7d3 ("igmp: acquire pmc lock for ip_mc_clear_src()")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 6, 2017
[ Upstream commit b4846fc ]

Andrey reported a lockdep warning on non-initialized
spinlock:

 INFO: trying to register non-static key.
 the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
 turning off the locking correctness validator.
 CPU: 1 PID: 4099 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.12.0-rc6+ #9
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
  dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
  register_lock_class+0x717/0x1aa0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:755
  ? 0xffffffffa0000000
  __lock_acquire+0x269/0x3690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3255
  lock_acquire+0x22d/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
  __raw_spin_lock_bh ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135
  _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:175
  spin_lock_bh ./include/linux/spinlock.h:304
  ip_mc_clear_src+0x27/0x1e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2076
  igmpv3_clear_delrec+0xee/0x4f0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1194
  ip_mc_destroy_dev+0x4e/0x190 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1736

We miss a spin_lock_init() in igmpv3_add_delrec(), probably
because previously we never use it on this code path. Since
we already unlink it from the global mc_tomb list, it is
probably safe not to acquire this spinlock here. It does not
harm to have it although, to avoid conditional locking.

Fixes: c38b7d3 ("igmp: acquire pmc lock for ip_mc_clear_src()")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 28, 2017
commit cdea465 upstream.

A vendor with a system having more than 128 CPUs occasionally encounters
the following crash during shutdown. This is not an easily reproduceable
event, but the vendor was able to provide the following analysis of the
crash, which exhibits the same footprint each time.

crash> bt
PID: 0      TASK: ffff88017c70ce70  CPU: 5   COMMAND: "swapper/5"
 #0 [ffff88085c143ac8] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059c8b
 #1 [ffff88085c143b28] __crash_kexec at ffffffff811052e2
 #2 [ffff88085c143bf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff811053d0
 #3 [ffff88085c143c10] oops_end at ffffffff8168ef88
 #4 [ffff88085c143c38] no_context at ffffffff8167ebb3
 #5 [ffff88085c143c88] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ec49
 #6 [ffff88085c143cd0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167edb3
 #7 [ffff88085c143ce0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff81691d1e
 #8 [ffff88085c143d40] do_page_fault at ffffffff81691ec5
 #9 [ffff88085c143d70] page_fault at ffffffff8168e188
    [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address]
    RIP: ffffffffa053c800  RSP: ffff88085c143e28  RFLAGS: 00010206
    RAX: ffff88017c72bfd8  RBX: ffff88017a8dc000  RCX: ffff8810588b5ac8
    RDX: ffff8810588b5a00  RSI: ffffffffa053c800  RDI: ffff8810588b5a00
    RBP: ffff88085c143e58   R8: ffff88017c70d408   R9: ffff88017a8dc000
    R10: 0000000000000002  R11: ffff88085c143da0  R12: ffff8810588b5ac8
    R13: 0000000000000100  R14: ffffffffa053c800  R15: ffff8810588b5a00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    <IRQ stack>
    [exception RIP: cpuidle_enter_state+82]
    RIP: ffffffff81514192  RSP: ffff88017c72be50  RFLAGS: 00000202
    RAX: 0000001e4c3c6f16  RBX: 000000000000f8a0  RCX: 0000000000000018
    RDX: 0000000225c17d03  RSI: ffff88017c72bfd8  RDI: 0000001e4c3c6f16
    RBP: ffff88017c72be78   R8: 000000000000237e   R9: 0000000000000018
    R10: 0000000000002494  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffff88017c72be20
    R13: ffff88085c14f8e0  R14: 0000000000000082  R15: 0000001e4c3bb400
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

This is the corresponding stack trace

It has crashed because the area pointed with RIP extracted from timer
element is already removed during a shutdown process.

The function is smi_timeout().

And we think ffff8810588b5a00 in RDX is a parameter struct smi_info

crash> rd ffff8810588b5a00 20
ffff8810588b5a00:  ffff8810588b6000 0000000000000000   .`.X............
ffff8810588b5a10:  ffff880853264400 ffffffffa05417e0   .D&S......T.....
ffff8810588b5a20:  24a024a000000000 0000000000000000   .....$.$........
ffff8810588b5a30:  0000000000000000 0000000000000000   ................
ffff8810588b5a30:  0000000000000000 0000000000000000   ................
ffff8810588b5a40:  ffffffffa053a040 ffffffffa053a060   @.S.....`.S.....
ffff8810588b5a50:  0000000000000000 0000000100000001   ................
ffff8810588b5a60:  0000000000000000 0000000000000e00   ................
ffff8810588b5a70:  ffffffffa053a580 ffffffffa053a6e0   ..S.......S.....
ffff8810588b5a80:  ffffffffa053a4a0 ffffffffa053a250   ..S.....P.S.....
ffff8810588b5a90:  0000000500000002 0000000000000000   ................

Unfortunately the top of this area is already detroyed by someone.
But because of two reasonns we think this is struct smi_info
 1) The address included in between  ffff8810588b5a70 and ffff8810588b5a80:
  are inside of ipmi_si_intf.c  see crash> module ffff88085779d2c0

 2) We've found the area which point this.
  It is offset 0x68 of  ffff880859df4000

crash> rd  ffff880859df4000 100
ffff880859df4000:  0000000000000000 0000000000000001   ................
ffff880859df4010:  ffffffffa0535290 dead000000000200   .RS.............
ffff880859df4020:  ffff880859df4020 ffff880859df4020    @.Y.... @.Y....
ffff880859df4030:  0000000000000002 0000000000100010   ................
ffff880859df4040:  ffff880859df4040 ffff880859df4040   @@.Y....@@.Y....
ffff880859df4050:  0000000000000000 0000000000000000   ................
ffff880859df4060:  0000000000000000 ffff8810588b5a00   .........Z.X....
ffff880859df4070:  0000000000000001 ffff880859df4078   ........x@.Y....

 If we regards it as struct ipmi_smi in shutdown process
 it looks consistent.

The remedy for this apparent race is affixed below.

Signed-off-by: Tony Camuso <tcamuso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This was first introduced in 7ea0ed2 ipmi: Make the
message handler easier to use for SMI interfaces
where some code was moved outside of the rcu_read_lock()
and the lock was not added.

Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 18, 2017
commit ab21922 upstream.

The dummy-hcd driver calls the gadget driver's disconnect callback
under the wrong conditions.  It should invoke the callback when Vbus
power is turned off, but instead it does so when the D+ pullup is
turned off.

This can cause a deadlock in the composite core when a gadget driver
is unregistered:

[   88.361471] ============================================
[   88.362014] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   88.362580] 4.14.0-rc2+ #9 Not tainted
[   88.363010] --------------------------------------------
[   88.363561] v4l_id/526 is trying to acquire lock:
[   88.364062]  (&(&cdev->lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<ffffffffa0547e03>] composite_disconnect+0x43/0x100 [libcomposite]
[   88.365051]
[   88.365051] but task is already holding lock:
[   88.365826]  (&(&cdev->lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<ffffffffa0547b09>] usb_function_deactivate+0x29/0x80 [libcomposite]
[   88.366858]
[   88.366858] other info that might help us debug this:
[   88.368301]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   88.368301]
[   88.369304]        CPU0
[   88.369701]        ----
[   88.370101]   lock(&(&cdev->lock)->rlock);
[   88.370623]   lock(&(&cdev->lock)->rlock);
[   88.371145]
[   88.371145]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   88.371145]
[   88.372211]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   88.372211]
[   88.373191] 2 locks held by v4l_id/526:
[   88.373715]  #0:  (&(&cdev->lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<ffffffffa0547b09>] usb_function_deactivate+0x29/0x80 [libcomposite]
[   88.374814]  #1:  (&(&dum_hcd->dum->lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<ffffffffa05bd48d>] dummy_pullup+0x7d/0xf0 [dummy_hcd]
[   88.376289]
[   88.376289] stack backtrace:
[   88.377726] CPU: 0 PID: 526 Comm: v4l_id Not tainted 4.14.0-rc2+ #9
[   88.378557] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[   88.379504] Call Trace:
[   88.380019]  dump_stack+0x86/0xc7
[   88.380605]  __lock_acquire+0x841/0x1120
[   88.381252]  lock_acquire+0xd5/0x1c0
[   88.381865]  ? composite_disconnect+0x43/0x100 [libcomposite]
[   88.382668]  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x54
[   88.383357]  ? composite_disconnect+0x43/0x100 [libcomposite]
[   88.384290]  composite_disconnect+0x43/0x100 [libcomposite]
[   88.385490]  set_link_state+0x2d4/0x3c0 [dummy_hcd]
[   88.386436]  dummy_pullup+0xa7/0xf0 [dummy_hcd]
[   88.387195]  usb_gadget_disconnect+0xd8/0x160 [udc_core]
[   88.387990]  usb_gadget_deactivate+0xd3/0x160 [udc_core]
[   88.388793]  usb_function_deactivate+0x64/0x80 [libcomposite]
[   88.389628]  uvc_function_disconnect+0x1e/0x40 [usb_f_uvc]

This patch changes the code to test the port-power status bit rather
than the port-connect status bit when deciding whether to isue the
callback.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: David Tulloh <david@tulloh.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
@thestinger
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No longer in-scope since it's x86.

randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Feb 9, 2018
Scenario:
1. Port down and do fail over
2. Ap do rds_bind syscall

PID: 47039  TASK: ffff89887e2fe640  CPU: 47  COMMAND: "kworker/u:6"
 #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9
 GrapheneOS#1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3
 GrapheneOS#2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518
 GrapheneOS#3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c
 GrapheneOS#4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675
 GrapheneOS#5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3
 GrapheneOS#6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8
 GrapheneOS#7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95
    [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address]
    RIP: 0000000000000000  RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8  RFLAGS: 00010282
    RAX: 00000000fffffffe  RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00  RCX:ffffffff81c99d88
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff896019ee08e8  RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00
    RBP: ffff898e35f15df0   R8: ffff896019ee08c8  R9:0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000400  R11: 0000000000000000  R12:ffff896019ee08c0
    R13: ffff889b77f6fe68  R14: ffffffff81c99d80  R15: ffffffffa022a1e0
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010 SS: 0018
 GrapheneOS#8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm]
 GrapheneOS#9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6
 GrapheneOS#10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0
 GrapheneOS#11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6

PID: 45659  TASK: ffff880d313d2500  CPU: 31  COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap"
 #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4
 GrapheneOS#1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf
 GrapheneOS#2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7
 GrapheneOS#3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb
 GrapheneOS#4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm]
 GrapheneOS#5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma]
 GrapheneOS#6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds]
 GrapheneOS#7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds]
 GrapheneOS#8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670

PID: 45659                          PID: 47039
rds_ib_laddr_check
  /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */
  rdma_create_id
  rdma_bind_addr
    cma_acquire_dev
      /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */
      cma_attach_to_dev
                                    cma_ndev_work_handler
                                      /* event_hanlder is null */
                                      id_priv->id.event_handler

Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Feb 27, 2018
It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge
Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low
so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in
random user space applications as follow,

kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000]
 #0  0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6)
 GrapheneOS#1  0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6)
 GrapheneOS#2  0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#3  0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#4  0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#5  0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#6  0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#7  0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#8  0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#9  0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt)
 GrapheneOS#10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6)
 GrapheneOS#11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt)

After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm,
THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out").

The root cause is as follows:

When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in
swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to
improve performance.  But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal
page, so only the head page is saved.  After swapping in, tail pages
will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory
corruption in the applications.

This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions
if the page is a THP.  So that the THP will be swapped out to swap
device.

Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled.  But it is found
that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible.  For example, if
CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if
zswap itself isn't enabled.

Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to
enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store
functions instead of the general interfaces.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209084947.22749-1-ying.huang@intel.com
Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out")
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>	[put THP checking in backend]
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.14]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 28, 2018
commit 7ba7166 upstream.

It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge
Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low
so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in
random user space applications as follow,

kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000]
 #0  0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6)
 #1  0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6)
 #2  0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt)
 #3  0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt)
 #4  0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt)
 #5  0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt)
 #6  0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt)
 #7  0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt)
 #8  0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt)
 #9  0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt)
 #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6)
 #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt)

After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm,
THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out").

The root cause is as follows:

When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in
swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to
improve performance.  But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal
page, so only the head page is saved.  After swapping in, tail pages
will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory
corruption in the applications.

This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions
if the page is a THP.  So that the THP will be swapped out to swap
device.

Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled.  But it is found
that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible.  For example, if
CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if
zswap itself isn't enabled.

Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to
enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store
functions instead of the general interfaces.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209084947.22749-1-ying.huang@intel.com
Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out")
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>	[put THP checking in backend]
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.14]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 28, 2018
commit 7ba7166 upstream.

It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge
Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low
so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in
random user space applications as follow,

kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000]
 #0  0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6)
 #1  0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6)
 #2  0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt)
 #3  0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt)
 #4  0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt)
 #5  0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt)
 #6  0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt)
 #7  0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt)
 #8  0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt)
 #9  0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt)
 #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6)
 #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt)

After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm,
THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out").

The root cause is as follows:

When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in
swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to
improve performance.  But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal
page, so only the head page is saved.  After swapping in, tail pages
will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory
corruption in the applications.

This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions
if the page is a THP.  So that the THP will be swapped out to swap
device.

Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled.  But it is found
that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible.  For example, if
CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if
zswap itself isn't enabled.

Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to
enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store
functions instead of the general interfaces.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209084947.22749-1-ying.huang@intel.com
Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out")
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>	[put THP checking in backend]
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.14]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 15, 2018
commit 1514839 upstream.

This patch fixes NULL pointer crash due to active timer running for abort
IOCB.

From crash dump analysis it was discoverd that get_next_timer_interrupt()
encountered a corrupted entry on the timer list.

 #9 [ffff95e1f6f0fd40] page_fault at ffffffff914fe8f8
    [exception RIP: get_next_timer_interrupt+440]
    RIP: ffffffff90ea3088  RSP: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0  RFLAGS: 00010013
    RAX: ffff95e1f6451028  RBX: 000218e2389e5f40  RCX: 00000001232ad600
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0  RDI: 0000000001232ad6
    RBP: ffff95e1f6f0fe40   R8: ffff95e1f6451188   R9: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000016  R11: 0000000000000016  R12: 00000001232ad5f6
    R13: ffff95e1f6450000  R14: ffff95e1f6f0fdf8  R15: ffff95e1f6f0fe10
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Looking at the assembly of get_next_timer_interrupt(), address came
from %r8 (ffff95e1f6451188) which is pointing to list_head with single
entry at ffff95e5ff621178.

 0xffffffff90ea307a <get_next_timer_interrupt+426>:      mov    (%r8),%rdx
 0xffffffff90ea307d <get_next_timer_interrupt+429>:      cmp    %r8,%rdx
 0xffffffff90ea3080 <get_next_timer_interrupt+432>:      je     0xffffffff90ea30a7 <get_next_timer_interrupt+471>
 0xffffffff90ea3082 <get_next_timer_interrupt+434>:      nopw   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
 0xffffffff90ea3088 <get_next_timer_interrupt+440>:      testb  $0x1,0x18(%rdx)

 crash> rd ffff95e1f6451188 10
 ffff95e1f6451188:  ffff95e5ff621178 ffff95e5ff621178   x.b.....x.b.....
 ffff95e1f6451198:  ffff95e1f6451198 ffff95e1f6451198   ..E.......E.....
 ffff95e1f64511a8:  ffff95e1f64511a8 ffff95e1f64511a8   ..E.......E.....
 ffff95e1f64511b8:  ffff95e77cf509a0 ffff95e77cf509a0   ...|.......|....
 ffff95e1f64511c8:  ffff95e1f64511c8 ffff95e1f64511c8   ..E.......E.....

 crash> rd ffff95e5ff621178 10
 ffff95e5ff621178:  0000000000000001 ffff95e15936aa00   ..........6Y....
 ffff95e5ff621188:  0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff   ................
 ffff95e5ff621198:  00000000000000a0 0000000000000010   ................
 ffff95e5ff6211a8:  ffff95e5ff621198 000000000000000c   ..b.............
 ffff95e5ff6211b8:  00000f5800000000 ffff95e751f8d720   ....X... ..Q....

 ffff95e5ff621178 belongs to freed mempool object at ffff95e5ff621080.

 CACHE            NAME                 OBJSIZE  ALLOCATED     TOTAL  SLABS  SSIZE
 ffff95dc7fd74d00 mnt_cache                384      19785     24948    594    16k
   SLAB              MEMORY            NODE  TOTAL  ALLOCATED  FREE
   ffffdc5dabfd8800  ffff95e5ff620000     1     42         29    13
   FREE / [ALLOCATED]
    ffff95e5ff621080  (cpu 6 cache)

Examining the contents of that memory reveals a pointer to a constant string
in the driver, "abort\0", which is set by qla24xx_async_abort_cmd().

 crash> rd ffffffffc059277c 20
 ffffffffc059277c:  6e490074726f6261 0074707572726574   abort.Interrupt.
 ffffffffc059278c:  00676e696c6c6f50 6920726576697244   Polling.Driver i
 ffffffffc059279c:  646f6d207325206e 6974736554000a65   n %s mode..Testi
 ffffffffc05927ac:  636976656420676e 786c252074612065   ng device at %lx
 ffffffffc05927bc:  6b63656843000a2e 646f727020676e69   ...Checking prod
 ffffffffc05927cc:  6f20444920746375 0a2e706968632066   uct ID of chip..
 ffffffffc05927dc:  5120646e756f4600 204130303232414c   .Found QLA2200A
 ffffffffc05927ec:  43000a2e70696843 20676e696b636568   Chip...Checking
 ffffffffc05927fc:  65786f626c69616d 6c636e69000a2e73   mailboxes...incl
 ffffffffc059280c:  756e696c2f656475 616d2d616d642f78   ude/linux/dma-ma

 crash> struct -ox srb_iocb
 struct srb_iocb {
           union {
               struct {...} logio;
               struct {...} els_logo;
               struct {...} tmf;
               struct {...} fxiocb;
               struct {...} abt;
               struct ct_arg ctarg;
               struct {...} mbx;
               struct {...} nack;
    [0x0 ] } u;
    [0xb8] struct timer_list timer;
    [0x108] void (*timeout)(void *);
 }
 SIZE: 0x110

 crash> ! bc
 ibase=16
 obase=10
 B8+40
 F8

The object is a srb_t, and at offset 0xf8 within that structure
(i.e. ffff95e5ff621080 + f8 -> ffff95e5ff621178) is a struct timer_list.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.4+
Fixes: 4440e46 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add IOCB Abort command asynchronous handling.")
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 15, 2018
commit 1514839 upstream.

This patch fixes NULL pointer crash due to active timer running for abort
IOCB.

From crash dump analysis it was discoverd that get_next_timer_interrupt()
encountered a corrupted entry on the timer list.

 #9 [ffff95e1f6f0fd40] page_fault at ffffffff914fe8f8
    [exception RIP: get_next_timer_interrupt+440]
    RIP: ffffffff90ea3088  RSP: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0  RFLAGS: 00010013
    RAX: ffff95e1f6451028  RBX: 000218e2389e5f40  RCX: 00000001232ad600
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0  RDI: 0000000001232ad6
    RBP: ffff95e1f6f0fe40   R8: ffff95e1f6451188   R9: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000016  R11: 0000000000000016  R12: 00000001232ad5f6
    R13: ffff95e1f6450000  R14: ffff95e1f6f0fdf8  R15: ffff95e1f6f0fe10
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Looking at the assembly of get_next_timer_interrupt(), address came
from %r8 (ffff95e1f6451188) which is pointing to list_head with single
entry at ffff95e5ff621178.

 0xffffffff90ea307a <get_next_timer_interrupt+426>:      mov    (%r8),%rdx
 0xffffffff90ea307d <get_next_timer_interrupt+429>:      cmp    %r8,%rdx
 0xffffffff90ea3080 <get_next_timer_interrupt+432>:      je     0xffffffff90ea30a7 <get_next_timer_interrupt+471>
 0xffffffff90ea3082 <get_next_timer_interrupt+434>:      nopw   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
 0xffffffff90ea3088 <get_next_timer_interrupt+440>:      testb  $0x1,0x18(%rdx)

 crash> rd ffff95e1f6451188 10
 ffff95e1f6451188:  ffff95e5ff621178 ffff95e5ff621178   x.b.....x.b.....
 ffff95e1f6451198:  ffff95e1f6451198 ffff95e1f6451198   ..E.......E.....
 ffff95e1f64511a8:  ffff95e1f64511a8 ffff95e1f64511a8   ..E.......E.....
 ffff95e1f64511b8:  ffff95e77cf509a0 ffff95e77cf509a0   ...|.......|....
 ffff95e1f64511c8:  ffff95e1f64511c8 ffff95e1f64511c8   ..E.......E.....

 crash> rd ffff95e5ff621178 10
 ffff95e5ff621178:  0000000000000001 ffff95e15936aa00   ..........6Y....
 ffff95e5ff621188:  0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff   ................
 ffff95e5ff621198:  00000000000000a0 0000000000000010   ................
 ffff95e5ff6211a8:  ffff95e5ff621198 000000000000000c   ..b.............
 ffff95e5ff6211b8:  00000f5800000000 ffff95e751f8d720   ....X... ..Q....

 ffff95e5ff621178 belongs to freed mempool object at ffff95e5ff621080.

 CACHE            NAME                 OBJSIZE  ALLOCATED     TOTAL  SLABS  SSIZE
 ffff95dc7fd74d00 mnt_cache                384      19785     24948    594    16k
   SLAB              MEMORY            NODE  TOTAL  ALLOCATED  FREE
   ffffdc5dabfd8800  ffff95e5ff620000     1     42         29    13
   FREE / [ALLOCATED]
    ffff95e5ff621080  (cpu 6 cache)

Examining the contents of that memory reveals a pointer to a constant string
in the driver, "abort\0", which is set by qla24xx_async_abort_cmd().

 crash> rd ffffffffc059277c 20
 ffffffffc059277c:  6e490074726f6261 0074707572726574   abort.Interrupt.
 ffffffffc059278c:  00676e696c6c6f50 6920726576697244   Polling.Driver i
 ffffffffc059279c:  646f6d207325206e 6974736554000a65   n %s mode..Testi
 ffffffffc05927ac:  636976656420676e 786c252074612065   ng device at %lx
 ffffffffc05927bc:  6b63656843000a2e 646f727020676e69   ...Checking prod
 ffffffffc05927cc:  6f20444920746375 0a2e706968632066   uct ID of chip..
 ffffffffc05927dc:  5120646e756f4600 204130303232414c   .Found QLA2200A
 ffffffffc05927ec:  43000a2e70696843 20676e696b636568   Chip...Checking
 ffffffffc05927fc:  65786f626c69616d 6c636e69000a2e73   mailboxes...incl
 ffffffffc059280c:  756e696c2f656475 616d2d616d642f78   ude/linux/dma-ma

 crash> struct -ox srb_iocb
 struct srb_iocb {
           union {
               struct {...} logio;
               struct {...} els_logo;
               struct {...} tmf;
               struct {...} fxiocb;
               struct {...} abt;
               struct ct_arg ctarg;
               struct {...} mbx;
               struct {...} nack;
    [0x0 ] } u;
    [0xb8] struct timer_list timer;
    [0x108] void (*timeout)(void *);
 }
 SIZE: 0x110

 crash> ! bc
 ibase=16
 obase=10
 B8+40
 F8

The object is a srb_t, and at offset 0xf8 within that structure
(i.e. ffff95e5ff621080 + f8 -> ffff95e5ff621178) is a struct timer_list.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.4+
Fixes: 4440e46 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add IOCB Abort command asynchronous handling.")
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 12, 2018
[ Upstream commit d754941 ]

If, for any reason, userland shuts down iscsi transport interfaces
before proper logouts - like when logging in to LUNs manually, without
logging out on server shutdown, or when automated scripts can't
umount/logout from logged LUNs - kernel will hang forever on its
sd_sync_cache() logic, after issuing the SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE cmd to all
still existent paths.

PID: 1 TASK: ffff8801a69b8000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow"
 #0 [ffff8801a69c3a30] __schedule at ffffffff8183e9ee
 #1 [ffff8801a69c3a80] schedule at ffffffff8183f0d5
 #2 [ffff8801a69c3a98] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81842199
 #3 [ffff8801a69c3b40] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8183e604
 #4 [ffff8801a69c3b70] wait_for_completion_io_timeout at ffffffff8183fc6c
 #5 [ffff8801a69c3bd0] blk_execute_rq at ffffffff813cfe10
 #6 [ffff8801a69c3c88] scsi_execute at ffffffff815c3fc7
 #7 [ffff8801a69c3cc8] scsi_execute_req_flags at ffffffff815c60fe
 #8 [ffff8801a69c3d30] sd_sync_cache at ffffffff815d37d7
 #9 [ffff8801a69c3da8] sd_shutdown at ffffffff815d3c3c

This happens because iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out(), the transport layer
timeout helper, would tell the queue timeout function (scsi_times_out)
to reset the request timer over and over, until the session state is
back to logged in state. Unfortunately, during server shutdown, this
might never happen again.

Other option would be "not to handle" the issue in the transport
layer. That would trigger the error handler logic, which would also need
the session state to be logged in again.

Best option, for such case, is to tell upper layers that the command was
handled during the transport layer error handler helper, marking it as
DID_NO_CONNECT, which will allow completion and inform about the
problem.

After the session was marked as ISCSI_STATE_FAILED, due to the first
timeout during the server shutdown phase, all subsequent cmds will fail
to be queued, allowing upper logic to fail faster.

Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco <rafael.tinoco@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 12, 2018
[ Upstream commit d754941 ]

If, for any reason, userland shuts down iscsi transport interfaces
before proper logouts - like when logging in to LUNs manually, without
logging out on server shutdown, or when automated scripts can't
umount/logout from logged LUNs - kernel will hang forever on its
sd_sync_cache() logic, after issuing the SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE cmd to all
still existent paths.

PID: 1 TASK: ffff8801a69b8000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow"
 #0 [ffff8801a69c3a30] __schedule at ffffffff8183e9ee
 #1 [ffff8801a69c3a80] schedule at ffffffff8183f0d5
 #2 [ffff8801a69c3a98] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81842199
 #3 [ffff8801a69c3b40] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8183e604
 #4 [ffff8801a69c3b70] wait_for_completion_io_timeout at ffffffff8183fc6c
 #5 [ffff8801a69c3bd0] blk_execute_rq at ffffffff813cfe10
 #6 [ffff8801a69c3c88] scsi_execute at ffffffff815c3fc7
 #7 [ffff8801a69c3cc8] scsi_execute_req_flags at ffffffff815c60fe
 #8 [ffff8801a69c3d30] sd_sync_cache at ffffffff815d37d7
 #9 [ffff8801a69c3da8] sd_shutdown at ffffffff815d3c3c

This happens because iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out(), the transport layer
timeout helper, would tell the queue timeout function (scsi_times_out)
to reset the request timer over and over, until the session state is
back to logged in state. Unfortunately, during server shutdown, this
might never happen again.

Other option would be "not to handle" the issue in the transport
layer. That would trigger the error handler logic, which would also need
the session state to be logged in again.

Best option, for such case, is to tell upper layers that the command was
handled during the transport layer error handler helper, marking it as
DID_NO_CONNECT, which will allow completion and inform about the
problem.

After the session was marked as ISCSI_STATE_FAILED, due to the first
timeout during the server shutdown phase, all subsequent cmds will fail
to be queued, allowing upper logic to fail faster.

Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco <rafael.tinoco@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
d1b pushed a commit to d1b/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Apr 25, 2018
This patch fixes NULL pointer crash due to active timer running for abort
IOCB.

From crash dump analysis it was discoverd that get_next_timer_interrupt()
encountered a corrupted entry on the timer list.

 GrapheneOS#9 [ffff95e1f6f0fd40] page_fault at ffffffff914fe8f8
    [exception RIP: get_next_timer_interrupt+440]
    RIP: ffffffff90ea3088  RSP: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0  RFLAGS: 00010013
    RAX: ffff95e1f6451028  RBX: 000218e2389e5f40  RCX: 00000001232ad600
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0  RDI: 0000000001232ad6
    RBP: ffff95e1f6f0fe40   R8: ffff95e1f6451188   R9: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000016  R11: 0000000000000016  R12: 00000001232ad5f6
    R13: ffff95e1f6450000  R14: ffff95e1f6f0fdf8  R15: ffff95e1f6f0fe10
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Looking at the assembly of get_next_timer_interrupt(), address came
from %r8 (ffff95e1f6451188) which is pointing to list_head with single
entry at ffff95e5ff621178.

 0xffffffff90ea307a <get_next_timer_interrupt+426>:      mov    (%r8),%rdx
 0xffffffff90ea307d <get_next_timer_interrupt+429>:      cmp    %r8,%rdx
 0xffffffff90ea3080 <get_next_timer_interrupt+432>:      je     0xffffffff90ea30a7 <get_next_timer_interrupt+471>
 0xffffffff90ea3082 <get_next_timer_interrupt+434>:      nopw   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
 0xffffffff90ea3088 <get_next_timer_interrupt+440>:      testb  $0x1,0x18(%rdx)

 crash> rd ffff95e1f6451188 10
 ffff95e1f6451188:  ffff95e5ff621178 ffff95e5ff621178   x.b.....x.b.....
 ffff95e1f6451198:  ffff95e1f6451198 ffff95e1f6451198   ..E.......E.....
 ffff95e1f64511a8:  ffff95e1f64511a8 ffff95e1f64511a8   ..E.......E.....
 ffff95e1f64511b8:  ffff95e77cf509a0 ffff95e77cf509a0   ...|.......|....
 ffff95e1f64511c8:  ffff95e1f64511c8 ffff95e1f64511c8   ..E.......E.....

 crash> rd ffff95e5ff621178 10
 ffff95e5ff621178:  0000000000000001 ffff95e15936aa00   ..........6Y....
 ffff95e5ff621188:  0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff   ................
 ffff95e5ff621198:  00000000000000a0 0000000000000010   ................
 ffff95e5ff6211a8:  ffff95e5ff621198 000000000000000c   ..b.............
 ffff95e5ff6211b8:  00000f5800000000 ffff95e751f8d720   ....X... ..Q....

 ffff95e5ff621178 belongs to freed mempool object at ffff95e5ff621080.

 CACHE            NAME                 OBJSIZE  ALLOCATED     TOTAL  SLABS  SSIZE
 ffff95dc7fd74d00 mnt_cache                384      19785     24948    594    16k
   SLAB              MEMORY            NODE  TOTAL  ALLOCATED  FREE
   ffffdc5dabfd8800  ffff95e5ff620000     1     42         29    13
   FREE / [ALLOCATED]
    ffff95e5ff621080  (cpu 6 cache)

Examining the contents of that memory reveals a pointer to a constant string
in the driver, "abort\0", which is set by qla24xx_async_abort_cmd().

 crash> rd ffffffffc059277c 20
 ffffffffc059277c:  6e490074726f6261 0074707572726574   abort.Interrupt.
 ffffffffc059278c:  00676e696c6c6f50 6920726576697244   Polling.Driver i
 ffffffffc059279c:  646f6d207325206e 6974736554000a65   n %s mode..Testi
 ffffffffc05927ac:  636976656420676e 786c252074612065   ng device at %lx
 ffffffffc05927bc:  6b63656843000a2e 646f727020676e69   ...Checking prod
 ffffffffc05927cc:  6f20444920746375 0a2e706968632066   uct ID of chip..
 ffffffffc05927dc:  5120646e756f4600 204130303232414c   .Found QLA2200A
 ffffffffc05927ec:  43000a2e70696843 20676e696b636568   Chip...Checking
 ffffffffc05927fc:  65786f626c69616d 6c636e69000a2e73   mailboxes...incl
 ffffffffc059280c:  756e696c2f656475 616d2d616d642f78   ude/linux/dma-ma

 crash> struct -ox srb_iocb
 struct srb_iocb {
           union {
               struct {...} logio;
               struct {...} els_logo;
               struct {...} tmf;
               struct {...} fxiocb;
               struct {...} abt;
               struct ct_arg ctarg;
               struct {...} mbx;
               struct {...} nack;
    [0x0 ] } u;
    [0xb8] struct timer_list timer;
    [0x108] void (*timeout)(void *);
 }
 SIZE: 0x110

 crash> ! bc
 ibase=16
 obase=10
 B8+40
 F8

The object is a srb_t, and at offset 0xf8 within that structure
(i.e. ffff95e5ff621080 + f8 -> ffff95e5ff621178) is a struct timer_list.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> GrapheneOS#4.4+
Fixes: 4440e46 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add IOCB Abort command asynchronous handling.")
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 26, 2018
[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08 ]

Scenario:
1. Port down and do fail over
2. Ap do rds_bind syscall

PID: 47039  TASK: ffff89887e2fe640  CPU: 47  COMMAND: "kworker/u:6"
 #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9
 #1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3
 #2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518
 #3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c
 #4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675
 #5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3
 #6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8
 #7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95
    [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address]
    RIP: 0000000000000000  RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8  RFLAGS: 00010282
    RAX: 00000000fffffffe  RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00  RCX:ffffffff81c99d88
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff896019ee08e8  RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00
    RBP: ffff898e35f15df0   R8: ffff896019ee08c8  R9:0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000400  R11: 0000000000000000  R12:ffff896019ee08c0
    R13: ffff889b77f6fe68  R14: ffffffff81c99d80  R15: ffffffffa022a1e0
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010 SS: 0018
 #8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm]
 #9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6
 #10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0
 #11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6

PID: 45659  TASK: ffff880d313d2500  CPU: 31  COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap"
 #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4
 #1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf
 #2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7
 #3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb
 #4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm]
 #5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma]
 #6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds]
 #7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds]
 #8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670

PID: 45659                          PID: 47039
rds_ib_laddr_check
  /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */
  rdma_create_id
  rdma_bind_addr
    cma_acquire_dev
      /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */
      cma_attach_to_dev
                                    cma_ndev_work_handler
                                      /* event_hanlder is null */
                                      id_priv->id.event_handler

Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 21, 2018
…s found

[ Upstream commit 72f17ba ]

If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking
through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively
passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if
different from the current one.

However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we
should continue walking through attributes using the current
table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested
attributes.

For example, given this sequence:

1  OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY
2  OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL
3	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID
4	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC
5	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST
6	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL
7	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC
8	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST
9  OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT
10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK
11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS

we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3,
and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting
attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS
evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is
15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the
wrong table:

[ 7654.586496] ==================================================================
[ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430
[ 7654.610983]
[ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1
[ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
[ 7654.631379] Call Trace:
[ 7654.634108]  [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[ 7654.639843]  [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290
[ 7654.647129]  [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.654607]  [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330
[ 7654.661406]  [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40
[ 7654.668789]  [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.676076]  [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.684234]  [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 7654.689968]  [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590
[ 7654.696574]  [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.705122]  [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0
[ 7654.712503]  [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
[ 7654.719401]  [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.726298]  [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.733195]  [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[ 7654.740187]  [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0
[ 7654.746406]  [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 7654.752914]  [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 7654.758456]  [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch]

[snip]

[ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[ 7655.138226]  ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch]
[ 7655.145507]
[ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 7655.152514]  ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa
[ 7655.160585]  ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
[ 7655.176701]                                                              ^
[ 7655.184372]  ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05
[ 7655.192431]  ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.200490] ==================================================================

Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 21, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ]

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 22, 2018
…s found

[ Upstream commit 72f17ba ]

If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking
through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively
passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if
different from the current one.

However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we
should continue walking through attributes using the current
table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested
attributes.

For example, given this sequence:

1  OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY
2  OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL
3	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID
4	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC
5	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST
6	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL
7	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC
8	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST
9  OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT
10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK
11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS

we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3,
and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting
attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS
evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is
15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the
wrong table:

[ 7654.586496] ==================================================================
[ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430
[ 7654.610983]
[ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1
[ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
[ 7654.631379] Call Trace:
[ 7654.634108]  [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[ 7654.639843]  [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290
[ 7654.647129]  [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.654607]  [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330
[ 7654.661406]  [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40
[ 7654.668789]  [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.676076]  [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.684234]  [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 7654.689968]  [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590
[ 7654.696574]  [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.705122]  [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0
[ 7654.712503]  [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
[ 7654.719401]  [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.726298]  [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.733195]  [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[ 7654.740187]  [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0
[ 7654.746406]  [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 7654.752914]  [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 7654.758456]  [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch]

[snip]

[ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[ 7655.138226]  ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch]
[ 7655.145507]
[ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 7655.152514]  ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa
[ 7655.160585]  ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
[ 7655.176701]                                                              ^
[ 7655.184372]  ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05
[ 7655.192431]  ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.200490] ==================================================================

Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 22, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ]

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 31, 2018
[ Upstream commit fca3234 ]

Executing command 'perf stat -T -- ls' dumps core on x86 and s390.

Here is the call back chain (done on x86):

 # gdb ./perf
 ....
 (gdb) r stat -T -- ls
...
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00007ffff56d1963 in vasprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6
(gdb) where
 #0  0x00007ffff56d1963 in vasprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6
 #1  0x00007ffff56ae484 in asprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6
 #2  0x00000000004f1982 in __parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x7fffffffd580,
    list=0xbfb970, name=0xbf3ef0 "cpu",
    head_config=0xbfb930, auto_merge_stats=false) at util/parse-events.c:1233
 #3  0x00000000004f1c8e in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x7fffffffd580,
    list=0xbfb970, name=0xbf3ef0 "cpu",
    head_config=0xbfb930) at util/parse-events.c:1288
 #4  0x0000000000537ce3 in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x7fffffffd580,
    scanner=0xbf4210) at util/parse-events.y:234
 #5  0x00000000004f2c7a in parse_events__scanner (str=0x6b66c0
    "task-clock,{instructions,cycles,cpu/cycles-t/,cpu/tx-start/}",
    parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, start_token=258) at util/parse-events.c:1673
 #6  0x00000000004f2e23 in parse_events (evlist=0xbe9990, str=0x6b66c0
    "task-clock,{instructions,cycles,cpu/cycles-t/,cpu/tx-start/}", err=0x0)
    at util/parse-events.c:1713
 #7  0x000000000044e137 in add_default_attributes () at builtin-stat.c:2281
 #8  0x000000000044f7b5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at
    builtin-stat.c:2828
 #9  0x00000000004c8b0f in run_builtin (p=0xab01a0 <commands+288>, argc=4,
    argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:297
 #10 0x00000000004c8d7c in handle_internal_command (argc=4,
    argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:349
 #11 0x00000000004c8ece in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe20c,
   argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:393
 #12 0x00000000004c929c in main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:537
(gdb)

It turns out that a NULL pointer is referenced. Here are the
function calls:

  ...
  cmd_stat()
  +---> add_default_attributes()
	+---> parse_events(evsel_list, transaction_attrs, NULL);
	             3rd parameter set to NULL

Function parse_events(xx, xx, struct parse_events_error *err) dives
into a bison generated scanner and creates
parser state information for it first:

   struct parse_events_state parse_state = {
                .list   = LIST_HEAD_INIT(parse_state.list),
                .idx    = evlist->nr_entries,
                .error  = err,   <--- NULL POINTER !!!
                .evlist = evlist,
        };

Now various functions inside the bison scanner are called to end up in
__parse_events_add_pmu(struct parse_events_state *parse_state, ..) with
first parameter being a pointer to above structure definition.

Now the PMU event name is not found (because being executed in a VM) and
this function tries to create an error message with

   asprintf(&parse_state->error.str, ....)

which references a NULL pointer and dumps core.

Fix this by providing a pointer to the necessary error information
instead of NULL. Technically only the else part is needed to avoid the
core dump, just lets be safe...

Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180308145735.64717-1-tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 9, 2019
[ Upstream commit aadcef6 ]

As Jiqun Li reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202883

sometimes, dead lock when make system call SYS_getdents64 with fsync() is
called by another process.

monkey running on android9.0

1.  task 9785 held sbi->cp_rwsem and waiting lock_page()
2.  task 10349 held mm_sem and waiting sbi->cp_rwsem
3. task 9709 held lock_page() and waiting mm_sem

so this is a dead lock scenario.

task stack is show by crash tools as following

crash_arm64> bt ffffffc03c354080
PID: 9785   TASK: ffffffc03c354080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "RxIoScheduler-3"
>> #7 [ffffffc01b50fac0] __lock_page at ffffff80081b11e8

crash-arm64> bt 10349
PID: 10349  TASK: ffffffc018b83080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "BUGLY_ASYNC_UPL"
>> #3 [ffffffc01f8cfa40] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffff8008a93afc
     PC: 00000033  LR: 00000000  SP: 00000000  PSTATE: ffffffffffffffff

crash-arm64> bt 9709
PID: 9709   TASK: ffffffc03e7f3080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "IntentService[A"
>> #3 [ffffffc001e67850] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffff8008a93afc
>> #8 [ffffffc001e67b80] el1_ia at ffffff8008084fc4
     PC: ffffff8008274114  [compat_filldir64+120]
     LR: ffffff80083584d4  [f2fs_fill_dentries+448]
     SP: ffffffc001e67b80  PSTATE: 80400145
    X29: ffffffc001e67b80  X28: 0000000000000000  X27: 000000000000001a
    X26: 00000000000093d7  X25: ffffffc070d52480  X24: 0000000000000008
    X23: 0000000000000028  X22: 00000000d43dfd60  X21: ffffffc001e67e90
    X20: 0000000000000011  X19: ffffff80093a4000  X18: 0000000000000000
    X17: 0000000000000000  X16: 0000000000000000  X15: 0000000000000000
    X14: ffffffffffffffff  X13: 0000000000000008  X12: 0101010101010101
    X11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f  X10: 6a6a6a6a6a6a6a6a   X9: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
     X8: 0000000080808000   X7: ffffff800827409c   X6: 0000000080808000
     X5: 0000000000000008   X4: 00000000000093d7   X3: 000000000000001a
     X2: 0000000000000011   X1: ffffffc070d52480   X0: 0000000000800238
>> #9 [ffffffc001e67be0] f2fs_fill_dentries at ffffff80083584d0
     PC: 0000003c  LR: 00000000  SP: 00000000  PSTATE: 000000d9
    X12: f48a02ff X11: d4678960 X10: d43dfc00  X9: d4678ae4
     X8: 00000058  X7: d4678994  X6: d43de800  X5: 000000d9
     X4: d43dfc0c  X3: d43dfc10  X2: d46799c8  X1: 00000000
     X0: 00001068

Below potential deadlock will happen between three threads:
Thread A		Thread B		Thread C
- f2fs_do_sync_file
 - f2fs_write_checkpoint
  - down_write(&sbi->node_change) -- 1)
			- do_page_fault
			 - down_write(&mm->mmap_sem) -- 2)
			  - do_wp_page
			   - f2fs_vm_page_mkwrite
						- getdents64
						 - f2fs_read_inline_dir
						  - lock_page -- 3)
  - f2fs_sync_node_pages
   - lock_page -- 3)
			    - __do_map_lock
			     - down_read(&sbi->node_change) -- 1)
						  - f2fs_fill_dentries
						   - dir_emit
						    - compat_filldir64
						     - do_page_fault
						      - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem) -- 2)

Since f2fs_readdir is protected by inode.i_rwsem, there should not be
any updates in inode page, we're safe to lookup dents in inode page
without its lock held, so taking off the lock to improve concurrency
of readdir and avoid potential deadlock.

Reported-by: Jiqun Li <jiqun.li@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 9, 2019
[ Upstream commit aadcef6 ]

As Jiqun Li reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202883

sometimes, dead lock when make system call SYS_getdents64 with fsync() is
called by another process.

monkey running on android9.0

1.  task 9785 held sbi->cp_rwsem and waiting lock_page()
2.  task 10349 held mm_sem and waiting sbi->cp_rwsem
3. task 9709 held lock_page() and waiting mm_sem

so this is a dead lock scenario.

task stack is show by crash tools as following

crash_arm64> bt ffffffc03c354080
PID: 9785   TASK: ffffffc03c354080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "RxIoScheduler-3"
>> #7 [ffffffc01b50fac0] __lock_page at ffffff80081b11e8

crash-arm64> bt 10349
PID: 10349  TASK: ffffffc018b83080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "BUGLY_ASYNC_UPL"
>> #3 [ffffffc01f8cfa40] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffff8008a93afc
     PC: 00000033  LR: 00000000  SP: 00000000  PSTATE: ffffffffffffffff

crash-arm64> bt 9709
PID: 9709   TASK: ffffffc03e7f3080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "IntentService[A"
>> #3 [ffffffc001e67850] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffff8008a93afc
>> #8 [ffffffc001e67b80] el1_ia at ffffff8008084fc4
     PC: ffffff8008274114  [compat_filldir64+120]
     LR: ffffff80083584d4  [f2fs_fill_dentries+448]
     SP: ffffffc001e67b80  PSTATE: 80400145
    X29: ffffffc001e67b80  X28: 0000000000000000  X27: 000000000000001a
    X26: 00000000000093d7  X25: ffffffc070d52480  X24: 0000000000000008
    X23: 0000000000000028  X22: 00000000d43dfd60  X21: ffffffc001e67e90
    X20: 0000000000000011  X19: ffffff80093a4000  X18: 0000000000000000
    X17: 0000000000000000  X16: 0000000000000000  X15: 0000000000000000
    X14: ffffffffffffffff  X13: 0000000000000008  X12: 0101010101010101
    X11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f  X10: 6a6a6a6a6a6a6a6a   X9: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
     X8: 0000000080808000   X7: ffffff800827409c   X6: 0000000080808000
     X5: 0000000000000008   X4: 00000000000093d7   X3: 000000000000001a
     X2: 0000000000000011   X1: ffffffc070d52480   X0: 0000000000800238
>> #9 [ffffffc001e67be0] f2fs_fill_dentries at ffffff80083584d0
     PC: 0000003c  LR: 00000000  SP: 00000000  PSTATE: 000000d9
    X12: f48a02ff X11: d4678960 X10: d43dfc00  X9: d4678ae4
     X8: 00000058  X7: d4678994  X6: d43de800  X5: 000000d9
     X4: d43dfc0c  X3: d43dfc10  X2: d46799c8  X1: 00000000
     X0: 00001068

Below potential deadlock will happen between three threads:
Thread A		Thread B		Thread C
- f2fs_do_sync_file
 - f2fs_write_checkpoint
  - down_write(&sbi->node_change) -- 1)
			- do_page_fault
			 - down_write(&mm->mmap_sem) -- 2)
			  - do_wp_page
			   - f2fs_vm_page_mkwrite
						- getdents64
						 - f2fs_read_inline_dir
						  - lock_page -- 3)
  - f2fs_sync_node_pages
   - lock_page -- 3)
			    - __do_map_lock
			     - down_read(&sbi->node_change) -- 1)
						  - f2fs_fill_dentries
						   - dir_emit
						    - compat_filldir64
						     - do_page_fault
						      - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem) -- 2)

Since f2fs_readdir is protected by inode.i_rwsem, there should not be
any updates in inode page, we're safe to lookup dents in inode page
without its lock held, so taking off the lock to improve concurrency
of readdir and avoid potential deadlock.

Reported-by: Jiqun Li <jiqun.li@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 9, 2019
[ Upstream commit aadcef6 ]

As Jiqun Li reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202883

sometimes, dead lock when make system call SYS_getdents64 with fsync() is
called by another process.

monkey running on android9.0

1.  task 9785 held sbi->cp_rwsem and waiting lock_page()
2.  task 10349 held mm_sem and waiting sbi->cp_rwsem
3. task 9709 held lock_page() and waiting mm_sem

so this is a dead lock scenario.

task stack is show by crash tools as following

crash_arm64> bt ffffffc03c354080
PID: 9785   TASK: ffffffc03c354080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "RxIoScheduler-3"
>> #7 [ffffffc01b50fac0] __lock_page at ffffff80081b11e8

crash-arm64> bt 10349
PID: 10349  TASK: ffffffc018b83080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "BUGLY_ASYNC_UPL"
>> #3 [ffffffc01f8cfa40] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffff8008a93afc
     PC: 00000033  LR: 00000000  SP: 00000000  PSTATE: ffffffffffffffff

crash-arm64> bt 9709
PID: 9709   TASK: ffffffc03e7f3080  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "IntentService[A"
>> #3 [ffffffc001e67850] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffff8008a93afc
>> #8 [ffffffc001e67b80] el1_ia at ffffff8008084fc4
     PC: ffffff8008274114  [compat_filldir64+120]
     LR: ffffff80083584d4  [f2fs_fill_dentries+448]
     SP: ffffffc001e67b80  PSTATE: 80400145
    X29: ffffffc001e67b80  X28: 0000000000000000  X27: 000000000000001a
    X26: 00000000000093d7  X25: ffffffc070d52480  X24: 0000000000000008
    X23: 0000000000000028  X22: 00000000d43dfd60  X21: ffffffc001e67e90
    X20: 0000000000000011  X19: ffffff80093a4000  X18: 0000000000000000
    X17: 0000000000000000  X16: 0000000000000000  X15: 0000000000000000
    X14: ffffffffffffffff  X13: 0000000000000008  X12: 0101010101010101
    X11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f  X10: 6a6a6a6a6a6a6a6a   X9: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
     X8: 0000000080808000   X7: ffffff800827409c   X6: 0000000080808000
     X5: 0000000000000008   X4: 00000000000093d7   X3: 000000000000001a
     X2: 0000000000000011   X1: ffffffc070d52480   X0: 0000000000800238
>> #9 [ffffffc001e67be0] f2fs_fill_dentries at ffffff80083584d0
     PC: 0000003c  LR: 00000000  SP: 00000000  PSTATE: 000000d9
    X12: f48a02ff X11: d4678960 X10: d43dfc00  X9: d4678ae4
     X8: 00000058  X7: d4678994  X6: d43de800  X5: 000000d9
     X4: d43dfc0c  X3: d43dfc10  X2: d46799c8  X1: 00000000
     X0: 00001068

Below potential deadlock will happen between three threads:
Thread A		Thread B		Thread C
- f2fs_do_sync_file
 - f2fs_write_checkpoint
  - down_write(&sbi->node_change) -- 1)
			- do_page_fault
			 - down_write(&mm->mmap_sem) -- 2)
			  - do_wp_page
			   - f2fs_vm_page_mkwrite
						- getdents64
						 - f2fs_read_inline_dir
						  - lock_page -- 3)
  - f2fs_sync_node_pages
   - lock_page -- 3)
			    - __do_map_lock
			     - down_read(&sbi->node_change) -- 1)
						  - f2fs_fill_dentries
						   - dir_emit
						    - compat_filldir64
						     - do_page_fault
						      - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem) -- 2)

Since f2fs_readdir is protected by inode.i_rwsem, there should not be
any updates in inode page, we're safe to lookup dents in inode page
without its lock held, so taking off the lock to improve concurrency
of readdir and avoid potential deadlock.

Reported-by: Jiqun Li <jiqun.li@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 9, 2019
[ Upstream commit 0510748 ]

We were crashing when processing a negative fd:

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x0000000000609bbf in syscall_arg__scnprintf_ioctl_cmd (bf=0x1172eca "", size=2038, arg=0x7fffffff8360) at trace/beauty/ioctl.c:182
  182			if (file->dev_maj == USB_DEVICE_MAJOR)
  Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install bzip2-libs-1.0.6-28.fc29.x86_64 elfutils-libelf-0.174-5.fc29.x86_64 elfutils-libs-0.174-5.fc29.x86_64 glib2-2.58.3-1.fc29.x86_64 libbabeltrace-1.5.6-1.fc29.x86_64 libunwind-1.2.1-6.fc29.x86_64 libuuid-2.32.1-1.fc29.x86_64 libxcrypt-4.4.3-2.fc29.x86_64 numactl-libs-2.0.12-1.fc29.x86_64 openssl-libs-1.1.1a-1.fc29.x86_64 pcre-8.42-6.fc29.x86_64 perl-libs-5.28.1-427.fc29.x86_64 popt-1.16-15.fc29.x86_64 python2-libs-2.7.15-11.fc29.x86_64 slang-2.3.2-4.fc29.x86_64 xz-libs-5.2.4-3.fc29.x86_64
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x0000000000609bbf in syscall_arg__scnprintf_ioctl_cmd (bf=0x1172eca "", size=2038, arg=0x7fffffff8360) at trace/beauty/ioctl.c:182
  #1  0x000000000048e295 in syscall__scnprintf_val (sc=0x123b500, bf=0x1172eca "", size=2038, arg=0x7fffffff8360, val=21519)
      at builtin-trace.c:1594
  #2  0x000000000048e60d in syscall__scnprintf_args (sc=0x123b500, bf=0x1172ec6 "-1, ", size=2042, args=0x7ffff6a7c034 "\377\377\377\377",
      augmented_args=0x7ffff6a7c064, augmented_args_size=4, trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, thread=0x1175cd0) at builtin-trace.c:1661
  #3  0x000000000048f04e in trace__sys_enter (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, evsel=0xb260b0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8, sample=0x7fffffff84f0)
      at builtin-trace.c:1880
  #4  0x00000000004915a4 in trace__handle_event (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8, sample=0x7fffffff84f0) at builtin-trace.c:2590
  #5  0x0000000000491eed in __trace__deliver_event (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8) at builtin-trace.c:2818
  #6  0x0000000000492030 in trace__deliver_event (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8) at builtin-trace.c:2845
  #7  0x0000000000492896 in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffdb58) at builtin-trace.c:3040
  #8  0x000000000049603a in cmd_trace (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffdb58) at builtin-trace.c:3952
  #9  0x00000000004d5103 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffdb58) at perf.c:474
  (gdb) p fd
  $1 = -1
  (gdb) p file
  $7 = (struct file *) 0xfffffffffffffff0
  (gdb) p ((struct thread_trace *)arg->thread)->files.table + fd
  $8 = (struct file *) 0xfffffffffffffff0
  (gdb)

Check for that and return NULL instead.

This problem was introduced recently, the other codepaths leading to
thread_trace__files_entry() check for negative fds, like thread__fd_path(),
but we need to do it at thread_trace__files_entry() as more users are now
calling it directly.

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Cláudio Gonçalves <lclaudio@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2d47338 ("perf trace beauty: Export function to get the files for a thread")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-oq7bvaaf07gsd4yqty3107u2@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Apr 22, 2019
By calling maps__insert() we assume to get 2 references on the map,
which we relese within maps__remove call.

However if there's already same map name, we currently don't bump the
reference and can crash, like:

  Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6

  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  GrapheneOS#1  0x00007ffff75d0895 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  GrapheneOS#2  0x00007ffff75d0769 in __assert_fail_base.cold () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  GrapheneOS#3  0x00007ffff75de596 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  GrapheneOS#4  0x00000000004fc006 in refcount_sub_and_test (i=1, r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:131
  GrapheneOS#5  refcount_dec_and_test (r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:148
  GrapheneOS#6  map__put (map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:299
  GrapheneOS#7  0x00000000004fdb95 in __maps__remove (map=0x1224df0, maps=0xb17d80) at util/map.c:953
  GrapheneOS#8  maps__remove (maps=0xb17d80, map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:959
  GrapheneOS#9  0x00000000004f7d8a in map_groups__remove (map=<optimized out>, mg=<optimized out>) at util/map_groups.h:65
  GrapheneOS#10 machine__process_ksymbol_unregister (sample=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, machine=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:728
  GrapheneOS#11 machine__process_ksymbol (machine=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, sample=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:741
  GrapheneOS#12 0x00000000004fffbb in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0xb11390, event=0x7ffff7279670, tool=0x7fffffffc7b0, file_offset=13936) at util/session.c:1362
  GrapheneOS#13 0x00000000005039bb in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0xb17e80) at util/ordered-events.c:243
  GrapheneOS#14 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0xb17e80, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:322
  GrapheneOS#15 0x00000000005005e4 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=session@entry=0xb11390, event=event@entry=0x7ffff72a4af8,
  ...

Add the map to the list and getting the reference event if we find the
map with same name.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Eric Saint-Etienne <eric.saint.etienne@oracle.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Fixes: 1e62856 ("perf symbols: Fix slowness due to -ffunction-section")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190416160127.30203-10-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
…_map

[ Upstream commit 39df730 ]

Detected via gcc's ASan:

  Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 64 object(s) allocated from:
    6     #0 0x7f606512e370 in __interceptor_realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee370)
    7     #1 0x556b0f1d7ddd in thread_map__realloc util/thread_map.c:43
    8     #2 0x556b0f1d84c7 in thread_map__new_by_tid util/thread_map.c:85
    9     #3 0x556b0f0e045e in is_event_supported util/parse-events.c:2250
   10     #4 0x556b0f0e1aa1 in print_hwcache_events util/parse-events.c:2382
   11     #5 0x556b0f0e3231 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2514
   12     #6 0x556b0ee0a66e in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58
   13     #7 0x556b0f01e0ae in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
   14     #8 0x556b0f01e859 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
   15     #9 0x556b0f01edc8 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
   16     #10 0x556b0f01f71f in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
   17     #11 0x7f6062ccf09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 8989605 ("perf tools: Do not put a variable sized type not at the end of a struct")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-3-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 54569ba ]

Detected with gcc's ASan:

  Direct leak of 66 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7ff3b1f32070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070)
      #1 0x560c8761034d in collect_config util/config.c:597
      #2 0x560c8760d9cb in get_value util/config.c:169
      #3 0x560c8760dfd7 in perf_parse_file util/config.c:285
      #4 0x560c8760e0d2 in perf_config_from_file util/config.c:476
      #5 0x560c876108fd in perf_config_set__init util/config.c:661
      #6 0x560c87610c72 in perf_config_set__new util/config.c:709
      #7 0x560c87610d2f in perf_config__init util/config.c:718
      #8 0x560c87610e5d in perf_config util/config.c:730
      #9 0x560c875ddea0 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:442
      #10 0x7ff3afb8609a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Taeung Song <treeze.taeung@gmail.com>
Fixes: 20105ca ("perf config: Introduce perf_config_set class")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-6-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 8bde851 ]

Detected with gcc's ASan:

  Direct leak of 4356 byte(s) in 120 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7ff1a2b5a070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070)
      #1 0x55719aef4814 in build_id_cache__origname util/build-id.c:215
      #2 0x55719af649b6 in print_sdt_events util/parse-events.c:2339
      #3 0x55719af66272 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2542
      #4 0x55719ad1ecaa in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58
      #5 0x55719aec745d in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #6 0x55719aec7d1a in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #7 0x55719aec8184 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #8 0x55719aeca41a in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #9 0x7ff1a07ae09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 40218da ("perf list: Show SDT and pre-cached events")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-7-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 42dfa45 ]

Using gcc's ASan, Changbin reports:

  =================================================================
  ==7494==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138)
      #1 0x5625e5330a5e in zalloc util/util.h:23
      #2 0x5625e5330a9b in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:10
      #3 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47
      #4 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505
      #5 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347
      #6 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47
      #7 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #8 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #9 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #10 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #11 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #12 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #13 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #14 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #15 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

  Indirect leak of 72 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138)
      #1 0x5625e532560d in zalloc util/util.h:23
      #2 0x5625e532566b in xyarray__new util/xyarray.c:10
      #3 0x5625e5330aba in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:15
      #4 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47
      #5 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505
      #6 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347
      #7 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47
      #8 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #9 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #10 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #11 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #12 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #13 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #14 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #15 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #16 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

His patch took care of evsel->prev_raw_counts, but the above backtraces
are about evsel->counts, so fix that instead.

Reported-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-hd1x13g59f0nuhe4anxhsmfp@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
…_event_on_all_cpus test

[ Upstream commit 93faa52 ]

  =================================================================
  ==7497==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f0333a88f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30)
      #1 0x5625e5326213 in cpu_map__trim_new util/cpumap.c:45
      #2 0x5625e5326703 in cpu_map__read util/cpumap.c:103
      #3 0x5625e53267ef in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map util/cpumap.c:120
      #4 0x5625e5326915 in cpu_map__new util/cpumap.c:135
      #5 0x5625e517b355 in test__openat_syscall_event_on_all_cpus tests/openat-syscall-all-cpus.c:36
      #6 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #7 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #8 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #9 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #10 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #11 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #12 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #13 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #14 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: f30a79b ("perf tools: Add reference counting for cpu_map object")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-15-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit f97a899 ]

  =================================================================
  ==7506==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 13 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f03339d6070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070)
      #1 0x5625e53aaef0 in expr__find_other util/expr.y:221
      #2 0x5625e51bcd3f in test__expr tests/expr.c:52
      #3 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #4 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #5 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #6 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #7 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #8 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #9 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #10 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #11 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 0751673 ("perf tools: Add a simple expression parser for JSON")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-16-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit d982b33 ]

  =================================================================
  ==20875==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 1160 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f1b6fc84138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138)
      #1 0x55bd50005599 in zalloc util/util.h:23
      #2 0x55bd500068f5 in perf_evsel__newtp_idx util/evsel.c:327
      #3 0x55bd4ff810fc in perf_evsel__newtp /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:216
      #4 0x55bd4ff81608 in test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test tests/evsel-tp-sched.c:69
      #5 0x55bd4ff528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #6 0x55bd4ff52baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #7 0x55bd4ff543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #8 0x55bd4ff5572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #9 0x55bd4ffc4087 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #10 0x55bd4ffc45c6 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #11 0x55bd4ffc49ca in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #12 0x55bd4ffc5138 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #13 0x7f1b6e34809a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

  Indirect leak of 19 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f1b6fc83f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30)
      #1 0x7f1b6e3ac30f in vasprintf (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x8830f)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 6a6cd11 ("perf test: Add test for the sched tracepoint format fields")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-17-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
…_map

[ Upstream commit 39df730 ]

Detected via gcc's ASan:

  Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 64 object(s) allocated from:
    6     #0 0x7f606512e370 in __interceptor_realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee370)
    7     #1 0x556b0f1d7ddd in thread_map__realloc util/thread_map.c:43
    8     #2 0x556b0f1d84c7 in thread_map__new_by_tid util/thread_map.c:85
    9     #3 0x556b0f0e045e in is_event_supported util/parse-events.c:2250
   10     #4 0x556b0f0e1aa1 in print_hwcache_events util/parse-events.c:2382
   11     #5 0x556b0f0e3231 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2514
   12     #6 0x556b0ee0a66e in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58
   13     #7 0x556b0f01e0ae in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
   14     #8 0x556b0f01e859 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
   15     #9 0x556b0f01edc8 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
   16     #10 0x556b0f01f71f in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
   17     #11 0x7f6062ccf09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 8989605 ("perf tools: Do not put a variable sized type not at the end of a struct")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-3-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 54569ba ]

Detected with gcc's ASan:

  Direct leak of 66 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7ff3b1f32070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070)
      #1 0x560c8761034d in collect_config util/config.c:597
      #2 0x560c8760d9cb in get_value util/config.c:169
      #3 0x560c8760dfd7 in perf_parse_file util/config.c:285
      #4 0x560c8760e0d2 in perf_config_from_file util/config.c:476
      #5 0x560c876108fd in perf_config_set__init util/config.c:661
      #6 0x560c87610c72 in perf_config_set__new util/config.c:709
      #7 0x560c87610d2f in perf_config__init util/config.c:718
      #8 0x560c87610e5d in perf_config util/config.c:730
      #9 0x560c875ddea0 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:442
      #10 0x7ff3afb8609a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Taeung Song <treeze.taeung@gmail.com>
Fixes: 20105ca ("perf config: Introduce perf_config_set class")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-6-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 8bde851 ]

Detected with gcc's ASan:

  Direct leak of 4356 byte(s) in 120 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7ff1a2b5a070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070)
      #1 0x55719aef4814 in build_id_cache__origname util/build-id.c:215
      #2 0x55719af649b6 in print_sdt_events util/parse-events.c:2339
      #3 0x55719af66272 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2542
      #4 0x55719ad1ecaa in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58
      #5 0x55719aec745d in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #6 0x55719aec7d1a in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #7 0x55719aec8184 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #8 0x55719aeca41a in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #9 0x7ff1a07ae09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 40218da ("perf list: Show SDT and pre-cached events")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-7-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit 42dfa45 ]

Using gcc's ASan, Changbin reports:

  =================================================================
  ==7494==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138)
      #1 0x5625e5330a5e in zalloc util/util.h:23
      #2 0x5625e5330a9b in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:10
      #3 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47
      #4 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505
      #5 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347
      #6 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47
      #7 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #8 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #9 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #10 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #11 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #12 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #13 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #14 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #15 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

  Indirect leak of 72 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138)
      #1 0x5625e532560d in zalloc util/util.h:23
      #2 0x5625e532566b in xyarray__new util/xyarray.c:10
      #3 0x5625e5330aba in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:15
      #4 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47
      #5 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505
      #6 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347
      #7 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47
      #8 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #9 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #10 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #11 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #12 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #13 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #14 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #15 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #16 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

His patch took care of evsel->prev_raw_counts, but the above backtraces
are about evsel->counts, so fix that instead.

Reported-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-hd1x13g59f0nuhe4anxhsmfp@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
…_event_on_all_cpus test

[ Upstream commit 93faa52 ]

  =================================================================
  ==7497==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f0333a88f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30)
      #1 0x5625e5326213 in cpu_map__trim_new util/cpumap.c:45
      #2 0x5625e5326703 in cpu_map__read util/cpumap.c:103
      #3 0x5625e53267ef in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map util/cpumap.c:120
      #4 0x5625e5326915 in cpu_map__new util/cpumap.c:135
      #5 0x5625e517b355 in test__openat_syscall_event_on_all_cpus tests/openat-syscall-all-cpus.c:36
      #6 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #7 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #8 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #9 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #10 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #11 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #12 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #13 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #14 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: f30a79b ("perf tools: Add reference counting for cpu_map object")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-15-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit f97a899 ]

  =================================================================
  ==7506==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 13 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f03339d6070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070)
      #1 0x5625e53aaef0 in expr__find_other util/expr.y:221
      #2 0x5625e51bcd3f in test__expr tests/expr.c:52
      #3 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #4 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #5 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #6 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #7 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #8 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #9 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #10 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #11 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 0751673 ("perf tools: Add a simple expression parser for JSON")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-16-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 1, 2019
[ Upstream commit d982b33 ]

  =================================================================
  ==20875==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 1160 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f1b6fc84138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138)
      #1 0x55bd50005599 in zalloc util/util.h:23
      #2 0x55bd500068f5 in perf_evsel__newtp_idx util/evsel.c:327
      #3 0x55bd4ff810fc in perf_evsel__newtp /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:216
      #4 0x55bd4ff81608 in test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test tests/evsel-tp-sched.c:69
      #5 0x55bd4ff528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358
      #6 0x55bd4ff52baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388
      #7 0x55bd4ff543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583
      #8 0x55bd4ff5572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722
      #9 0x55bd4ffc4087 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302
      #10 0x55bd4ffc45c6 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354
      #11 0x55bd4ffc49ca in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398
      #12 0x55bd4ffc5138 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520
      #13 0x7f1b6e34809a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)

  Indirect leak of 19 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f1b6fc83f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30)
      #1 0x7f1b6e3ac30f in vasprintf (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x8830f)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 6a6cd11 ("perf test: Add test for the sched tracepoint format fields")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190316080556.3075-17-changbin.du@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 20, 2019
[ Upstream commit b9abbdf ]

By calling maps__insert() we assume to get 2 references on the map,
which we relese within maps__remove call.

However if there's already same map name, we currently don't bump the
reference and can crash, like:

  Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6

  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff75d0895 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00007ffff75d0769 in __assert_fail_base.cold () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #3  0x00007ffff75de596 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #4  0x00000000004fc006 in refcount_sub_and_test (i=1, r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:131
  #5  refcount_dec_and_test (r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:148
  #6  map__put (map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:299
  #7  0x00000000004fdb95 in __maps__remove (map=0x1224df0, maps=0xb17d80) at util/map.c:953
  #8  maps__remove (maps=0xb17d80, map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:959
  #9  0x00000000004f7d8a in map_groups__remove (map=<optimized out>, mg=<optimized out>) at util/map_groups.h:65
  #10 machine__process_ksymbol_unregister (sample=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, machine=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:728
  #11 machine__process_ksymbol (machine=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, sample=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:741
  #12 0x00000000004fffbb in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0xb11390, event=0x7ffff7279670, tool=0x7fffffffc7b0, file_offset=13936) at util/session.c:1362
  #13 0x00000000005039bb in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0xb17e80) at util/ordered-events.c:243
  #14 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0xb17e80, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:322
  #15 0x00000000005005e4 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=session@entry=0xb11390, event=event@entry=0x7ffff72a4af8,
  ...

Add the map to the list and getting the reference event if we find the
map with same name.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Eric Saint-Etienne <eric.saint.etienne@oracle.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Fixes: 1e62856 ("perf symbols: Fix slowness due to -ffunction-section")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190416160127.30203-10-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jun 2, 2019
[ Upstream commit ff612ba ]

We've been seeing the following sporadically throughout our fleet

panic: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4584!
netversion: 5.0-0
Backtrace:
 #0 [ffffc90003adb880] machine_kexec at ffffffff81041da8
 #1 [ffffc90003adb8c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8110396c
 #2 [ffffc90003adb988] crash_kexec at ffffffff811048ad
 #3 [ffffc90003adb9a0] oops_end at ffffffff8101c19a
 #4 [ffffc90003adb9c0] do_trap at ffffffff81019114
 #5 [ffffc90003adba00] do_error_trap at ffffffff810195d0
 #6 [ffffc90003adbab0] invalid_op at ffffffff81a00a9b
    [exception RIP: btrfs_reloc_cow_block+692]
    RIP: ffffffff8143b614  RSP: ffffc90003adbb68  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: fffffffffffffff7  RBX: ffff8806b9c32000  RCX: ffff8806aad00690
    RDX: ffff880850b295e0  RSI: ffff8806b9c32000  RDI: ffff88084f205bd0
    RBP: ffff880849415000   R8: ffffc90003adbbe0   R9: ffff88085ac90000
    R10: ffff8805f7369140  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff880850b295e0
    R13: ffff88084f205bd0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffc90003adbbb0] __btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf1cd
 #8 [ffffc90003adbc28] btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf4b3
 #9 [ffffc90003adbc78] btrfs_search_slot at ffffffff813c2e6c

The way relocation moves data extents is by creating a reloc inode and
preallocating extents in this inode and then copying the data into these
preallocated extents.  Once we've done this for all of our extents,
we'll write out these dirty pages, which marks the extent written, and
goes into btrfs_reloc_cow_block().  From here we get our current
reloc_control, which _should_ match the reloc_control for the current
block group we're relocating.

However if we get an ENOSPC in this path at some point we'll bail out,
never initiating writeback on this inode.  Not a huge deal, unless we
happen to be doing relocation on a different block group, and this block
group is now rc->stage == UPDATE_DATA_PTRS.  This trips the BUG_ON() in
btrfs_reloc_cow_block(), because we expect to be done modifying the data
inode.  We are in fact done modifying the metadata for the data inode
we're currently using, but not the one from the failed block group, and
thus we BUG_ON().

(This happens when writeback finishes for extents from the previous
group, when we are at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() which updates the data
reloc tree (inode item, drops/adds extent items, etc).)

Fix this by writing out the reloc data inode always, and then breaking
out of the loop after that point to keep from tripping this BUG_ON()
later.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[ add note from Filipe ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jun 2, 2019
[ Upstream commit ff612ba ]

We've been seeing the following sporadically throughout our fleet

panic: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4584!
netversion: 5.0-0
Backtrace:
 #0 [ffffc90003adb880] machine_kexec at ffffffff81041da8
 #1 [ffffc90003adb8c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8110396c
 #2 [ffffc90003adb988] crash_kexec at ffffffff811048ad
 #3 [ffffc90003adb9a0] oops_end at ffffffff8101c19a
 #4 [ffffc90003adb9c0] do_trap at ffffffff81019114
 #5 [ffffc90003adba00] do_error_trap at ffffffff810195d0
 #6 [ffffc90003adbab0] invalid_op at ffffffff81a00a9b
    [exception RIP: btrfs_reloc_cow_block+692]
    RIP: ffffffff8143b614  RSP: ffffc90003adbb68  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: fffffffffffffff7  RBX: ffff8806b9c32000  RCX: ffff8806aad00690
    RDX: ffff880850b295e0  RSI: ffff8806b9c32000  RDI: ffff88084f205bd0
    RBP: ffff880849415000   R8: ffffc90003adbbe0   R9: ffff88085ac90000
    R10: ffff8805f7369140  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff880850b295e0
    R13: ffff88084f205bd0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffc90003adbbb0] __btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf1cd
 #8 [ffffc90003adbc28] btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf4b3
 #9 [ffffc90003adbc78] btrfs_search_slot at ffffffff813c2e6c

The way relocation moves data extents is by creating a reloc inode and
preallocating extents in this inode and then copying the data into these
preallocated extents.  Once we've done this for all of our extents,
we'll write out these dirty pages, which marks the extent written, and
goes into btrfs_reloc_cow_block().  From here we get our current
reloc_control, which _should_ match the reloc_control for the current
block group we're relocating.

However if we get an ENOSPC in this path at some point we'll bail out,
never initiating writeback on this inode.  Not a huge deal, unless we
happen to be doing relocation on a different block group, and this block
group is now rc->stage == UPDATE_DATA_PTRS.  This trips the BUG_ON() in
btrfs_reloc_cow_block(), because we expect to be done modifying the data
inode.  We are in fact done modifying the metadata for the data inode
we're currently using, but not the one from the failed block group, and
thus we BUG_ON().

(This happens when writeback finishes for extents from the previous
group, when we are at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() which updates the data
reloc tree (inode item, drops/adds extent items, etc).)

Fix this by writing out the reloc data inode always, and then breaking
out of the loop after that point to keep from tripping this BUG_ON()
later.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[ add note from Filipe ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jun 2, 2019
[ Upstream commit ff612ba ]

We've been seeing the following sporadically throughout our fleet

panic: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4584!
netversion: 5.0-0
Backtrace:
 #0 [ffffc90003adb880] machine_kexec at ffffffff81041da8
 #1 [ffffc90003adb8c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8110396c
 #2 [ffffc90003adb988] crash_kexec at ffffffff811048ad
 #3 [ffffc90003adb9a0] oops_end at ffffffff8101c19a
 #4 [ffffc90003adb9c0] do_trap at ffffffff81019114
 #5 [ffffc90003adba00] do_error_trap at ffffffff810195d0
 #6 [ffffc90003adbab0] invalid_op at ffffffff81a00a9b
    [exception RIP: btrfs_reloc_cow_block+692]
    RIP: ffffffff8143b614  RSP: ffffc90003adbb68  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: fffffffffffffff7  RBX: ffff8806b9c32000  RCX: ffff8806aad00690
    RDX: ffff880850b295e0  RSI: ffff8806b9c32000  RDI: ffff88084f205bd0
    RBP: ffff880849415000   R8: ffffc90003adbbe0   R9: ffff88085ac90000
    R10: ffff8805f7369140  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff880850b295e0
    R13: ffff88084f205bd0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffc90003adbbb0] __btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf1cd
 #8 [ffffc90003adbc28] btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf4b3
 #9 [ffffc90003adbc78] btrfs_search_slot at ffffffff813c2e6c

The way relocation moves data extents is by creating a reloc inode and
preallocating extents in this inode and then copying the data into these
preallocated extents.  Once we've done this for all of our extents,
we'll write out these dirty pages, which marks the extent written, and
goes into btrfs_reloc_cow_block().  From here we get our current
reloc_control, which _should_ match the reloc_control for the current
block group we're relocating.

However if we get an ENOSPC in this path at some point we'll bail out,
never initiating writeback on this inode.  Not a huge deal, unless we
happen to be doing relocation on a different block group, and this block
group is now rc->stage == UPDATE_DATA_PTRS.  This trips the BUG_ON() in
btrfs_reloc_cow_block(), because we expect to be done modifying the data
inode.  We are in fact done modifying the metadata for the data inode
we're currently using, but not the one from the failed block group, and
thus we BUG_ON().

(This happens when writeback finishes for extents from the previous
group, when we are at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() which updates the data
reloc tree (inode item, drops/adds extent items, etc).)

Fix this by writing out the reloc data inode always, and then breaking
out of the loop after that point to keep from tripping this BUG_ON()
later.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[ add note from Filipe ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2019
… allocation

After memory allocation failure vc_allocate() doesn't clean up data
which has been initialized in visual_init(). In case of fbcon this
leads to divide-by-0 in fbcon_init() on next open of the same tty.

memory allocation in vc_allocate() may fail here:
1097:     vc->vc_screenbuf = kzalloc(vc->vc_screenbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);

on next open() fbcon_init() skips vc_font.data initialization:
1088:     if (!p->fontdata) {

division by zero in fbcon_init() happens here:
1149:     new_cols /= vc->vc_font.width;

Additional check is needed in fbcon_deinit() to prevent
usage of uninitialized vc_screenbuf:

1251:        if (vc->vc_hi_font_mask && vc->vc_screenbuf)
1252:                set_vc_hi_font(vc, false);

Crash:

 GrapheneOS#6 [ffffc90001eafa60] divide_error at ffffffff81a00be4
    [exception RIP: fbcon_init+463]
    RIP: ffffffff814b860f  RSP: ffffc90001eafb18  RFLAGS: 00010246
...
 GrapheneOS#7 [ffffc90001eafb60] visual_init at ffffffff8154c36e
 GrapheneOS#8 [ffffc90001eafb80] vc_allocate at ffffffff8154f53c
 GrapheneOS#9 [ffffc90001eafbc8] con_install at ffffffff8154f624
...

Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Halat <ghalat@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
awcurless referenced this issue in awcurless/linux-hardened Jun 4, 2019
[ Upstream commit ff612ba ]

We've been seeing the following sporadically throughout our fleet

panic: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4584!
netversion: 5.0-0
Backtrace:
 #0 [ffffc90003adb880] machine_kexec at ffffffff81041da8
 anthraxx#1 [ffffc90003adb8c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8110396c
 anthraxx#2 [ffffc90003adb988] crash_kexec at ffffffff811048ad
 anthraxx#3 [ffffc90003adb9a0] oops_end at ffffffff8101c19a
 anthraxx#4 [ffffc90003adb9c0] do_trap at ffffffff81019114
 anthraxx#5 [ffffc90003adba00] do_error_trap at ffffffff810195d0
 anthraxx#6 [ffffc90003adbab0] invalid_op at ffffffff81a00a9b
    [exception RIP: btrfs_reloc_cow_block+692]
    RIP: ffffffff8143b614  RSP: ffffc90003adbb68  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: fffffffffffffff7  RBX: ffff8806b9c32000  RCX: ffff8806aad00690
    RDX: ffff880850b295e0  RSI: ffff8806b9c32000  RDI: ffff88084f205bd0
    RBP: ffff880849415000   R8: ffffc90003adbbe0   R9: ffff88085ac90000
    R10: ffff8805f7369140  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff880850b295e0
    R13: ffff88084f205bd0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 anthraxx#7 [ffffc90003adbbb0] __btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf1cd
 anthraxx#8 [ffffc90003adbc28] btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf4b3
 anthraxx#9 [ffffc90003adbc78] btrfs_search_slot at ffffffff813c2e6c

The way relocation moves data extents is by creating a reloc inode and
preallocating extents in this inode and then copying the data into these
preallocated extents.  Once we've done this for all of our extents,
we'll write out these dirty pages, which marks the extent written, and
goes into btrfs_reloc_cow_block().  From here we get our current
reloc_control, which _should_ match the reloc_control for the current
block group we're relocating.

However if we get an ENOSPC in this path at some point we'll bail out,
never initiating writeback on this inode.  Not a huge deal, unless we
happen to be doing relocation on a different block group, and this block
group is now rc->stage == UPDATE_DATA_PTRS.  This trips the BUG_ON() in
btrfs_reloc_cow_block(), because we expect to be done modifying the data
inode.  We are in fact done modifying the metadata for the data inode
we're currently using, but not the one from the failed block group, and
thus we BUG_ON().

(This happens when writeback finishes for extents from the previous
group, when we are at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() which updates the data
reloc tree (inode item, drops/adds extent items, etc).)

Fix this by writing out the reloc data inode always, and then breaking
out of the loop after that point to keep from tripping this BUG_ON()
later.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[ add note from Filipe ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jun 9, 2019
… allocation

commit a1ad1cc upstream.

After memory allocation failure vc_allocate() doesn't clean up data
which has been initialized in visual_init(). In case of fbcon this
leads to divide-by-0 in fbcon_init() on next open of the same tty.

memory allocation in vc_allocate() may fail here:
1097:     vc->vc_screenbuf = kzalloc(vc->vc_screenbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);

on next open() fbcon_init() skips vc_font.data initialization:
1088:     if (!p->fontdata) {

division by zero in fbcon_init() happens here:
1149:     new_cols /= vc->vc_font.width;

Additional check is needed in fbcon_deinit() to prevent
usage of uninitialized vc_screenbuf:

1251:        if (vc->vc_hi_font_mask && vc->vc_screenbuf)
1252:                set_vc_hi_font(vc, false);

Crash:

 #6 [ffffc90001eafa60] divide_error at ffffffff81a00be4
    [exception RIP: fbcon_init+463]
    RIP: ffffffff814b860f  RSP: ffffc90001eafb18  RFLAGS: 00010246
...
 #7 [ffffc90001eafb60] visual_init at ffffffff8154c36e
 #8 [ffffc90001eafb80] vc_allocate at ffffffff8154f53c
 #9 [ffffc90001eafbc8] con_install at ffffffff8154f624
...

Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Halat <ghalat@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jun 9, 2019
… allocation

commit a1ad1cc upstream.

After memory allocation failure vc_allocate() doesn't clean up data
which has been initialized in visual_init(). In case of fbcon this
leads to divide-by-0 in fbcon_init() on next open of the same tty.

memory allocation in vc_allocate() may fail here:
1097:     vc->vc_screenbuf = kzalloc(vc->vc_screenbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);

on next open() fbcon_init() skips vc_font.data initialization:
1088:     if (!p->fontdata) {

division by zero in fbcon_init() happens here:
1149:     new_cols /= vc->vc_font.width;

Additional check is needed in fbcon_deinit() to prevent
usage of uninitialized vc_screenbuf:

1251:        if (vc->vc_hi_font_mask && vc->vc_screenbuf)
1252:                set_vc_hi_font(vc, false);

Crash:

 #6 [ffffc90001eafa60] divide_error at ffffffff81a00be4
    [exception RIP: fbcon_init+463]
    RIP: ffffffff814b860f  RSP: ffffc90001eafb18  RFLAGS: 00010246
...
 #7 [ffffc90001eafb60] visual_init at ffffffff8154c36e
 #8 [ffffc90001eafb80] vc_allocate at ffffffff8154f53c
 #9 [ffffc90001eafbc8] con_install at ffffffff8154f624
...

Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Halat <ghalat@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Jul 3, 2019
Make sure to return a proper negative error code from copy_process()
when anon_inode_getfile() fails with CLONE_PIDFD.
Otherwise _do_fork() will not detect an error and get_task_pid() will
operator on a nonsensical pointer:

R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dbc2c
R13: 00007ffc15fbb0ff R14: 00007ff07e47e9c0 R15: 0000000000000000
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 7990 Comm: syz-executor290 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6+ GrapheneOS#9
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline]
RIP: 0010:get_task_pid+0xe1/0x210 kernel/pid.c:372
Code: 89 ff e8 62 27 5f 00 49 8b 07 44 89 f1 4c 8d bc c8 90 01 00 00 eb 0c
e8 0d fe 25 00 49 81 c7 38 05 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 18 00 74
08 4c 89 ff e8 31 27 5f 00 4d 8b 37 e8 f9 47 12 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88808a4a7d78 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 00000000000000a7 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffff888088180600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88808a4a7d90 R08: ffffffff814fb3a8 R09: ffffed1015d66bf8
R10: ffffed1015d66bf8 R11: 1ffff11015d66bf7 R12: 0000000000041ffc
R13: 1ffff11011494fbc R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000053d
FS:  00007ff07e47e700(0000) GS:ffff8880aeb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004b5100 CR3: 0000000094df2000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
  _do_fork+0x1b9/0x5f0 kernel/fork.c:2360
  __do_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2454 [inline]
  __se_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2448 [inline]
  __x64_sys_clone+0xc1/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:2448
  do_syscall_64+0xfe/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000e0dc0d058c9e7142@google.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+002e636502bc4b64eb5c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 6fd2fe4 ("copy_process(): don't use ksys_close() on cleanups")
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jul 24, 2019
commit c952b35 upstream.

bpf/btf write_* functions need ff->ph->env.

With this missing, pipe-mode (perf record -o -)  would crash like:

Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.

This patch assign proper ph value to ff.

Committer testing:

  (gdb) run record -o -
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf record -o -
  PERFILE2
  <SNIP start of perf.data headers>
  Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  __do_write_buf (size=4, buf=0x160, ff=0x7fffffff8f80) at util/header.c:126
  126		memcpy(ff->buf + ff->offset, buf, size);
  (gdb) bt
  #0  __do_write_buf (size=4, buf=0x160, ff=0x7fffffff8f80) at util/header.c:126
  #1  do_write (ff=ff@entry=0x7fffffff8f80, buf=buf@entry=0x160, size=4) at util/header.c:137
  #2  0x00000000004eddba in write_bpf_prog_info (ff=0x7fffffff8f80, evlist=<optimized out>) at util/header.c:912
  #3  0x00000000004f69d7 in perf_event__synthesize_features (tool=tool@entry=0x97cc00 <record>, session=session@entry=0x7fffe9c6d010,
      evlist=0x7fffe9cae010, process=process@entry=0x4435d0 <process_synthesized_event>) at util/header.c:3695
  #4  0x0000000000443c79 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=false, rec=0x97cc00 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1214
  #5  0x0000000000444ec9 in __cmd_record (rec=0x97cc00 <record>, argv=<optimized out>, argc=0) at builtin-record.c:1435
  #6  cmd_record (argc=0, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-record.c:2450
  #7  0x00000000004ae3e9 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x98e058 <commands+216>, argc=argc@entry=3, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at perf.c:304
  #8  0x000000000042eded in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:356
  #9  run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:400
  #10 main (argc=3, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:522
  (gdb)

After the patch the SEGSEGV is gone.

Reported-by: David Carrillo Cisneros <davidca@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Fixes: 606f972 ("perf bpf: Save bpf_prog_info information as headers to perf.data")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620010453.4118689-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Sep 10, 2019
Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper
fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set
PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread").

Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent
the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by
Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex -
i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex
from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen
afterwards.

PID: 474    TASK: ffff8813e11f4600  CPU: 10  COMMAND: "kswapd0"
   #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405
   GrapheneOS#1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27
   GrapheneOS#2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec
   GrapheneOS#3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186
   GrapheneOS#4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f
   GrapheneOS#5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8
   GrapheneOS#6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81
   GrapheneOS#7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio]
   GrapheneOS#8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio]
   GrapheneOS#9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio]
  GrapheneOS#10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce
  GrapheneOS#11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778
  GrapheneOS#12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f
  GrapheneOS#13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428
  GrapheneOS#14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device")
Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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