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Включение поддержки аппаратной криптографии rk3568 #1

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Применены следующие патчи: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-rockchip/list/?series=680909&archive=both
для включения аппаратного криптографического модуля

Не знаю, по какой причине они не вошли в оригинальный Linux, но мы их у себя применили, работают на вашей плате.
Для работы также требуется добавить сущность в dts

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shcgit commented Jun 18, 2024

Здравствуйте.
Подскажете как протестировать, бенчмарки снять?

shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

netfilter pull request 24-04-11

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

Patches #1 and #2 add missing rcu read side lock when iterating over
expression and object type list which could race with module removal.

Patch #3 prevents promisc packet from visiting the bridge/input hook
	 to amend a recent fix to address conntrack confirmation race
	 in br_netfilter and nf_conntrack_bridge.

Patch #4 adds and uses iterate decorator type to fetch the current
	 pipapo set backend datastructure view when netlink dumps the
	 set elements.

Patch #5 fixes removal of duplicate elements in the pipapo set backend.

Patch torvalds#6 flowtable validates pppoe header before accessing it.

Patch torvalds#7 fixes flowtable datapath for pppoe packets, otherwise lookup
         fails and pppoe packets follow classic path.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled
aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function,
which waits for the work to end if it has already started.
However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will
try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired.

The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state
is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since
disabling aRFS deletes the rules.

Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is
enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled.

Kernel log:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G          I
------------------------------------------------------
ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90
       arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
       process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0
       worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0
       kthread+0xd7/0x100
       ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

-> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
       lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
       __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
       __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
       arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
       ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
       ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
       genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270
       netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460
       __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
       __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170
       __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
       do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&priv->state_lock);
                               lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
                               lock(&priv->state_lock);
  lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by ethtool/386089:
 #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240
 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G          I        6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0
 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160
 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360
 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80
 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
 ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270
 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460
 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
 </TASK>

Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Running a lot of VK CTS in parallel against nouveau, once every
few hours you might see something like this crash.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
PGD 8000000114e6e067 P4D 8000000114e6e067 PUD 109046067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 53891 Comm: deqp-vk Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ torvalds#27
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021
RIP: 0010:gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0xe3/0x180 [nouveau]
Code: c7 48 01 c8 49 89 45 58 85 d2 0f 84 95 00 00 00 41 0f b7 46 12 49 8b 7e 08 89 da 42 8d 2c f8 48 8b 47 08 41 83 c7 01 48 89 ee <48> 8b 40 08 ff d0 0f 1f 00 49 8b 7e 08 48 89 d9 48 8d 75 04 48 c1
RSP: 0000:ffffac20c5857838 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000004d8001 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 00000000004d8001 RSI: 00000000000006d8 RDI: ffffa07afe332180
RBP: 00000000000006d8 R08: ffffac20c5857ad0 R09: 0000000000ffff10
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa07af27e2de0 R12: 000000000000001c
R13: ffffac20c5857ad0 R14: ffffa07a96fe9040 R15: 000000000000001c
FS:  00007fe395eed7c0(0000) GS:ffffa07e2c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000011febe001 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:

...

 ? gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0xe3/0x180 [nouveau]
 ? gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x37/0x180 [nouveau]
 nvkm_vmm_iter+0x351/0xa20 [nouveau]
 ? __pfx_nvkm_vmm_ref_ptes+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
 ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
 ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
 ? __lock_acquire+0x3ed/0x2170
 ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
 nvkm_vmm_ptes_get_map+0xc2/0x100 [nouveau]
 ? __pfx_nvkm_vmm_ref_ptes+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
 ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
 nvkm_vmm_map_locked+0x224/0x3a0 [nouveau]

Adding any sort of useful debug usually makes it go away, so I hand
wrote the function in a line, and debugged the asm.

Every so often pt->memory->ptrs is NULL. This ptrs ptr is set in
the nv50_instobj_acquire called from nvkm_kmap.

If Thread A and Thread B both get to nv50_instobj_acquire around
the same time, and Thread A hits the refcount_set line, and in
lockstep thread B succeeds at refcount_inc_not_zero, there is a
chance the ptrs value won't have been stored since refcount_set
is unordered. Force a memory barrier here, I picked smp_mb, since
we want it on all CPUs and it's write followed by a read.

v2: use paired smp_rmb/smp_wmb.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: be55287 ("drm/nouveau/imem/nv50: embed nvkm_instobj directly into nv04_instobj")
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240411011510.2546857-1-airlied@gmail.com
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Currently normal HugeTLB fault ends up crashing the kernel, as p4dp derived
from p4d_offset() is an invalid address when PGTABLE_LEVEL = 5. A p4d level
entry needs to be allocated when not available while walking the page table
during HugeTLB faults. Let's call p4d_alloc() to allocate such entries when
required instead of current p4d_offset().

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffff80000000
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081da9000
 [ffffffff80000000] pgd=1000000082cec003, p4d=0000000082c32003, pud=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 108 Comm: high_addr_hugep Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4 torvalds#48
 Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT)
 pstate: 01402005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : huge_pte_alloc+0xd4/0x334
 lr : hugetlb_fault+0x1b8/0xc68
 sp : ffff8000833bbc20
 x29: ffff8000833bbc20 x28: fff000080080cb58 x27: ffff800082a7cc58
 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: fff0000800378e40 x24: fff00008008d6c60
 x23: 00000000de9dbf07 x22: fff0000800378e40 x21: 0004000000000000
 x20: 0004000000000000 x19: ffffffff80000000 x18: 1ffe00010011d7a1
 x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffffffffffffff x15: 0000000000000001
 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff8000816120d0 x12: ffffffffffffffff
 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: fff00008008ebd0c x9 : 0004000000000000
 x8 : 0000000000001255 x7 : fff00008003e2000 x6 : 00000000061d54b0
 x5 : 0000000000001000 x4 : ffffffff80000000 x3 : 0000000000200000
 x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000080000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
 huge_pte_alloc+0xd4/0x334
 hugetlb_fault+0x1b8/0xc68
 handle_mm_fault+0x260/0x29c
 do_page_fault+0xfc/0x47c
 do_translation_fault+0x68/0x74
 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94
 el0_da+0x2c/0x9c
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xc4
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
 Code: aa000084 cb010084 b24c2c84 8b130c93 (f9400260)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a6bbf5d ("arm64: mm: Add definitions to support 5 levels of paging")
Reported-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415094003.1812018-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
On arm64, UBSAN traps can be decoded from the trap instruction. Add the
add, sub, and mul overflow trap codes now that CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
exists. Seen under clang 19:

  Internal error: UBSAN: unrecognized failure code: 00000000f2005515 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240411-fix-ubsan-in-hardening-config-v1-0-e0177c80ffaa@kernel.org
Fixes: 557f8c5 ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer")
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415182832.work.932-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770
       page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70
       cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0
       __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0
       _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210
       cpu_up+0x91/0xe0
       cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0
       bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0
       smp_init+0x25/0xa0
       kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0
       kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0
       ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
       lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
       cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
       static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
       __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
       dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
       __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
       memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
       hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
       vfs_write+0x387/0x550
       ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
       do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
                               lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
                               lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
  rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by bash/46904:
 #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70
 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40

stack backtrace:
CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140
 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887
Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c
R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00

In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain:

 memory_failure
  __page_handle_poison
   zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock)
   dissolve_free_huge_page
    __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio
     static_key_slow_dec
      cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock)

Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead.

This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace
hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key").  As it introduced
rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison().

[linmiaohe@huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 torvalds#6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 torvalds#7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 torvalds#8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 torvalds#9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 torvalds#10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 torvalds#11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 torvalds#12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 torvalds#13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 torvalds#14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 torvalds#15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 torvalds#16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 torvalds#17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 torvalds#18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 torvalds#19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

Patch #1 amends a missing spot where the set iterator type is unset.
	 This is fixing a issue in the previous pull request.

Patch #2 fixes the delete set command abort path by restoring state
         of the elements. Reverse logic for the activate (abort) case
	 otherwise element state is not restored, this requires to move
	 the check for active/inactive elements to the set iterator
	 callback. From the deactivate path, toggle the next generation
	 bit and from the activate (abort) path, clear the next generation
	 bitmask.

Patch #3 skips elements already restored by delete set command from the
	 abort path in case there is a previous delete element command in
	 the batch. Check for the next generation bit just like it is done
	 via set iteration to restore maps.

netfilter pull request 24-04-18

* tag 'nf-24-04-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: nf_tables: fix memleak in map from abort path
  netfilter: nf_tables: restore set elements when delete set fails
  netfilter: nf_tables: missing iterator type in lookup walk
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418010948.3332346-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
On arm64 machines, swsusp_save() faults if it attempts to access
MEMBLOCK_NOMAP memory ranges. This can be reproduced in QEMU using UEFI
when booting with rodata=off debug_pagealloc=off and CONFIG_KFENCE=n:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff8000000000
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x0000000096000007
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
    FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000
    CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
    GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
  swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000eeb0b000
  [ffffff8000000000] pgd=180000217fff9803, p4d=180000217fff9803, pud=180000217fff9803, pmd=180000217fff8803, pte=0000000000000000
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
  Modules linked in: xt_multiport ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c iptable_filter bpfilter rfkill at803x snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg dwmac_generic stmmac_platform snd_hda_codec stmmac joydev pcs_xpcs snd_hda_core phylink ppdev lp parport ramoops reed_solomon ip_tables x_tables nls_iso8859_1 vfat multipath linear amdgpu amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy hid_generic usbhid hid radeon video drm_suballoc_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm i2c_algo_bit drm_display_helper cec drm_kms_helper drm
  CPU: 0 PID: 3663 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.6.2+ torvalds#76
  Source Version: 4e22ed63a0a48e7a7cff9b98b7806d8d4add7dc0
  Hardware name: Greatwall GW-XXXXXX-XXX/GW-XXXXXX-XXX, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 01/19/2021
  pstate: 600003c5 (nZCv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : swsusp_save+0x280/0x538
  lr : swsusp_save+0x280/0x538
  sp : ffffffa034a3fa40
  x29: ffffffa034a3fa40 x28: ffffff8000001000 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: ffffff8001400000 x25: ffffffc08113e248 x24: 0000000000000000
  x23: 0000000000080000 x22: ffffffc08113e280 x21: 00000000000c69f2
  x20: ffffff8000000000 x19: ffffffc081ae2500 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 6666662074736420 x16: 3030303030303030 x15: 3038666666666666
  x14: 0000000000000b69 x13: ffffff9f89088530 x12: 00000000ffffffea
  x11: 00000000ffff7fff x10: 00000000ffff7fff x9 : ffffffc08193f0d0
  x8 : 00000000000bffe8 x7 : c0000000ffff7fff x6 : 0000000000000001
  x5 : ffffffa0fff09dc8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000004e
  Call trace:
   swsusp_save+0x280/0x538
   swsusp_arch_suspend+0x148/0x190
   hibernation_snapshot+0x240/0x39c
   hibernate+0xc4/0x378
   state_store+0xf0/0x10c
   kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24

The reason is swsusp_save() -> copy_data_pages() -> page_is_saveable()
-> kernel_page_present() assuming that a page is always present when
can_set_direct_map() is false (all of rodata_full,
debug_pagealloc_enabled() and arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() false),
irrespective of the MEMBLOCK_NOMAP ranges. Such MEMBLOCK_NOMAP regions
should not be saved during hibernation.

This problem was introduced by changes to the pfn_valid() logic in
commit a7d9f30 ("arm64: drop pfn_valid_within() and simplify
pfn_valid()").

Similar to other architectures, drop the !can_set_direct_map() check in
kernel_page_present() so that page_is_savable() skips such pages.

Fixes: a7d9f30 ("arm64: drop pfn_valid_within() and simplify pfn_valid()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.14.x
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: xiongxin <xiongxin@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: xiongxin <xiongxin@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yaxiong Tian <tianyaxiong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417025248.386622-1-tianyaxiong@kylinos.cn
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: rework commit message]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Petr Machata says:

====================
mlxsw: Fixes

This patchset fixes the following issues:

- During driver de-initialization the driver unregisters the EMAD
  response trap by setting its action to DISCARD. However the manual
  only permits TRAP and FORWARD, and future firmware versions will
  enforce this.

  In patch #1, suppress the error message by aligning the driver to the
  manual and use a FORWARD (NOP) action when unregistering the trap.

- The driver queries the Management Capabilities Mask (MCAM) register
  during initialization to understand if certain features are supported.

  However, not all firmware versions support this register, leading to
  the driver failing to load.

  Patches #2 and #3 fix this issue by treating an error in the register
  query as an indication that the feature is not supported.

v2:
- Patch #2:
    - Make mlxsw_env_max_module_eeprom_len_query() void
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1713446092.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
At the time of LPAR boot up, partition firmware provides Open Firmware
property ibm,dma-window for the PE. This property is provided on the PCI
bus the PE is attached to.

There are execptions where the partition firmware might not provide this
property for the PE at the time of LPAR boot up. One of the scenario is
where the firmware has frozen the PE due to some error condition. This
PE is frozen for 24 hours or unless the whole system is reinitialized.

Within this time frame, if the LPAR is booted, the frozen PE will be
presented to the LPAR but ibm,dma-window property could be missing.

Today, under these circumstances, the LPAR oopses with NULL pointer
dereference, when configuring the PCI bus the PE is attached to.

  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x000000c8
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001024c0
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in:
  Supported: Yes
  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-150600.9-default #1
  Hardware name: IBM,9043-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_023) hv:phyp pSeries
  NIP:  c0000000001024c0 LR: c0000000001024b0 CTR: c000000000102450
  REGS: c0000000037db5c0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.4.0-150600.9-default)
  MSR:  8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28000822  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c00000000010254c DAR: 00000000000000c8 DSISR: 00080000 IRQMASK: 0
  ...
  NIP [c0000000001024c0] pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP+0x70/0x2a0
  LR [c0000000001024b0] pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP+0x60/0x2a0
  Call Trace:
    pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP+0x60/0x2a0 (unreliable)
    pcibios_setup_bus_self+0x1c0/0x370
    __of_scan_bus+0x2f8/0x330
    pcibios_scan_phb+0x280/0x3d0
    pcibios_init+0x88/0x12c
    do_one_initcall+0x60/0x320
    kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x3e4
    kernel_init+0x34/0x1d0
    ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c

Fixes: b1fc44e ("pseries/iommu/ddw: Fix kdump to work in absence of ibm,dma-window")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240422205141.10662-1-gbatra@linux.ibm.com
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
syzbot was able to trigger a NULL deref in fib_validate_source()
in an old tree [1].

It appears the bug exists in latest trees.

All calls to __in_dev_get_rcu() must be checked for a NULL result.

[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 2 PID: 3257 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:fib_validate_source+0xbf/0x15a0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:425
Code: 18 f2 f2 f2 f2 42 c7 44 20 23 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 44 24 78 42 c6 44 20 27 f3 e8 5d 88 48 fc 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 18 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 d2 15 98 fc 48 89 5c 24 10 41 bf
RSP: 0018:ffffc900015fee40 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800f7a4000 RCX: ffff88800f4f90c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000004001eac RDI: ffff8880160c64c0
RBP: ffffc900015ff060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88800f7a4000
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88800f4f90c0 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800f7a4000
FS:  00007f938acfe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888058c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f938acddd58 CR3: 000000001248e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
  ip_route_use_hint+0x410/0x9b0 net/ipv4/route.c:2231
  ip_rcv_finish_core+0x2c4/0x1a30 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:327
  ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 [inline]
  ip_sublist_rcv+0x3ed/0xe50 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:638
  ip_list_rcv+0x422/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:673
  __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5572 [inline]
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6b1/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5620
  __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline]
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x9f9/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:5764
  netif_receive_skb_list+0x55/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:5816
  xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:257 [inline]
  xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:335 [inline]
  bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x1818/0x1d00 net/bpf/test_run.c:363
  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x81f/0x1170 net/bpf/test_run.c:1376
  bpf_prog_test_run+0x349/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3736
  __sys_bpf+0x45c/0x710 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5115
  __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5201 [inline]
  __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 [inline]
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199

Fixes: 02b2494 ("ipv4: use dst hint for ipv4 list receive")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421184326.1704930-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
…active

The default nna (node_nr_active) is used when the pool isn't tied to a
specific NUMA node. This can happen in the following cases:

 1. On NUMA, if per-node pwq init failure and the fallback pwq is used.
 2. On NUMA, if a pool is configured to span multiple nodes.
 3. On single node setups.

5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for
unbound workqueues") set the default nna->max to min_active because only #1
was being considered. For #2 and #3, using min_active means that the max
concurrency in normal operation is pushed down to min_active which is
currently 8, which can obviously lead to performance issues.

exact value nna->max is set to doesn't really matter. #2 can only happen if
the workqueue is intentionally configured to ignore NUMA boundaries and
there's no good way to distribute max_active in this case. #3 is the default
behavior on single node machines.

Let's set it the default nna->max to max_active. This fixes the artificially
lowered concurrency problem on single node machines and shouldn't hurt
anything for other cases.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Fixes: 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dm-devel/20240410084531.2134621-1-shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com/
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Yue Sun and xingwei lee reported a divide error bug in
wq_update_node_max_active():

divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:wq_update_node_max_active+0x369/0x6b0 kernel/workqueue.c:1605
Code: 24 bf 00 00 00 80 44 89 fe e8 83 27 33 00 41 83 fc ff 75 0d 41
81 ff 00 00 00 80 0f 84 68 01 00 00 e8 fb 22 33 00 44 89 f8 99 <41> f7
fc 89 c5 89 c7 44 89 ee e8 a8 24 33 00 89 ef 8b 5c 24 04 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018fbb0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 00000000000000ff RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888100ada500
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000ff RDI: 0000000080000000
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff815b1fcd R09: 1ffff1100364ad72
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100364ad73 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000000ff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888135c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb8c06ca6f8 CR3: 000000010d6c6000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 workqueue_offline_cpu+0x56f/0x600 kernel/workqueue.c:6525
 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4e1/0x870 kernel/cpu.c:194
 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x411/0x7d0 kernel/cpu.c:1092
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x544/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
 kthread+0x2ed/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

After analysis, it happens when all of the CPUs in a workqueue's affinity
get offine.

The problem can be easily reproduced by:

 # echo 8 > /sys/devices/virtual/workqueue/<any-wq-name>/cpumask
 # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/online

Use the default max_actives for nodes when all of the CPUs in the
workqueue's affinity get offline to fix the problem.

Reported-by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAEkJfYPGS1_4JqvpSo0=FM0S1ytB8CEbyreLTtWpR900dUZymw@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
If stack_depot_save_flags() allocates memory it always drops
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP flag.  So when KASAN tries to track __GFP_NOLOCKDEP
allocation we may end up with lockdep splat like bellow:

======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.9.0-rc3+ torvalds#49 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 kswapd0/149 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff88811346a920
(&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}-{4:4}, at: xfs_reclaim_inode+0x3ac/0x590
[xfs]

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff8bb33100 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
balance_pgdat+0x5d9/0xad0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
 -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x7da/0x1030
        lock_acquire+0x15d/0x400
        fs_reclaim_acquire+0xb5/0x100
 prepare_alloc_pages.constprop.0+0xc5/0x230
        __alloc_pages+0x12a/0x3f0
        alloc_pages_mpol+0x175/0x340
        stack_depot_save_flags+0x4c5/0x510
        kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
        kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
        __kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90
        kmem_cache_alloc+0x15e/0x4a0
        __alloc_object+0x35/0x370
        __create_object+0x22/0x90
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x477/0x5b0
        krealloc+0x5f/0x110
        xfs_iext_insert_raw+0x4b2/0x6e0 [xfs]
        xfs_iext_insert+0x2e/0x130 [xfs]
        xfs_iread_bmbt_block+0x1a9/0x4d0 [xfs]
        xfs_btree_visit_block+0xfb/0x290 [xfs]
        xfs_btree_visit_blocks+0x215/0x2c0 [xfs]
        xfs_iread_extents+0x1a2/0x2e0 [xfs]
 xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin+0x376/0x10a0 [xfs]
        iomap_iter+0x1d1/0x2d0
 iomap_file_buffered_write+0x120/0x1a0
        xfs_file_buffered_write+0x128/0x4b0 [xfs]
        vfs_write+0x675/0x890
        ksys_write+0xc3/0x160
        do_syscall_64+0x94/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79

Always preserve __GFP_NOLOCKDEP to fix this.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240418141133.22950-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com
Fixes: cd11016 ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a0caa289-ca02-48eb-9bf2-d86fd47b71f4@redhat.com/
Reported-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f9ff999a-e170-b66b-7caf-293f2b147ac2@opensource.wdc.com/
Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Tested-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
One of my CI runs popped the following lockdep splat

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc4+ #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
btrfs/471533 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff92ba46980850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0

but task is already holding lock:
ffff92ba46980bd0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1c8f/0x2600

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}:
       down_read+0x42/0x170
       btrfs_rename+0x607/0xb00
       btrfs_rename2+0x2e/0x70
       vfs_rename+0xaf8/0xfc0
       do_renameat2+0x586/0x600
       __x64_sys_rename+0x43/0x50
       do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16){++++}-{3:3}:
       down_write+0x3f/0xc0
       btrfs_inode_lock+0x40/0x70
       prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x1b0/0x370
       relocate_file_extent_cluster+0xb2/0x720
       relocate_data_extent+0x107/0x160
       relocate_block_group+0x442/0x550
       btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2cb/0x4b0
       btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x50/0x1b0
       btrfs_balance+0x92f/0x13d0
       btrfs_ioctl+0x1abf/0x2600
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0
       do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #0 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire+0x13e7/0x2180
       lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0
       __mutex_lock+0xbe/0xc00
       btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0
       btrfs_ioctl+0x206b/0x2600
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0
       do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &fs_info->cleaner_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16 --> &fs_info->subvol_sem

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&fs_info->subvol_sem);
                               lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16);
                               lock(&fs_info->subvol_sem);
  lock(&fs_info->cleaner_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by btrfs/471533:
 #0: ffff92ba4319e420 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x3b5/0x2600
 #1: ffff92ba46980bd0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1c8f/0x2600

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 471533 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
 check_noncircular+0x148/0x160
 ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0
 __lock_acquire+0x13e7/0x2180
 lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0
 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0
 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
 __mutex_lock+0xbe/0xc00
 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0
 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0
 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0
 btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0
 btrfs_ioctl+0x206b/0x2600
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? __do_sys_statfs+0x61/0x70
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? reacquire_held_locks+0xd1/0x1f0
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x307/0x8a0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? lock_release+0xca/0x2a0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x35c/0x8a0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f

This happens because when we call rename we already have the inode mutex
held, and then we acquire the subvol_sem if we are a subvolume.  This
makes the dependency

inode lock -> subvol sem

When we're running data relocation we will preallocate space for the
data relocation inode, and we always run the relocation under the
->cleaner_mutex.  This now creates the dependency of

cleaner_mutex -> inode lock (from the prealloc) -> subvol_sem

Qgroup delete is doing this in the opposite order, it is acquiring the
subvol_sem and then it is acquiring the cleaner_mutex, which results in
this lockdep splat.  This deadlock can't happen in reality, because we
won't ever rename the data reloc inode, nor is the data reloc inode a
subvolume.

However this is fairly easy to fix, simply take the cleaner mutex in the
case where we are disabling qgroups before we take the subvol_sem.  This
resolves the lockdep splat.

Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Issue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace:
When both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning
in check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems
to be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with
the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not.

Similar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by
removing the flag. Do the same for i40e too.

[Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is
flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0
[  +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966
check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4
nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr
rfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma
intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif
isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal
intel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core
iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore
ioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich
intel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad
xfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe
drm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel
libata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
[  +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1
[  +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS
SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020
[  +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e]
[  +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48
81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd
ff <0f> 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90
[  +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX:
0000000000000027
[  +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:
ffff94d47f620bc0
[  +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
00000000ffff7fff
[  +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12:
ffff94c5451ea180
[  +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15:
ffff94c5f1330ab0
[  +0.000001] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  +0.000002] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4:
00000000007706f0
[  +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[  +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[  +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554
[  +0.000001] Call Trace:
[  +0.000001]  <TASK>
[  +0.000002]  ? __warn+0x80/0x130
[  +0.000003]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000002]  ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0
[  +0.000005]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[  +0.000003]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  +0.000002]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  +0.000006]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000002]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000002]  __flush_workqueue+0x126/0x3f0
[  +0.000015]  ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x1c/0xe0 [ib_core]
[  +0.000056]  __ib_unregister_device+0x6a/0xb0 [ib_core]
[  +0.000023]  ib_unregister_device_and_put+0x34/0x50 [ib_core]
[  +0.000020]  i40iw_close+0x4b/0x90 [irdma]
[  +0.000022]  i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close+0x54/0xc0 [i40e]
[  +0.000035]  i40e_service_task+0x126/0x190 [i40e]
[  +0.000024]  process_one_work+0x174/0x340
[  +0.000003]  worker_thread+0x27e/0x390
[  +0.000001]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000002]  kthread+0xdf/0x110
[  +0.000002]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000002]  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[  +0.000003]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000001]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  +0.000004]  </TASK>
[  +0.000001] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 4d5957c ("i40e: remove WQ_UNBOUND and the task limit of our workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Sindhu Devale <sindhu.devale@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Robert Ganzynkowicz <robert.ganzynkowicz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-2-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over
aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf().
The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of
the VF configuration lock.

If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK
flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always
acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the
LAG mutex.

Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then
removing 2 VF:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc6 torvalds#54 Tainted: G        W  O
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock:
ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]

but task is already holding lock:
ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
       lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
       ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice]
       ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice]
       __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice]
       ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice]
       process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
       worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
       kthread+0x104/0x140
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

-> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
       validate_chain+0x558/0x800
       __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
       lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
       ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
       ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
       ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
       process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
       worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
       kthread+0x104/0x140
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
                               lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
                               lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
  lock(&vf->cfg_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771:
 #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice]
 #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G        W  O       6.8.0-rc6 torvalds#54
Hardware name:
Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150
 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230
 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450
 validate_chain+0x558/0x800
 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120
 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
 ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 kthread+0x104/0x140
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
 </TASK>

To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the
VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only
after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held.

Fixes: 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com>
Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
…nix_gc().

syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().

One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.

So, the splat is false-positive.

Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.

Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
 -----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
       unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
       unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
       skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
       skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
       __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
       kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
       kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
       manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
       unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
       unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
       do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
       splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
       do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
       __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
       __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
       __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
       __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
       process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
       process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
       worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
       kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
       ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(unix_gc_lock);
                               lock(&u->lock);
                               lock(unix_gc_lock);
  lock(&u->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
 </TASK>

Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net

The following patchset contains two Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net:

Patch #1 fixes SCTP checksumming for IPVS with gso packets,
	 from Ismael Luceno.

Patch #2 honor dormant flag from netdev event path to fix a possible
	 double hook unregistration.

* tag 'nf-24-04-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path
  ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425090149.1359547-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
We found below OOB crash:

[   33.452494] ==================================================================
[   33.453513] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec
[   33.454660] Write of size 164 at addr c1d03d30 by task swapper/0/0
[   33.455515]
[   33.455767] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G           O       6.1.25-mainline #1
[   33.456880] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[   33.457555]  unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
[   33.458326]  show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x4c
[   33.459072]  dump_stack_lvl from print_report+0x158/0x4a4
[   33.459863]  print_report from kasan_report+0x9c/0x148
[   33.460616]  kasan_report from kasan_check_range+0x94/0x1a0
[   33.461424]  kasan_check_range from memset+0x20/0x3c
[   33.462157]  memset from refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec
[   33.463064]  refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0 from tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick+0x180/0x53c
[   33.464181]  tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick from do_idle+0x264/0x354
[   33.465029]  do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24
[   33.465769]  cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xf0/0xf4
[   33.466528]  rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x18
[   33.467397]
[   33.467644] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0/0
[   33.468493]  and is located at offset 112 in frame:
[   33.469172]  refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0x0/0x2ec
[   33.469917]
[   33.470165] This frame has 2 objects:
[   33.470696]  [32, 76) 'global_zone_diff'
[   33.470729]  [112, 276) 'global_node_diff'
[   33.471294]
[   33.472095] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   33.472862] page:3cd72da8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x41d03
[   33.473944] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0)
[   33.474565] raw: 00001000 ed741470 ed741470 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
[   33.475656] raw: 00000000
[   33.476050] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   33.476816]
[   33.477061] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   33.477732]  c1d03c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   33.478630]  c1d03c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
[   33.479526] >c1d03d00: 00 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[   33.480415]                                                ^
[   33.481195]  c1d03d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[   33.482088]  c1d03e00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   33.482978] ==================================================================

We find the root cause of this OOB is that arm does not clear stale stack
poison in the case of cpuidle.

This patch refer to arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S to resolve this issue.

From cited commit [1] that explain the problem

Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning.

In the case of cpuidle, CPUs exit the kernel a number of levels deep in
C code.  Any instrumented functions on this critical path will leave
portions of the stack shadow poisoned.

If CPUs lose context and return to the kernel via a cold path, we
restore a prior context saved in __cpu_suspend_enter are forgotten, and
we never remove the poison they placed in the stack shadow area by
functions calls between this and the actual exit of the kernel.

Thus, (depending on stackframe layout) subsequent calls to instrumented
functions may hit this stale poison, resulting in (spurious) KASAN
splats to the console.

To avoid this, clear any stale poison from the idle thread for a CPU
prior to bringing a CPU online.

From cited commit [2]

Extend to check for CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

[1] commit 0d97e6d ("arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison")
[2] commit d56a9ef ("kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK")

Signed-off-by: Boy Wu <boy.wu@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Fixes: 5615f69 ("ARM: 9016/2: Initialize the mapping of KASan shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Merge series from Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>:

This patchset fixes 2 problems on TDM which both find a solution
by properly implementing the .trigger() callback for the TDM backend.

ATM, enabling the TDM formatters is done by the .prepare() callback
because handling the formatter is slow due to necessary calls to CCF.

The first problem affects the TDMIN. Because .prepare() is called on DPCM
backend first, the formatter are started before the FIFOs and this may
cause a random channel shifts if the TDMIN use multiple lanes with more
than 2 slots per lanes. Using trigger() allows to set the FE/BE order,
solving the problem.

There has already been an attempt to fix this 3y ago [1] and reverted [2]
It triggered a 'sleep in irq' error on the period IRQ. The solution is
to just use the bottom half of threaded IRQ. This is patch #1. Patch #2
and #3 remain mostly the same as 3y ago.

For TDMOUT, the problem is on pause. ATM pause only stops the FIFO and
the TDMOUT just starves. When it does, it will actually repeat the last
sample continuously. Depending on the platform, if there is no high-pass
filter on the analog path, this may translate to a constant position of
the speaker membrane. There is no audible glitch but it may damage the
speaker coil.

Properly stopping the TDMOUT in pause solves the problem. There is
behaviour change associated with that fix. Clocks used to be continuous
on pause because of the problem above. They will now be gated on pause by
default, as they should. The last change introduce the proper support for
continuous clocks, if needed.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-amlogic/20211020114217.133153-1-jbrunet@baylibre.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-amlogic/20220421155725.2589089-1-narmstrong@baylibre.com
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Currently, enabling SG_DEBUG in the kernel will cause nouveau to hit a
BUG() on startup:

  kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:187!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 7 PID: 930 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ torvalds#30
  Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/A320M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 1.I0 01/22/2019
  RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
  Code: 69 88 32 01 83 e1 03 f6 c3 03 75 20 a8 01 75 1e 48 09 cb 41 89 54
  24 08 49 89 1c 24 41 89 6c 24 0c 5b 5d 41 5c e9 7b b9 88 00 <0f> 0b 0f 0b
  0f 0b 48 8b 05 5e 46 9a 01 eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffa776017bf6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa77600d87000 RCX: 000000000000002b
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa77680d87000
  RBP: 000000000000e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: ffff98f4c46aa508 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98f4c46aa508
  R13: ffff98f4c46aa008 R14: ffffa77600d4a000 R15: ffffa77600d4a018
  FS:  00007feeb5aae980(0000) GS:ffff98f5c4dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f22cb9a4520 CR3: 00000001043ba000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? die+0x36/0x90
   ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
   ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
   ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
   ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
   ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
   ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
   ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
   nvkm_firmware_ctor+0x14a/0x250 [nouveau]
   nvkm_falcon_fw_ctor+0x42/0x70 [nouveau]
   ga102_gsp_booter_ctor+0xb4/0x1a0 [nouveau]
   r535_gsp_oneinit+0xb3/0x15f0 [nouveau]
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? nvkm_udevice_new+0x95/0x140 [nouveau]
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? ktime_get+0x47/0xb0
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   nvkm_subdev_oneinit_+0x4f/0x120 [nouveau]
   nvkm_subdev_init_+0x39/0x140 [nouveau]
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   nvkm_subdev_init+0x44/0x90 [nouveau]
   nvkm_device_init+0x166/0x2e0 [nouveau]
   nvkm_udevice_init+0x47/0x70 [nouveau]
   nvkm_object_init+0x41/0x1c0 [nouveau]
   nvkm_ioctl_new+0x16a/0x290 [nouveau]
   ? __pfx_nvkm_client_child_new+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
   ? __pfx_nvkm_udevice_new+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
   nvkm_ioctl+0x126/0x290 [nouveau]
   nvif_object_ctor+0x112/0x190 [nouveau]
   nvif_device_ctor+0x23/0x60 [nouveau]
   nouveau_cli_init+0x164/0x640 [nouveau]
   nouveau_drm_device_init+0x97/0x9e0 [nouveau]
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? pci_update_current_state+0x72/0xb0
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   nouveau_drm_probe+0x12c/0x280 [nouveau]
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0
   pci_device_probe+0xc7/0x270
   really_probe+0xe6/0x3a0
   __driver_probe_device+0x87/0x160
   driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xc0
   __driver_attach+0xec/0x1f0
   ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
   bus_for_each_dev+0x88/0xd0
   bus_add_driver+0x116/0x220
   driver_register+0x59/0x100
   ? __pfx_nouveau_drm_init+0x10/0x10 [nouveau]
   do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x320
   do_init_module+0x60/0x250
   init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0
   idempotent_init_module+0x120/0x2b0
   __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
  RIP: 0033:0x7feeb5cc20cd
  Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89
  f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0
  ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1b cd 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007ffcf220b2c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055fdd2916aa0 RCX: 00007feeb5cc20cd
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055fdd29161e0 RDI: 0000000000000035
  RBP: 00007ffcf220b380 R08: 00007feeb5d8fb20 R09: 00007ffcf220b310
  R10: 000055fdd2909dc0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055fdd29161e0
  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 000055fdd29203e0 R15: 000055fdd2909d80
   </TASK>

We hit this when trying to initialize firmware of type
NVKM_FIRMWARE_IMG_DMA because we allocate our memory with
dma_alloc_coherent, and DMA allocations can't be turned back into memory
pages - which a scatterlist needs in order to map them.

So, fix this by allocating the memory with vmalloc instead().

V2:
* Fixup explanation as the prior one was bogus

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240429182318.189668-1-lyude@redhat.com
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Currently we allocate all 3 levels of radix3 page tables using
nvkm_gsp_mem_ctor(), which uses dma_alloc_coherent() for allocating all of
the relevant memory. This can end up failing in scenarios where the system
has very high memory fragmentation, and we can't find enough contiguous
memory to allocate level 2 of the page table.

Currently, this can result in runtime PM issues on systems where memory
fragmentation is high - as we'll fail to allocate the page table for our
suspend/resume buffer:

  kworker/10:2: page allocation failure: order:7, mode:0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL),
  nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0
  CPU: 10 PID: 479809 Comm: kworker/10:2 Not tainted
  6.8.6-201.ChopperV6.fc39.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: SLIMBOOK Executive/Executive, BIOS N.1.10GRU06 02/02/2024
  Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80
   warn_alloc+0x165/0x1e0
   ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xb3/0x2b0
   __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xd7d/0xde0
   __alloc_pages+0x32d/0x350
   __dma_direct_alloc_pages.isra.0+0x16a/0x2b0
   dma_direct_alloc+0x70/0x270
   nvkm_gsp_radix3_sg+0x5e/0x130 [nouveau]
   r535_gsp_fini+0x1d4/0x350 [nouveau]
   nvkm_subdev_fini+0x67/0x150 [nouveau]
   nvkm_device_fini+0x95/0x1e0 [nouveau]
   nvkm_udevice_fini+0x53/0x70 [nouveau]
   nvkm_object_fini+0xb9/0x240 [nouveau]
   nvkm_object_fini+0x75/0x240 [nouveau]
   nouveau_do_suspend+0xf5/0x280 [nouveau]
   nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x3e/0xb0 [nouveau]
   pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x67/0x1e0
   ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x10/0x10
   __rpm_callback+0x41/0x170
   ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x10/0x10
   rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
   ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x10/0x10
   rpm_suspend+0x120/0x6a0
   pm_runtime_work+0x98/0xb0
   process_one_work+0x171/0x340
   worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
   ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
   kthread+0xe5/0x120
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

Luckily, we don't actually need to allocate coherent memory for the page
table thanks to being able to pass the GPU a radix3 page table for
suspend/resume data. So, let's rewrite nvkm_gsp_radix3_sg() to use the sg
allocator for level 2. We continue using coherent allocations for lvl0 and
1, since they only take a single page.

V2:
* Don't forget to actually jump to the next scatterlist when we reach the
  end of the scatterlist we're currently on when writing out the page table
  for level 2

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240429182318.189668-2-lyude@redhat.com
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported
a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0
linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034

CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377
 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601
 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026
 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094
 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108
 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144
 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244
 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186
 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324
 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824
 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159
 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390
 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461
 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534
 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648
 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976
 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576
 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645
 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781
 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553
 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454
 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381
 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33
 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378
 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169
 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526
 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540
 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313
 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295
 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303
 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451
 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129
 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492
 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963
 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250
 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850
 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730
 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745
 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191
 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203
 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199
 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52
 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29
Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29
RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its
ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup
code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier.

Fixes: 1149557 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Symptom:
When the hsuid attribute is set for the first time on an IQD Layer3
device while the corresponding network interface is already UP,
the kernel will try to execute a napi function pointer that is NULL.

Example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 2057.572696] illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] SMP
[ 2057.572702] Modules linked in: af_iucv qeth_l3 zfcp scsi_transport_fc sunrpc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6
nft_reject nft_ct nf_tables_set nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink ghash_s390 prng xts aes_s390 des_s390 de
s_generic sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 sha512_s390 vfio_ccw vfio_mdev mdev vfio_iommu_type1 eadm_sch vfio ext4 mbcache jbd2 qeth_l2 bridge stp llc dasd_eckd_mod qeth dasd_mod
 qdio ccwgroup pkey zcrypt
[ 2057.572739] CPU: 6 PID: 60182 Comm: stress_client Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-541.el8.s390x #1
[ 2057.572742] Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
[ 2057.572744] Krnl PSW : 0704f00180000000 0000000000000002 (0x2)
[ 2057.572748]            R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
[ 2057.572751] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000a3b008d8 0000000000000000
[ 2057.572754]            00000000a3b008d8 cb923a29c779abc5 0000000000000000 00000000814cfd80
[ 2057.572756]            000000000000012c 0000000000000000 00000000a3b008d8 00000000a3b008d8
[ 2057.572758]            00000000bab6d500 00000000814cfd80 0000000091317e46 00000000814cfc68
[ 2057.572762] Krnl Code:#0000000000000000: 0000                illegal
                         >0000000000000002: 0000                illegal
                          0000000000000004: 0000                illegal
                          0000000000000006: 0000                illegal
                          0000000000000008: 0000                illegal
                          000000000000000a: 0000                illegal
                          000000000000000c: 0000                illegal
                          000000000000000e: 0000                illegal
[ 2057.572800] Call Trace:
[ 2057.572801] ([<00000000ec639700>] 0xec639700)
[ 2057.572803]  [<00000000913183e2>] net_rx_action+0x2ba/0x398
[ 2057.572809]  [<0000000091515f76>] __do_softirq+0x11e/0x3a0
[ 2057.572813]  [<0000000090ce160c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x3c/0x58
[ 2057.572817] ([<0000000090d2cbd6>] do_softirq.part.1+0x56/0x60)
[ 2057.572822]  [<0000000090d2cc60>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80/0x98
[ 2057.572825]  [<0000000091314706>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2be/0xd70
[ 2057.572827]  [<000003ff803dd6d6>] afiucv_hs_send+0x24e/0x300 [af_iucv]
[ 2057.572830]  [<000003ff803dd88a>] iucv_send_ctrl+0x102/0x138 [af_iucv]
[ 2057.572833]  [<000003ff803de72a>] iucv_sock_connect+0x37a/0x468 [af_iucv]
[ 2057.572835]  [<00000000912e7e90>] __sys_connect+0xa0/0xd8
[ 2057.572839]  [<00000000912e9580>] sys_socketcall+0x228/0x348
[ 2057.572841]  [<0000000091514e1a>] system_call+0x2a6/0x2c8
[ 2057.572843] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[ 2057.572844]  [<0000000091317e44>] __napi_poll+0x4c/0x1d8
[ 2057.572846]
[ 2057.572847] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Analysis:
There is one napi structure per out_q: card->qdio.out_qs[i].napi
The napi.poll functions are set during qeth_open().

Since
commit 1cfef80 ("s390/qeth: Don't call dev_close/dev_open (DOWN/UP)")
qeth_set_offline()/qeth_set_online() no longer call dev_close()/
dev_open(). So if qeth_free_qdio_queues() cleared
card->qdio.out_qs[i].napi.poll while the network interface was UP and the
card was offline, they are not set again.

Reproduction:
chzdev -e $devno layer2=0
ip link set dev $network_interface up
echo 0 > /sys/bus/ccwgroup/devices/0.0.$devno/online
echo foo > /sys/bus/ccwgroup/devices/0.0.$devno/hsuid
echo 1 > /sys/bus/ccwgroup/devices/0.0.$devno/online
-> Crash (can be enforced e.g. by af_iucv connect(), ip link down/up, ...)

Note that a Completion Queue (CQ) is only enabled or disabled, when hsuid
is set for the first time or when it is removed.

Workarounds:
- Set hsuid before setting the device online for the first time
or
- Use chzdev -d $devno; chzdev $devno hsuid=xxx; chzdev -e $devno;
to set hsuid on an existing device. (this will remove and recreate the
network interface)

Fix:
There is no need to free the output queues when a completion queue is
added or removed.
card->qdio.state now indicates whether the inbound buffer pool and the
outbound queues are allocated.
card->qdio.c_q indicates whether a CQ is allocated.

Fixes: 1cfef80 ("s390/qeth: Don't call dev_close/dev_open (DOWN/UP)")
Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240430091004.2265683-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
Using restricted DMA pools (CONFIG_DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL=y) in conjunction
with dynamic SWIOTLB (CONFIG_SWIOTLB_DYNAMIC=y) leads to the following
crash when initialising the restricted pools at boot-time:

  | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
  | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  | pc : rmem_swiotlb_device_init+0xfc/0x1ec
  | lr : rmem_swiotlb_device_init+0xf0/0x1ec
  | Call trace:
  |  rmem_swiotlb_device_init+0xfc/0x1ec
  |  of_reserved_mem_device_init_by_idx+0x18c/0x238
  |  of_dma_configure_id+0x31c/0x33c
  |  platform_dma_configure+0x34/0x80

faddr2line reveals that the crash is in the list validation code:

  include/linux/list.h:83
  include/linux/rculist.h:79
  include/linux/rculist.h:106
  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:306
  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:1695

because add_mem_pool() is trying to list_add_rcu() to a NULL
'mem->pools'.

Fix the crash by initialising the 'mem->pools' list_head in
rmem_swiotlb_device_init() before calling add_mem_pool().

Reported-by: Nikita Ioffe <ioffe@google.com>
Tested-by: Nikita Ioffe <ioffe@google.com>
Fixes: 1aaa736 ("swiotlb: allocate a new memory pool when existing pools are full")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2025
The blammed commit copied to argv the size of the reallocated argv,
instead of the size of the old_argv, thus reading and copying from
past the old_argv allocated memory.

Following BUG_ON was hit:
[    3.038929][    T1] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040!
[    3.039147][    T1] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
...
[    3.056489][    T1] Call trace:
[    3.056591][    T1]  __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 (P)
[    3.056773][    T1]  dm_split_args+0x20c/0x210
[    3.056942][    T1]  dm_table_add_target+0x13c/0x360
[    3.057132][    T1]  table_load+0x110/0x3ac
[    3.057292][    T1]  dm_ctl_ioctl+0x424/0x56c
[    3.057457][    T1]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
[    3.057634][    T1]  invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c
[    3.057804][    T1]  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
[    3.057970][    T1]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[    3.058123][    T1]  el0_svc+0x50/0xac
[    3.058266][    T1]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc4
[    3.058452][    T1]  el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b4
[    3.058620][    T1] Code: f800865e a9bf7bfd 910003fd 941f48aa (d4210000)
[    3.058897][    T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    3.059083][    T1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception

Fix it by copying the size of src, and not the size of dst, as it was.

Fixes: 5a2a6c4 ("dm: always update the array size in realloc_argv on success")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2025
Calling core::fmt::write() from rust code while FineIBT is enabled
results in a kernel panic:

[ 4614.199779] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/cet.c:132!
[ 4614.205343] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 4614.211781] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6057 Comm: dmabuf_dump Tainted: G     U     O       6.12.17-android16-0-g6ab38c534a43 #1 9da040f27673ec3945e23b998a0f8bd64c846599
[ 4614.227832] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
[ 4614.241247] RIP: 0010:do_kernel_cp_fault+0xea/0xf0
...
[ 4614.398144] RIP: 0010:_RNvXs5_NtNtNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt3num3impyNtB9_7Display3fmt+0x0/0x20
[ 4614.407792] Code: 48 f7 df 48 0f 48 f9 48 89 f2 89 c6 5d e9 18 fd ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 81 ea 14 61 af 2c 74 03 0f 0b 90 <66> 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 89 f2 48 8b 3f be 01 00 00 00 5d e9 e7
[ 4614.428775] RSP: 0018:ffffb95acfa4ba68 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 4614.434609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 4614.442587] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffb95acfa4ba70 RDI: ffffb95acfa4bc88
[ 4614.450557] RBP: ffffb95acfa4bae0 R08: ffff0a00ffffff05 R09: 0000000000000070
[ 4614.458527] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffab67eaf0 R12: ffffb95acfa4bcc8
[ 4614.466493] R13: ffffffffac5d50f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 4614.474473]  ? __cfi__RNvXs5_NtNtNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt3num3impyNtB9_7Display3fmt+0x10/0x10
[ 4614.484118]  ? _RNvNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt5write+0x1d2/0x250

This happens because core::fmt::write() calls
core::fmt::rt::Argument::fmt(), which currently has CFI disabled:

library/core/src/fmt/rt.rs:
171     // FIXME: Transmuting formatter in new and indirectly branching to/calling
172     // it here is an explicit CFI violation.
173     #[allow(inline_no_sanitize)]
174     #[no_sanitize(cfi, kcfi)]
175     #[inline]
176     pub(super) unsafe fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result {

This causes a Control Protection exception, because FineIBT has sealed
off the original function's endbr64.

This makes rust currently incompatible with FineIBT. Add a Kconfig
dependency that prevents FineIBT from getting turned on by default
if rust is enabled.

[ Rust 1.88.0 (scheduled for 2025-06-26) should have this fixed [1],
  and thus we relaxed the condition with Rust >= 1.88.

  When `objtool` lands checking for this with e.g. [2], the plan is
  to ideally run that in upstream Rust's CI to prevent regressions
  early [3], since we do not control `core`'s source code.

  Alice tested the Rust PR backported to an older compiler.

  Peter would like that Rust provides a stable `core` which can be
  pulled into the kernel: "Relying on that much out of tree code is
  'unfortunate'".

    - Miguel ]

Signed-off-by: Paweł Anikiel <panikiel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: rust-lang/rust#139632 [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/20250410154556.GB9003@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/ [2]
Link: rust-lang/rust#139632 (comment) [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410115420.366349-1-panikiel@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/att0-CANiq72kjDM0cKALVy4POEzhfdT4nO7tqz0Pm7xM+3=_0+L1t=A@mail.gmail.com
[ Reduced splat. - Miguel ]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2025
…cess

Add __netif_tx_lock() to ensure that only one packet is being
transmitted at a time to avoid race conditions in the netif_txq
struct and prevent packet data corruption. Failing to do so causes
kernel panic with the following error:

[ 2184.746764] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2184.751412] kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99!
[ 2184.756728] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

logs: https://gist.github.com/MeghanaMalladiTI/9c7aa5fc3b7fb03f87c74aad487956e9

The lock is acquired before calling emac_xmit_xdp_frame() and released after the
call returns. This ensures that the TX queue is protected from concurrent access
during the transmission of XDP frames.

Fixes: 62aa324 ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Add XDP support")
Signed-off-by: Meghana Malladi <m-malladi@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506110546.4065715-3-m-malladi@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2025
When userspace does PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, but Supm extension is not
available, the kernel crashes:

Oops - illegal instruction [#1]
    [snip]
epc : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a
 ra : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x74/0x15a
epc : ffffffff80011ace ra : ffffffff80011a30 sp : ffffffc60039be10
    [snip]
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000010a79073 cause: 0000000000000002
    set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a
    __riscv_sys_prctl+0x352/0x73c
    do_trap_ecall_u+0x17c/0x20c
    andle_exception+0x150/0x15c

Fix it by checking if Supm is available.

Fixes: 09d6775 ("riscv: Add support for userspace pointer masking")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504101920.3393053-1-namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2025
 into HEAD

KVM/riscv fixes for 6.15, take #1

- Add missing reset of smstateen CSRs
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2025
Currently iwdev->rf is allocated in irdma_probe(), but free in
irdma_ib_dealloc_device(). It can be misleading. Move the free to
irdma_remove() to be more obvious.

Freeing in irdma_ib_dealloc_device() leads to KASAN use-after-free
issue. Which can also lead to NULL pointer dereference. Fix this.

irdma_deinit_interrupts() can't be moved before freeing iwdef->rf,
because in this case deinit interrupts will be done before freeing irqs.
The simplest solution is to move kfree(iwdev->rf) to irdma_remove().

Reproducer:
  sudo rmmod irdma

Minified splat(s):
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma]
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
   ? kfree+0x253/0x450
   ? irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma]
   kasan_report+0xed/0x120
   ? irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma]
   irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma]
   auxiliary_bus_remove+0x56/0x80
   device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x530
   ? kernfs_put.part.0+0x147/0x310
   driver_detach+0xbf/0x180
   bus_remove_driver+0x11b/0x2a0
   auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x1a/0x50
   irdma_exit_module+0x40/0x4c [irdma]

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
  RIP: 0010:ice_free_rdma_qvector+0x2a/0xa0 [ice]
  Call Trace:
   ? ice_free_rdma_qvector+0x2a/0xa0 [ice]
   irdma_remove+0x179/0x2d0 [irdma]
   auxiliary_bus_remove+0x56/0x80
   device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x530
   ? kobject_put+0x61/0x4b0
   driver_detach+0xbf/0x180
   bus_remove_driver+0x11b/0x2a0
   auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x1a/0x50
   irdma_exit_module+0x40/0x4c [irdma]

Reported-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8e533834-4564-472f-b29b-4f1cb7730053@linux.intel.com/
Fixes: 3e0d3cb ("ice, irdma: move interrupts code to irdma")
Reviewed-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tatyana Nikolova <tatyana.e.nikolova@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250414234231.523-1-tatyana.e.nikolova@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2025
When memory is insufficient, the allocation of nfs_lock_context in
nfs_get_lock_context() fails and returns -ENOMEM. If we mistakenly treat
an nfs4_unlockdata structure (whose l_ctx member has been set to -ENOMEM)
as valid and proceed to execute rpc_run_task(), this will trigger a NULL
pointer dereference in nfs4_locku_prepare. For example:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u64:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-dirty torvalds#60
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40
Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule
RIP: 0010:nfs4_locku_prepare+0x35/0xc2
Code: 89 f2 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 68 69 ef b5 53 48 8b 8e 90 00 00 00 48 89 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffbbafc006bdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004b RBX: ffff9b964fc1fa00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: fffffffffffffff4 RDI: ffff9ba53fddbf40
RBP: ffff9ba539934000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbbafc006bc38
R10: ffffffffb6b689c8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9ba539934030
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000004248060 R15: ffffffffb56d1c30
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ba5881f0000(0000) knlGS:00000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 000000093f244000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rpc_execute+0xbc/0x480
 rpc_async_schedule+0x2f/0x40
 process_one_work+0x232/0x5d0
 worker_thread+0x1da/0x3d0
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 kthread+0x10d/0x240
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 000000000000000c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Free the allocated nfs4_unlockdata when nfs_get_lock_context() fails and
return NULL to terminate subsequent rpc_run_task, preventing NULL pointer
dereference.

Fixes: f30cb75 ("NFS: Always wait for I/O completion before unlock")
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417072508.3850532-1-lilingfeng3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2025
When CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST is enabled, fprobe triggers the following
warning:

    WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
    kernel/trace/fprobe.c:457 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

    other info that might help us debug this:
	#1: ffffffff863c4e08 (fprobe_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fprobe_module_callback+0x7b/0x8c0

    Call Trace:
	fprobe_module_callback
	notifier_call_chain
	blocking_notifier_call_chain

This warning occurs because fprobe_remove_node_in_module() traverses an
RCU list using RCU primitives without holding an RCU read lock. However,
the function is only called from fprobe_module_callback(), which holds
the fprobe_mutex lock that provides sufficient protection for safely
traversing the list.

Fix the warning by specifying the locking design to the
CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST mechanism. Add the lockdep_is_held() argument to
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() to inform the RCU checker that fprobe_mutex
provides the required protection.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250410-fprobe-v1-1-068ef5f41436@debian.org/

Fixes: a3dc298 ("tracing: fprobe: Cleanup fprobe hash when module unloading")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Tested-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@mandelbit.com>
Tested-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2025
If the discard worker is running and there's currently only one block
group, that block group is a data block group, it's in the unused block
groups discard list and is being used (it got an extent allocated from it
after becoming unused), the worker can end up in an infinite loop if a
transaction abort happens or the async discard is disabled (during remount
or unmount for example).

This happens like this:

1) Task A, the discard worker, is at peek_discard_list() and
   find_next_block_group() returns block group X;

2) Block group X is in the unused block groups discard list (its discard
   index is BTRFS_DISCARD_INDEX_UNUSED) since at some point in the past
   it become an unused block group and was added to that list, but then
   later it got an extent allocated from it, so its ->used counter is not
   zero anymore;

3) The current transaction is aborted by task B and we end up at
   __btrfs_handle_fs_error() in the transaction abort path, where we call
   btrfs_discard_stop(), which clears BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING from
   fs_info, and then at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() we set the fs to RO mode
   (setting SB_RDONLY in the super block's s_flags field);

4) Task A calls __add_to_discard_list() with the goal of moving the block
   group from the unused block groups discard list into another discard
   list, but at __add_to_discard_list() we end up doing nothing because
   btrfs_run_discard_work() returns false, since the super block has
   SB_RDONLY set in its flags and BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING is not set
   anymore in fs_info->flags. So block group X remains in the unused block
   groups discard list;

5) Task A then does a goto into the 'again' label, calls
   find_next_block_group() again we gets block group X again. Then it
   repeats the previous steps over and over since there are not other
   block groups in the discard lists and block group X is never moved
   out of the unused block groups discard list since
   btrfs_run_discard_work() keeps returning false and therefore
   __add_to_discard_list() doesn't move block group X out of that discard
   list.

When this happens we can get a soft lockup report like this:

  [71.957] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 27s! [kworker/u4:3:97]
  [71.957] Modules linked in: xfs af_packet rfkill (...)
  [71.957] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G        W          6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa
  [71.957] Tainted: [W]=WARN
  [71.957] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  [71.957] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs]
  [71.957] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs]
  [71.957] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...)
  [71.957] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246
  [71.957] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [71.957] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad
  [71.957] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080
  [71.957] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860
  [71.957] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000
  [71.957] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89707bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [71.957] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [71.957] CR2: 00005605bcc8d2f0 CR3: 000000010376a001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
  [71.957] PKRU: 55555554
  [71.957] Call Trace:
  [71.957]  <TASK>
  [71.957]  process_one_work+0x17e/0x330
  [71.957]  worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0
  [71.957]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  [71.957]  kthread+0xef/0x220
  [71.957]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [71.957]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  [71.957]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [71.957]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  [71.957]  </TASK>
  [71.957] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
  [71.987] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G        W    L     6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa
  [71.989] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
  [71.989] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  [71.991] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs]
  [71.992] Call Trace:
  [71.993]  <IRQ>
  [71.994]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x80
  [71.994]  panic+0x10b/0x2da
  [71.995]  watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x9a/0xa1
  [71.996]  ? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
  [71.997]  __hrtimer_run_queues+0x132/0x2a0
  [71.997]  hrtimer_interrupt+0xff/0x230
  [71.998]  __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x55/0x100
  [71.999]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x90
  [72.000]  </IRQ>
  [72.000]  <TASK>
  [72.001]  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
  [72.002] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs]
  [72.002] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...)
  [72.005] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246
  [72.006] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [72.006] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad
  [72.007] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080
  [72.008] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860
  [72.009] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000
  [72.010]  ? btrfs_discard_workfn+0x51/0x400 [btrfs 23b01089228eb964071fb7ca156eee8cd3bf996f]
  [72.011]  process_one_work+0x17e/0x330
  [72.012]  worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0
  [72.013]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  [72.014]  kthread+0xef/0x220
  [72.014]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [72.015]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  [72.015]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [72.016]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  [72.017]  </TASK>
  [72.017] Kernel Offset: 0x15000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
  [72.019] Rebooting in 90 seconds..

So fix this by making sure we move a block group out of the unused block
groups discard list when calling __add_to_discard_list().

Fixes: 2bee7eb ("btrfs: discard one region at a time in async discard")
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1242012
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2025
MACsec offload is not supported in switchdev mode for uplink
representors. When switching to the uplink representor profile, the
MACsec offload feature must be cleared from the netdevice's features.

If left enabled, attempts to add offloads result in a null pointer
dereference, as the uplink representor does not support MACsec offload
even though the feature bit remains set.

Clear NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC in mlx5e_fix_uplink_rep_features().

Kernel log:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f]
CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 4714 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_02_17_35 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0
Code: d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ad 15 00 00 8b 35 91 5c fe 03 85 f6 75 29 49 8d 7e 60 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a6 15 00 00 4d 3b 76 60 0f 85 fd 0b 00 00 65 ff
RSP: 0018:ffff888147a4f160 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000078
RBP: ffff888147a4f2e0 R08: ffffffffa05d2c19 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: ffff888152de0000
FS:  00007f855e27d800(0000) GS:ffff88881ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004e5768 CR3: 000000013ae7c005 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0
 ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220
 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core]
 ? __mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0
 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190
 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core]
 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1ae0/0x1ae0
 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530
 ? macsec_upd_offload+0x145/0x380
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90
 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x249/0x6b0
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0xb5/0x240
 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core]
 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsa+0x11a0/0x11a0 [mlx5_core]
 macsec_update_offload+0x26c/0x820
 ? macsec_set_mac_address+0x4b0/0x4b0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50
 macsec_upd_offload+0x2c8/0x380
 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820
 ? __nla_parse+0x22/0x30
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x15e/0x240
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240
 ? cap_capable+0xd4/0x330
 genl_rcv_msg+0x3ea/0x670
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0
 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190
 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12b/0x390
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0
 ? netlink_ack+0xd80/0xd80
 ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0xf90/0xf90
 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xac0
 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x155/0xac0
 ? _copy_from_iter+0x1bb/0x12c0
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 netlink_unicast+0x440/0x700
 ? netlink_attachskb+0x760/0x760
 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530
 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170
 netlink_sendmsg+0x749/0xc10
 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700
 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170
 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700
 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53f/0x760
 ? import_iovec+0x7/0x10
 ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30
 ? __copy_msghdr+0x3c0/0x3c0
 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x90/0x90
 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x28/0xa30
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170
 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x110/0x110
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x116/0x3b0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1da/0x3b0
 ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680
 ? __delete_object+0x21/0x50
 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180
 ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20
 ? kmem_cache_free+0x14c/0x4e0
 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f855e113367
Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
RSP: 002b:00007ffd15e90c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f855e113367
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd15e90cf0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffd15e90dbc R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 000000000045d100
R10: 00007f855e011dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000019
R13: 0000000067c6b785 R14: 00000000004a1e80 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_dpll mlx5_core rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 8ff0ac5 ("net/mlx5: Add MACsec offload Tx command support")
Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1746958552-561295-1-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2025
…unload

Kernel panic occurs when a devmem TCP socket is closed after NIC module
is unloaded.

This is Devmem TCP unregistration scenarios. number is an order.
(a)netlink socket close    (b)pp destroy    (c)uninstall    result
1                          2                3               OK
1                          3                2               (d)Impossible
2                          1                3               OK
3                          1                2               (e)Kernel panic
2                          3                1               (d)Impossible
3                          2                1               (d)Impossible

(a) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() is called when devmem TCP socket is
    closed.
(b) page_pool_destroy() is called when the interface is down.
(c) mp_ops->uninstall() is called when an interface is unregistered.
(d) There is no scenario in mp_ops->uninstall() is called before
    page_pool_destroy().
    Because unregister_netdevice_many_notify() closes interfaces first
    and then calls mp_ops->uninstall().
(e) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() accesses struct net_device to acquire
    netdev_lock().
    But if the interface module has already been removed, net_device
    pointer is invalid, so it causes kernel panic.

In summary, there are only 3 possible scenarios.
 A. sk close -> pp destroy -> uninstall.
 B. pp destroy -> sk close -> uninstall.
 C. pp destroy -> uninstall -> sk close.

Case C is a kernel panic scenario.

In order to fix this problem, It makes mp_dmabuf_devmem_uninstall() set
binding->dev to NULL.
It indicates an bound net_device was unregistered.

It makes netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() do not acquire netdev_lock()
if binding->dev is NULL.

A new binding->lock is added to protect a dev of a binding.
So, lock ordering is like below.
 priv->lock
 netdev_lock(dev)
 binding->lock

Tests:
Scenario A:
    ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \
        -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 &
    pid=$!
    sleep 10
    kill $pid
    ip link set $interface down
    modprobe -rv $module

Scenario B:
    ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \
        -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 &
    pid=$!
    sleep 10
    ip link set $interface down
    kill $pid
    modprobe -rv $module

Scenario C:
    ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \
        -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 &
    pid=$!
    sleep 10
    modprobe -rv $module
    sleep 5
    kill $pid

Splat looks like:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc001fffa9f7: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00000000fffd4fb8-0x00000000fffd4fbf]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2041 Comm: ncdevmem Tainted: G    B   W           6.15.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(undef)  0947ec89efa0fd68838b78e36aa1617e97ff5d7f
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock (./include/linux/sched.h:2244 kernel/locking/mutex.c:400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:443 kernel/locking/mutex.c:605 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 13 00 00 49 8b 1e 48 83 e3 f8 74 6a 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 34 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 f
RSP: 0018:ffff88826f7ef730 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000fffd4f88 RCX: ffffffffaa9bc811
RDX: 000000001fffa9f7 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000fffd4fbc
RBP: ffff88826f7ef8b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed103e6aa1a4
R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff88826f7ef442 R12: fffffbfff669f65e
R13: ffff88812a830040 R14: ffff8881f3550d20 R15: 00000000fffd4f88
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888866c05000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000563bed0cb288 CR3: 00000001a7c98000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
 ...
 netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy (net/core/netdev-genl.c:953 (discriminator 3))
 genl_release (net/netlink/genetlink.c:653 net/netlink/genetlink.c:694 net/netlink/genetlink.c:705)
 ...
 netlink_release (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:737)
 ...
 __sock_release (net/socket.c:647)
 sock_close (net/socket.c:1393)

Fixes: 1d22d30 ("net: drop rtnl_lock for queue_mgmt operations")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514154028.1062909-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 22, 2025
Guoyu Yin reported a splat in the ipmr netns cleanup path:

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 14564 Comm: syz.4.838 Not tainted 6.14.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 7d 48 c7 83 60 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 71 67 7f 00 e8 4c 2d 8a fd 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 93 e8 41 2d 8a fd 0f b6 2d 80 54 ea 01 31 ff 89 ee e8
RSP: 0018:ffff888109547c58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888108c12dc0 RCX: ffffffff83e09868
RDX: ffff8881022b3300 RSI: ffffffff83e098d4 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff888104288000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed10211825c9
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88801816c4a0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff888108c13320 R14: ffff888108c12dc0 R15: fffffbfff0b74058
FS:  00007f84f39316c0(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f84f3930f98 CR3: 0000000113b56000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ipmr_net_exit_batch+0x50/0x90 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:3160
 ops_exit_list+0x10c/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:177
 setup_net+0x47d/0x8e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:394
 copy_net_ns+0x25d/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:516
 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xaf0 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc3/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
 ksys_unshare+0x78d/0x9a0 kernel/fork.c:3342
 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3413 [inline]
 __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3411 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3411
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f84f532cc29
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f84f3931038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f84f5615fa0 RCX: 00007f84f532cc29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000400
RBP: 00007f84f53fba18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f84f5615fa0 R15: 00007fff51c5f328
 </TASK>

The running kernel has CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES disabled, and
the sanity check for such build is still too loose.

Address the issue consolidating the relevant sanity check in a single
helper regardless of the kernel configuration. Also share it between
the ipv4 and ipv6 code.

Reported-by: Guoyu Yin <y04609127@gmail.com>
Fixes: 50b9420 ("ipmr: tune the ipmr_can_free_table() checks.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/372dc261e1bf12742276e1b984fc5a071b7fc5a8.1747321903.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
I started seeing this in recent Fedora 42 kernels:

  # uname -a
  Linux number 6.14.3-300.fc42.x86_64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Sun Apr 20 16:08:39 UTC 2025 x86_64 GNU/Linux
  #

  # perf test vmlinux
    1: vmlinux symtab matches kallsyms                                 : FAILED!
  #

Where we have Rust enabled:

  # grep CONFIG_RUST /boot/config-6.14.3-300.fc42.x86_64
  CONFIG_RUSTC_VERSION=108600
  CONFIG_RUST_IS_AVAILABLE=y
  CONFIG_RUSTC_LLVM_VERSION=200101
  CONFIG_RUSTC_HAS_COERCE_POINTEE=y
  CONFIG_RUST=y
  CONFIG_RUSTC_VERSION_TEXT="rustc 1.86.0 (05f9846f8 2025-03-31) (Fedora 1.86.0-1.fc42)"
  CONFIG_RUST_FW_LOADER_ABSTRACTIONS=y
  CONFIG_RUST_PHYLIB_ABSTRACTIONS=y
  # CONFIG_RUST_DEBUG_ASSERTIONS is not set
  CONFIG_RUST_OVERFLOW_CHECKS=y
  # CONFIG_RUST_BUILD_ASSERT_ALLOW is not set
  #

Looking at the reason for the failure:

  # perf test -v vmlinux |& grep ^ERR
  ERR : 0xffffffff99efc7d0: __pfx__RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_ not on kallsyms
  ERR : 0xffffffff99efc7e0: _RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_ not on kallsyms
  #

But:

  # grep -w u /proc/kallsyms
  ffffffff99efc7d0 u __pfx__RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_
  ffffffff99efc7e0 u _RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_
  #

The test checks that "vmlinux symtab matches kallsyms", so it finds those two
symbols in vmlinux:

  # pahole --running_kernel_vmlinux
  /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/6.14.3-300.fc42.x86_64/vmlinux
  #

  # readelf -sW /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/6.14.3-300.fc42.x86_64/vmlinux | grep -Ew '(__pfx__RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_|_RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_)'
 81844: ffffffff81efc7e0   524 FUNC    LOCAL  DEFAULT    1 _RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_
144259: ffffffff81efc7d0    16 FUNC    LOCAL  DEFAULT    1 __pfx__RNCINvNtNtNtCsf5tcb0XGUW4_4core4iter8adapters3map12map_try_foldjNtCsagR6JbSOIa9_12drm_panic_qr7VersionuINtNtNtBa_3ops12control_flow11ControlFlowB10_ENcB10_0NCINvNvNtNtNtB8_6traits8iterator8Iterator4find5checkB10_NCNvMB12_B10_13from_segments0E0E0B12_
  #

It is there.

From the nm documentation we can see that:

           "U" The symbol is undefined.

           "u" The symbol is a unique global symbol.  This is a GNU extension to the
	       standard set of ELF symbol bindings.  For such a symbol the dynamic
	       linker will make sure that in the entire process there is just one
	       symbol with this name and type in use.

So lets consider 'u' symbols in /proc/kallsyms when loading it to cover this case.

Fedora:40 shows this as a 'l' symbol, so consider that as well.

With this patch 'perf test 1' is happy again:

  # perf test vmlinux
    1: vmlinux symtab matches kallsyms                                 : Ok
  #

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aBE_n0PGl3g6h-cS@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
Running the "perf script task-analyzer tests" with address sanitizer
showed a double free:
```
FAIL: "test_csv_extended_times" Error message: "Failed to find required string:'Out-Out;'."
=================================================================
==19190==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x50b000017b10 in thread T0:
    #0 0x55da9601c78a in free (perf+0x26078a) (BuildId: e7ef50e08970f017a96fde6101c5e2491acc674a)
    #1 0x55da96640c63 in filename__read_build_id tools/perf/util/symbol-minimal.c:221:2

0x50b000017b10 is located 0 bytes inside of 112-byte region [0x50b000017b10,0x50b000017b80)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x55da9601ce40 in realloc (perf+0x260e40) (BuildId: e7ef50e08970f017a96fde6101c5e2491acc674a)
    #1 0x55da96640ad6 in filename__read_build_id tools/perf/util/symbol-minimal.c:204:10

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x55da9601ca23 in malloc (perf+0x260a23) (BuildId: e7ef50e08970f017a96fde6101c5e2491acc674a)
    #1 0x55da966407e7 in filename__read_build_id tools/perf/util/symbol-minimal.c:181:9

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: double-free (perf+0x26078a) (BuildId: e7ef50e08970f017a96fde6101c5e2491acc674a) in free
==19190==ABORTING
FAIL: "invocation of perf script report task-analyzer --csv-summary csvsummary --summary-extended command failed" Error message: ""
FAIL: "test_csvsummary_extended" Error message: "Failed to find required string:'Out-Out;'."
---- end(-1) ----
132: perf script task-analyzer tests                                 : FAILED!
```

The buf_size if always set to phdr->p_filesz, but that may be 0
causing a free and realloc to return NULL. This is treated in
filename__read_build_id like a failure and the buffer is freed again.

To avoid this problem only grow buf, meaning the buf_size will never
be 0. This also reduces the number of memory (re)allocations.

Fixes: b691f64 ("perf symbols: Implement poor man's ELF parser")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250501070003.22251-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
Specify the threshold for dumping offcpu samples with --off-cpu-thresh,
the unit is milliseconds. Default value is 500ms.

Example:

  perf record --off-cpu --off-cpu-thresh 824

The example above collects direct off-cpu samples where the off-cpu time
is longer than 824ms.

Committer testing:

After commenting out the end off-cpu dump to have just the ones that are
added right after the task is scheduled back, and using a threshould of
1000ms, we see some periods (the 5th column, just before "offcpu-time"
in the 'perf script' output) that are over 1000.000.000 nanoseconds:

  root@number:~# perf record --off-cpu --off-cpu-thresh 10000
  ^C[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  [ perf record: Captured and wrote 3.902 MB perf.data (34335 samples) ]
  root@number:~# perf script
<SNIP>
  Isolated Web Co   59932 [028] 63839.594437: 1000049427 offcpu-time:
             7fe63c7976c2 __syscall_cancel_arch_end+0x0 (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fe63c78c04c __futex_abstimed_wait_common+0x7c (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fe63c78e928 pthread_cond_timedwait@@GLIBC_2.3.2+0x178 (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             5599974a9fe7 mozilla::detail::ConditionVariableImpl::wait_for(mozilla::detail::MutexImpl&, mozilla::BaseTimeDuration<mozilla::TimeDurationValueCalculator> const&)+0xe7 (/usr/lib64/fir>
                100000000 [unknown] ([unknown])

          swapper       0 [025] 63839.594459:     195724    cycles:P:  ffffffffac328270 read_tsc+0x0 ([kernel.kallsyms])
  Isolated Web Co   59932 [010] 63839.594466: 1000055278 offcpu-time:
             7fe63c7976c2 __syscall_cancel_arch_end+0x0 (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fe63c78ba24 __syscall_cancel+0x14 (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fe63c804c4e __poll+0x1e (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fe633b0d1b8 PollWrapper(_GPollFD*, unsigned int, int) [clone .lto_priv.0]+0xf8 (/usr/lib64/firefox/libxul.so)
                10000002c [unknown] ([unknown])

          swapper       0 [027] 63839.594475:     134433    cycles:P:  ffffffffad4c45d9 irqentry_enter+0x19 ([kernel.kallsyms])
          swapper       0 [028] 63839.594499:     215838    cycles:P:  ffffffffac39199a switch_mm_irqs_off+0x10a ([kernel.kallsyms])
  MediaPD~oder #1 1407676 [027] 63839.594514:     134433    cycles:P:      7f982ef5e69f dct_IV(int*, int, int*)+0x24f (/usr/lib64/libfdk-aac.so.2.0.0)
          swapper       0 [024] 63839.594524:     267411    cycles:P:  ffffffffad4c6ee6 poll_idle+0x56 ([kernel.kallsyms])
  MediaSu~sor torvalds#75 1093827 [026] 63839.594555:     332652    cycles:P:      55be753ad030 moz_xmalloc+0x200 (/usr/lib64/firefox/firefox)
          swapper       0 [027] 63839.594616:     160548    cycles:P:  ffffffffad144840 menu_select+0x570 ([kernel.kallsyms])
  Isolated Web Co   14019 [027] 63839.595120: 1000050178 offcpu-time:
             7fc9537cc6c2 __syscall_cancel_arch_end+0x0 (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fc9537c104c __futex_abstimed_wait_common+0x7c (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fc9537c3928 pthread_cond_timedwait@@GLIBC_2.3.2+0x178 (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6)
             7fc95372a3c8 pt_TimedWait+0xb8 (/usr/lib64/libnspr4.so)
             7fc95372a8d8 PR_WaitCondVar+0x68 (/usr/lib64/libnspr4.so)
             7fc94afb1f7c WatchdogMain(void*)+0xac (/usr/lib64/firefox/libxul.so)
             7fc947498660 [unknown] ([unknown])
             7fc9535fce88 [unknown] ([unknown])
             7fc94b620e60 WatchdogManager::~WatchdogManager()+0x0 (/usr/lib64/firefox/libxul.so)
          fff8548387f8b48 [unknown] ([unknown])

          swapper       0 [003] 63839.595712:     212948    cycles:P:  ffffffffacd5b865 acpi_os_read_port+0x55 ([kernel.kallsyms])
<SNIP>

Suggested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gautam Menghani <gautam@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241108204137.2444151-2-howardchu95@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250501022809.449767-10-howardchu95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
Despite the fact that several lockdep-related checks are skipped when
calling trylock* versions of the locking primitives, for example
mutex_trylock, each time the mutex is acquired, a held_lock is still
placed onto the lockdep stack by __lock_acquire() which is called
regardless of whether the trylock* or regular locking API was used.

This means that if the caller successfully acquires more than
MAX_LOCK_DEPTH locks of the same class, even when using mutex_trylock,
lockdep will still complain that the maximum depth of the held lock stack
has been reached and disable itself.

For example, the following error currently occurs in the ARM version
of KVM, once the code tries to lock all vCPUs of a VM configured with more
than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs, a situation that can easily happen on modern
systems, where having more than 48 CPUs is common, and it's also common to
run VMs that have vCPU counts approaching that number:

[  328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
[  328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator.
[  328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report
[  328.187531] depth: 48  max: 48!
[  328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664:
[  328.194957]  #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0
[  328.204048]  #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.212521]  #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.220991]  #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.229463]  #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.237934]  #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.246405]  torvalds#6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0

Luckily, in all instances that require locking all vCPUs, the
'kvm->lock' is taken a priori, and that fact makes it possible to use
the little known feature of lockdep, called a 'nest_lock', to avoid this
warning and subsequent lockdep self-disablement.

The action of 'nested lock' being provided to lockdep's lock_acquire(),
causes the lockdep to detect that the top of the held lock stack contains
a lock of the same class and then increment its reference counter instead
of pushing a new held_lock item onto that stack.

See __lock_acquire for more information.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-ID: <20250512180407.659015-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
Use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus instead of a custom implementation when locking
all vCPUs of a VM, to avoid triggering a lockdep warning, in the case in
which the VM is configured to have more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs.

This fixes the following false lockdep warning:

[  328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
[  328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator.
[  328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report
[  328.187531] depth: 48  max: 48!
[  328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664:
[  328.194957]  #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0
[  328.204048]  #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.212521]  #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.220991]  #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.229463]  #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.237934]  #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0
[  328.246405]  torvalds#6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-ID: <20250512180407.659015-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
The same buf is used for the program headers and reading notes. As the
notes memory may be reallocated then this corrupts the memory pointed
to by the phdr. Using the same buffer is in any case a logic
error. Rather than deal with the duplicated code, introduce an elf32
boolean and a union for either the elf32 or elf64 headers that are in
use. Let the program headers have their own memory and grow the buffer
for notes as necessary.

Before `perf list -j` compiled with asan would crash with:
```
==4176189==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x5160000070b8 at pc 0x555d3b15075b bp 0x7ffebb5a8090 sp 0x7ffebb5a8088
READ of size 8 at 0x5160000070b8 thread T0
    #0 0x555d3b15075a in filename__read_build_id tools/perf/util/symbol-minimal.c:212:25
    #1 0x555d3ae43aff in filename__sprintf_build_id tools/perf/util/build-id.c:110:8
...

0x5160000070b8 is located 312 bytes inside of 560-byte region [0x516000006f80,0x5160000071b0)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x555d3ab21840 in realloc (perf+0x264840) (BuildId: 12dff2f6629f738e5012abdf0e90055518e70b5e)
    #1 0x555d3b1506e7 in filename__read_build_id tools/perf/util/symbol-minimal.c:206:11
...

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x555d3ab21423 in malloc (perf+0x264423) (BuildId: 12dff2f6629f738e5012abdf0e90055518e70b5e)
    #1 0x555d3b1503a2 in filename__read_build_id tools/perf/util/symbol-minimal.c:182:9
...
```

Note: this bug is long standing and not introduced by the other asan
fix in commit fa9c497 ("perf symbol-minimal: Fix double free in
filename__read_build_id").

Fixes: b691f64 ("perf symbols: Implement poor man's ELF parser")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250528032637.198960-2-irogers@google.com
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Cc: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Cc: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Weilin Wang <weilin.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Cc: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>
Cc: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
syzkaller has found another ugly race in the VGIC, this time dealing
with VGIC creation. Since kvm_vgic_create() doesn't sufficiently protect
against in-flight vCPU creations, it is possible to get a vCPU into the
kernel w/ an in-kernel VGIC but no allocation of private IRQs:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000d20
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x0000000096000046
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
    FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000046, ISS2 = 0x00000000
    CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
    GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
  user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000103e4f000
  [0000000000000d20] pgd=0800000102e1c403, p4d=0800000102e1c403, pud=0800000101146403, pmd=0000000000000000
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000046 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 246 Comm: test Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6-00097-g0c90821f5db8 torvalds#16
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  pstate: 814020c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c
  lr : kvm_vgic_set_owner+0x54/0xa4
  sp : ffff80008086ba20
  x29: ffff80008086ba20 x28: ffff0000c19b5640 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c4879bd0 x24: 000000000000001e
  x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c487af80
  x20: ffff0000c487af18 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000001afadd5a8b
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
  x14: ffff0000c19b56c0 x13: 0030c9adf9d9889e x12: ffffc263710e1908
  x11: 0000001afb0d74f2 x10: e0966b840b373664 x9 : ec806bf7d6a57cd5
  x8 : ffff80008086b980 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
  x5 : 0000000080800054 x4 : 4ec4ec4ec4ec4ec5 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000d20
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P)
   kvm_vgic_set_owner+0x54/0xa4
   kvm_timer_enable+0xf4/0x274
   kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change+0xe0/0x380
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x93c/0x9e0
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0xec
   invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
   do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
   el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
   Code: b9000841 d503201f 52800001 52800022 (88e17c02)
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Plug the race by explicitly checking for an in-progress vCPU creation
and failing kvm_vgic_create() when that's the case. Add some comments to
document all the things kvm_vgic_create() is trying to guard against
too.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250523194722.4066715-6-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.16, take #1

- Make the irqbypass hooks resilient to changes in the GSI<->MSI
  routing, avoiding behind stale vLPI mappings being left behind. The
  fix is to resolve the VGIC IRQ using the host IRQ (which is stable)
  and nuking the vLPI mapping upon a routing change.

- Close another VGIC race where vCPU creation races with VGIC
  creation, leading to in-flight vCPUs entering the kernel w/o private
  IRQs allocated.

- Fix a build issue triggered by the recently added workaround for
  Ampere's AC04_CPU_23 erratum.

- Correctly sign-extend the VA when emulating a TLBI instruction
  potentially targeting a VNCR mapping.

- Avoid dereferencing a NULL pointer in the VGIC debug code, which can
  happen if the device doesn't have any mapping yet.
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2025
The following issue happens with a buggy module:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218
PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d
RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68
R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038
R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff
FS:  00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590
 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0
 s_next+0x5b/0xa0
 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070
 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0
 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280
 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920
 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue may happen as follows:
(1) Add kprobe tracepoint;
(2) insmod test.ko;
(3)  Module triggers ftrace disabled;
(4) rmmod test.ko;
(5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --> Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed;
ftrace_mod_get_kallsym()
...
strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
...

The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and
sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is
discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text
modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops
more than just the text modification.

When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because
kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace
saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This
allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names
instead of just their raw memory addresses.

When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if
ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The
problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms
is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that
has already been freed as it will return:

  strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);

Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523135452.626d8dcd@gandalf.local.home/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aba4b5c ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 6, 2025
When performing a right split on a folio, the split_at2 may point to a
not-present page if the offset + length equals the original folio size,
which will trigger the following error:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea0006000008
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 143ffb9067 P4D 143ffb9067 PUD 143ffb8067 PMD 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 502640 Comm: fsx Not tainted 6.15.0-rc3-gc6156189fc6b torvalds#889 PR
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/4
 RIP: 0010:truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x208/0x620
 Code: ff 03 48 01 da e8 78 7e 13 00 48 83 05 10 b5 5a 0c 01 85 c0 0f 85 1c 02 001
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90005bafab0 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea0005ffff00 RCX: 0000000000000002
 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 0000000000013975 RDI: ffffc90005bafa30
 RBP: ffffea0006000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000009bf
 R10: 00000000000007e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001633
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffea0005ffff00 R15: fffffffffffffffe
 FS:  00007f9f9a161740(0000) GS:ffff8894971fd000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffea0006000008 CR3: 000000017c2ae000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  truncate_inode_pages_range+0x226/0x720
  truncate_pagecache+0x57/0x90
  ...

Fix this issue by skipping the split if truncation aligns with the folio
size, make sure the split page number lies within the folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250512062825.3533342-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: 7460b47 ("mm/truncate: use folio_split() in truncate operation")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: ErKun Yang <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 6, 2025
…ugetlb folios

A kernel crash was observed when replacing free hugetlb folios:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 28 UID: 0 PID: 29639 Comm: test_cma.sh Tainted 6.15.0-rc6-zp torvalds#41 PREEMPT(voluntary)
RIP: 0010:alloc_and_dissolve_hugetlb_folio+0x1d/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b30fa90 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000342cca RCX: ffffea0043000000
RDX: ffffc9000b30fb08 RSI: ffffea0043000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000b30fb20 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88886f92eb00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0043000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000010c0200 R15: 0000000000000004
FS:  00007fcda5f14740(0000) GS:ffff8888ec1d8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000391402000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
 replace_free_hugepage_folios+0xb6/0x100
 alloc_contig_range_noprof+0x18a/0x590
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? down_read+0x12/0xa0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 cma_range_alloc.constprop.0+0x131/0x290
 __cma_alloc+0xcf/0x2c0
 cma_alloc_write+0x43/0xb0
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb2/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x46/0x70
 full_proxy_write+0x62/0xa0
 vfs_write+0xf8/0x420
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? filp_flush+0x86/0xa0
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? filp_close+0x1f/0x30
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? do_dup2+0xaf/0x160
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ksys_write+0x65/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

There is a potential race between __update_and_free_hugetlb_folio() and
replace_free_hugepage_folios():

CPU1                              CPU2
__update_and_free_hugetlb_folio   replace_free_hugepage_folios
                                    folio_test_hugetlb(folio)
                                    -- It's still hugetlb folio.

  __folio_clear_hugetlb(folio)
  hugetlb_free_folio(folio)
                                    h = folio_hstate(folio)
                                    -- Here, h is NULL pointer

When the above race condition occurs, folio_hstate(folio) returns NULL,
and subsequent access to this NULL pointer will cause the system to crash.
To resolve this issue, execute folio_hstate(folio) under the protection
of the hugetlb_lock lock, ensuring that folio_hstate(folio) does not
return NULL.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1747884137-26685-1-git-send-email-yangge1116@126.com
Fixes: 04f13d2 ("mm: replace free hugepage folios after migration")
Signed-off-by: Ge Yang <yangge1116@126.com>
Reviewed-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Barry Song <21cnbao@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies
to the entire address space if either:
1) start_addr and size are both 0
2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1

>From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the
size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well.

Fixes: 13acfec ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests")
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605061458.196003-2-apatel@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
When building the free space tree with the block group tree feature
enabled, we can hit an assertion failure like this:

  BTRFS info (device loop0 state M): rebuilding free space tree
  assertion failed: ret == 0, in fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1102
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1102!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6592 Comm: syz-executor322 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-gd7fa1af5b33e #0 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
  pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : populate_free_space_tree+0x514/0x518 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1102
  lr : populate_free_space_tree+0x514/0x518 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1102
  sp : ffff8000a4ce7600
  x29: ffff8000a4ce76e0 x28: ffff0000c9bc6000 x27: ffff0000ddfff3d8
  x26: ffff0000ddfff378 x25: dfff800000000000 x24: 0000000000000001
  x23: ffff8000a4ce7660 x22: ffff70001499cecc x21: ffff0000e1d8c160
  x20: ffff0000e1cb7800 x19: ffff0000e1d8c0b0 x18: 00000000ffffffff
  x17: ffff800092f39000 x16: ffff80008ad27e48 x15: ffff700011e740c0
  x14: 1ffff00011e740c0 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff
  x11: ffff700011e740c0 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 94ef24f55d2dbc00
  x8 : 94ef24f55d2dbc00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
  x5 : ffff8000a4ce6f98 x4 : ffff80008f415ba0 x3 : ffff800080548ef0
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000003e
  Call trace:
   populate_free_space_tree+0x514/0x518 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1102 (P)
   btrfs_rebuild_free_space_tree+0x14c/0x54c fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1337
   btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xa78/0xe10 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3074
   btrfs_remount_rw fs/btrfs/super.c:1319 [inline]
   btrfs_reconfigure+0x828/0x2418 fs/btrfs/super.c:1543
   reconfigure_super+0x1d4/0x6f0 fs/super.c:1083
   do_remount fs/namespace.c:3365 [inline]
   path_mount+0xb34/0xde0 fs/namespace.c:4200
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:4221 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4432 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4409 [inline]
   __arm64_sys_mount+0x3e8/0x468 fs/namespace.c:4409
   __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
   invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
   el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
   do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
   el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
  Code: f0047182 91178042 528089c3 9771d47 (d4210000)
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This happens because we are processing an empty block group, which has
no extents allocated from it, there are no items for this block group,
including the block group item since block group items are stored in a
dedicated tree when using the block group tree feature. It also means
this is the block group with the highest start offset, so there are no
higher keys in the extent root, hence btrfs_search_slot_for_read()
returns 1 (no higher key found).

Fix this by asserting 'ret' is 0 only if the block group tree feature
is not enabled, in which case we should find a block group item for
the block group since it's stored in the extent root and block group
item keys are greater than extent item keys (the value for
BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM_KEY is 192 and for BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY and
BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY the values are 168 and 169 respectively).
In case 'ret' is 1, we just need to add a record to the free space
tree which spans the whole block group, and we can achieve this by
making 'ret == 0' as the while loop's condition.

Reported-by: syzbot+36fae25c35159a763a2a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6841dca8.a00a0220.d4325.0020.GAE@google.com/
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[BUG]
There is syzbot based reproducer that can crash the kernel, with the
following call trace: (With some debug output added)

 DEBUG: rescue=ibadroots parsed
 BTRFS: device fsid 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8 devid 1 transid 8 /dev/loop0 (7:0) scanned by repro (1010)
 BTRFS info (device loop0): first mount of filesystem 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8
 BTRFS info (device loop0): using blake2b (blake2b-256-generic) checksum algorithm
 BTRFS info (device loop0): using free-space-tree
 BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5312512 mirror 1 wanted 0xb043382657aede36608fd3386d6b001692ff406164733d94e2d9a180412c6003 found 0x810ceb2bacb7f0f9eb2bf3b2b15c02af867cb35ad450898169f3b1f0bd818651 level 0
 DEBUG: read tree root path failed for tree csum, ret=-5
 BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5328896 mirror 1 wanted 0x51be4e8b303da58e6340226815b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a found 0x51be4e8b303da58e634022a315b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a level 0
 BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5292032 mirror 1 wanted 0x1924ccd683be9efc2fa98582ef58760e3848e9043db8649ee382681e220cdee4 found 0x0cb6184f6e8799d9f8cb335dccd1d1832da1071d12290dab3b85b587ecacca6e level 0
 process 'repro' launched './file2' with NULL argv: empty string added
 DEBUG: no csum root, idatacsums=0 ibadroots=134217728
 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f]
 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1010 Comm: repro Tainted: G           OE       6.15.0-custom+ torvalds#249 PREEMPT(full)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
 RIP: 0010:btrfs_lookup_csum+0x93/0x3d0 [btrfs]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  btrfs_lookup_bio_sums+0x47a/0xdf0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_submit_bbio+0x43e/0x1a80 [btrfs]
  submit_one_bio+0xde/0x160 [btrfs]
  btrfs_readahead+0x498/0x6a0 [btrfs]
  read_pages+0x1c3/0xb20
  page_cache_ra_order+0x4b5/0xc20
  filemap_get_pages+0x2d3/0x19e0
  filemap_read+0x314/0xde0
  __kernel_read+0x35b/0x900
  bprm_execve+0x62e/0x1140
  do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x3fc/0x520
  __x64_sys_execveat+0xdc/0x130
  do_syscall_64+0x54/0x1d0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

[CAUSE]
Firstly the fs has a corrupted csum tree root, thus to mount the fs we
have to go "ro,rescue=ibadroots" mount option.

Normally with that mount option, a bad csum tree root should set
BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS flag, so that any future data read will
ignore csum search.

But in this particular case, we have the following call trace that
caused NULL csum root, but not setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS:

load_global_roots_objectid():

		ret = btrfs_search_slot();
		/* Succeeded */
		btrfs_item_key_to_cpu()
		found = true;
		/* We found the root item for csum tree. */
		root = read_tree_root_path();
		if (IS_ERR(root)) {
			if (!btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, IGNOREBADROOTS))
			/*
			 * Since we have rescue=ibadroots mount option,
			 * @ret is still 0.
			 */
			break;
	if (!found || ret) {
		/* @found is true, @ret is 0, error handling for csum
		 * tree is skipped.
		 */
	}

This means we completely skipped to set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS if
the csum tree is corrupted, which results unexpected later csum lookup.

[FIX]
If read_tree_root_path() failed, always populate @ret to the error
number.

As at the end of the function, we need @ret to determine if we need to
do the extra error handling for csum tree.

Fixes: abed4aa ("btrfs: track the csum, extent, and free space trees in a rb tree")
Reported-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Longxing Li <coregee2000@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
 into HEAD

KVM/riscv fixes for 6.16, take #1

- Fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls
- Don't treat SBI HFENCE calls as NOPs
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
This fixes the following problem:

[  749.901015] [   T8673] run fstests cifs/001 at 2025-06-17 09:40:30
[  750.346409] [   T9870] ==================================================================
[  750.346814] [   T9870] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb_set_sge+0x2cc/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  750.347330] [   T9870] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888011082890 by task xfs_io/9870
[  750.347705] [   T9870]
[  750.348077] [   T9870] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9870 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2-metze.02+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  750.348082] [   T9870] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  750.348085] [   T9870] Call Trace:
[  750.348086] [   T9870]  <TASK>
[  750.348088] [   T9870]  dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
[  750.348106] [   T9870]  print_report+0xd1/0x640
[  750.348116] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[  750.348120] [   T9870]  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x26/0x210
[  750.348124] [   T9870]  kasan_report+0xe7/0x130
[  750.348128] [   T9870]  ? smb_set_sge+0x2cc/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  750.348262] [   T9870]  ? smb_set_sge+0x2cc/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  750.348377] [   T9870]  __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x17/0x30
[  750.348381] [   T9870]  smb_set_sge+0x2cc/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  750.348496] [   T9870]  smbd_post_send_iter+0x1990/0x3070 [cifs]
[  750.348625] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smbd_post_send_iter+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.348741] [   T9870]  ? update_stack_state+0x2a0/0x670
[  750.348749] [   T9870]  ? cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.348870] [   T9870]  ? cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.348990] [   T9870]  ? update_stack_state+0x2a0/0x670
[  750.348995] [   T9870]  smbd_send+0x58c/0x9c0 [cifs]
[  750.349117] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smbd_send+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.349231] [   T9870]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x65/0xb0
[  750.349235] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[  750.349242] [   T9870]  ? arch_stack_walk+0xa7/0x100
[  750.349250] [   T9870]  ? stack_trace_save+0x92/0xd0
[  750.349254] [   T9870]  __smb_send_rqst+0x931/0xec0 [cifs]
[  750.349374] [   T9870]  ? kernel_text_address+0x173/0x190
[  750.349379] [   T9870]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70
[  750.349382] [   T9870]  ? kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70
[  750.349385] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x9d/0xa0
[  750.349389] [   T9870]  ? __pfx___smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.349508] [   T9870]  ? smb2_mid_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x7e0 [cifs]
[  750.349626] [   T9870]  ? cifs_call_async+0x277/0xb00 [cifs]
[  750.349746] [   T9870]  ? cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.349867] [   T9870]  ? netfs_do_issue_write+0xc2/0x340 [netfs]
[  750.349900] [   T9870]  ? netfs_advance_write+0x45b/0x1270 [netfs]
[  750.349929] [   T9870]  ? netfs_write_folio+0xd6c/0x1be0 [netfs]
[  750.349958] [   T9870]  ? netfs_writepages+0x2e9/0xa80 [netfs]
[  750.349987] [   T9870]  ? do_writepages+0x21f/0x590
[  750.349993] [   T9870]  ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0xe1/0x140
[  750.349997] [   T9870]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.350002] [   T9870]  smb_send_rqst+0x22e/0x2f0 [cifs]
[  750.350131] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.350255] [   T9870]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0
[  750.350261] [   T9870]  ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x60
[  750.350268] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.350271] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x81/0xf0
[  750.350275] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  750.350278] [   T9870]  ? smb2_setup_async_request+0x293/0x580 [cifs]
[  750.350398] [   T9870]  cifs_call_async+0x477/0xb00 [cifs]
[  750.350518] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smb2_writev_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.350636] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_cifs_call_async+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.350756] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  750.350760] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.350763] [   T9870]  ? __smb2_plain_req_init+0x933/0x1090 [cifs]
[  750.350891] [   T9870]  smb2_async_writev+0x15ff/0x2460 [cifs]
[  750.351008] [   T9870]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  750.351012] [   T9870]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0
[  750.351018] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smb2_async_writev+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.351144] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[  750.351150] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x40
[  750.351154] [   T9870]  ? cifs_pick_channel+0x242/0x370 [cifs]
[  750.351275] [   T9870]  cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.351554] [   T9870]  ? cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.351677] [   T9870]  netfs_do_issue_write+0xc2/0x340 [netfs]
[  750.351710] [   T9870]  netfs_advance_write+0x45b/0x1270 [netfs]
[  750.351740] [   T9870]  ? rolling_buffer_append+0x12d/0x440 [netfs]
[  750.351769] [   T9870]  netfs_write_folio+0xd6c/0x1be0 [netfs]
[  750.351798] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.351804] [   T9870]  netfs_writepages+0x2e9/0xa80 [netfs]
[  750.351835] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_netfs_writepages+0x10/0x10 [netfs]
[  750.351864] [   T9870]  ? exit_files+0xab/0xe0
[  750.351867] [   T9870]  ? do_exit+0x148f/0x2980
[  750.351871] [   T9870]  ? do_group_exit+0xb5/0x250
[  750.351874] [   T9870]  ? arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x92/0x630
[  750.351879] [   T9870]  ? exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x98/0x170
[  750.351882] [   T9870]  ? do_syscall_64+0x2cf/0xd80
[  750.351886] [   T9870]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.351890] [   T9870]  do_writepages+0x21f/0x590
[  750.351894] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_do_writepages+0x10/0x10
[  750.351897] [   T9870]  filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0xe1/0x140
[  750.351901] [   T9870]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xba/0x100
[  750.351904] [   T9870]  ? __pfx___filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x10/0x10
[  750.351912] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.351916] [   T9870]  filemap_write_and_wait_range+0x7d/0xf0
[  750.351920] [   T9870]  cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.352042] [   T9870]  filp_flush+0x107/0x1a0
[  750.352046] [   T9870]  filp_close+0x14/0x30
[  750.352049] [   T9870]  put_files_struct.part.0+0x126/0x2a0
[  750.352053] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  750.352058] [   T9870]  exit_files+0xab/0xe0
[  750.352061] [   T9870]  do_exit+0x148f/0x2980
[  750.352065] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10
[  750.352069] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.352072] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8a/0xf0
[  750.352076] [   T9870]  do_group_exit+0xb5/0x250
[  750.352080] [   T9870]  get_signal+0x22d3/0x22e0
[  750.352086] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10
[  750.352089] [   T9870]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x68/0x100
[  750.352101] [   T9870]  ? folio_add_lru+0xda/0x120
[  750.352105] [   T9870]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x92/0x630
[  750.352109] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10
[  750.352115] [   T9870]  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x98/0x170
[  750.352118] [   T9870]  do_syscall_64+0x2cf/0xd80
[  750.352123] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  750.352126] [   T9870]  ? count_memcg_events+0x1b4/0x420
[  750.352132] [   T9870]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x148/0x690
[  750.352136] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8a/0xf0
[  750.352140] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  750.352143] [   T9870]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x68/0x100
[  750.352146] [   T9870]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x250
[  750.352151] [   T9870]  ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50
[  750.352154] [   T9870]  ? exc_page_fault+0x75/0xe0
[  750.352160] [   T9870]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.352163] [   T9870] RIP: 0033:0x7858c94ab6e2
[  750.352167] [   T9870] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7858c94ab6b8.
[  750.352175] [   T9870] RSP: 002b:00007858c9248ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000022
[  750.352179] [   T9870] RAX: fffffffffffffdfe RBX: 00007858c92496c0 RCX: 00007858c94ab6e2
[  750.352182] [   T9870] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  750.352184] [   T9870] RBP: 00007858c9248d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  750.352185] [   T9870] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: fffffffffffffde0
[  750.352187] [   T9870] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 00007ffc072d2230
[  750.352191] [   T9870]  </TASK>
[  750.352195] [   T9870]
[  750.395206] [   T9870] Allocated by task 9870 on cpu 0 at 750.346406s:
[  750.395523] [   T9870]  kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70
[  750.395532] [   T9870]  kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70
[  750.395536] [   T9870]  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x60
[  750.395539] [   T9870]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x9d/0xa0
[  750.395543] [   T9870]  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x13c/0x3f0
[  750.395548] [   T9870]  mempool_alloc_slab+0x15/0x20
[  750.395553] [   T9870]  mempool_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x340
[  750.395557] [   T9870]  smbd_post_send_iter+0x63e/0x3070 [cifs]
[  750.395694] [   T9870]  smbd_send+0x58c/0x9c0 [cifs]
[  750.395819] [   T9870]  __smb_send_rqst+0x931/0xec0 [cifs]
[  750.395950] [   T9870]  smb_send_rqst+0x22e/0x2f0 [cifs]
[  750.396081] [   T9870]  cifs_call_async+0x477/0xb00 [cifs]
[  750.396232] [   T9870]  smb2_async_writev+0x15ff/0x2460 [cifs]
[  750.396359] [   T9870]  cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.396492] [   T9870]  netfs_do_issue_write+0xc2/0x340 [netfs]
[  750.396544] [   T9870]  netfs_advance_write+0x45b/0x1270 [netfs]
[  750.396576] [   T9870]  netfs_write_folio+0xd6c/0x1be0 [netfs]
[  750.396608] [   T9870]  netfs_writepages+0x2e9/0xa80 [netfs]
[  750.396639] [   T9870]  do_writepages+0x21f/0x590
[  750.396643] [   T9870]  filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0xe1/0x140
[  750.396647] [   T9870]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xba/0x100
[  750.396651] [   T9870]  filemap_write_and_wait_range+0x7d/0xf0
[  750.396656] [   T9870]  cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.396787] [   T9870]  filp_flush+0x107/0x1a0
[  750.396791] [   T9870]  filp_close+0x14/0x30
[  750.396795] [   T9870]  put_files_struct.part.0+0x126/0x2a0
[  750.396800] [   T9870]  exit_files+0xab/0xe0
[  750.396803] [   T9870]  do_exit+0x148f/0x2980
[  750.396808] [   T9870]  do_group_exit+0xb5/0x250
[  750.396813] [   T9870]  get_signal+0x22d3/0x22e0
[  750.396817] [   T9870]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x92/0x630
[  750.396822] [   T9870]  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x98/0x170
[  750.396827] [   T9870]  do_syscall_64+0x2cf/0xd80
[  750.396832] [   T9870]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.396836] [   T9870]
[  750.397150] [   T9870] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888011082800
                           which belongs to the cache smbd_request_0000000008f3bd7b of size 144
[  750.397798] [   T9870] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
                           allocated 144-byte region [ffff888011082800, ffff888011082890)
[  750.398469] [   T9870]
[  750.398800] [   T9870] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  750.399141] [   T9870] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11082
[  750.399148] [   T9870] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[  750.399155] [   T9870] page_type: f5(slab)
[  750.399161] [   T9870] raw: 000fffffc0000000 ffff888022d65640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[  750.399165] [   T9870] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  750.399169] [   T9870] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  750.399172] [   T9870]
[  750.399505] [   T9870] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  750.399863] [   T9870]  ffff888011082780: fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  750.400247] [   T9870]  ffff888011082800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  750.400618] [   T9870] >ffff888011082880: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  750.400982] [   T9870]                          ^
[  750.401370] [   T9870]  ffff888011082900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  750.401774] [   T9870]  ffff888011082980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  750.402171] [   T9870] ==================================================================
[  750.402696] [   T9870] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  750.403202] [   T9870] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8880110a2000
[  750.403797] [   T9870] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  750.404204] [   T9870] #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
[  750.404581] [   T9870] PGD 5ce01067 P4D 5ce01067 PUD 5ce02067 PMD 78aa063 PTE 80000000110a2021
[  750.404969] [   T9870] Oops: Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  750.405394] [   T9870] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9870 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B               6.16.0-rc2-metze.02+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  750.406510] [   T9870] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[  750.406967] [   T9870] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  750.407440] [   T9870] RIP: 0010:smb_set_sge+0x15c/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  750.408065] [   T9870] Code: 48 83 f8 ff 0f 84 b0 00 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 11 00 0f 85 69 01 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 08 <49> 89 04 24 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f
[  750.409283] [   T9870] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005e2e758 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  750.409803] [   T9870] RAX: ffff888036c53400 RBX: ffffc90005e2e878 RCX: 1ffff11002214400
[  750.410323] [   T9870] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8880110a2008
[  750.411217] [   T9870] RBP: ffffc90005e2e798 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000400
[  750.411770] [   T9870] R10: ffff888011082800 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880110a2000
[  750.412325] [   T9870] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90005e2e888 R15: ffff88801a4b6000
[  750.412901] [   T9870] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88812bc68000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  750.413477] [   T9870] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  750.414077] [   T9870] CR2: ffff8880110a2000 CR3: 000000005b0a6005 CR4: 00000000000726f0
[  750.414654] [   T9870] Call Trace:
[  750.415211] [   T9870]  <TASK>
[  750.415748] [   T9870]  smbd_post_send_iter+0x1990/0x3070 [cifs]
[  750.416449] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smbd_post_send_iter+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.417128] [   T9870]  ? update_stack_state+0x2a0/0x670
[  750.417685] [   T9870]  ? cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.418380] [   T9870]  ? cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.419055] [   T9870]  ? update_stack_state+0x2a0/0x670
[  750.419624] [   T9870]  smbd_send+0x58c/0x9c0 [cifs]
[  750.420297] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smbd_send+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.420936] [   T9870]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x65/0xb0
[  750.421456] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[  750.421954] [   T9870]  ? arch_stack_walk+0xa7/0x100
[  750.422460] [   T9870]  ? stack_trace_save+0x92/0xd0
[  750.422948] [   T9870]  __smb_send_rqst+0x931/0xec0 [cifs]
[  750.423579] [   T9870]  ? kernel_text_address+0x173/0x190
[  750.424056] [   T9870]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70
[  750.424813] [   T9870]  ? kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70
[  750.425323] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x9d/0xa0
[  750.425831] [   T9870]  ? __pfx___smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.426548] [   T9870]  ? smb2_mid_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x7e0 [cifs]
[  750.427231] [   T9870]  ? cifs_call_async+0x277/0xb00 [cifs]
[  750.427882] [   T9870]  ? cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.428909] [   T9870]  ? netfs_do_issue_write+0xc2/0x340 [netfs]
[  750.429425] [   T9870]  ? netfs_advance_write+0x45b/0x1270 [netfs]
[  750.429882] [   T9870]  ? netfs_write_folio+0xd6c/0x1be0 [netfs]
[  750.430345] [   T9870]  ? netfs_writepages+0x2e9/0xa80 [netfs]
[  750.430809] [   T9870]  ? do_writepages+0x21f/0x590
[  750.431239] [   T9870]  ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0xe1/0x140
[  750.431652] [   T9870]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.432041] [   T9870]  smb_send_rqst+0x22e/0x2f0 [cifs]
[  750.432586] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.433108] [   T9870]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0
[  750.433482] [   T9870]  ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x60
[  750.433855] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.434214] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x81/0xf0
[  750.434561] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  750.434903] [   T9870]  ? smb2_setup_async_request+0x293/0x580 [cifs]
[  750.435394] [   T9870]  cifs_call_async+0x477/0xb00 [cifs]
[  750.435892] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smb2_writev_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.436388] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_cifs_call_async+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.436881] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  750.437237] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.437579] [   T9870]  ? __smb2_plain_req_init+0x933/0x1090 [cifs]
[  750.438062] [   T9870]  smb2_async_writev+0x15ff/0x2460 [cifs]
[  750.438557] [   T9870]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  750.438906] [   T9870]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0
[  750.439293] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_smb2_async_writev+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[  750.439786] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[  750.440143] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x40
[  750.440495] [   T9870]  ? cifs_pick_channel+0x242/0x370 [cifs]
[  750.440989] [   T9870]  cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.441492] [   T9870]  ? cifs_issue_write+0x256/0x610 [cifs]
[  750.441987] [   T9870]  netfs_do_issue_write+0xc2/0x340 [netfs]
[  750.442387] [   T9870]  netfs_advance_write+0x45b/0x1270 [netfs]
[  750.442969] [   T9870]  ? rolling_buffer_append+0x12d/0x440 [netfs]
[  750.443376] [   T9870]  netfs_write_folio+0xd6c/0x1be0 [netfs]
[  750.443768] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.444145] [   T9870]  netfs_writepages+0x2e9/0xa80 [netfs]
[  750.444541] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_netfs_writepages+0x10/0x10 [netfs]
[  750.444936] [   T9870]  ? exit_files+0xab/0xe0
[  750.445312] [   T9870]  ? do_exit+0x148f/0x2980
[  750.445672] [   T9870]  ? do_group_exit+0xb5/0x250
[  750.446028] [   T9870]  ? arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x92/0x630
[  750.446402] [   T9870]  ? exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x98/0x170
[  750.446762] [   T9870]  ? do_syscall_64+0x2cf/0xd80
[  750.447132] [   T9870]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.447499] [   T9870]  do_writepages+0x21f/0x590
[  750.447859] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_do_writepages+0x10/0x10
[  750.448236] [   T9870]  filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0xe1/0x140
[  750.448595] [   T9870]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xba/0x100
[  750.448953] [   T9870]  ? __pfx___filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x10/0x10
[  750.449336] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.449697] [   T9870]  filemap_write_and_wait_range+0x7d/0xf0
[  750.450062] [   T9870]  cifs_flush+0x153/0x320 [cifs]
[  750.450592] [   T9870]  filp_flush+0x107/0x1a0
[  750.450952] [   T9870]  filp_close+0x14/0x30
[  750.451322] [   T9870]  put_files_struct.part.0+0x126/0x2a0
[  750.451678] [   T9870]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  750.452033] [   T9870]  exit_files+0xab/0xe0
[  750.452401] [   T9870]  do_exit+0x148f/0x2980
[  750.452751] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10
[  750.453109] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  750.453459] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8a/0xf0
[  750.453787] [   T9870]  do_group_exit+0xb5/0x250
[  750.454082] [   T9870]  get_signal+0x22d3/0x22e0
[  750.454406] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10
[  750.454709] [   T9870]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x68/0x100
[  750.455031] [   T9870]  ? folio_add_lru+0xda/0x120
[  750.455347] [   T9870]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x92/0x630
[  750.455656] [   T9870]  ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10
[  750.455967] [   T9870]  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x98/0x170
[  750.456282] [   T9870]  do_syscall_64+0x2cf/0xd80
[  750.456591] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  750.456897] [   T9870]  ? count_memcg_events+0x1b4/0x420
[  750.457280] [   T9870]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x148/0x690
[  750.457616] [   T9870]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8a/0xf0
[  750.457925] [   T9870]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  750.458297] [   T9870]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x68/0x100
[  750.458672] [   T9870]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x250
[  750.459191] [   T9870]  ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50
[  750.459600] [   T9870]  ? exc_page_fault+0x75/0xe0
[  750.460130] [   T9870]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  750.460570] [   T9870] RIP: 0033:0x7858c94ab6e2
[  750.461206] [   T9870] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7858c94ab6b8.
[  750.461780] [   T9870] RSP: 002b:00007858c9248ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000022
[  750.462327] [   T9870] RAX: fffffffffffffdfe RBX: 00007858c92496c0 RCX: 00007858c94ab6e2
[  750.462653] [   T9870] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  750.462969] [   T9870] RBP: 00007858c9248d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  750.463290] [   T9870] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: fffffffffffffde0
[  750.463640] [   T9870] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 00007ffc072d2230
[  750.463965] [   T9870]  </TASK>
[  750.464285] [   T9870] Modules linked in: siw ib_uverbs ccm cmac nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core cifs_md4 netfs softdog vboxsf vboxguest cpuid intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry pmt_class intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry intel_vsec polyval_clmulni ghash_clmulni_intel sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel rapl i2c_piix4 i2c_smbus joydev input_leds mac_hid sunrpc binfmt_misc kvm_intel kvm irqbypass sch_fq_codel efi_pstore nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock vmw_vmci dmi_sysfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic vboxvideo usbhid drm_vram_helper psmouse vga16fb vgastate drm_ttm_helper serio_raw hid ahci libahci ttm pata_acpi video wmi [last unloaded: vboxguest]
[  750.467127] [   T9870] CR2: ffff8880110a2000

cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Fixes: c45ebd6 ("cifs: Provide the capability to extract from ITER_FOLIOQ to RDMA SGEs")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
Add a macro CRYPTO_MD5_STATESIZE for the Crypto API export state
size of md5 and use that in dm-crypt instead of relying on the
size of struct md5_state (the latter is currently undergoing a
transition and may shrink).

This commit fixes a crash on 32-bit machines:
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2+ torvalds#993 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Workqueue: kcryptd-254:0-1 kcryptd_crypt [dm_crypt]
EIP: __crypto_shash_export+0xf/0x90
Code: 4a c1 c7 40 20 a0 b4 4a c1 81 cf 0e 00 04 08 89 78 50 e9 2b ff ff ff 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 57 56 53 89 c3 89 d6 8b 00 8b 40 14 <8b> 50 fc f6 40 13 01 74 04 4a 2b 50 14 85 c9 74 10 89 f2 89 d8 ff
EAX: 303a3435 EBX: c3007c90 ECX: 00000000 EDX: c3007c38
ESI: c3007c38 EDI: c3007c90 EBP: c3007bfc ESP: c3007bf0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010216
CR0: 80050033 CR2: 303a3431 CR3: 04fbe000 CR4: 00350e90
Call Trace:
 crypto_shash_export+0x65/0xc0
 crypt_iv_lmk_one+0x106/0x1a0 [dm_crypt]

Fixes: efd62c8 ("crypto: md5-generic - Use API partial block handling")
Reported-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/f1625ddc-e82e-4b77-80c2-dc8e45b54848@gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
shcgit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
We encountered following crash when testing a XDP_REDIRECT feature
in production:

[56251.579676] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff93120dd40f30), but was ffffb301ef3a6740. (next=ffff93120dd
40f30).
[56251.601413] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[56251.611357] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
[56251.621082] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[56251.632073] CPU: 111 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/111 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P           O       6.12.33-cloudflare-2025.6.
3 #1
[56251.653155] Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [O]=OOT_MODULE
[56251.663877] Hardware name: MiTAC GC68B-B8032-G11P6-GPU/S8032GM-HE-CFR, BIOS V7.020.B10-sig 01/22/2025
[56251.682626] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x4b/0xa0
[56251.693203] Code: 0e 48 c7 c7 68 e7 d9 97 e8 42 16 fe ff 0f 0b 48 8b 52 08 48 39 c2 74 14 48 89 f1 48 c7 c7 90 e7 d9 97 48
 89 c6 e8 25 16 fe ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 02 49 39 f0 74 14 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 e8 e7 d9 97 4c 89
[56251.725811] RSP: 0018:ffff93120dd40b80 EFLAGS: 00010246
[56251.736094] RAX: 0000000000000075 RBX: ffffb301e6bba9d8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[56251.748260] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9149afda0b80 RDI: ffff9149afda0b80
[56251.760349] RBP: ffff9131e49c8000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff93120dd40a18
[56251.772382] R10: ffff9159cf2ce1a8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff911a80850000
[56251.784364] R13: ffff93120fbc7000 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff9139e7510e40
[56251.796278] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9149afd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[56251.809133] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[56251.819561] CR2: 00007f5e85e6f300 CR3: 00000038b85e2006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[56251.831365] PKRU: 55555554
[56251.838653] Call Trace:
[56251.845560]  <IRQ>
[56251.851943]  cpu_map_enqueue.cold+0x5/0xa
[56251.860243]  xdp_do_redirect+0x2d9/0x480
[56251.868388]  bnxt_rx_xdp+0x1d8/0x4c0 [bnxt_en]
[56251.877028]  bnxt_rx_pkt+0x5f7/0x19b0 [bnxt_en]
[56251.885665]  ? cpu_max_write+0x1e/0x100
[56251.893510]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.902276]  __bnxt_poll_work+0x190/0x340 [bnxt_en]
[56251.911058]  bnxt_poll+0xab/0x1b0 [bnxt_en]
[56251.919041]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.927568]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.935958]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.944250]  __napi_poll+0x2b/0x160
[56251.951155]  bpf_trampoline_6442548651+0x79/0x123
[56251.959262]  __napi_poll+0x5/0x160
[56251.966037]  net_rx_action+0x3d2/0x880
[56251.973133]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.981265]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.989262]  ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x162/0x2a0
[56251.996967]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56252.004875]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56252.012673]  ? bnxt_msix+0x62/0x70 [bnxt_en]
[56252.019903]  handle_softirqs+0xcf/0x270
[56252.026650]  irq_exit_rcu+0x67/0x90
[56252.032933]  common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0
[56252.039498]  </IRQ>
[56252.044246]  <TASK>
[56252.048935]  asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
[56252.055727] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xb8/0x420
[56252.063305] Code: dc 01 00 00 e8 f9 79 3b ff e8 64 f7 ff ff 49 89 c5 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 a5 32 3a ff 45 84 ff 0f 85 ae
 01 00 00 fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 88 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 49 63 ce 4c 89 ea 48 6b f1 68 48 29
[56252.088911] RSP: 0018:ffff93120c97fe98 EFLAGS: 00000202
[56252.096912] RAX: ffff9149afd80000 RBX: ffff9141d3a72800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[56252.106844] RDX: 00003329176c6b98 RSI: ffffffe36db3fdc7 RDI: 0000000000000000
[56252.116733] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000000004e
[56252.126652] R10: ffff9149afdb30c4 R11: 071c71c71c71c71c R12: ffffffff985ff860
[56252.136637] R13: 00003329176c6b98 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[56252.146667]  ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xab/0x420
[56252.153909]  cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40
[56252.160360]  do_idle+0x176/0x1c0
[56252.166456]  cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30
[56252.173248]  start_secondary+0xf7/0x100
[56252.179941]  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[56252.186886]  </TASK>

From the crash dump, we found that the cpu_map_flush_list inside
redirect info is partially corrupted: its list_head->next points to
itself, but list_head->prev points to a valid list of unflushed bq
entries.

This turned out to be a result of missed XDP flush on redirect lists. By
digging in the actual source code, we found that
commit 7f0a168 ("bnxt_en: Add completion ring pointer in TX and RX
ring structures") incorrectly overwrites the event mask for XDP_REDIRECT
in bnxt_rx_xdp. We can stably reproduce this crash by returning XDP_TX
and XDP_REDIRECT randomly for incoming packets in a naive XDP program.
Properly propagate the XDP_REDIRECT events back fixes the crash.

Fixes: a7559bc ("bnxt: support transmit and free of aggregation buffers")
Tested-by: Andrew Rzeznik <arzeznik@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhai <yan@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aFl7jpCNzscumuN2@debian.debian
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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