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Align securitySchemes
and security
of CAMARA API specs with IdentityAndConsentManagement WG
#57
Comments
@jpengar : Now that we have the technical ruleset in for the 3-legged flows as well, I would suggest we also add (hint) the flow type within the security scheme. For eg. instead of the generic name openId, why not use specifically either openId-ciba or openId-authcode ? |
Partly Fixes camaraproject#57
Hi @shilpa-padgaonkar, Jesús is OOO. This topic is also being discussed in Commonalities: issue #53, and PR #57. In the issue there is an inventory of the current situation. The proposal there was to use "openIdConnect" as securitySchemes key everywhere, but as OIDC implies the discovery of the supported flows outside of the spec, your proposal to add some hint about the specific flow to be used with OIDC makes sense, as there is no other way to express that in OpenAPI with the openIdConnect type. |
Yes, that is what I meant with "your proposal" |
In the last WG call conference (20/09) we proposed from Telefónica to define a default This This securityScheme provides the flexibility to support any of the defined flows (Auth code or CIBA) to access CAMARA APIs and to decouple APIs definition from APIs use cases definition. And the inventory (being created in PR #62) could be used to include a recommended flow according to the technical rule set defined in This will ensure that the CAMARA API specifications are consistent with each other and with the IdentityAndConsentManagement work. |
@jpengar @jlurien : I would change the sentence formulation for "or APIs without personal data processing guaranteed by Legal & Privacy teams so that Client Credentials securityScheme is included." to "or where API providers find the current security schemes too restrictive and have the needed agreement from their legal and privacy teams such that they can use client credentials security scheme." Legal and privacy rules are different in different parts of the world. Any API provider across the globe can decide to offer Camara APIs and they should be able to do so in the most efficient way based on the legal framework they need to comply to and should be given a chance to request for these exceptions in Camara. For the auth-code and CIBA part: |
@jpengar Also to avoid any confusion, I would like to point out that the basic authN-authZ doc still applies. It clearly states the use of client credentials and OIDC. The line above "define a default openIdConnect securityScheme for all CAMARA APIs and treat it as a CAMARA commonality." is a bit misleading, especially for the audience who might not have seen the authN-authZ doc. So I agree that for all Camara APIs where OIDC has been agreed, we can use the security scheme as shown below & as proposed above: securitySchemes: and where client credentials is agreed we use |
Made changes as per camaraproject#57 (comment) and camaraproject#57 (comment)
I'm afraid we at Telefónica don't feel confortable with this sentence: "API providers find the current security schemes too restrictive". Every time personal user data is processed by an API and the user can exercise their rights either via opt-in and/or opt-out, 3-legged access tokens must be used
That's true. The And regarding your other comments, more specifically on the proposal we made for the securitySchemes, given your feedback, what do you think about the following:
...keeping the proposal AS IS in camaraproject/Commonalities#53. This way the API specification will remain generic and the API technical specification will be completely decoupled from local regulations, legal decisions and so on... |
@jpengar : From DT side we are fine with this interpretation. You convey my points in better words :) The legal departments will say whether there is processing of personal data or not, or whether opt-out applies or not, etc... which depends on various factors, such as local regulations (as you mention). |
@jpengar For your other points: And regarding your other comments, more specifically on the proposal we made for the securitySchemes, given your feedback, what do you think about the following: just leaving the openIdConnect securityScheme in the CAMARA API yamls.
Client Credentials is not included because it can be already covered by the openIdConnect securityScheme.
The allowed flows/grant types are detected by the `.well-known'. Including client credentials if applicable.
This way there is no impact on the APIs yaml, keeping it generic and consistent across CAMARA.
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No, I meant the `.well-known' openId configuration endpoint, but only as a way to keep the YAML securityScheme generic, as already mentioned. Regarding the inventory file, it could actually be quite challenging... because we might even have different flows depending on local regulations, couldn't we? |
Maybe @jpengar can be more specific on how client credentials is already covered by the openIdConnect securityScheme? Is a Camara API provider allowed to say: I support client credentials but not user authentication and consent collection because my legal counsel tells me it is not needed in my jurisdiction? Would such a API provider then specify the above proposed oauth2 security scheme and not openidConnect?
How would this .well-known file look like in the various cases?
|
I assumed the inventory because we discussed this in the last id-consent call and said that the recommended flow could be specified here. But fine for me if we don't maintain it. Now that we agree, we could have different flows based on local regulations, I personally would prefer to have client credentials oauth2 flow separately specified in addition to oidc. But we can ask for more feedback from other contributors here as well. |
Yes, exactly. E.g. https://auth.es-pro.baikalplatform.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
OpenID configuration provides the list of supported flows which could include client credentials. OpenID Spec --> https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderMetadata
This is precisely what we propose to keep separate from API YAMLs and technical solution. We propose to have just one generic openIdConnect securityScheme, leaving the API spec open, i.e. not tied to legal dependencies that may change locally on each country, not tied to commercial/business dependencias on how APIs are sold by API provider, and so on... The API specification should be common and agnostic to all this. Leave those discussions to another level, business level, legal level, etc... |
Hi @jpengar, |
Hi @jepengar, |
@Elisabeth-Ericsson Hi Eli,
What do you mean by "even if they only expose APIs"? In the context of CAMARA, this is what it is all about. And in this context, CSPs (Operators) are already required to implement OpenID Connect capable authorisation servers, for example to expose CIBA. This is because, as mentioned above, every time personal user data is processed by an API and the user can exercise their rights either via opt-in and/or opt-out, 3-legged access must be used (i.e. client credentials would not apply).
We propose to have only one securityScheme to keep API specs as generic as possible. |
Hi @jpengar ! I like the idea of using "well-known" endpoint to deliver information about supported security schemes - a smart idea to give developers information about out auth server capabilities! On the other hand, I see it as a challenge when a developer gets a sim-swap.yaml and sees in securitySchemes openIdConnect only... which is not the case in many countries. Should we define the way we want to introduce market-specific scenarios? I like the generic approach, but it also has its challenges - a lack of precise information about how to consume API (client credentials? three-legged? pure oauth2.0? OpenId Connect?, etc.). |
I think there are two or more ways to look at "a common Camara security" scheme. So, yes: the IDGW/AZ metadata can be at the .well-known endpoint but I think it would be clearer for developers to have a common security scheme agreed upon here for the case where there is no user-consent needed for an API and/or in a country.
|
Let me put it another way. I think we all tend to agree that the access flow/grant to be used to consume a CAMARA API may be different depending on business and legal dependencies, which would be different according to local regulations in each country/market and so on... Will we change the API spec to add or remove securitySchemes depending on local regulations? If country A's local regulation does not allow API X to be used with client credentials, do we change the API spec to remove client credentials for that country? Or the other way around?... How do we expect to manage this for each API and for the different countries where CAMARA APIs are exposed? With our proposal, the API Spec could be decoupled from these business/legal dependencies. Or, if tomorrow CAMARA decides to use a new additional flow/grant, will we update all CAMARA API Specs in all API subproject working groups to include a securityScheme that reflects that? Given the context we are describing here, it may be that these dependencies should be handled as part of the product catalogue in a local market for the different product-purpose combinations. Keep the CAMARA API specs generic, do not restrict one flow or another at API spec level. |
Hi @jpengar, The API should list the possible security schemas which make sense for the API. Then the CSP must select the one (or many) supported security schemes for the API product + purpose combination depending on his local regulations. This API Product information must be exposed by the CSP to allow the aggregator /ASPs to implement the correct flows. The consequence is that all API invokers (the aggregators) will have to implement all of the security schemes named in the API spec, unless they want to make business with selected CSPs only. We also need to assure that we can support client_credential or authorization_code also with native oauth2 security schemes. |
In the OAS specs (https://swagger.io/specification/?sbsearch=security%20scheme), under security scheme object, the mandatory field "type" explicitly specifies oauth2 (specified types - "apiKey", "http", "mutualTLS", "oauth2", "openIdConnect"). I am not sure if developers could therefore understand that oauth2 is implicitly possible when the type is specified as openIdConnect in Camara as suggested here in the above comments. |
Hi @shilpa-padgaonkar, we are having this debate also in commonalities, let's try to consolidate all opinions. Problem here is how developers will understand the concept of "possibility". When listing several explicit securitySchemes in the OAS spec, that is saying to developers that they can use any of the listed schemes to access the API, at their discretion, and that implementations must support all of them simultaneously, while the idea behind using discovery feature of OIDC is to avoid this assumption. The supported grant_types to access certain API will depend on the agreements between operators, based on the regulatory and business constraints of each country or market. That should be reflected elsewhere, not in the CAMARA OAS spec, which should be common and as much agnostic as possible to all of this. |
Wouldn’t the countries’ “local” legislation be an issue which should be addressed?
OAuth and OpenID are authorizations for access.
Why is the consent “solution” placing the problem on the carrier?
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Subject: Re: [camaraproject/IdentityAndConsentManagement] Align `securitySchemes` and `security` of CAMARA API specs with IdentityAndConsentManagement WG (Issue #57)
Hi @shilpa-padgaonkar<https://github.com/shilpa-padgaonkar>, we are having this debate also in commonalities, let's try to consolidate all opinions.
Problem here is how developers will understand the concept of "possibility". When listing several explicit securitySchemes in the OAS spec, that is saying to developers that they can use any of the listed schemes to access the API, at their discretion, and that implementations must support all of them simultaneously, while the idea behind using discovery feature of OIDC is to avoid this assumption.
The supported grant_types to access certain API will depend on the agreements between operators, based on the regulatory and business constraints of each country or market. That should be reflected elsewhere, not in the CAMARA OAS spec, which should be common and as much agnostic as possible to all of this.
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@jlurien The OAS also gives some hints on how to handle multiple authN types with logical ORs + ANDs. Eventually every API provider will anyways have to update their individual documentation/specs to add their custom details regarding specific AuthZ url or openIdConnect URl and could then remove info not relevant to their implementation? BTW agree on your point about consolidation of all opinions on this topic. Currently several open threads in comm, id-consent and some individual subprjs. |
I don't get this part, sorry, how are ANDs and ORs being specified in OAS? |
Please bear in mind with the I still think that this should be defined within the API specification; and maybe different endpoints for 'regulation free' implementors - it's much much easier to reason about that way. |
In reality I doubt developers will go to any .well-known URL to discover anything. Before making any call to an API there will be an on-boarding process for developers where they have to register their applications, to consume certain APIs under certain purposes, accept T&Cs, exchange credentials, and as part of this procedure, the required grant_type and authn flows needed to consume the API have to be communicated, taking into account the purposes and regulation. This process is being designed in parallel, using TMForum APIs. Here we are designing the APIs and as part of the OAS spec we have to complete security sections with something that is compliant to the spec but at the same time flexible enough to accommodate all possibilities. Scopes have to be standardized as a minimum, and openIdConnect as securityScheme allows to express this flexibilty. At the same time, we have to document all of this, and probably add some guidance or references in the APIs to let developers understand the whole process. This is what was agreed in the last TSC. |
For the record, this issue was discussed at the TSC 2023-10-19 meeting and the conclusions and next steps agreed can be found at https://github.com/camaraproject/Governance/blob/main/documentation/MeetingMinutes/TSC/TSC-2023-10-19-Meeting-Minutes.md#commonalities--icm. |
As a follow-up of the TSC discussion, we have to agree on some wording to be included as part of the API spec, indicating to the potential API customers why we are not listing specific grant-types in the spec, and how to discover which authorization flows they will be allowed to use. The whole documentation can be kept in an external doc, tbd. In the spec we can include something generic and short, such as:
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Thanks @bigludo7 !! Please, this is a priority issue and WG participants are encouraged to provide their feedback on the wording proposal so that this issue can be closed as soon as possible and the API subprojects can adapt their API specifications accordingly. |
In order to properly manage the review process, I've created the PR #93 to include in the WG documentation the final agreement reached by the TSC and the WG participants on the @bigludo7 @sebdewet @hdamker You have already approved the text template proposal above. Please could you just do the same in the PR, so that the PR can be merged directly after everyone's review. For the rest of the WG participants, please just provide your comment in the PR to complete the review process as soon as possible. |
@diegogonmar : I am fine with the text |
I understand the drive towards having a generic text to keep the complex legal topics out of the spec. However, is there a compromise possible in keeping information about security schema flows within the spec? The current
May be some or all of this is discussed & documented in GSMA? I don't know but it's good to capture the discussion in public domain. Is it not possible to add all the applicable security flows in the spec for the respective endpoints (i.e.) why not the spec be the superset with all possible security flows for an endpoint? An operator, who feels that only a subset is applicable in a geographical area because of legal reasons, can decide to do the same in their respective spec in that geographical deployment. All operators in that region will have to do the same for the same legal reasons and there will be uniformity. From a developer point of view, the spec that clearly states all the applicable security flows for an endpoint will help them develop solutions independently based on the spec and chose a subset while onboarding to a specific operator (if needed). I feel, it should not be other way around. |
Hi @sfnuser, |
Hi @diegogonmar Please note that when this proposal is agreed in TSC, it is also agreed to create a separate document - and also discussed in Commonalities here - to list the possible security schema for the APIs but we have not seen one and yet APIs have already merged this I want to reiterate that the current agreed proposal on TSC is a short term solution and it spreads to all the APIs already. |
Hi @sfnuser ** Client Credentials to be included to fully cover the agreement. What you reiterate is not correct, the issue was long discussed both here and in commonalities and, following CAMARA established procedures, was escalated to TSC for agreement. Discussion happened there, considering options and choosing the best one. You link such agreement and indicates it is an agreement, not a short term one. Further, in 7/12 it was ratified again that solution is not being rediscussed. |
This issue is intended to define a single common/standard OpenID Connect security scheme for CAMARA API specs aligned with the OIDC FE/BE flows defined in https://github.com/camaraproject/IdentityAndConsentManagement/blob/main/documentation/user-consent.md#authorization-flows--grant-types as the access flows to CAMARA APIs.
e.g.
This ensures that the CAMARA API specifications are consistent with each other and with the IdentityAndConsentManagement work:
securitySchemes
, such as client credentials, would generally be removed. Client credentials access (2-legged) must only be used "when user resource is NOT involved & the client belongs to confidential category".security
property.This has already been proposed in Commonalities in: camaraproject/Commonalities#53 where the proposal is very detailed. So we can just refer this issue in IdentityAndConsentManagement to issue #53 in Commonalities. The same Commonalities issue is not only intended to unify the usage of
securitySchemes
andsecurity
fields, but also to define a common scope naming format for CAMARA API specifications.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: