Prevent byte-by-byte and attachment inference side channel attacks #10266
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Codecov ReportAttention: Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## develop #10266 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 63.64% 63.75% +0.11%
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Files 362 362
Lines 43954 43997 +43
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+ Hits 27972 28047 +75
+ Misses 15982 15950 -32 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. |
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@phoerious I think this is ready to merge |
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Feb 7, 2024
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Attack - KeeShare attachments can be inferred because of attachment de-duplication. Solution - Prevent de-duplication of normal database entry attachments with those entry attachments synchronized/associated with a KeeShare database. This is done using the KeeShare database UUID injected into the hash calculation of the attachment prior to de-dupe. The attachments themselves are not modified in any way. -------- Attack - Side channel byte-by-byte inference due to compression de-duplication of data between a KeeShare database and it's parent. Solution - Generate a random array between 64 and 512 bytes, convert to hex, and store in the database custom data. -------- Attack vector assumptions: 1. Compression is enabled 2. The attacker has access to a KeeShare database actively syncing with the victim's database 3. The victim's database is unlocked and syncing 4. The attacker can see the exact size of the victim's database after saving, and syncing, the KeeShare database Thank you to Andrés Fábrega from Cornell University for theorizing and informing us of this attack vector.
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Release 2.7.7 - Support USB Hotplug for Hardware Key interface [keepassxreboot#10092] - Support 1PUX and Bitwarden import [keepassxreboot#9815] - Browser: Add support for PassKeys [keepassxreboot#8825, keepassxreboot#9987, keepassxreboot#10318] - Build System: Move to vcpkg manifest mode [keepassxreboot#10088] - Fix multiple TOTP issues [keepassxreboot#9874] - Fix focus loss on save when the editor is not visible anymore [keepassxreboot#10075] - Fix visual when removing entry from history [keepassxreboot#9947] - Fix first entry is not selected when a search is performed [keepassxreboot#9868] - Prevent scrollbars on entry drag/drop [keepassxreboot#9747] - Prevent duplicate characters in "Also choose from" field of password generator [keepassxreboot#9803] - Security: Prevent byte-by-byte and attachment inference side channel attacks [keepassxreboot#10266] - Browser: Fix raising Update Entry messagebox [keepassxreboot#9853] - Browser: Fix bugs when returning credentials [keepassxreboot#9136] - Browser: Fix crash on database open from browser [keepassxreboot#9939] - Browser: Fix support for referenced URL fields [keepassxreboot#8788] - MacOS: Fix crash when changing highlight/accent color [keepassxreboot#10348] - MacOS: Fix TouchID appearing even though lid is closed [keepassxreboot#10092] - Windows: Fix terminating KeePassXC processes with MSI installer [keepassxreboot#9822] - FdoSecrets: Fix database merge crash when enabled [keepassxreboot#10136] # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQEzBAABCAAdFiEENIkEDB8MPuq41ValRA/GXy4MbgEFAmXs7VsACgkQRA/GXy4M # bgHLpwf/brnyPPs3gJxZmD2pn8542D4CCsDh0fTceurOtqCe3J4Y+Fftc5euuoQu # 6rP4vJdd586l7JX5FnYIPXvGiU9op3MudJh+y+RN/PWwKcXNIXfUItMhpZEka49n # xnw+Wvbilg1QIHSSmZdIjBpohnEkA67qhWauc3bCacrRyEvIOzVMTxnqDTe4GUDy # CyauaRMMKezRTpLxSsk63TDAZZgDwK4ci5lC6ysHekc1Za6IbI3fMFjz1BGj+kPU # tMHMfDCWqK/5JZ27ZWcxy7m8tJY9m3rb+MoCyFRQz9ixaEe29yf5NqYdm9sn1Dlh # O7aFi7/EJtsBlXdguw5BcTPbsL7XEQ== # =Cots # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: directory '/home/runner/.gnupg' created # gpg: keybox '/home/runner/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created # gpg: Signature made Sat Mar 9 23:14:35 2024 UTC # gpg: using RSA key 3489040C1F0C3EEAB8D556A5440FC65F2E0C6E01 # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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could you clarify which releases are affected? |
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Anything less than 2.7.7 |
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Attack - KeeShare attachments can be inferred because of attachment de-duplication.
Solution - Prevent de-duplication of normal database entry attachments with those entry attachments synchronized/associated with a KeeShare database. This is done using the KeeShare database UUID injected into the hash calculation of the attachment prior to de-dupe. The attachments themselves are not modified in any way.
Attack - Side channel byte-by-byte inference due to compression de-duplication of data between a KeeShare database and it's parent.
Solution - Generate a random array between 64 and 512 bytes, convert to hex, and store in the database custom data.
Attack vector assumptions:
Thank you to Andrés Fábrega from Cornell University for theorizing and informing us of this attack vector.
Type of change