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Forbid auctions from having both buyers and component auctions #419

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Dec 20, 2022
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Forbid auctions from having both buyers and component auctions #419

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Forbid the top-level auction from having both buyers and component au…
MattMenke2 Dec 14, 2022
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Update FLEDGE.md
MattMenke2 Dec 15, 2022
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8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions FLEDGE.md
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Expand Up @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ This will cause the browser to execute the appropriate bidding and auction logic

The optional `directFromSellerSignals` field can also be used to pass signals to the auction, similar to `sellerSignals`, `perBuyerSignals`, and `auctionSignals`. The difference is that `directFromSellerSignals` are trusted to come from the seller because the content loads from a [subresource bundle](https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/blob/main/explainers/subresource-loading.md) loaded from a seller's origin, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the signals. For more details, see [2.5 directFromSellerSignals](#25-additional-trusted-signals-directfromsellersignals).

In some cases, multiple SSPs may want to participate in an auction, with the winners of separate auctions being passed up to another auction, run by another SSP. To facilitate these "component auctions", `componentAuctions` can optionally contain additional auction configurations for each seller's "component auction". The winning bid of each of these "component auctions" will be passed to the "top-level" auction. How bids are scored in this case is further described in [2.4 Scoring Bids in Component Auctions](#24-scoring-bids-in-component-auctions). The `AuctionConfig` of component auctions may not have their own `componentAuctions`.
In some cases, multiple SSPs may want to participate in an auction, with the winners of separate auctions being passed up to another auction, run by another SSP. To facilitate these "component auctions", `componentAuctions` can optionally contain additional auction configurations for each seller's "component auction". The winning bid of each of these "component auctions" will be passed to the "top-level" auction. How bids are scored in this case is further described in [2.4 Scoring Bids in Component Auctions](#24-scoring-bids-in-component-auctions). The `AuctionConfig` of component auctions may not have their own `componentAuctions`. When `componentAuctions` is non-empty, `interestGroupBuyers` must be empty. That is, for any particular FLEDGE auction, either there is a single seller and no component auctions, or else all bids come from component auctions and the top-level auction can only choose among the component auctions' winners.

The returned `auctionResultPromise` object is _opaque_: it is not possible for any code on the publisher page to inspect the winning ad or otherwise learn about its contents, but it can be passed to a Fenced Frame for rendering. (The [Fenced Frame Opaque Source explainer](https://github.com/shivanigithub/fenced-frame/blob/master/explainer/opaque_src.md) has initial thoughts about how this could be implemented.) If the auction produces no winning ad, the return value can also be null, although this non-opaque return value leaks one bit of information to the surrounding page. In this case, for example, the seller might choose to render a contextually-targeted ad.

Expand All @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ All fields that specify URLs for loading scripts or JSON (`decisionLogicUrl` and

A `Permissions-Policy` directive named "run-ad-auction" controls access to the `navigator.runAdAuction()` API.

In the case of a component auction, all `AuctionConfig` parameters for that component auction are only scoped to buyer and seller scripts run as part of that auction component. Similarly, all values specified by the top-level auction are not applied to the component auctions.
In the case of a component auction, all `AuctionConfig` parameters for that component auction are only scoped to buyer and seller scripts run as part of that auction component. Similarly, all values specified by the top-level auction are not applied to the component auctions. When the top-level auction has component auctions, fields that affect bidder scripts have no effect, since the top-level auction has no bidders in it (e.g, `perBuyerSignals`, `perBuyerTimeouts`, `perBuyerGroupLimits`, etc).


#### 2.2 Auction Participants
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ Seller scripts in component auctions behave a little differently. They still ex
* allowComponentAuction: If this field is not true, the bid will be rejected.
* bid: (optional) Modified bid value to provide to the top-level seller script. If present, this will be passed to the top-level seller's `scoreAd()` and `reportResult()` methods instead of the original bid, if the ad wins the component auction and top-level auction, respectively.

Once all of a component auction's bids have been scored by the component auction's seller script, the bid with the highest score is passed to the top-level seller to score. For that bid, the top-level seller's `scoreAd()` method is passed the `ad` value from the component auction seller's `scoreAd()` method, and there is an additional `componentSeller` field in the `browserSignals`, which is the seller for the component auction. All other values are the same as if the bid had come from an interest group participating directly in the top-level auction. In the case of a tie, one of the highest scoring bids will be chosen randomly and only that bid will be passed to the top-level seller to score.
Once all of a component auction's bids have been scored by the component auction's seller script, the bid with the highest score is passed to the top-level seller to score. For that bid, the top-level seller's `scoreAd()` method is passed the `ad` value from the component auction seller's `scoreAd()` method, and there is an additional `componentSeller` field in the `browserSignals`, which is the seller for the component auction. All other values are the same as if the bid had come from an interest group participating directly in the top-level auction. In the case of a tie, one of the highest scoring bids will be chosen randomly and only that bid will be passed to the top-level seller to score. The seller of a component auction may reject all bids by giving them scores <= 0. In that case, no bid from that component auciton will be passed to the top-level auction.

The ultimate winner of the top-level auction is the single bid the top-level seller script gives the highest score. This may either be the winning bid of one of the component auctions, or a bid from one of the `interestGroupBuyers` in the `AuctionConfig` of the top-level auction. Those bids will be scored directly by the top-level seller script without having to win any component auction.
The ultimate winner of the top-level auction is the single bid the top-level seller script gives the highest score, of the wining bids of the component auctions.


#### 2.5 Additional Trusted Signals (directFromSellerSignals)
Expand Down